PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DOMINGO CASINILLO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Casinillo versus People

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Domingo Casinillo, a criminal appeal from a conviction for rape. The victim, Leticia Soria, an eighteen-year-old barrio lass from Mati, Davao Oriental, identified Casinillo as the man who, armed with a short firearm, dragged her from her home on the night of 13 May 1989 and ravaged her in the bushes. The case matters for the bar because it gathers in one decision the Court's settled rules on the credibility of a rape complainant, the weight of a police blotter entry, the nature of a police lineup, the weakness of alibi, and the presumption of innocence that the prosecution must overcome with proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Procedural History

Leticia Soria filed her complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental, which after preliminary investigation found reasonable ground to hold the accused for trial. The Provincial Prosecutor then filed three separate Informations: one for rape against Casinillo alone, one for robbery with rape, and one for robbery in band against Casinillo and three co-accused. Upon arraignment all the accused pleaded not guilty, and the three cases were tried jointly before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao Oriental sitting at Mati. In its decision promulgated on 22 October 1990, the trial court acquitted all the accused in the robbery with rape and robbery in band cases, but convicted Casinillo of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the offended party twenty thousand pesos as moral damages and ten thousand pesos as attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit. Casinillo filed his notice of appeal on 25 October 1990, and the case reached the Supreme Court by ordinary appeal.

Facts

At about half past eight in the evening of 13 May 1989, while Leticia Soria was resting in the kitchen of their house in Barangay Danao, Mati, with her mother Consolacion, her brother Mario, and her sister Julieta, a man pushed the kitchen door open and barged in, followed by two companions. By the light of the fluorescent lamp, Leticia recognized the intruder as Domingo Casinillo, whom she had known since 1988 as the uncle of a classmate and friend. He was armed with a short firearm. When her mother asked why he was searching the house, he poked a revolver at her head and warned her to keep quiet or he would kill them all. He then tore a curtain into strips and tied the hands of her mother and brother.

Casinillo forcibly brought Leticia outside with the gun poked at her, telling her they would go to a neighbor's house and that she would knock on the door. About three hundred meters from her house, he suddenly stopped her, dragged her toward the bushes, and boxed her twice in the solar plexus, causing her to collapse. He hugged and kissed her, and when she resisted he struck her right thigh with his firearm and boxed her thighs repeatedly until she felt weak. He raised her shirt, kissed her body, pulled down her shorts and panty, and, while she cried and begged him to stop, he covered her mouth with one hand and pointed the gun at her throat with the other. She felt him insert his penis into her vagina, causing her great pain, this being her first sexual experience. Afterwards he warned her not to tell anyone, but she told her mother what had happened.

The following morning, accompanied by her mother and brothers and their neighbors, she reported the rape to the barangay captain, who brought them to the police headquarters in Mati, and then to the Provincial Hospital of Davao Oriental, where a medical examination disclosed a hymenal laceration at the five o'clock position with bleeding and multiple contusion-hematoma at the medial aspect of both thighs. Casinillo's defense was alibi: he claimed he was in his house in Dawan, Mati, with his wife and son, and never left the place, a story corroborated by his wife and his father.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the offended party positively identified the accused as her assailant.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the offended party is credible and that her testimony is worthy of belief.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Applicable Provisions

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, defines and penalizes the crime of rape, and the Information charged that the accused, armed with a firearm and with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of Leticia Soria against her will. The Court's review is governed by the constitutional presumption of innocence. Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.

That presumption places on the prosecution the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court also invokes the rule on suppressed evidence, Section 3, paragraph e, of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

The Court holds that this rule does not apply where the evidence claimed to be suppressed is merely corroborative or is equally available to the accused.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found positive identification. The offended party recognized the appellant from the moment he and his companions barged into the well-lit kitchen, and his face was exposed from the time he dragged her out of the house to the time he raped her and brought her back. The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on the police blotter entry stating that the rapists wore white cloth masks. An entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit, for it could be incomplete and inaccurate. The entries were wanting in material particulars, they were made not by the offended party but by her mother, and there was no evidence that they were read to the offended party or presented to her, so they cannot bind her. The Court likewise dismissed the grievance over the police lineups, since the trial court's finding of identification did not even consider them, and a police lineup is a mechanical act not covered by the right against testimonial compulsion or the right to counsel.

On the second issue, the Court found the complainant credible. Her testimony was full of sincerity and candor, she was unwavering under rigorous cross-examination, and there was no proof of improper motive. The Court observed that it is difficult to conceive of a reason that would motivate a provincial lass to undergo the embarrassment and humiliation of a public trial affecting her honor and to submit to the examination of her private parts other than to bring her defiler to justice.

On the third issue, the Court held that guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The defense of alibi was patently weak, corroborated only by the accused's spouse and parent, who would naturally be expected to give statements that would free their spouse or son from liability. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else; it must likewise be undisputably demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime, and the appellant failed to show such impossibility. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. The claim of suppressed evidence also failed, because the testimonies of the arresting officer and the barangay captain would have been merely corroborative and were equally available to the accused.

Doctrine

An accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and the prosecution must overthrow that presumption with proof beyond reasonable doubt, scrutinized by the court independently of the defense. Absolute certainty is not demanded; only moral certainty as to the elements of the offense and the identity of the offender, that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. In reviewing rape cases, the Court applies three guiding principles: an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. A police blotter entry is not necessarily entitled to full credit, and an entry not made by the complainant and not shown to have been read to her cannot bind her. A police lineup is a mechanical act that does not require the guiding hand of counsel. Alibi, inherently weak and easily fabricated, must be supported by strong corroboration and by proof of physical impossibility, and it cannot prevail over positive identification. Finally, the rule that willfully suppressed evidence is adverse does not apply where the evidence is merely corroborative or equally available to the accused.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Domingo Casinillo for rape and his sentence of reclusion perpetua, but increased the moral damages from twenty thousand pesos to forty thousand pesos, with costs against the appellant.

Remember This

Memorize the three guiding principles in the review of rape cases, and the rule that alibi must prove physical impossibility and cannot prevail over positive identification. Examiners use this case for the credibility of a rape complainant, the limited weight of a police blotter, the validity of a police lineup without counsel, and the requisites of alibi.