TEOFILA DE LUNA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, CASIANO DE LUNA AND FLAVIANO DE LUNA, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Teofila de Luna appeals from the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP-22167 declaring null and void the proceedings
conducted and the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(“MCTC”) in Civil Case No. 245 upon the ground that the MCTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of that action.

The relevant factual antecedents of this Petition for Review are
undisputed.

Petitioner Teofila de Luna had been in peaceful and continuous
possession of four (4) hectares of land located at Barangay Masinao, Sta.
Maria, Laguna. Petitioner and her
father, Martin de Luna, had worked for many years on this land as agricultural
tenants thereof.

After the demise of petitioner’s father, she continued to
cultivate the subject parcels of land. Petitioner’s name appears in the master list of agricultural tenants in
the Province of Laguna issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(“DAR”) as a full-fledged tenant of landholder Atty. Francisco Redor.

On 21 May 1986, petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against her
two (2) brothers, private respondents Casiano and Flaviano de Luna, who
allegedly had turned petitioner out of her possession of the parcels of land
through stealth. The complaint for
forcible entry was filed with the MCTC of Mabitac, Sta. Maria, Laguna and there
docketed as Civil Case No. 245.

The complaint was initially dismissed by the MCTC on 30 September
1986 on the basis that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court (“RTC”) under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316 in
relation to Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 583. However, after considering an Omnibus Motion of petitioner, the
MCTC set aside its earlier order and instead referred the case to the DAR.

After the referral to the DAR and acting upon the certification
issued by DAR that the case was proper for trial in the municipal court, the
MCTC proceeded to hear the complaint for ejectment. In due course, the MCTC rendered a decision requiring private
respondents to vacate the premises and to pay petitioner Teofila de Luna the
amount of P5,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus
the costs of the suit.

Private respondents Casiano and Flaviano de Luna went before the
RTC on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction, seeking annulment of the proceedings conducted and the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. 245. Their petition was dismissed by the RTC, however, upon the grounds that
(a) the ejectment case was within the jurisdiction of the MCTC; and (b) the
special civil action of certiorari was not a substitute remedy for a
lost appeal.

Dissatisfied, respondent de Luna brothers appealed to the Court
of Appeals and raised the issue of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the dispute.

On 16 January 1991, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision,
now in question, reversing that of the RTC. Applying Section 21 of R.A. No. 1199 in relation to Section 23 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Court of
Appeals declared that the controversy
was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC as successor of the defunct Court of Agrarian Reform
(“CAR”).

Petitioner, before this Court, questions the conclusions reached
by the Court of Appeals and argues that Section 21 of R.A. No. 1199 is
inapplicable to the instant dispute. She asserts that the suit for ejectment, in the light of circumstances
here, was within the jurisdiction of the MCTC. Due to the untimely demise of petitioner, however, this Court ordered the substitution of the heirs of deceased Teofila de Luna as the new
petitioners. In our resolution dated 12
October 1992, Pedro de Luna, Gliceria Luna-Real and Nieves de Luna were
substituted as new petitioners in present petition.

Deliberating upon the allegations adduced and the arguments
raised, we find the petition meritorious.

We have heretofore held, in a considerable number of cases,^[1] that
where no agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the contending
parties and the situation is one merely for forcible entry, the RTC, acting as
an agrarian court, has no jurisdiction.

In Arejola
vs. Camarines Sur Regional Agricultural School,^[2] the Court had occasion to spell out
the underlying rationale of the above ruling. In Arejola, the private respondents had filed with the
CAR, Naga City, a complaint for “illegal ejectment with prayer for
issuance of a preliminary injunction,” alleging that private respondent
School was the owner or legal possessor of a parcel of land which the other
private respondents were tilling as tenants of the School; that predecessor of
petitioner Arejola, through force and intimidation and without prior knowledge
and consent of the other private respondents, fenced the entire area of their
holding by means of barbed wire and had prevented
them (the tenants) from cultivating the same unless they recognized him
(Arejola) as legal owner and gave him the landholder’s share; and that Arejola
be ordered to desist from interfering with private respondent tenants’
cultivation of the land. Arejola in
turn asserted that he was lawful possessor of the land involved; that private
respondents were occupying the same without any right to do so; and that
because there was no tenancy relationship between himself and private
respondent tenants, the CAR had no jurisdiction
over the controversy, the remedy being an action in the ordinary courts of
justice for unlawful entry. The CAR
ruled in favor of the tenants and ordered Arejola to reinstate them to their
respective landholdings. On appeal by certiorari,
this Court reversed the CAR holding that that court had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. The
Court said:

“Thus, in Tumbaga vs. Vasquez, G.R. L-8719, July 17, 1956, we
declared that when a mere intruder holds possession of property belonging to
another, the ordinary courts do not lose jurisdiction in a forcible entry case
even if he should claim (untruthfully) a tenancy relationship with the owner. In other words, where the case is really
mere forcible entry, the Court of Agrarian Relations does not have jurisdiction. And in Pabustan vs. De Guzman, 109 Phil.
278, we ruled that when there is no tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, the Agrarian Court has no jurisdiction.

The reason is not far to seek.

Under Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 1267 (as amended by Republic Act
1409) creating said Court [of Agrarian Relations], it is given jurisdiction to
consider, investigate, decide and settle all questions x x x involving those
relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons
in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties
works the land.

The Court is thus empowered to act where there is a legal
‘relationship’ between the parties fighting before it. Such relationship must necessarily be that
of agricultural tenancy. And the
law governing agricultural tenancy, Republic Act 1199 explains that
tenancy relationship is a ‘juridical tie’ which arises between a landholder and
a tenant once they agree expressly or impliedly to undertake jointly the
cultivation of land belonging to        
the former, etc. [Sec. 6] (See also
sections 3 and 5, Republic Act 1199).

It must be remembered that the [CAR] was established to enforce
all laws and regulations governing the relation of capital and labor on all
agricultural lands. Necessarily, the
law contemplated a legal relationship between landowner and tenant. This does not exist where one is owner or
possessor and the other a squatter or deforciant. x x x.”^[3]
(Underscoring supplied)

This reasoning has guided this Court in the determination of the
RTC’s jurisdiction over cases arising under other Philippine agrarian statutes:
e.g., C.A. No. 461 (giving the Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction over
disputes involving landowner and tenant); R.A. No. 1267 (creating the Court of
Agrarian Relations); R.A. No. 3844 (the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963);
P.D. No. 27 and its implementing rules and regulations; and P.D. No. 946
(reorganizing the Courts of Agrarian Relations, streamlining their procedures
and for other purposes).^[4]

Considering the facts constituting this case, we do not believe
the MCTC exceeded its jurisdiction in acting on the ejectment suit. No juridical tie connects private
respondents with petitioner, which compels characterization of the present
controversy as an agrarian dispute. Respondents, it is true, claim that they were co-tenants of their
father, Martin de Luna, who was apparently the original tenant or lessee with
whom landholder Atty. Redor had entered into a contract of agrarian tenancy or
landholding. This allegation, however,
in their answer, did not divest the MCTC of jurisdiction over the dispute. It is common place doctrine that
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of the cause of action and
the relief alleged and sought in the complaint, and not by the averments in the
answer.^[5]
The complaint by petitioner in the MCTC did set forth a cause of action for
ejectment and damages. That complaint
averred that Teofila de Luna was the duly registered tenant of Atty. Redor (who
was not a party to the ejectment proceedings) and that her continuous and
peaceful possession was disrupted by persons who were not owners of the
tenanted property.

The primary issue in an ejectment suit is material possession of
the realty only, not possession de jure. Here, the MCTC did not pretend to
resolve issues other than the question of physical possession. The trial judge referred to petitioner’s
registration as agricultural tenant only for the purpose of determining who, as
between Teofila and her brothers, was the actual prior possessor of the property. The defense of co-tenancy was considered by
the MCTC only insofar as it tended to sustain or detract from petitioner
Teofila’s claim of prior peaceful and continued possession. The record showed, however, no prima
facie basis for that defense as respondents were not among those registered
in the DAR master list of agricultural tenants in Laguna. Further, private respondents did not allege
that they had been selected by the landowner to succeed Martin de Luna as
tenants of the land.^[6]
Finally, the certification by the DAR that the case was proper or ripe for
hearing by the MCTC indicated that there was pending before the DAR no dispute
involving an agricultural tenancy relationship (i.e., between landholder and
agricultural tenant) to which a dispute between persons who are concededly
co-tenants could be consolidated for procedural convenience as an incident to
the main case.

Clearly, the dispute between the parties to the instant case
involved the situation of forcible entry only. The trial court correctly concluded that private respondents cannot,
through force and stealth, terminate petitioner’s continuous and peaceful
possession, even upon the pretension that they were co-tenants, or entitled to
be co-tenants, with Teofila over the land in question. Private respondents were not entitled to
take the law into their own hands.

Respondents contend that they may be deemed the “third
persons” referred to in Section 21 of R.A. No. 1199, thereby bringing the
dispute within the ambit of authority of the RTC as an agrarian court. This is erroneous.

In the Arejola case discussed above, the same
contention was made and in the course of rejecting that contention, this Court
had occasion to elaborate on the meaning of “third party” as used in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 1199:

“It is true that sec. 21 of Republic Act 1199 says:

‘All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the
landholder or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of
disputes arising from the relationship of landholder and tenant, as well as the
violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall be under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of such courts as may now or hereafter be authorized by
law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes.’

However, we perceive no compelling reason to widen the scope of
Sec. 7 of Republic Act 1267 (as amended) creating the Court of Agrarian
Relations so as to include any legal dispute wherein one party is agricultural
tenant, no matter who his opponent is. Considering the whole Act, the ‘third party’ mentioned in the said
sec. 21 should be construed to mean person who is neither landholder nor
tenant, but who acts for, openly, secretly, or factually for the
landholder. For instance, a sheriff
enforcing an execution sale against the landholder; or a purchaser or
transferee of the land, or a mere dummy of the landowner.

No such situation obtains here. The ‘tenants’ have no legal relationship with Arejola. They do not claim to be his tenants. Indeed, they refused to recognize him as
such. They do not aver he was acting
for or in connivance with their landlord, the Agricultural School. If the Court acted favorably to the tenants’
desire and was consistent, it would have to declare them as ‘tenants’ of Arejola,
— (which it did not) — with the right of the latter to get a share of
the crops; thereby recognizing the right of Arejola to possession
(constructive at least) of the very lot which he had allegedly fenced and
entered illegally.”^[7]
(Underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied)

Since private respondents here are
neither landholders, tenants, nor other persons acting for or on behalf of the
landowner but, in truth and at this stage, mere deforciants, they are not a
“third party” within the meaning of Section 21 of R.A. No. 1199 and
the dispossession complained of by petitioner does not come within the
jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as an agrarian court.

We note that the Court of Appeals relied upon the case of Tomacruz
vs. Court of Agrarian Relations^[8] to
support its conclusion that the dispossession of petitioner by respondents
comes within the situation contemplated in Section 21 of R.A. No. 1199. Such reliance is misplaced.

In Tomacruz, private respondents had filed before the CAR
a petition alleging that private respondent Felimon Silva was landholder of a
parcel of land, of which the other private respndents were tenants; that
petitioner Tomacruz who claimed to be owner of the land, by threats and force
took from private respondents ten (10) cavans of the produce of the land; and
that there was a large quantity of palay still to be threshed but which private
respondents refused to thresh because of petitioner Tomacruz’s actions. Private respondents prayed that Tomacruz be
enjoined from harassing them and to return the ten (10) cavans of palay taken
from them, and that Silva be treated owner of the land in question and that the
other private respondents be declared Silva’s bonafide tenants. After trial, the CAR held that Silva was
landholder of the lot in question, and ordered Tomacruz to desist from
molesting and harassing the tenants of Silva, and to deliver to Silva the value
of the palay he had taken and received as alleged landholder. In the course of affirming the decision of the CAR, the Supreme Court said:

“In this appeal, the petitioner claims that the lower court
erred in making a finding on the ownership of the land because the same is
beyond its jurisdiction. He claims
that the lower court should have suspended the proceedings pending
determination of the question of ownership in the ordinary courts.

We have examined the decision of the trial court and of the other
records of the case, and we find the argument of the petitioner to be
without merit. What the lower court did
was only to admit evidence of ownership for the purpose of determining who, as
between Silva and Tomacruz, is the landholder to whom landholder’s share in the
produce should be delivered by the tenants.

x x x                                                                          x
x x                                                                             x x x

x x x. Petitioner claims on
the strength of the above circumstances, that the court below should have
suspended the trial to await the outcome of the case in the Court of First
Instance for the review of the decree in the Land Registration Case — the
basis of petitioner’s title.

As we have adverted to above, all the arguments are of no avail, in
view of the following provision of the Agricultural Tenancy Act:

‘All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the
landholder or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of
disputes arising from the relationship of landholder and tenant, as well as the
violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall be under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of such courts as may now or hereafter be authorized by
law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes. (Sec. 21, R.A. 1199, Italics supplied)’

The court below found that petitioner Tomacruz had entered upon
the land and appropriated to himself the landholder’s share of the harvest
for the year 1947-48. This certainly
is a dispossession by a third party of his landholding and comes within the
express provision of the law.”^[9]

Clearly, Tomacruz involved a situation where a person
claiming to be landowner had forcibly taken a portion of the produce of the
land from persons who were actually cultivating the land. This Court in effect held that the CAR had
jurisdiction to determine whether there existed an agricultural tenancy
relationship between persons admittedly cultivating the land on the one hand
and on the other hand, Tomacruz who had claimed to be landholder. The CAR concluded that there was indeed an
agricultural tenancy relationship not with Tomacruz but rather with
Silva, who had proved his title over the land by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that the CAR had
jurisdiction to make that determination of landownership, on a provisional
basis and for the limited purpose of deciding whether Tomacruz had the legal
right to enter upon the land and appropriate to himself the share of the
harvest pertaining to the lawful landholder. Note that Tomacruz who had dispossessed the tenants of a portion of the
produce of the land was precisely the kind of third party referred in Arejola;
for Tomacruz purported to act as landholder claiming to have bought the land
from a vendor whose possession had antedated the possession of Silva. Tomacruz is not in conflict with
either Arejola or with our decision in the instant
case.

It remains only to stress once more that the only issue before
the MCTC in Civil Case No. 245 is physical possession of the landholding in
question, and that the conclusion we here reach is without prejudice to the
right of petitioner heirs of Teofila de Luna and private respondents to bring a
proper case before a court of competent jurisdiction, where the landowner is
properly impleaded, to determine who is entitled to be or remain agricultural
tenant(s) or lessee(s) of the land in question, in view of the passing away of
both Martin de Luna and Teofila de Luna.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED DUE COURSE,
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. – G.R. No. SP-22167 dated 16
January 1991 and its Resolution dated 8
March 1991 are hereby SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered, REINSTATING and AFFIRMING the
Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mabitac, Sta. Maria, Laguna
Province in Civil Case No. 245. Costs
against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, and
Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
E.g., Tumbaga vs. Vasquez 99 Phil 1051 (1956); Manlapaz vs.
Pagdanganan 54 OG No. 34, 7890, (1957); Pambustan vs. de Guzman 109 Phil
278 (1960); Arejola vs. Camarines Sur Regional Agricultural School, 110
Phil 517 (1960); Dumlao v. De Guzman, 1 SCRA 14 (1961); Lartimoza v.
Blanco, 1 SCRA 231 (1961). See also
Salandan vs. Tizon 62 SCRA 388 (1975); Nonan vs. Plan 63 SCRA 261
(1975); Derecho vs. Abiera 34 SCRA 58 (1970); Ferrer vs.
Villamor, 60 SCRA 106 (1974).

^[2]
110
Phil 517 (1960).

^[3]
110 Phil. at 519-520.

^[4]
See Pabustan v. De Guzman, supra; Manlapaz v.
Pagdanganan, supra; Arejola v. Camarines Sur, supra,
Almodiel v. Blanco, 5 SCRA 647 (1962); De Chavez v. Zobel, 55
SCRA 26 (1974); Ferrer v. Villamor, 60 SCRA 106 (1974). See also Geronimo v. Court of
Appeals, 121 SCRA 859 (1983); Philippine National Railway v. Del Valle,
29 SCRA 573 (1969); Manila Railroad Co. v. Court of Appeals, 30 SCRA 892
(1969); Fleischer v. Pamplona Plantation Co., 88 SCRA 1144 (1969).

Under R.A. No.
6657 (also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), which took effect
on 15 June 1988, disputes involving agrarian reform matters are now within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. Sec. 50 of RA 6657 reads:

“Quasi-Judicial Powers of the
DAR.- The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

x x x                       x x x                 x
x x”

^[5]
See Alvarez vs. Guanzon 131 SCRA 559 (1984); Concepcion vs.
Presiding Judge 119 SCRA 222 (1982).

^[6]
See also Sec. 9 of RA 3844 which
provides:

“Sec.
9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not
Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties. – In case of death or
permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the
leasehold continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can
cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within
one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the
following: (a) the surviving spouse;
(b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest
descendant in the order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be
exercised at the end of the agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to
exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be
in accordance with the order herein established.

In case of
death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall
bind his legal heirs.”

^[7]
110 Phil. at 520-521.

^[8]
2 SCRA 568 (1961).

^[9]
Tomacruz v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 2 SCRA at 572-573.