REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MAXIMO WONG, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner seeks to set  aside the judgment of respondent Court
of Appeals^[1]
in affirmance of the decision of the court a quo^[2]
granting the petition filed by herein
private respondent Maximo Wong for the change of his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.
which was his name prior to his adoption by Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong.

The facts are undisputed. Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala,
Sr., and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he
was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his
sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of
their natural parents^[3] and
by order of the court in Special Case No. 593^[4]
issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty
Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong
Wong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high
school teacher. They decided to adopt
the children as they remained childless after fifteen years of marriage. The couple showered their adopted children
with parental love and reared them as their own children.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent,
by then married and a junior
Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition
to change his name to Maximo Alcala,
Jr. It was averred that his use of the
surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as
the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality;
that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive
mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.

As earlier stated, on July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in
favor of private respondent, the trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional
requirements having been fully complied with, petitioner’s prayer to change his
name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted.^[5] On
appeal to respondent court, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic
through the Solicitor General, the decision of the court below was affirmed in full, hence this petition for
review on certiorari.

The lone issue to be settled is whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his
petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the
granting of said petition.

The Solicitor General
contends that private respondent’s allegations of ridicule and/or isolation
from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition
for change of name. He claims that for
private respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass
ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother who is still
alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further, the Solicitor General posits that
the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of
the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to use the surname of the
adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving the
impression that he has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents.^[6]

In refutation, private respondent argues that he did as the law
required, that is, upon adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However, being already emancipated, he can
now decide what is best for and by himself. It is at this time that he realized that the Chinese name he carries
causes him undue ridicule and embarrassment and affects his business and social
life. In fact, his adoptive mother,
being aware of his predicament, gave her consent to the petition for change of
name, albeit making it clear that the same shall in no way affect the legal
adoption, and even underwent the rigors of trial to substantiate her sworn
statement. If his adoptive mother does
not take offense nor feel any resentment, abhorrence or insecurity about his
desire to change his name, private respondent avers that there can be no
possible prejudice on her, much less the State.^[7]

We feel that we should preface our review of this case with a
clear comprehension of the legal significance of a person’s name. For all practical and legal purposes, a
man’s name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community
in which he lives and is best known. It
is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him.^[8] Names
are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are
descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essentiaI
thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance
in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial. ^[9]

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the
surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the family to which he
belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but
the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.^[10]

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the
individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a
name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside
the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis
causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.^[11]

Title XIII, Book I of the Civil Code, in Articles 364 to 380,
provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surnames. Considering the subject and personalities
involved in this present review, particular attention must be called to Article
365 which mandates that “(a)n adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter,” in correlation with Article 341 on the effects of adoption,
among which is to “(e)ntitle the adopted person to use the adopter’s
surname.” This same entitlement of an adopted child is maintained in
Article 39(3), Title II of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code. More
recently, Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, or the
Family Code, echoes the same statutory right of an adopted child to use the
surname of the adopter.^[12]
Clearly, from the very wordings of the law, it may be inferred that the use of
the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a
right.

Under Article 376 of the Civil Code, “(n)o person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority.” The application for
change of name thereunder involves a special proceeding governed by and
conducted under the strictures of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and one which
involves substantial changes, with the declared objective of such judicial
proceedings being the prevention of fraud. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of personal
name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in
keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which application is made
should normally make its decree recording such change of name.^[13]

A change of name is a
special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving his relation
with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the
community. It is a proceeding in
rem^[14]
and, as such, strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements,
particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction thereover.^[15] For
this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register.^[16]

To digress a little for purposes of clarification, the change of
name contemplated under Article 376 and reglementarily implemented by Rule 103
must not be confused with and cannot be effected through the summary proceeding
proposed in Article 412 of the same Code, as procedurally regulated by Rule 108
of the Rules, which refers only to correction of clerical errors, such as those
which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, or an error made
by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or writing, or some harmless
or innocuous change,^[17] and
not those which will involve substantial changes.^[18]

Turning now to the case at bar, we are guided by the
jurisprudential dictum that the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for the purpose of identification, and a change of
name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised
in the light of reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow;^[19]
it is a privilege which may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or
reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor.^[20]

We find unacceptable the assertion of the Solicitor General that
private respondent’s allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of
his present surname is unsubstantiated.

The testimony of private respondent in the lower court bears out
the existence of valid cause in his bid for change of name:

“ATTY. DUMAMBA:

Q    Now, after adoption, when
you went to school, what did you use as your surname?

A     ‘Wong,’ sir.

Q    Now, after you adopted
the surname ‘Wong’ in your studies, what did you observe?

A     I observed that ‘Wong’
as a surname embarrassed me to my friends and when I go with Chinese friends I
cannot talk Chinese. I am living in
Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no one can believe that I am Muslim. I have a little business of Furniture but I
have little (sic) customer because no one believes me that I am Muslim.

Q    You want to inform this
Honorable Court that this family name you are using which is ‘Wong’ embarrassed
you from (sic) your friends and relatives and also cause(d) damage to your business?

A     Yes sir.

x x x

ATTY. DUMAMBA:

Q    Now, considering that
according to you, you are embarrassed because of the family name you are using,
your friends shy away from you and it is a handicap in your business, what is your
desire for the Court to do in order to help you?

A     Change my family name.

Q    From ‘Wong’ to what do
you want your surname changed?

A     ‘Alcala, Jr.’, sir.

x x x

COURT:

Q    What is your purpose in
changing your family name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr.?

A     I feel embarrassed to my
friends and also to my relatives and as I said I have a little business of
furniture and only a few customers buying for the fact that they don’t believe
I am Muslim.

Cross.

ATTY. SERO:

      With the permission of the Honorable Court.

Q    Your father’s name is
Maximo Alcala, Sr., is he still alive?

A     Yes, sir.

Q    And what does your father
say to this proposed changed (sic) of your name, your family name to your real
family name given to you?

A     Yes, sir,

Q    They have no objection to
it?

A     No, sir.

Q    Stated before this
Honorable Court, the purpose why you wanted to change your name from ‘Wong’ to
‘Alcala’ is so that to avoid embarrassment because you are a Muslim and your
Muslim relatives think that you are Chinese.

A     Yes, sir.

Q    Not for the purpose to
hide anything or what not?

A     No, sir.”^[21]

The foregoing testimony of private respondent is materially
corroborated by the testimony of private respondent’s adoptive mother:

“Q   Now, what did you
observe to (sic) your son Maximo Wong after you and your husband adopted him?

A     When I adopted him and
he used the surname ‘Wong’ I observed that some of his relatives, cousins and
friends seem to shy away from him and despise him in school that is why I
agreed to change his name.”^[22]

We uphold these observations in the decision of respondent
appellate court:

“The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name as
contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a
person an opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his best
interest (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory
to the court and not all the best evidence available is required. (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965;
Nacionales vs. Republic, L-18067, April 29, 1966; both cases cited in 1 SCRA
843). In the present case, We believe
that the court a quo had exercised its discretion judiciously
when it granted the petition.

“From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter
mother Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that said appellee was prompted to file the
petition for change of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his
family name ‘Wong’ brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he
being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his
social and business life. It has been
held that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality
which only hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause
for change of name (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965, Que Liong Sian vs.
Republic, L-23167, Aug. 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1074). Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his social
standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or injury to the
interest of the State or other persons (Calderon vs. Republic, supra). Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of
this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of
other persons would result in the change of petitioner’s name.”^[23]

It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for
change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.^[24]
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change
results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will
avoid confusion;^[25]
(d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
unaware of her alien parentage;^[26] (e)
A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage,
all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;^[27]
and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.^[28]

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question
of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the
court. The evidence presented need only
be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available.^[29]
Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, what is involved is not
a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious
evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant
and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the
courts.

While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the
Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the
surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of
adoption proceedings.^[30] The
act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act by which
relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing
between persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one’s family of the child of
another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights
and privileges of such. The purpose of
an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between the
child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies
adoption being more an incident than the object of the proceeding.^[31]
The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of
an application for adoption. On this
point, there is unanimous agreement.^[32]

It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from
the natural parents to the adoptive parents the custody of the child’s person,
the duty of obedience owing by the child, and all other legal consequences and
incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as if the child had been
born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such
limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed.^[33]
More specifically under the present state of our law, the Family Code, superseding
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code on the matter,^[34]
relevantly provides in this wise with regard to the issue involved in this
case:

“Art. 189. Adoption
shall have the following effects:

(1)   For
civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;” (Emphasis supplied.)

x x x

The Solicitor General maintains the position that to sustain the
change of name would run counter to the behest of Article 365 of the Civil Code
and the ruling in Manuel vs. Republic^[35] that
“one should not be allowed to use a surname which otherwise he is not
permitted to employ under the law,” and would set a bad example to other
persons who might also seek a change of their surnames on lame excuses.^[36]

While we appreciate the Solicitor General’s apprehensions and concern,
we find the same to be unfounded. We do
not believe that by reverting to his old name, private respondent would then be
using a name which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law prescribes the surname that a
person may employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit
the use of any other surname, and only subjects such recourse to the obtention
of the requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it permits.

If we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its
conclusion, then there will never be any possibility or occasion for any
person, regardless of status, to change his name, in view of the supposed
subsequent violation of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in the
event that the petition is granted. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court would then be rendered inutile. This could hardly have been the intendment
of the law.

A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law
only by way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the
use of surname. The law fixes the
surname that may be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be
changed only upon judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the
parties who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term “persons”
to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain judicially accepted
exceptional circumstances, petition the court for a change of name, we do not
see any legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such a
remedy by an adopted child. In other
words, Article 365 is not an exception, much less can it bar resort, to Rule
103.

We are of the view that the circumstances herein obtaining are
within the ambit of the established exceptions and find merit in private
respondent’s submission:

“Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial purpose
which (State) is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and
provide his best interest (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In the instant case, the court a quo found
the petition of Maximo Wong for change of name justifiable after due hearing,
thus its ‘factual findings and appreciation of testimonies count heavily and
need not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial
court is in a better position to examine real evidence as well as to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (Baliwag Transit,
Inc. vs. CA, 147 SCRA 82). Moreover,
the trial court could take judicial notice of other existing factors in the
community where herein respondent which it considers material in its judicious
determination of the case. x x x.

“Additionally, herein respondent is already of age and as such
he can decide what is best for him. His
experience with regards (sic) his social and business dealings is personal and
it is only him (sic) who can attest to the same. Finding his predicament’s proper remedy is solely through legal process,
herein respondent accordingly filed a petition pursuant to Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court which was granted by the Court a
quo.”^[37]

Besides, we have faith in the circumspection of our lower courts
and that, in the exercise of their discretion, said courts shall consider
petitions for change of name only on cogent and meritorious grounds as would
justify the granting of such applications. We do not expect our trial courts to cater or give in to the whim or
caprice of an applicant, aside from the fact that there is always the safeguard
and corrective interdiction of appellate review.

It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private
respondent to the use of the name of his parents by nature as crass
ingratitude. To go by the Solicitor
General’s suggestion that private respondent should have his adoption revoked
if he wants to use the surname of his natural father would be to exact too dear
a toll for making use of an appropriate and valid remedy available under the
law.

Herein private respondent, before he filed the petition for
change of name, asked for his adoptive mother’s permission to do so:

“Q   Now, in filing this
petition for change of surname, you had talked with your adopted mother?

A     Yes, sir.

Q    Did you ask permission
from her whether she wants you to change the surname?

A     Yes, sir.”^[38]

True enough, the above testimony of private respondent was
confirmed by his adoptive mother in this manner:

“Q   How are you related
to Maximo Wong?

A    My adopted son.

Q    He is your adopted son,
did your son talk to you when he filed this petition for change of his surname?

A     Yes, he even tried to
ask me and I said, alright if you want to change.

x x x

Q    Now, when you agreed to the filing of this petition
for change of name, did you reduce your consent in writing?

A     Yes, sir, I agreed also
so that his business will prosper because he is already Alcala and not Wong
because Wong they said is Chinese.”^[39]

As proof of her assent to the filing of said petition (her
husband having already passed away), Concepcion Ty Vda. de Wong executed an
affidavit in Cotabato City on May 27, 1985, with these textual declarations:

“That I am the same and identical person, who is the surviving
adapted (sic) parent of Maximo Wong;

“That I personally discovered it myself from the time my
adapted (sic) son Maximo used the surname of my late husband Wong, his
relatives and childhood friends shy away from him because he is branded as a
son of a chinese which is different from them whose parents are muslim
Filipinos;

“That pity my son who is
often ridiculed (sic) by his friends and relatives because of his family name
Wong, hence, in order not to
humper (sic) his social and
business life the future, I am voluntarily and of my own free will without being forced, coerced, or
intimidated give (sic) my consent to his desire to change his surname without
affecting however the legal adoption granted by the Court on September 9, 1967,
making him as one of my legal and compulsory heir (sic).

“That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of
all the above mentioned facts and for all legal intent (sic) and
purposes.”^[40]

There could be no other plausible reason for private respondent
to first secure his adoptive mother’s consent before resorting to the
questioned legal recourse other than the parental respect and reverence which
is owed by and to be expected of a dutiful child. If private respondent was such an ingrate, as the Solicitor General
would have us believe, he would not have bothered to seek his adoptive mother’s
counsel. In the same breath, had his
adoptive mother regarded him as an ungrateful adoptee, she would not have
executed the affidavit above quoted, much less testify in his behalf at the
hearing of his petition.

Moreover, worthy of note is the fact that private respondent’s
adoptive mother emphasized that she executed the above affidavit “without
affecting the legal adoption granted by the Court on September 9, 1967, making
him as one of my legal and compulsory heir(s).” This is incontrovertible
proof that she never entertained any misgivings or reservations with respect to
her consent to his petition. This
likewise dispels any possible confusion as to private respondent’s legal status
or adoptive paternity and his successional rights. Concordantly, we have heretofore held that change of name does
not define or effect a change in one’s existing family relations or in the
rights and duties flowing therefrom. It
does not alter one’s legal capacity, civil status or citizenship: what is altered is only the name.^[41]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
C.A.-G.R. C.V. No. 12753; Per
Justice Alfredo Marigomen, with Justices Lorna S. Lombos-De la Fuente and
Jainal D. Rasul concurring.

^[2]
Special Proceeding No. 189, Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Cotabato City;
Judge Eduardo B. Singayao, presiding.

^[3]
Exhibit A, 3; Original Record, 6.

^[4]
Per Judge David P. Avila of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I,
Cotabato City; Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 26.

^[5]
Original Record, 59.    

^[6]
Rollo, 14.

^[7]
Comment of Private Respondent, 2-3; Rollo, 52-53.

^[8]
38 Am. Jur., Name 594-595.

^[9]
65 C.J.S., Names 2.

^[10]
I Tolentino, A., Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines (1987 ed.), 721.

^[11]
Op. cit.

^[12]
Art. 189, infra.

^[13]
Re Ross, 8 Cal 2d 608, 67 P2d 94, 110 ALR 217.

^[14]
Ong Huang Tin vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 9 (1967).

^[15]
See Tan vs. Republic, 4 SCRA 1128 (1962).

^[16]
Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 (1956); Ng Yao
Sing vs. Republic, 16 SCRA 483 (1966).

^[17]
Ansaldo vs. Republic, 102 Phil. 104 (1958); Beduya, et al. vs.
Republic, 115 SCRA 109 (1964); Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic, 38 SCRA
409 (1971); Vda. de Castro vs. Republic, 134 SCRA 12 (1985).

^[18]
See Baybayan vs. Republic, 16 SCRA 403 (196); San Roque vs.
Republic, 23 SCRA 444 (1968).

^[19]
Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, 102 Phil. 48 (1957); Nacionales vs.
Republic, 1 SCRA 366 (1966); Chiu Hap Chiu vs. Republic, 16 SCRA 864
(19).

^[20]
Yu Chi Han vs. Republic, 15 SCRA 454 (1965).

^[21]
TSN, June 24, 1986, 4, 5, 6-7.

^[22]
Ibid., id., 8.

^[23]
Annex E, Petition; Rollo, 46-47.

^[24]
Chiu Hap Chiu vs. Republic, supra, Fn. 19.

^[25]
Haw Liong vs. Republic, 1 SCRA 677 (1966); Republic vs. Tañada,
etc., et al., 42 SCRA 419 (1971); Alfon vs. Republic, 97 SCRA 858
(1980).

^[26]
Ang Chay vs. Republic, 34 SCRA 224 (1970).

^[27]
Uy vs. Republic, 15 SCRA 457 (1965).

^[28]
Oshita vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 700 (1967).

^[29]
Ching vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 1012 (1956); Uy vs. Republic, supra;
Oshita vs. Republic, supra.

^[30] 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption 914.

^[31]
1 Am. Jur., Adoption of Children 621-622.

^[32]
Op. cit., 623.

^[33]
Op. cit., 651.

^[34]
Article 253, Family Code.

^[35]
1 SCRA 836 (1961).

^[36]
Rollo, 11-12, 15.

^[37]
Memorandum for Private Respondent; Rollo, 71-72.

^[38]
TSN, June 24, 1986, 4.

^[39]
Ibid., id., 8.

^[40]
Affidavit of Consent, Exhibit B; Original Record, 9; Rollo, 47-48.

^[41]
Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253 (1966); Calderon vs. Republic, 19
SCRA 721 (1967).