WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORPORATION, ILOILO MULTI PARTS SUPPLY CORP., VIRGILIO ANG, SOUTHERN SALES CORP., AND CHANG LIANG, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND STAR GROUP …

The principal question in the proceedings at bar is whether or
not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the
Municipal Trial Court against a lessee — grounded on the expiration of the
latter’s lease — ­should be abated or suspended by an action filed in the
Regional Trial Court by the defendant lessee — on the claim that he is
entitled to a right of preemption (or prior purchase) of the premises in
question and wishes to have said right judicially enforced.

The question arises from facts not disputed and now briefly
narrated.

Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation (or
Ramon Que), Iloilo Multi Parts Supply Corporation (or
Ramon Que), Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern Sales Corporation, and Chang Liang, Jr. were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas
standing on registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin,
Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin
and Ester L. Jarantilla.^[1]
The leases were embodied in uniformly worded deeds executed by the individual
petitioners, as lessees, and Lourdes C. Locsin,
representing the lessors-co-owners.^[2]
The lease contracts, among others –

1. stipulated fixed terms or periods (September 1, 1987 to August
30, 1989);

2. provided for a deposit of an amount equal to two months’
rents;

3. provided that the lessee should give the lessor
30 days prior notice of the intention to terminate or renew the contract, and
that if no such written notice were given, the lessor
would consider the contract terminated on the expiration of the term; and

4. contained a “reservation of rights” reading as follows:^[3]

“Reservation of rights. 
–  LESSOR reserves the rights
to sell, mortgage, hypothecate or encumber the property so long as it requires
the purchase(r) or mortgage creditors to respect the terms of this lease contract;
provided further that LESSEE shall be duly informed about LESSOR’s
plan to sell the property.”

On September 18, 1989, after the expiration of the period fixed
in the lease agreements, the lessors executed a
public instrument entitled “Deed of Absolute Sale”^[4]
in virtue of which they sold the leased property to Star Group Resources and
Development Inc. (hereafter, simply referred to as Star Group).  The deed provided inter alia that the “Vendee shall henceforth deal with the
lessees and occupants of the properties herein sold without any further
warranty or obligation on the part of the Vendors.”

On November 22, 1989, the buyer, Star Group, brought separate
actions of unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial
Court In Cities of Iloilo City against the lessees, which were docketed as
follows:

1) that filed against Virgilio Ang:  Civil Case
No. 227 (89), assigned to Branch 3;

2) that instituted against Chang Liang,
Jr.:  Civil Case No. 230 (89), raffled
to Branch 2;

3) that filed against Henry Tan and Southern Sales
Corporation:  Civil Case No. 232 (89),
assigned to Branch 2;

4) that filed against Ramon Que “(for
the premises occupied by WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORPORATION):” Civil Case No.
233, assigned to Branch 2; and

5) that commenced against Ramon Que
“(for the premises occupied by ILOILO MULTI PARTS SUPPLY CORPORATION):” Civil
Case No. 234, raffled to Branch 2.

The lessees refused to concede, and indeed impugned, Star Group’s
right to eject them.  They argued that in
so selling the properties and seeking their ejectment
therefrom, the lessors —
and their buyer — had violated their leasehold rights because (a) they (the
lessees) were not accorded the right of preemption, (b) the buyer was not
required to honor the leases, and (c) the lessees were denied the option to renew
their leases upon the expiration thereof.

These propositions they set forth in their answers with
counterclaims in the unlawful detainer actions
against them in the Municipal Trial Courts (Branches 2 and 3).

The same propositions were also set out as causes of action in a
complaint filed on December 1, 1989 by some of them — Wilmon,
Iloilo Multi Parts, Virgilio Ang
(doing business under the name and style of “Iloilo Rightway
Marketing”), Southern Sales and Chang Liang, Jr.
(doing business under the name and style of “Iloilo Bright Construction
Supply”)^[5]
— in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. 
Impleaded as defendants in the complaint were
the Star Group Resources and Development, Inc. and its President, Juanito Sio alias Juanito Sio Soy Liong, and the co-owners-vendors, namely:  Lucy A. Solinap,
Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin,
Ester Locsin Jarantila, and
Fr. Jerry R. Locsin, the latter as Administrator of
the Estate of the deceased Jose C. Locsin.^[6]
The action thus commenced was docketed as Civil Case No. 18931 and
raffled to Branch 28.  In their
complaint, the plaintiffs-lessees prayed chiefly that –

1) the sale of the buildings, bodegas and the land on which they
stand be declared null and void ab initio;

2) they be allowed to exercise their right of pre-emption or
redemption, and to recover their two-month deposits;

3) the titles to the properties be conveyed to them;

4) they be paid by the defendants jointly and severally moral
damages in the sum of 1.5 million pesos, exemplary damages in the amount of
P10,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the sum of P200,000.00.

In the unlawful detainer actions,
position papers were required by the courts and submitted by the parties on the
issue of whether or not the unlawful detainer actions
should be covered by the rules of summary procedure.  The courts ruled that Cases Numbered 227
(against Virgilio Ang), 230
(against Chang Liang, Jr.) and 234 (against
Iloilo Multi Parts Supply Corporation), must be so tried, but not Civil Cases
Numbered 232 (against Henry Tan and Southern Sales Corporation) and 233
(against Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation), as to which
the summary procedure rules were inapplicable. 
The lessees moved for reconsideration of the order and additionally
prayed for dismissal of the ejectment suits on the
grounds of litis pendentia
(adverting no doubt to Civil Case No. 18931 instituted by them in the RTC) and
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the actions.  Their pleas were denied.

Thereupon three of the lessees — Ramon Que,
Southern Sales Corporation, and Henry T. Tan — quite precipitately and
improperly, filed petitions for certiorari with this Court for the
annulment and setting aside of the orders of the Municipal Trial Court (Branch
2), which were docketed as G.R. Nos. 94855 and 94856.  Another lessee, Antonio Chua also
instituted a similar action of certiorari in this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 95371.^[7]
Predictably, this Court refused to take cognizance of their petitions.  G.R. No. 95371 was referred to the Court of
Appeals by Resolution of the Second Division dated October 15, 1990 “for proper
determination and disposition” that Court’s jurisdiction being concurrent
with this Court’s.  G.R. Nos. 94855 and
94856 were referred to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,^[8]
to which the lessees should have gone for relief in the first place.^[9]
In the Regional Trial Court, the cases were docketed as Civil Cases Numbered
19420 (Ramon Que v. Hon. Honrado, etc., et al.) and 19421 (Southern Sales
Corporation and Henry T. Tan v. Hon. Honrado,
etc., et al.).

The Executive Judge of the Trial Court (Hon. Ricardo M. Ilarde) issued a restraining order dated October 18, 1990
enjoining proceedings in the unlawful detainer
cases.  However, on March 11, 1991, His
Honor promulgated judgment on the merits dismissing the petitions and
dissolving the preliminary injunction of October 18, 1990.  Judge Ilarde ruled
that the unlawful detainer cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, and that the pendency of Civil Case No. 18931 in the RTC did not warrant
suspension of the unlawful detainer cases, “the only
issue in the ** (the latter suits being) physical possession or possession de
facto while the issue involved in Civil Case No. 18931 ** is basically one
of ownership,” and it being “settled rule that the pendency
of an action involving ownership and annulment of sale ** does not stay the
proceedings in the ejectment case.”^[10]
The lessees filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by Judge Ilarde, by Order dated April 22, 1991.

From this decision of March 11, 1991, Ramon Que,
Southern Sales Corporation and Henry Tan have appealed to this Court on the
legal issue of “whether or not ** (Judge Ilarde)
erred in finding that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities did not abuse its
discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to dismiss or to hold in abeyance
the proceedings in the subject unlawful detainer
cases.” (Rollo, G.R. No. 98700-01, p. 5).  Their appeal was docketed as G.R.
Nos. 98700-­01.^[11]

On the other hand, two (2) of the lessees, Wilmon
Auto Supply Corporation (represented by Ramon Que)
and Chang Liang — who are among the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 18931 pending in Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo
City — took a different tack.  They
filed a motion in said Court praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to
stop the Municipal Trial Court from hearing their ejectment
cases.  They argued that the decision in
Civil Case No. 18931 would be decisive of the rights of the parties,
particularly on the question of the lessees’ claimed option to renew their
leases.

The Trial Court however denied their motion.  To nullify the Trial Court’s denial of their
plea for injunctive relief, they repaired to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari.  Their
action was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23750. 
The Court of Appeal ruled adversely to them.  In its Decision promulgated on February 28,
1991, the Appellate Tribunal pointed out (a) that “the issues ** (the
petitioners) are raising in the Regional Trial Court are the very same issues
they, as defendants in the ejectment cases, are
raising ** and (considering that “the Municipal Trial Court’s jurisdiction is
not in question”) there is no reason why simply because the same issues are
raised in the action brought in the Regional Trial Court the ejectment proceedings should be suspended, and (b) that in
truth, “questions pertaining to ‘the relation between landlord and tenant, the
period or life of the lease or tenancy, the reasonableness of the rental, the
right of the tenant (to remain in occupancy) against the will of the landlord,
etc.’ are (precisely) the sort of questions which should be decided in the ejectment case.”^[12]
From this judgment, the lessees have taken an appeal to this Court.  Their appeal was docketed as G.R.
No 97637.^[13]

The issues raised in G.R. No. 97637 and G.R. Nos. 98700-01, are
substantially the same, viz.:^[14]

a)  whether or not, in light
of Vda. de Murga
v. Chan, 25 SCRA 441 and Valderama
Lumber Manufacturers Co., Inc. v. L.S. Sarmiento Co.,
5 SCRA 287, the Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the actions which
are real in nature and involve interpretation of lease contracts over immovables;

b)  whether or not the Court
of Appeals deviated from the doctrine laid down in Vda.
de Legaspi v. Avendaño,
79 SCRA 135, 145;

c)  whether or not, pursuant
to Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674,
and Orellano v. Alvestir,
76 SCRA 536, the actions in the Municipal Trial Court for the ejectment of the lessees from the property occupied by them
should be suspended until adjudgment of the cases in
the RTC involving the sale, ownership and physical possession of said property;
and

d)  whether or not Dante
v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 and other precedents
invoked by the petitioners should apply.

As stated in this opinion’s opening paragraph, the crucial
question, at bottom, is whether or not Star Group’s unlawful detainer suits in the Municipal Trial Court against
petitioner lessees for the reason that their leases had expired, should be abated
by the actions filed in the Regional Trial Court by said petitioner lessees
based on the contention that they are entitled to a right of preemption or
prior purchase of the leased premises. 
It is a question that is far from novel, one that has been passed upon
and resolved by this Court in numerous cases, and one to which a negative
answer has invariably been given.  The
relevant precedents are hereunder outlined.

1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in
ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or
other courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966]) do not abate the latter; and
neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue,
et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]).

2. An “accion publiciana” does not suspend an ejectment
suit against the plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza,
106 SCRA 187 [1981]).

3. A “writ of possession case”, where ownership is
concededly the principal issue before the Regional Trial Court does not
preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue involved is the material
possession or possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa, Sr. v. C.A., et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 [1988]).

4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a
bar to an ejectment suit involving the same property
(Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 [1972]).

5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not
affect ejectment actions (e.g., to compel renewal of
a lease contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng,
18 SCRA 1184 [1966]; Pardo de Tavera
v. Encarnacion, 22 SCRA 632 [1968]; Rosales v. CFI,
154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Commander Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 161 SCRA 264 [1988]).

6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from
deed of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto
de retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit
between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA
600 [1975]).

7. An action for reconveyance of
property or “accion reivindicatoria”
also has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the
same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 [1963]; Salinas v. Navarro,
126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v. C.A., 133 SCRA 520 [1984]); Drilon
v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 [1987]; Ching
v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 [1987]; Philippine Feeds Milling co., Inc. v. C.A., 174
SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 [1989];
Guzman v. C.A. [annulment of sale and reconveyance],
177 SCRA 604 [1989]; Demamay v. C.A., 186 SCRA 608
[1990]; Leopoldo Sy v.
C.A., et al., [annulment of sale and reconveyance],
G.R. No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).

8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or
document affecting property operate to abate ejectment
actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable
mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC
[annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros
v. C.A. [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v. Sison
[annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala
v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. [annulment of
document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]).

The underlying reasons for the above rulings were that the
actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession,
and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was
merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment
proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be
set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there
resolved.  This is specially true in the
cases at bar, where the petitioners-lessees’ claims — that the lessors (and the buyer of the leased premises) had violated
their leasehold rights because (a) they (the lessees) were not accorded the
right of preemption, (b) the buyer was not required to respect their leases,
and (c) the lessees were denied the option to renew their leases upon the
expiration thereof — constituted their causes of action in the suits
commenced by them in the Regional Trial Court.^[15]

In Leopoldo Sy v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 95818, August
2, 1991,^[16]
for instance, the following pronouncements were made:

“Private respondents insist that the Rule on Summary Procedure does
not apply since there is a question of ownership involved albeit in another
case pending in another court, that is, the aforesaid Civil Case No. 88-47264
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 
We apprehend that if this theory is adopted, the applicability of the
Rule on Summary Procedure in ejectment cases could
easily be thwarted by the defendant through the simple expedient of filing an
action in the regional trial court contesting the plaintiffs ownership over the
property from which defendant is sought to be evicted.  Hence, the obvious intimation of private
respondents that the regular procedure, and not the summary procedure, should
be followed * * does not impress us as being endowed with legal or logical
support.

“* * * * *.

“Thus, the fact that the tenant had previously filed a separate
action in the former Court of First Instance involving the ownership of the
land is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment.  Such
action filed by the tenant only lends credence to the fact that the ejectment case filed by plaintiffs agianst
the former does not involve the question of title.  (Lozada vs. Abragan, et al., 66 SCRA 600 [1975]).  This is so because the judgment rendered in
an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be held
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a
different cause of action involving possession. 
(Ang Ping, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 40, et al., 154 SCRA 77 [1987]). 
Furthermore in ejectment cases the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
not by the defenses raised by defendant. 
(Ramirez v. Chit, 21 SCRA 1364 [1967]).

“ * * *.  The pendency of the action for reconveyance
does not constitute a compelling reason to delay the termination of an ejectment case, for it gives rise merely to an expectancy
that the documents assailed therein may be nullified and the subject properties
may be ordered reconveyed to private respondents, as
compared to the clear, actual and existing legal right of petitioner to the
possession of the subject property as the registered owner.  (Galgala, et al.
vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., et al., 177 SCRA 288
[1989]).”

The precedents invoked by the petitioners^[17] do
not represent current and prevailing doctrine; they might at most be deemed
exceptions justifying the general rule. 
Moreover, the facts in the rulings invoked by them are quite readily
distinguishable from the numerous precedents upholding said general rule.

Thus, as regards the seemingly contrary ruling in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, 79 SCRA 135 (1977), this Court observed, in Salinas
v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167, 172-173
(1983), that “the exception to the rule in this case of Vda.
de Legaspi is based on strong reasons of
equity not found in the present petition. 
The right of the petitioners is not so seriously placed in issue in the
annulment case as to warrant a deviation, on equitable grounds, from the
imperative nature of the rule.  In the Vda. de Legaspi case,
execution of the decision in the ejectment case would
also have meant demolition of the premises, a factor not present in this
petition.”

Vda. de Murga
v. Chan, 25 SCRA 441 (1968) is not in point.  In that case, the essential requisite of an
unequivocal demand to vacate and surrender the premises had not been fulfilled,
as the demand actually made on the lessee was in the alternative:  either pay rentals at an increased rate, or
if this be unacceptable, to surrender the leased property.  Furthermore, it appeared that the defendant’s
lease had not been legitimately ended but, on the contrary, had been
automatically renewed in virtue of a special clause in the lease contract.  It was for these reasons that this Court held
that the case was “outside the jurisdiction of the municipal court * *.”^[18]

Neither is Valderrama Lumber
Manufacturer’s Co., Inc. v. L.S. Sarmiento Co., 5
SCRA 287 (1962), also relied upon by the petitioners, in point.  Here, the ejectment
complaint was also found to be fatally defective in that it failed to allege
that the plaintiff had been in prior possession of the premises in question, or
had been deprived thereof by any of the means set forth in Section 1, Rule 72
of the Rules of Court or that possession was being unlawfully withheld from
said plaintiff.

The facts in Quiambao v.
Osorio, 158 SCRA 674 (1988) are also quite peculiar and differ from those
in the cases at bar.  Quiambao
v. Osorio originated from a complaint for forcible entry filed against Quiambao in the Malabon Municipal
Court by persons claiming to be legitimate possessors of a 30,835-square-meter
lot by virtue of Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor by the
former Land Tenure Administration (later, the Land Authority, then the Department
of Agrarian Reform).  Quiambao
moved to dismiss the action, alleging that that agreement had been impugned in
an administrative case before the Land Authority and said case constituted a
“prejudicial question.” The motion was denied, and Quiambao
instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of First
Instance to nullify the order of denial and cause dismissal of the ejectment suit.  In
this certiorari suit, the Land Authority, by leave of court, intervened
“praying that the petition for certiorari be granted and ** (it, the
Land Authority) be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.” It further
appears that subsequently, the Land Authority promulgated judgment in the
administrative case “affirming the cancellation of Agreement to Sell No. 3482”
thus making more apparent “the folly of allowing the ejectment
case to proceed ** .” Upon these facts, it appearing that the contract on which
the plaintiff’s cause of action for ejectment was
founded had been cancelled by the proper administrative authority, this Court
ordered dismissal of the ejectment case.

Orellano v. Alvestir, 76 SCRA 536 (1977), another
precedent cited by the petitioners, originated from an action instituted by Alvestir in the Court of First Instance praying that he be
adjudged to have the right to continue in possession of a parcel of land
despite the sale thereof by the Archbishop of Manila to Orellano
because said sale had been executed in violation of “Republic Act 1162 as
amended by Republic Act No. 1599 to the effect that:  ‘That no lot or portion thereof actually
occupied by a tenant or occupant shall be sold by the landowner to any other
persons than such tenant or occupant, unless the latter renounces in a public
instrument his right under this Act.’” What Orellano
did was to file a suit of unlawful detainer against Alvestir in the city court invoking his superior right of
possession in virtue of said sale to him by the Archbishop of Manila of the
premises in question.  Upon these facts,
this Court held:^[19]

“ * * * Orellano’s claim of better right
of possession in his complaint for ejectment is
already in issue in Alvestir’s action for rescission
pending in the Court of First Instance. 
It does not matter that Orellano is defendant
in that case whereas he is plaintiff in the city court, as long as the issues
raised in the pleadings by either of the parties require the resolution of the
same cause.  There is no question here
that the same parties are involved in both cases, albeit in Civil Case No.
53664, there are other parties who are not parties in the ejectment
suit.  (Alzua
vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Juan vs. Go Cotay, 26
Phil. 328).  The subject matter is
possession of the identical land in dispute. 
And the cause of Alvestir in the Court of
First Instance case is the same cause he alleged as affirmative defense in the detainer case.  In
any event, it is beyond cavil of doubt that until the question of whether or
not Alvestir has a right of priority, under the laws
invoked by him, over Orellano to purchase the land in
dispute is decided, the matter of who between appellant and appellee
has the better right of possession over it cannot be determined.  We are not in any way suggesting that appellee’s action for rescission is clearly
meritorious.  What is apparent is that it
is not on its face groundless.  The
contention of appellant that Alvestir cannot have any
standing in law, even under the provisions of Republic Act 1162, as amended,
invoked by him is a matter that We cannot resolve here.  It is but proper, therefore, from any point
of view, that Civil Case No. 63664 be allowed to follow its course and the ejectment suit be dismissed.”

As will be seen, a special law was a necessary factor in the controversy, which is a feature that
may well serve to distinguish the case from the precedents relied upon by the
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in their adjudication of the cases at
bar.  In any event, even assuming that
there is irreconcilable conflict between Orellano
and the other precedents listed and outlined in this opinion, there is no
difficulty whatever in concluding that the overwhelming weight of authority is
decidedly contrary to Orellano, precluding
application thereof to the present cases.

It may well be stressed in closing that as the law now stands,
even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases, “the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership,” the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial courts, and
Municipal Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve
“the issue of ownership ** only to determine the issue of possession.”^[20]

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals, being entirely in accord with the facts on record and applicable law
and jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED in toto,
and the petitions are DISMISSED.  Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., on leave.

^[1]
Petition:  Annex C

^[2] Id.:  p. 13 and Annex B

^[3] Rollo, pp. 35, 38

^[4]
Petition, Annex C

^[5]
Together with them, other tenants also sued as co-plaintiffs, namely:  Vic Imperial Sales Corporation, Joaquin Kua (doing business under the name and style of “New
Center Radio and Electrical Supply”), and Tung
Ah Hua & Company (doing business under the name
and style of “Victory Auto Supply”) (Rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 23750, p. 19)

^[6]
SEE footnote 1 and related text, supra

^[7] Rollo, CA-G.R. SP. No. 23750, p. 112

^[8]
By Resolution dated September 17, 1990

^[9]
Actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 are
within the concurrent jurisdictions of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
and Regional Trial Courts

^[10] Rollo, G.R. No. 98700-01, pp. 29, 34, 36

^[11]
Petition for review dated May 15, 1991

^[12] Rollo, G.R. No. 97637, pp. 29, 32-33

^[13] Petition for review dated March 21, 1991

^[14] Rollo, G.R. 97637, pp. 8-9; Rollo,
G.R No. 98700-01, p. 6

^[15]
See page 3, supra; SEE also footnote 10 and related text (Decision of
the Regional Trial Court), supra, and footnote 12 and related text
(Decision of the Court of Appeals), supra

^[16]
Second Division, per Regalado, J.

^[17] SEE page 5, supra

^[18] At p. 449

^[19] At page 542

^[20]
Sec. 33 (2), Batas Pambansa Bilang
129, eff. Aug. 14, 1981, otherwise known as “The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.” Sec. 88, R.A. 296, the Judiciary
Act of 1948, empowered courts of the first level, in forcible entry and detainer proceedings, “to receive evidence upon the
question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the property, solely
for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and
damages for detention;” and Sec. 3 (c) of R.A. 5967 granted to City Courts
jurisdiction in “ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought
in issue in the pleadings,” to resolve said “issue of ownership ** in
conjunction with the issue of possession.”