NILO H. RAYMUNDO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTEENTH DIVISION, HON. JUDGE, RTC, BR. 133, MAKATI, METRO MANILA AND GALERIA DE MAGALLANES ASSOCIATION, INC., RESPONDE…

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
restraining order and preliminary injunction to annul and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 11, 1991^[1]
dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari and prohibition which
assailed the Orders^[2]
dated June 1, 1990^[3]
and June 29, 1990^[4]
of the trial court.

It appears on record that on July 5, 1989, the administrator of
the Galleria de Magallanes Condominium discovered that petitioner Nilo
Raymundo, who was an owner/occupant of Unit
AB-122 of said condominium, made an unauthorized installation of glasses at the
balcony of his unit in violation
of Article IV, Section 3 paragraph (d) of the Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions of the Association, which states that:

“d. Nothing shall be done or placed in any unit
or in the common areas which is beyond or will impair the structural strength
of the buildings or alter the original architecture, appearance and
specifications of the building, including the external facade thereof.”^[5]

Thereafter, the administrator of said condominium reported said
violation to the Board of Directors of the private respondent Galleria de
Magallanes Association, Inc. in a special meeting held on July 8,1989 and the
former sent a letter dated July 12, 1989^[6] to
the petitioner demanding the latter to remove the illegal and unauthorized
installation of glasses at his unit.

Petitioner refused, consequently, private respondent filed a
complaint for mandatory injunction against petitioner on February 21, 1990 with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 in Civil Case No. 90-490.

On March 12, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for extension of time to file an Answer^[7]
as well as a Motion for production of document^[8] which
were granted in an Order dated March 16, 1990^[9]

However, on March 23, 1990, instead of an Answer, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss with the trial court on the ground that said court
has no jurisdiction over the present case since a complaint for mandatory
injunction is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Court.

The Motion to Dismiss was denied in the Order of June 1,1990, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

“This is a suit for mandatory injunction. Under Sec. 21 of BP 129, as amended, it is the Regional Trial
Court which has the legal competence to issue the same. Corollarily, the second ground must be
denied. The action is essentially one
which falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

“WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied, for lack of
merit.”^[10]

Likewise, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in
the Order of June 29, 1990 which We quote,
to wit:

“As denominated in the complaint itself, this is a suit for
mandatory injunction, and the nature of the action as designated by the
plaintiff is substantiated by the allegations of the complaint itself. Such being the case, Sec. 21 of BP 129
governs. The claims for attorney’s fees
is incidental to the nature of the complaint as one of mandatory injunction which is also attested by the
prayer in the complaint “to remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of
glasses at Unit AB-122 of the Condominium within five (5) days from receipt of
the order xxx” and, therefore, does not affect the legal competence of the Court
to act on the complaint.”^[11]

On elevation to the appellate court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
restraining order and preliminary injunction, the petition was again dismissed
on March 11, 1991.

Hence, this petition alleging want of jurisdiction of the trial
court to hear and decide private respondent’s complaint for mandatory
injunction considering that private respondent’s sole pecuniary claim of
P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees in Civil Case No. 90-490 is within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court as provided for
under Section 33 of B.P. 129.

We do not agree.

The contention of the petitioner is devoid of merit because private respondent’s
complaint is an action to compel the petitioner to remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of
glasses at Unit AB-122 of the condominium which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 is
not applicable in the instant case, but paragraph (1), Section 19 and paragraph
(1), Section 21 of said law which provide:

“Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1)    In all civil actions in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;”

xxx                                        xxx                                           xxx

“Sec. 21. Original
Jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
original jurisdiction:

(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which
may be enforced in any part of their respective regions;”

A civil action in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation has invariably been held to be within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.

“In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts [now municipal
trial courts] or in the courts of first instance [now regional trial courts]
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance [now
regional trial courts].”^[12]

As correctly stated by
the Court of Appeals, the question for resolution is whether or not
the petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of
Restriction of the corporation, and if so, to remove the illegal and
unauthorized installation of glasses at Unit AB-122 of the Condominium. Clearly, the issue is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

In the instant case, the claim of attorney’s fees by the private
respondent in the amount of P10,000.00 is only incidental to its principal
cause of action which is for the removal of the illegal and unauthorized
installation of the glasses made by the petitioner and therefore, said amount
is not determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.

Note should be taken, however, that the trial court had
erroneously considered the complaint as one for mandatory injunction, misled
perhaps by the caption of the complaint.

A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. It is provisional because it constitutes a
temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the main action and
it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the
result of the main action.^[13]

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on March 11, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 62-70, CA-G.R. SP No. 22231, Ponente: Justice Justo P. Torres,
Jr., with Justice Ricardo J. Francisco and Justice Consuelo Yñares-Santiago
concurring.

^[2]
Penned by Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 55.

^[4]
Id., at p. 60.

^[5]
Id., at p. 35.

^[6]
Annex “J”, Petition, CA-Rollo, p. 5.

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 38-40.

^[8]
Id., at pp. 41-43.

^[9]
Id., at p. 45.

^[10]
Id., at p. 55.

^[11]
Id., at p. 60.

^[12]
Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623 [1979].

^[13]
Regalado, Remedial Law, 5th Revised Ed. Vol. I.