G.R. No. 97430. June 26, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GOMER MENDOZA Y PURIGAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
NOCON, J.:
It was at broad daylight at around ten o’clock in the morning of
September 19, 1989, when the gruesome killing of a housemaid by the name of Rebecca Miranda
Abarca and the taking of valuables amounting to Thirty Thousand Six Hundred
Pesos (P30,600.00) from the house of herein complainant, Eloisa Magdurulang
located at Villa Angelica Subdivision, Kaybiga, Novaliches, Kalookan City
occurred.
Consequently, criminal charges against herein appellant Gomer
Mendoza were filed under an Information which reads:
“That on or about the 19th day of
September 19, 1989 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the
following items, to wit:
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all belonging to one ELOISA MAGDURULANG y GALANG, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter in the aforementioned total amount of P29,900.00; (sic) and on
the occasion thereof, attack, assault and strangled with a nylon cord one
REBECCA ABARCA y MIRANDA, a housemaid thereat, thereby causing her
instanteneous (sic) death.
Contrary to law.”[1]
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime of Robbery with
Homicide as charged in the Information. Anchoring his defense on alibi, the trial court rejected the same and
rendered judgment against herein appellant, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the
accused GOMER MENDOZA y PURIGAY
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased the amount of P30,000.00 and to reimburse the heirs
of the deceased the sum of P10,800.00 representing burial and funeral expenses;
to pay Eloisa Magdurulang the amount of P16,700.00 representing the value of
the unrecovered lost items and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.”
As borne out from the records, the facts of the case are as
follows:
It was about ten minutes past one o’clock in the afternoon of September 19, 1989, when complainant Eloisa
Magdurulang received a phone call at her office from one of her neighbors informing
her that something had happened at her house at Villa Angelica Subdivision,
Kaybiga, Kalookan City. Complainant
immediately left for home and upon arrival thereat, she found her housemaid
Rebecca Abarca dead and the following valuables stolen: one (1) unit Sanyo betamax worth P12,000,
one (1) unit Imarflex Betamax rewinder worth P850, one (1) Casio portable organ
worth P5,000, one (1) Seiko Lady’s wrist watch worth P1,200, one (1) Kodak
instamatic camera worth P800, one (1) men’s gold ring worth P500, one (1) men’s
gold necklace with crucifix pendant worth P2,500, two (2) pieces children’s
necklace with zodiac sign pendant worth P3,000, one set of earring worth P800,
one (1) gold ring with stone (brillantitos) worth P500, two (2) pieces lady’s
gold necklace with pendant worth P3,000 and three (3) men’s T-shirt worth P450,
totalling to P30,600.00.
At the scene of the crime, the deceased, Rebecca Abarca had been
strangled and hung with a nylon cord and a suicide note[2] was
discovered in the room where she was found. Complainant however, upon comparing the suicide letter with a copy of a
recent handwritten letter of Abarca, Exhibit “K”,[3]
strongly disputed the suicide letter to be that of the deceased.
Two days later, appellant was surrendered by his father Gregorio
Mendoza to the police authorities to whom he admitted[4]
during custodial investigation his responsibility for the crime committed on
September 19, 1989 at complainant’s house. Appellant recounted that he was about to leave complainant’s house, with
the items he had stolen, when the housemaid Rebecca Abarca saw him. Hence, he ran after the maid, following her
inside a room and when he got hold of her, he pressed her head against the bed
and covered it with a pillow. Later, he
took the dead body of the maid, tied her neck with a nylon cord and hung her by
the window.[5]
Appellant then made a suicide letter to make it appear that the maid took her
own life.[6]
Appellant likewise admitted that he pawned some of the items he
stole and that he kept the pawnshop tickets under the linoleum in their house.[7]
Pursuant to his disclosure, accused-appellant together with Pfc. Reynor Melmida
and Pat. Edgardo Aquino went to the former’s house to get the pawnshop tickets,
one (1) from Cebuano pawnshop covering a Sanyo Betamax and another from
Villarica pawnshop which covered a lady’s wristwatch[8] which
they found at the place indicated by the accused-appellant. The items pawned were redeemed out of the
money provided by appellant’s father, Gregorio Mendoza and returned to the
owner Eloisa Magdurulang.[9]
Accused-appellant now seeks to nullify the judgment of the trial
court on the ground that the circumstantial evidence presented was insufficient
to overcome accused-appellant’s presumption of innocence; and in proving that
he was the person responsible for the robbery and the killing of the deceased.
The real issue in the case at bar is whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to warrant appellant’s
conviction.
Jurisprudence teaches us that for circumstantial evidence to be
sufficient to support a conviction, all
the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.[10]
Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the
requisites therefor are present, namely: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences must be
based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.[11]
The intent to gain, being an internal act, cannot be established
by direct evidence, except in cases of confession by the accused. It must therefore, be inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense.[12]
In the instant case, the following circumstances point to the
guilt of the accused-appellant:
1.
The two (2) pawnshop tickets covering a Sanyo Betamax and a
lady’s wristwatch, items stolen from Eloisa Magdurulang, were recovered in the
appellant’s house in the place pointed to by him under the linoleum.[13]
2.
Appellant was voluntarily surrendered by his father, Gregorio Mendoza,
to the police authorities to whom he confessed his guilt.[14]
3. Appellant
was able to redeem the stolen betamax from the Cebuano pawnshop after he signed
the pawnshop ticket[15] and
the stolen wristwatch was redeemed from the Villarica pawnshop after appellant’s
ID card was presented together with the pawnshop certificate.[16]
4.
It was the father of the accused-appellant who provided for
the money to be used in redeeming the stolen items from the pawnshops.[17]
5.
Finally, appellant’s house is just beside the house of Eloisa
Magdurulang,[18]
thus, affording appellant the opportunity to easily commit the crime and to
seek refuge in his house.
All the foregoing circumstances constitute clear proof of
appellant’s guilt considering that even before he could be arrested, his father
surrendered him to the police authorities. It would be at variance with ordinary human behavior for appellant’s
father to have voluntarily placed his son under police custody absent any culpability
on his son’s part for any offense.[19]
That the pawnshop certificates covering the stolen articles were
recovered in the appellant’s house seriously implicates appellant to the crime
charged considering his unexplained possession of said certificates. His knowledge of the whereabouts of the
pawnshop certificates convinces Us that appellant is responsible for the
commission of the offense charged. When
it is proven that property stolen is found in the possession of a person, who
is unable to give a satisfactory explanation as to his possession of such
property, a prima facie case is made against such person sufficient to justify
his conviction of the crime of larceny of said property. Men who come honestly into the possession of
property have no difficulty in explaining the method by which they came into
such possession.[20]
The sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support a
conviction, must be determined on its own peculiar circumstances and all the
facts and circumstances are to be considered together as a whole, and, when so
considered, may be sufficient to support a conviction, although one or more of
the facts if taken separately would not be sufficient for this purpose.[21]
In the case before Us, after taking into consideration all the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime charged, one is led to
the inescapable conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator thereof.
As found by the Court a quo:
“The Court after analyzing the evidence adduced by the
prosecution firmly believe that all the evidences presented are all
circumstantial, however, although circumstantial, they are sufficient to
convict accused of the crime charged in the information. The following circumstances/observation of
the court pointed to the accused as the killer of Rebecca Abarca and looter of
the stolen properties of Eloisa Magdurulang. Further, the evidences adduced by the prosecution have successfully
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence afforded the accused and had established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.“[22]
Appellant disputes the reliability of the police officers’
testimony claiming that his father only accompanied him to the police
headquarters because of the fear that he might be salvaged, he being the prime
suspect of the crime.
But We find nothing in the evidence on record that appellant was
one of the primary suspects two days after the robbery and killing and that
there was a conspiracy to liquidate him, so that appellant’s father had to
surrender him to the police for his own protection.
Courts generally give full faith and credit to the testimony of
police officers on the basis of the presumption of the regularity in
performance of their official duties. Their testimonies cannot simply be discredited where no improper motive
is shown why they would frame up appellant,[23] or
in the absence of proof to the contrary.[24]
Guided by the foregoing principles and the absence of any evidence
whatsoever to show that the prosecution witnesses had ulterior motives to
testify falsely against appellant, other than to tell the truth and to bring to
justice the perpetrator of the crime charged, their testimonies are worthy of
full faith and credit.
On the other hand, appellant denies confessing to the crime
charged; his having informed the police authorities the whereabouts of the
pawnshop tickets; his having signed the aforementioned pawnshop ticket[25]
and that his father provided the money to redeem the stolen items.
As between a negative assertion and a positive one, the latter
carries greater weight than a negative assertion. Mere denials constitute self-serving negative evidence, which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declarations of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[26]
In addition thereto, his allegation that on the night of the day
in question he slept at home cannot be taken seriously without accounting for
his whereabouts in the morning of said day, when the offense was believed to
have been perpetrated.[27]
Besides, time and again courts have looked upon the defense of
alibi with suspicion[28] and
always receive it with caution[29]not
only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of its easy
fabrication.[30]
For alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The requisite of time and place must be
strictly met. The accused must show
that he was at some other place where the crime was committed at the time of
its commission.[31]
Appellant failed to meet the requisites.
Appellant’s extra-judicial confession before Pfc. Reynor Melmida
and Pat. Edgardo Aquino, having been elicited during custodial investigation,
in the absence of counsel and, albeit an informal one, not being reduced to
writing, is inadmissible in evidence against appellant. As held in People vs. Lacap,
G.R. No. 78730, promulgated March 8, 1989:
“No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, or by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right
to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.”[32]
Where therefore, the execution of the extrajudicial confession is
made in the absence of counsel, de parte or de officio, and the
waiver was not made with the assistance of counsel, said extrajudicial
confession should be disregarded.
However, even without the extra-judicial confession, the
circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution unerringly points to the appellant as the author of the crime
charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed herefrom is hereby
AFFIRMED save for the modifications that the indemnity to be paid to the heirs
of the deceased be increased to P50,000.00[33] and
the amount to be paid to Eloisa Magdurulang be increased to P17,400.00. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, p. 7.
[2]
Exhibit “P”, Records, p. 68.
[3]
Records, p. 61.
[4]
T.S.N., March 28, 1990, p. 4.
[5]
Id., at pp. 5-6.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
T.S.N., January 22, 1990, pp. 5-6.
[8]
Id., at p. 6.
[9]
T.S.N., November 10, 1989, p. 9.
[10]
People vs. Maravilla, Jr., No. 77968, 167 SCRA 645, (1988).
[11]
People vs. Alcantara, No. 74737, 163 SCRA 783, (1988).
[12]
Bernal vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-32798, 165 SCRA 18, (1988).
[13]
T.S.N., January 22, 1990, p. 6.
[14]
T.S.N., March 28, 1990, p. 12.
[15]
Id, at p. 5.
[16]
T.S.N., January 22, 1990, p. 9.
[17]
Id., at p. 10.
[18]
T.S.N., May 31, 1990, p. 4.
[19]
People vs. Dy, No. 74517, 158 SCRA 111, (1988).
[20]
U.S. vs. Espia, No. 5813, 16 Phil. 506, (1910).
[21]
People vs. Aldeguer, G.R. No. 47991, 184 SCRA, (1990).
[22]
Decision, p. 5, Rollo, p. 68.
[23]
People vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, 185 SCRA 154, (1990).
[24]
People vs. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 83260, 184 SCRA 416, (1990).
[25]
Decision, p. 6, Rollo, p.
69.
[26]
People vs. Alcantara, No. 74739, 163 SCRA 783, (1988).
[27]
T.S.N., May 31, 1990, p. 4.
[28]
People vs. Bondoc, No. L-2278, 85 Phil. 545 (1950).
[29]
People vs. Cinco, No. 46144, 67 Phil. 196 (1939).
[30]
People vs. Rafallo, No. L-2265, 86 Phil. 22 (1950).
[31]
People vs. Cruz, No. 68805, 142 SCRA 576, (1986).
[32]
171 SCRA 147.
[33]
People vs. Sison, G.R. No. 86455, 189 SCRA 643, (1990).