PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, VS. ALVIN LIQUEN Y COROS, ACCUSED/APPELLANT.

Alvin C. Liquen was prosecuted
for violation of R.A. No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal information alleged:

“That on or about the 26th day of August, 1989, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell to Sgt. Pedro S. Mamuad, a NARCOM
agent, who posed as buyer, two (2) match boxes containing dried marijuana
leaves, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.

Contrary to law.”^[1]

At arraignment, accused Liquen entered a plea of not guilty, and the case proceeded to
trial. In due course of time, the trial
court rendered a decision convicting the accused and sentencing him as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused ALVIN LIQUEN y
COROS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, and
pursuant to the said law hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the costs. The
two match boxes of marijuana dried leaves subject of this charge are ordered
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government.”^[2]

In his brief, appellant Liquen made the following assignment of
errors:

“1. The court a
quo gravely erred in admitting the peso bills and marijuana adduced in
evidence by the prosecution.

2. The court a quo erred in
finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged has been
established beyond reasonable doubt.”^[3]

The evidence of the
prosecution tended to establish that on 24 August 1989, the 9th Narcotics
Command (“NARCOM”) Regional Unit in Zamboanga City, received
information from a civilian informer that marijuana was being sold at Sangali,
Zamboanga City. Sgt. Pedro S. Mamuad,
NARCOM, was dispatched the following day, together with the civilian informer,
to survey and observe the locality identified. The two (2) proceeded to Sangali, Zamboanga City, and there they saw
appellant Liquen selling, at or near the vicinity of the JR Store, what they
presumed to be marijuana to a group of teenagers, each of the group giving him
payment therefore. Sgt. Mamuad did not
arrest Alvin Liquen at that time since he was then on a surveillance and
observation mission.

On 26 August 1989, a team of NARCOM agents was formed to entrap
appellant Liquen. Sgt. Amos Foncardas,
the team leader who was also the arresting officer, designated Sgt. Mamuad to
pose as buyer of marijuana. He was
handed two (2) P10.00 bills and
four (4) P5.00 bills, or a total amount of P40.00, which bills were previously
marked, for use in purchasing marijuana. The other two (2) team members were Sgt. Alarcon and Sgt. Francia.

At 2:00 o’clock p.m. of 26 August 1989, the team took a
privately-owned jeepney bound for Sangali, Zamboanga City. When they were nearing the vicinity of the
JR Store, Sgt. Mamuad saw appellant at the store. Sgt. Mamuad instructed the jeepney driver to park at a CAFGU
check-point, some 100 meters away from the JR Store. Sgt. Mamuad walked back towards the JR Store, followed closely by
the rest of his team. When Sgt. Mamuad
reached the store, he approached appellant Liquen and struck up a conversation
with appellant. Sgt. Mamuad indicated
to appellant his (Sgt. Mamuad’s) intention to buy some “damo”
(grass or marijuana) and gave appellant Liquen the marked peso bills. Appellant Liquen gave Sgt. Mamuad two (2)
match boxes of marijuana, at the price of P20.00 per box.

Sgt. Mamuad opened the match boxes, inspected and smelled the
contents thereof, and satisfied that the boxes contained marijuana, gave the
pre-arranged signal which consisted of scratching the back of his head. Forthwith, the rest of the team, Sgts.
Foncardas, Alarcon and Francia went inside the store, surrounded appellant
Liquen and arrested him, after introducing themselves as NARCOM agents. The team searched the body of appellant and
recovered from the front right pocket of his pants the P40.00 in marked money
received from Sgt. Mamuad. Appellant
Liquen was thereafter brought to the NARCOM Headquarters for investigation. Sgt. Francia advised the team to place their
initials on the top of each of the two (2) match boxes. The two (2) boxes of marijuana were
forwarded to the Philippine Constabulary (“PC”) Crime Laboratory for
examination and report. In Chemistry
Record No. D-653-09 (Exhibit “A”), PC Chemist Mrs. Athena Anderson
stated that four (4) tests were conducted on the specimen contents of the boxes
and all four (4) tests showed that the contents consisted of dried marijuana
leaves.

In his first assignment of error, appellant Liquen claims that
the peso bills and marijuana confiscated from him should not have been admitted
in evidence against him since these were the fruits of an illegal arrest and
search conducted on him. Liquen insists
that he was not lawfully arrested by the NARCOM agents as he was not then
committing any offense, but was, according to him, merely taking a snack at the
JR Store at the time he was arrested.

Appellant’s first defense is bereft of merit. It has been held many times by this Court
that entrapment, or the employment of ways and means of entrapping and catching
an offender in flagrante as no bar to prosecution and conviction,
not being prohibited by law.^[4] In the case at bar, appellant Liquen
having been caught in flagrante as a result of the “buy-bust
operation,” the police team was not only authorized but indeed obligated
to arrest appellant Liquen, even without a warrant of arrest.^[5]
Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, reads in
part as follows:

“Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. —
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; x x x.”

In respect of the claim that the body
search conducted on appellant was unlawful because it had not been supported by
a valid search warrant, it suffices to note that one of the recognized
exceptions to the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
search warrant, relates precisely to a search that is incidental to a lawful
arrest.^[6]
Thus, the seizure of the marked money and the marijuana from appellant Liquen
after his lawful arrest without warrant cannot successfully be assailed as
violative of the constitutional provision prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures.

The second principal defense of appellant Liquen was that he had
been “framed” by the police team. He denied having sold marijuana to Sgt. Mamuad. The story that he gave during the trial was
that on the date and at the time mentioned the information, he happened to be
taking a snack at the JR Store when NARCOM agents who were then unknown to him
arrived. One of the agents allegedly
poked a knife at his throat and dragged him towards a parked vehicle. He was forcibly placed inside the vehicle
and brought to a place unfamiliar to him for investigation. The defense presented two (2) witnesses to
support this story.

The defense of “frame-up,” like alibi, is a weak
defense that is easy to fabricate but difficult to prove.^[7]
“Frame-up” as a defense is probably more difficult to prove than alibi,
because of the presumption that public officers like NARCOM agents had
performed their official duty in a regular manner.^[8] In
the case at bar, there is more than sufficient evidence to show that appellant
had indeed been caught in flagrante by the NARCOM agents in the
course of their “buy-bust operation.” Appellant had physically
delivered to Sgt. Mamuad the two (2) match boxes of marijuana leaves, pursuant
to their agreement of purchase and sale. The agreement and the prompt delivery of the marijuana made by
appellant, constituted the sale that is punished by the law.^[9]

Appellant denigrates the prosecution’s evidence as incredible,
and describes the prosecution’s “improbable account of an alleged pusher
plying his trade x x x at a public place, in full view of inquisitive
on-lookers and for a pittance of P40.00 x x x,” as unworthy of belief and
credence.^[10]

Drug pushers are not normally very discriminating and selective
in the choice of the place where they peddle their illicit merchandise and that
place frequently includes a public place.^[11]
Indeed, the public character of a place does not necessarily insure its
avoidance as a venue for prohibited sales by drug pushers; the public nature of
the place chosen or adopted may in fact serve to conceal and disguise the
nature of the transactions engaged in by drug peddlers.

In People v. Paco, (supra), the Court rejected much
the same defense here put up by appellant Liquen, and said:

“Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case
belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at anytime and at any
place. After the offer to buy is
accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a
few minutes. The fact that
the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people
may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these
factors may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers
caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall (People v. Rubio, G.R.
No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329; People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141,
January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store (People v. Khan, supra)
along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22,
1985, 140 SCRA 259), and in front of a house (People v. Policarpio, G.R.
No. 69844, February 23, 1988.)”^[12]

Experience shows that whether the
poseur-buyer and the agents knew each other, is not material. What matters on a review of the judgment of
conviction is not the level of pre-existing familiarity between the buyer and
the seller of prohibited drugs, but positive proof of the agreement and the
delivery which consummates the sale of a prohibited article.^[13]

Finally, appellant argues that because of certain contradictions
and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The supposed inconsistencies
were the following:

“Prosecution witness Sgt. Mamuad declared that accused
appellant was sitting inside JR Store when the former approached the
latter and transacted the alleged sale of marijuana. (TSN, p. 16, October 17, 1989) On the other hand, Sgt. Foncardas
testified that he saw Sgt. Mamuad gave the money to Liquen outside the
store. (TSN, p. 20, October 19, 1989)

It seems quite odd that
the arresting team could not even agree as to the physical appearance and name
of their alleged informer. While Sgt.
Mamuad testified that the civilian informer, alias Mario, stands at 5’ 6″
with short-trimmed hair (TSN, p. 21, October 17, 1989), Sgt. Foncardas
described Mario as 5′ 3″ in height and short-haired (TSN, p. 12, October
19, 1989), and latter declared that the name of the informer is Jeffrey. (TSN, p.16, October 18, 1989) Sgt. Alarcon
for his part described Mario as 5′ 4″ in height and long-haired. (TSN, p. 21, 1989).

According to Sgt. Focardas, he instructed Sgt. Mamuad to buy
two (2) match boxes of marijuana with the P40.00 he gave to the latter (TSN, p.
18, October 19, 1989), however, Sgt. Mamuad stated that he did not know how
much marijuana the amount of P40.00 can buy (TSN, p. 25, October 17, 1989) when
he supposedly conducted surveillance and acted as poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation.”^[14]

The Court, however, considers that
alleged discrepancies relating to (a) whether the purchase of the
prohibited drug took place inside or outside the JR Store in Sangali, Zamboanga
City; (b) the precise physical appearance and height of the police informer;
and (c) whether the buyer knew how much marijuana the amount of P40.00 could
buy, all deal with minor details and do not adversely impact upon the credibility
of the prosecution’s witnesses nor upon the trustworthiness of the testimony
offered by them.^[15]

Finally, the Court notes that the trial court found the testimony
of the police officers before the trial court to have been straightforward and
credible. Appellant did not even try to
show that he was known to the police officers involved prior to his
arrest. There was in addition no proof
of any evil motive on the part of the policemen that might have led them to
extort money and falsely to attribute to appellant a serious criminal
offense. Thus, appellant was simply
unable to overcome the presumption that the members of the police team which
arrested him had acted in the regular performance of their public duty.^[16]

It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the trial
court imposed upon appellant only the penalty of reclusion perpetua
(which should be life imprisonment). The trial court, in other words, failed to apply completely the penalty
prescribed in Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, which reads as follows:

“Sec. 4. Sale,
Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug,
or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should
a prohibited drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.”
(Underscoring supplied)

Under the above quoted provision, both
life imprisonment and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 must
be imposed in case of conviction. Since
appeal by an accused who has been convicted in a criminal case throws open the
whole case for review, including modification and increase of the imposable penalty,^[17]
the Court must now impose upon appellant a fine of P20,000.00 in addition to
the penalty of life imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 31
January 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: the penalty properly imposable is not reclusion
perpetua which is different juridically from the correct penalty of life
imprisonment. The imposable penalty
must include a fine of P20,000.00. Accordingly, the penalty of life imprisonment is hereby IMPOSED, plus
a fine of P20,000.00. Costs against
appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Record, p. 1.

^[2]
Appellee’s Brief, p. 3; Rollo, 36.

^[3]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 1.

^[4]
People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376 (1990); People v. Gatong-o, 168
SCRA 716 (1988); People v. Lagasca, 148 SCRA 264 (1987); People v.
Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 (1986).

^[5]
People v. Santos, 200 SCRA 431 (1991).

^[6]
E.g., People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990); People v.
Castiller, supra; Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA
267 (1986).

^[7]
People v. del Pilar, 188 SCRA 37 (1990); People v. Nabunat, 182
SCRA 52 (1990).

^[8]
People v. Macuto, 176 SCRA 762 (1989); People v. Rualo, 152 SCRA
635 (1987).

^[9]
People v. Borja, 182 SCRA 581 (1990); People v. Consuelo, 184
SCRA 402 (1990).

^[10]
Appelant’s Brief, p. 4; Rollo, p. 30.

^[11]
People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 29 (1990); People v. Paco, 170 SCRA
681 (1989).

^[12]
Appellee’s Brief, p. 14-15; Rollo, p. 36.

^[13]
People v. Borja, supra; People v. Consuelo, supra.

^[14]
Appellee’s Brief, pp. 15-16; Rollo, p. 36.

^[15]
People v. Arbolante, 203 SCRA 85 (1991) citing People v. dela
Torre, G.R. Nos. L-90804-05, July 1, 1991; People v. Santiago, G.R. No.
L-46132, May 28, 1991; People v. Ansing, 196 SCRA 374 (1991); People v.
Mergar, 157 SCRA 718 (1988); People v. Manuel, 160 SCRA 248 (1988);
People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500 (1987).

^[16]
People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (1988); People v. De Jesus, 145
SCRA 521 (1986).

^[17]
E.g., People v. Avila, G.R. No. 84612, 11 March 1992; see also Lontoc v.
People, 74 Phil. 513 (1943).