THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. AGUSTIN LANSAÑGAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, alleged to have
been committed as follows: “That the said Agustin Lansangan, on or about the 6th
day of December, 1913, in the municipality of Concepcion, Province of Tarlac,
willfully, maliciously, and criminally, with premeditation and treachery, did
kill one Marcelino Tipay, a child of 7 years of age; contrary to law.”

The defendant was duly arrested, arraigned, tried, found guilty of the crime
of homicide in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac, and
sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of fourteen years eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court. Here the appellant was
represented by an attorney de officio. The only defense made by the
appellant is that the proof adduced during the trial of the cause does not
justify, beyond a reasonable doubt, the conclusions of the lower court.

From an examination of the evidence brought here we find that the following
facts are sustained beyond a reasonable doubt:

That for a long time before the death of the said Marcelino Tipay, the
defendant and Maria Bautista, the mother of the deceased, had been living and
cohabiting together; that a short time before the 6th day of December, 1913, the
defendant and the said Maria Bautista had a quarrel and the defendant left the
house where he had been living with Maria Bautista, threatening to kill her or
some of her children; that a few days after the defendant had left ‘the house of
Maria Bautista, the deceased Marcelino Tipay and one of the other children of
the said Maria Bautista were playing in the highway on the afternoon of the 6th
day of December, 1913; that the defendant passed by where the children were
playing and, for some reason or other, induced the said Marcelino Tipay to
accompany him in the direction of an estero; that later on the same day, the
child (Marcelino Tipay) riot having returned home, a search was made for it;
that late in the evening one of the children met the defendant in the highway or
road, leaving the estero, and at that time the clothing of the defendant was wet
up to his waist; that inquiry was made of him concerning the whereabouts of the
said Marcelino Tipay, whereupon he immediately returned to the estero,
went into the water and picked up the dead body of the child from the bottom of
the estero and brought it ashore; that upon an examination of the body
of the said Marcelino Tipay, it was found that the cervical vertebra had been
dislocated. Suspicion was at once directed to the said defendant as the person
who had caused the death of the said Marcelino. Tipay and the next day (the 7th
of December, 1913) a complaint was presented against him in the court of the
justice of the peace of the municipality of Conception, Province of Tarlac, and
a preliminary examination was held by the said justice of the peace, who found
that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant was guilty of the
crime and ordered him to be held for trial in the Court of First Instance of
said province. Later the case was brought to trial in the Court of First
Instance.

After hearing the evidence the Honorable Julio Llorente, judge, in a
carefully prepared opinion, in which he makes an extensive summary of the
evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, reached the conclusion that the
evidence showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of the
crime of homicide. The lower court found that there were no circumstances upon
which he could qualify the crime as assassination.

The defendant, at the time of the trial, was a man of forty years of age. The
deceased was a child of seven years of age. The supreme court of Spain has held
in numerous decisions, and those decisions have been followed by this court,
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery exists whenever one person employs
means, methods and forms which insure the execution or commission of the crime
without any danger arising or resulting to himself from the acts of the person
attacked. 1 Alcubilla, 444. Decision of the supreme court of Spain of July 13,
1897; U. S. vs. De Leon (1 Phil. Rep., 163); U. S. vs. Ricafor
(1 Phil. Rep., 173); U. S. vs. Rubeta (1 Phil. Rep., 331); U. S.
vs. Abelinde (1 Phil. Rep., 568); U. S. vs. Abaigar (2 PhiL
Rep., 417); U. S. vs. Santos (2 Phil. Rep., 453); U. S. vs.
Alvarez (3 Phil. Rep., 24).

The supreme court of Spain has also held (and this court has followed said
decisions) in considering alevosia as a qualifying circumstance of the crime of
assassination, that when an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender
years and causes its death, that he runs no risk whatever of personal injury to
himself from such attack and that therefore in such a case alevosia should be
considered as a qualifying circumstance of the crime, and the same should be
qualified as assassination. In the present case the child was of tender years,
being but seven years old. Whatever method the defendant employed, in causing
the death of the deceased, the same was done without any possibility of danger
resulting to himself from the child. The crime, therefore, in the present case
should be qualified as that of assassination. Decisions of the supreme court of
Spain: January 26, 1877 (where the child was 30 months old); October 29, 1879
(where the child was 11 years old); October 10,1883 (a child of tender years);
November 15, 1895 (where the child was 3 years old); July 13, 1897 (a young
child). U. S. vs. Irarion (2 Phil. Rep., 476) ; U. S. vs. De
Jesus (14 Phil. Rep., 190).

From the record we find no aggravating circumstances accompanying the
commission of the crime. Considering all of the facts and circumstances,
however, and the ignorance of the defendant, we are disposed to give him the
benefit of article 11 of the Penal Code as an extenuating circumstance, and
impose upon him the minimum penalty provided for the crime of assassination. The
sentence of the lower court is therefore hereby reversed and it is hereby
ordered and decreed that a sentence be entered declaring that the defendant is
guilty of the crime of assassination, with the qualifying circumstance of
alevosia, and the extenuating circumstance of article 11 of the Penal
Code, and sentencing the defendant to be imprisoned for a period of twenty years
of cadena temporal, to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by
law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the
costs.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, Moreland, and Araullo,
JJ., concur.