BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION, RAY DEAN SALVOSA AND CORAZON CONCEPCION, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ALMA ANGIWAN, DANILO SORIANO AND RESTITUTO C. RIVERA, …

Petitioners appear to have followed the adage, “When in doubt,
shoot first and ask questions later.” in issuing the questioned directive to
its striking faculty employees. Encountering adverse decisions from both the Labor Arbiter^[1]
and the National Labor Relations Commission,^[2]
petitioners ask Us to reverse. Private
respondents, however, state that petitioners are asking this Court to review
findings of facts made by the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. As the petition poses a rather new issue for
this Court to rule upon, We have decided to review the findings of fact made by
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.

Public respondent National Labor Relations Commission found the
facts to be as follows:

“Complainants Alma Angiwan, Danilo Soriano and Restituto Rivera
were hired respectively in November 1987, June 1978 and May 1982. Alma Angiwan is not a member of the Union
while the latter two complainants are members of Kapisanan at Lakas ng mga Guro
sa BCF-ALU which staged a strike on March 8, 1988.

On April 29, 1988, the Secretary of Labor and Employment Franklin
M. Drilon issued an Order directing the striking employees to return to work at
the opening of school year 1988-89 and for the school to accept them all under
the same terms and conditions prior to the work stoppage.

On May 8, 1988, Baguio College Foundation, through its community
newspaper, the ‘Gold Ore,’ directed all the striking employees to report to the
office of Mrs. Corazon R. Concepcion, Vice-President for Administration of BCF,
on May 14, 1988 between the hours of 8:00 o’clock a.m. to 10:00 o’clock
a.m. That aside from the published
directive, respondent Concepcion likewise issued written directive to the
individual union members directing them to report to her office on said date
and time (May 14, 1988 between 8 to 10 a.m.) ‘to signify their compliance with
the order of the Secretary.’ Some union members, including the complainants who
did not read the notice published in the newspaper (Gold Ore) and who did not
receive the directive of Concepcion, failed to report to her (Concepcion) on
the date and time set by her. Other
union members who received their notices on time reported to Concepcion. They were required to enter her office one
at a time. Inside her office, they were berated and chastised for
participating in the strike. Concepcion
also told them to look for another job and threatened them that she has a hand
in the assignment of teaching loads.

That later, the complainants came to know of the directive of
Concepcion. They went to her office
with their letters signifying their intention to comply with the return to work
order of the Secretary. However,
Concepcion told them that she could no longer accommodate them because they
reported only after or beyond the date and time indicated in her directive and
that they violated her written directive. Subsequently, the complainants
received individual notices dated May 25, 1988, signed by respondent Ray Dean
Salvosa, Executive Vice-President of BCF which states:

‘By failing to report to the V.P. for
Administration Corazon R. Concepcion between 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. on May 14,
1988 despite notice, you willfully disobeyed the return to work order issued by
the Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Secretary
of Labor last April 28, 1988, and therefore, your employment at Baguio Colleges
Foundation as Faculty members is hereby terminated.’^[3]

Claiming that their dismissals were illegal, private respondents
filed complaints against petitioners with the Labor Arbiter. On January 8, 1990, Labor Arbiter Gambito
rendered a joint decision in favor of private respondents with the dispositive
portion reading as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered ORDERING the respondents to reinstate Alma Angiwan, Danilo Soriano and
Restituto Rivera to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and
without reduction in their teaching loads prior to their dismissal and to pay their backwages effective at the
opening of classes of school year 1988-1989 based on the minimum rate provided
in RA 6640, aside from other benefits and privileges they may have been
entitled to up to their actual reinstatement.

“Respondents are likewise ordered to pay P2,000.00 each to counsel
for Angiwan and Soriano and counsel for Rivera as attorney’s fees.

“SO ORDERED.”^[4]

Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission. On November 29, 1990,
public respondent NLRC issued its decision in favor of private respondents
affirming en toto the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

Hence, this instant petition where petitioners claim that the
public respondent committed serious and palpable error amounting to grave abuse
of discretion in holding that:

1. they varied the tenor of
the return­-to-work order issued by the Honorable Secretary of Labor on April
29, 1988; and

2. the dismissal of private
respondents Angiwan (who was employed on a probationary basis) and Soriano and
Rivera (Both of whom were contractual employees) are illegal.

The Honorable Secretary of Labor’s April 29, 1988 Return-to-Work
Order which spawned the illegal dismissal cases before the Labor Arbiter reads
as follows:

“‘WHEREFORE, ABOVE PREMISES CONSIDERED, and pursuant to Article 263
(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over
the entire labor dispute at Baguio Colleges Foundation. Accordingly, all members who are presently
not rendering their usual work but are engaged in concerted activities are
hereby enjoined from pursuing their activities to avert exacerbation of the
situation and return to work at the opening of the school year 1988-89 and for
the College to accept them all under the same terms and conditions prior to the
work stoppage.’ ”^[5]

Petitioners claim that they were merely following said Order when
they had published in the “Gold Ore,” a newspaper of general circulation in
Baguio City and in Benguet Province, the following directive:

“‘Please be informed that the Secretary of Labor, the Hon. Franklin
M. Drilon, has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute at BCF. Quoted below is the pertinent portion of the
order that was issued by the Department of Labor and Employment last April 29,
1988 and received by BCF on May 5, 1988:

x x x x x x

“In view of this, all striking employees are hereby directed to
report to the office of the Vice President for Administration, BCF, between the
hours of 8 a.m. and 10:00 on Saturday, May 14, 1988 to signify their compliance
with the Order of the Secretary.”^[6]

Petitioners terminated the employment of private respondents who did
not report as earlier ordered with a termination letter which reads as follows:

“By failing to report to the VP for Administration Corazon R.
Concepcion between 8:00 A.M. and 10:00 A.M., on May 14, 1988 despite notice,
you willfully disobeyed the return-to-work order issued by the Hon. Franklin M.
Drilon, Secretary of Labor, last April 29, 1988, and, therefore, your
employment at Baguio Colleges Foundation as faculty member is hereby
terminated.”^[7]

Petitioners claim that:

x x x The directive was issued not out of malice but in all good
faith, not for expediency but due to necesity. Necessity because the opening of the ensuing school year was drawing
nearer, and the school administrators needed to know how many of those striking
teachers were coming back to teach. It
was important for Your Petitioners to know who among those in its faculty
roster were available for teaching assignment for the ensuing semester because
the subjects-offerings for that semester would, as in other semesters past,
have to be based on the availability of teachers. x x x.^[8]

They also claim that:

“Public Respondent likewise charged Your Petitioners with having
changed ‘the time frame set in the Order to only one day.’ (Resolution, Annex
“B”, at p. 8). This is not
correct. For, as can be seen from the
evidence, the directive in question was published in the Gold Ore on May 8,
1988, and the date indicated therein for the striking teachers to report was
May 14, 1988, or a period of six days – not one day.”^[9]

Private respondents complain that petitioners should have first
ascertained why they (private respondents) could not report on May 14, 1988 as
directed. They claim that as soon as
they have learned of said directive, they immediately reported to petitioner
Concepcion and this was way before the start of classes of school year 1988-89.

The precedent case of Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle
Philippines, Inc.^[10]
leaves no doubt as to the character of the Secretary of Labor’s Assumption
Order (i.e. return-to-work order) and the compliance required of the parties,
as follows:

“UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art.
264(g) on the settlement of labor disputes and this is, that assumption and
certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly
complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition
questioning their validity. This
extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at
a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national
interests.

“Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their
claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts
that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an
assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing
unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their
actions. x x x.”^[11]
(Emphasis in the original)

Being executory in character, there was nothing for the parties
to do but implement the same.

It could be the case that petitioner school had to know several
weeks in advance, who of the striking teachers were available for teaching
assignments for the school year 1988-89 “because the subject offerings x x x
(would) have to be based on the availability of teachers”^[12]
but it would have been prudent for petitioner school to file with the Secretary
of Labor a motion for clarification^[13] of
said assumption order and inform him of petitioner school’s peculiar requirements
regarding the offering of subjects based on the availability of teachers which
had to be determined way in advance of actual classes.

Not having done so and having dismissed private respondents for
not reporting on the date the
petitioner school had unilaterally determined, public respondent NLRC committed
no grave abuse of discretion in ruling as follows:

“By directing striking employees to report on a fixed date and time
prior (to) the opening of school year 1988-89, respondents-appellants have
indeed varied the tenor of the Return-to-Work Order with the obvious effect of
restrictively changing the time frame set in the Order to only one day. Nothing in the Order had authorized BCF,
either indirectly or impliedly, to alter the period within which striking
employees should report at a fixed date and time, much less clothe it with the
power of dismissal over the striking employees who failed to report on the date
it set.

“The return-to-work Order is clear and unambiguous. It admits (of) no further interpretation
such as (what) the BCF would want to be read into it as part of its
prerogative, (Rollo 60), which it, in turn, invokes to justify the dismissal of
herein complainants. The publication of
the directive in the community newspaper and the mailing of the same to the
striking employees would not give any added significance to an obviously
self-serving act.”^[14]

The Court can only suspect something sinister in petitioners’
actions which has been aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum
as follows:

“Moreover, the return to work order of the Secretary of Labor was
issued on April 29, 1988. The first
semester at BCF was to start in June 1988. The striking teachers were requested to report on May 14, 1988 between 8
to 10 A.M. only. Private respondents,
however, did not receive the notice sent to them by petitioners. Neither were they able to read the
publication of the notice in the Gold Ore.

“Despite the lack of notice, however, as soon as private
respondents learned about the directive, they lost no time within a reasonable
period before the start of second semester in going to the office of petitioner
Concepcion to signify their intention to follow the return to work Order of the
Secretary of Labor. However,
petitioners stuck to May 14, 1988 between 8 to 10 A.M. as the cut-off period
for signifying their intention to return to work. What can be inferred from this act of petitioners is that they
really wanted private respondents removed from their employment at all costs
such that they resorted to the ploy that since private respondents did not
return to their respective work within the limited period set by petitioners,
the former were automatically deemed to have abandoned their work or failed to
follow a lawful order of their employer.”^[15]

Not having found any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent NLRC, its findings are conclusive on this Court as they are
supported by substantial evidence.^[16]
Verily, We have to deny the petition.

We find no need to discuss petitioners’ second issue as it is
clear from petitioner Salvosa’s letter that private respondents were dismissed
for not reporting on the date petitioner school stated in its directive. The issue of the status of employment of
private respondents was merely an afterthought to give some semblance of
legality to the dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the questioned NLRC decision and resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED with the clarification that the award of backwages is limited
to a period of only THREE (3) years.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Joint Decision, NLRC Cases Nos.
01-06-50186-88, “Angiwan v. Baguio Colleges Foundation;” 01-06-50188­-88,
“Soriano v. Baguio Colleges Foundation;” and 01-07­-50221-88, “Rivera v.
Baguio Colleges Foundation,” promulgated January 8, 1990, penned by Hon.
Rolando D. Gambito, Labor Arbiter.

^[2]
Resolution promulgated November 29, 1990, Ponente, Bernardo,
Commissioner; concurred in by Javier,
Presiding Commissioner and Rayala, Commissioner.

^[3]
NLRC Resolution, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 45-47.

^[4]
Labor Arbiter’s Decision, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 40-41.

^[5]
Labor Arbiter’s Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 33.

^[6]
NLRC Resolution, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50.

^[7]
Id.

^[8]
Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 22.

^[9]
Id.

^[10]
192 SCRA 396 (1991).

^[11]
At pp. 409-410.

^[12]
Petition, p. 21; Rollo, p. 22.

^[13]
Applying suppletorily the Revised Rules of Court as per Sec. 3, Rule I, Revised
Rules of the NLRC, Nov. 5, 1986.

^[14]
NLRC Resolution, p. 8; Rollo, p. 51.

^[15]
Public Respondent’s Memorandum, pp 6-7; Rollo, pp.
163-164.

^[16]
National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991).