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MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., JUDGE BENIGNO T. DAYAW, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 80, QUEZON CITY, AND DEPUTY SHERIFF JOSE MARTINEZ, …

G.R. No. 97535. August 04, 1995 August 4, 1995

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Manila Electric Company versus La Campana Food Products

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Manila Electric Company, known as Meralco, against La Campana Food Products, Incorporated, Judge Benigno Dayaw of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and Deputy Sheriff Jose Martinez. Meralco asks the Supreme Court to annul the trial court's judgment by default, which ordered it to reconnect La Campana's electric service, to refund a sum of money with interest, and to pay attorney's fees, and to stop the enforcement of the writ of execution. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the whole remedial architecture of default: the fatal effect of a motion without a notice of hearing, the difference between an order of default and a judgment by default, the requisites of relief from an order of default, the meaning of extrinsic fraud as a ground for new trial, and the rule that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

Procedural History

La Campana filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and the case was first assigned to Branch 78, presided over by Judge Percival Lopez. After Judge Lopez inhibited himself upon Meralco's oral motion, the case was re-raffled to Branch 80, presided over by Judge Benigno Dayaw. Meralco failed to file its answer within the reglementary period, and upon La Campana's ex parte motion, Judge Dayaw issued an order of default and later rendered a judgment by default in favor of La Campana. Meralco then filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default and or for new trial, which Judge Dayaw denied. Meralco filed a notice of appeal, which the trial court likewise denied as filed out of time, and the court granted La Campana's motion for execution. Instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals, Meralco went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining order, and the Court's First Division issued a temporary restraining order in Meralco's favor.

Facts

On August 21, 1990, La Campana sued Meralco after receiving a notice of disconnection for alleged non-payment of two billings: a differential billing of 65,619 pesos and 26 centavos for electric energy used but not registered in the meter due to alleged tampering discovered on September 22, 1986, and an underbilling of 169,941 pesos and 29 centavos, with a balance of 28,323 pesos and 55 centavos, arising from a meter multiplier failure. Summons was served on Meralco on August 23, 1990, so the period to answer expired on September 7, 1990.

On September 7, 1990, Meralco filed a motion for extension of fifteen days within which to file an answer, but the motion contained no notice of hearing. It was never acted upon. Meralco's answer with counterclaim was actually received at Branch 78 only on September 21, 1990, beyond the period to answer but within the requested extension. Because no answer had been filed within the reglementary period, La Campana filed an ex parte motion to declare Meralco in default, which Judge Dayaw granted on October 8, 1990. After receiving La Campana's evidence ex parte, the trial court rendered its judgment by default on November 20, 1990.

Meralco did not appeal the judgment. Instead, on December 3, 1990, it filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default and or for new trial, claiming it had filed an answer and that the judgment was obtained by fraud. Judge Dayaw denied the motion on January 10, 1991, ruling that Meralco could not presume its defective motion for extension would be granted and that the motion was pro forma for failing to set forth the facts constituting fraud. Meralco then filed a notice of appeal on January 28, 1991, which the trial court denied on February 22, 1991, as filed out of time, and the court granted La Campana's motion for execution. A writ of execution issued on March 12, 1991, and Deputy Sheriff Jose Martinez was appointed special sheriff to enforce it.

Issues

  • Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Meralco in default and in rendering judgment by default against it.
  • Whether or not the trial court correctly denied Meralco's motion to set aside the judgment by default and or for new trial.
  • Whether or not Meralco's notice of appeal was filed out of time, and whether or not certiorari and prohibition may substitute for the lost appeal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, on relief from an order of default, provides:

Section 3. Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.

This provision fixes what may be set aside, namely the order of default, and the grounds Meralco had to establish but did not.

Section 9 of Rule 13, on service upon a party in default, provides:

Section 9. Service upon party in default. No service of papers other than substantially amended or supplemental pleadings and final orders or judgments shall be necessary on a party in default unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default, in which event he shall be entitled to notice of all further proceedings regardless of whether the order of default is set aside or not.

This provision answers Meralco's complaint that it was not notified of the ex parte motion to declare it in default.

Section 2 of Rule 41, on judgments or orders subject to appeal, provides:

A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.

This provision confirms that the remedy against a judgment by default is appeal, the very remedy Meralco lost.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion. Meralco's motion for extension of time to file an answer contained no notice of the place and date of hearing, an omission it could not explain. The Court quoted its earlier ruling that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority to act upon. Meralco could not presume that its defective motion would be granted, so when it filed its answer on September 21, 1990, fourteen days after the period expired, it was already in default and had to bear all the legal consequences. Nor was Meralco entitled to notice of the ex parte motion to declare it in default, because a defendant who fails to answer within the time provided by the Rules is already in default.

On the second issue, the Court clarified that what an aggrieved party seeks to set aside is the order of default, an interlocutory order that is not appealable, and not the judgment by default, which is a final disposition and appealable to the Court of Appeals. Even granting that the motion was proper, it was correctly denied because Meralco failed to show that its failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect, and it did not allege a meritorious defense. As a motion for new trial grounded on fraud, it also failed, because the fraud it claimed was in the ex parte motion, and La Campana could not have known of the answer, which was received only on October 8, 1990, while the ex parte motion was filed earlier on September 27, 1990. The Court defined the fraud required:

Fraud, as a ground for new trial, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, it is the kind of fraud which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy.

Meralco's failure to go to trial was solely attributable to its own failure to comply with the Rules. Its motion was also pro forma for failing to specify the facts constituting fraud with particularity, and a pro forma motion does not interrupt the running of the period to appeal.

On the third issue, having received the decision on November 29, 1990, Meralco had until December 14, 1990, to file a notice of appeal. The notice it filed on January 28, 1991, was clearly out of time. Having lost its right to appeal, Meralco could not take refuge in certiorari and prohibition, because the special civil action of certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.

Doctrine

A motion that does not comply with the notice of hearing requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is a worthless piece of paper, and any extension it seeks is not deemed granted; a defendant who fails to answer within the reglementary period is in default and is not entitled to notice of the motion to declare him in default. What may be set aside under Section 3 of Rule 18 is the order of default, upon proof that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect and that the defendant has a meritorious defense; the judgment by default itself is a final, appealable judgment. Fraud as a ground for new trial must be extrinsic or collateral, meaning it prevented the party from having a trial or presenting his case, and it must be alleged with particularity, otherwise the motion is pro forma and does not interrupt the period to appeal. Finally, certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, the temporary restraining order dissolved, the judgment by default and the orders of the trial court declared final, and the writ of execution declared valid, with costs against Meralco.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a motion without a notice of hearing is a worthless piece of paper, and that what is set aside is the order of default while what is appealed is the judgment by default. Examiners use this case to test the consequences of a defective motion for extension, the requisites of relief from an order of default, the extrinsic fraud requirement for new trial, and the rule against certiorari as a substitute for a lost appeal.