GAUDENCIO T. CENA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND THE HON PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, IN HER CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

May a government employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days
of government service, be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an
old-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977? This is the
issue raised before this Court by petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a Registrar of
the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.

The facts are not disputed.

Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on
November 16, 1978 as Legal Officer II of the Law Department of Caloocan City
where he stayed for seven (7) years until his transfer on November 16, 1986 to
the Office of the Congressman of the First District of Caloocan City where he
worked for only three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising
Staff Officer.

On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register
of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the time he reached
the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a total
government service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of
Justice, through Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old-age
pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.

The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the
Civil Service Commission whether or not to allow the extension of service of
petitioner Cena as he is covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, series
1990. In his 2nd Indorsement dated
August 6, 1990, the LRA Administrator observed that if petitioner’s service as
of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months and 6 days (should be 11 years, 9
months and 6 days) would be extended to 15 years, he would have to retire on
April 15, 1994 at the age of 68 years.

On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner
Cena’s request for extension of service in its CSC Resolution No. 90-681,
declaring therein, that Mr. Cena shall be considered retired from the service
on January 22, 1991, the date when he shall reach the compulsory retirement age
of sixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year is sought by
the head of office under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990.

Petitioner Cena  filed a
motion for reconsideration. On October
17, 1990, the Civil Service Commission set aside its CSC Resolution No. 90-681
and allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-year extension of his service from January 22,
1991 to January 22, 1992, citing CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, series of
1990, the pertinent of which reads:

“1. Any request for the extension of service of
compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for
retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service
who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall
be granted for a period not exceeding
one (12) year.”

On January 22, 1991, petitioner’s second motion for
reconsideration was denied in its CSC Resolution No. 91-101.

Hence, the instant petition for review   on certiorari alleging that the Civil Service Commission
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it granted the extension of
petitioner’s service as Registrar of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, for a
period of only one (1) year pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series
of 1990, instead of three (3) years and three (3) months to complete the
15-year service requirement for his retirement with full benefits as provided
under Section 11, par. (b) of Presidential Decree No. 1146, otherwise known as
the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.

Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1)
of Memorandum Circular No. 27 allowing an extension of service of a compulsory
retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is both erroneous and contrary
to the “benevolent and munificent intentions” of Section 11 of P.D.
1146. Petitioner points out that par.
(b), Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the maximum number
of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15 years of service.

The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that the questioned provision
being generally worded, Section 11 par. (b), P.D. 1146 has general application,
thus respondent CSC has no authority to limit through CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 27 the privilege under said section to government employees who lack just
one year to complete the 15-year service requirement.

The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public
respondent CSC is the central personnel agency of the government, it is vested
with the power and authority, among others, to grant or allow extension of
service beyond retirement age pursuant to Section 14 par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle
A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). In interpreting Section 11 par.
(b) of P.D. 1146, public respondent CSC contends that the phrase
“Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years”, is
qualified by the clause: “Unless
the service is extended by appropriate authorities,” which means that the
extension of service must be first authorized by the Commission, as the appropriate
authority referred to in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146, before the service of
a compulsory retiree (one who has already reached age of 65 years with at least
15 years of service) can be extended.

We grant the petition.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to
authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only one (1) year the
extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 without having completed 15 years of services, when said limitation
has no relation to or connection with the provision of the law supposed to be
carried into effect.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 provides thus:

“SEC. 12. Powers and
Functions.- The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x                  x x x                 x x x

“(14) Take
appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil
Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;”

As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot authorize the modification of an express provision of a special law
(Revised Government Service Insurance of 1977). Otherwise, the intent and purpose of the provisions on retirement
and pension of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146)
would be rendered nugatory and meaningless.

Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977 expressly provides, thus:

“SEC. 11. Conditions
for Old-Age Pension. – (a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a member who:

x x x            x x x             x x x

“(b) Unless the
service is extended by appropriate
authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least fifteen years of service: Provided,
That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed
to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years.” (Emphasis supplied)

Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or
establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in
favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and
well?being of government employees may be enhanced (Bautista vs. Auditor
General, 104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78957,
June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).

The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil.
176, that a pension partakes of the nature of “retained wages” of the
retiree for a double purpose: (1) to
entice competent men and women to enter the government service, and (2) permit
them to retire from the service with relative security, not only for those who
have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by
illness or accident.

We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes
creating pension or establishing retirement plans in cases involving officials
of the Judiciary who lacked the age and service requirement for
retirement. We see no cogent reason to
rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive Branch, as in
the case of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but opted to avail of the
statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 to continue in the
service to complete the 15-year service requirement in order to avail of
old-age pension.

In Re: Application for
Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana, Adm. Matter No. 5460, En
Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988, the Court, applying the liberal approach,
ruled that Justice Plana, who at the time of his courtesy resignation on March
25, 1986 lacked a few months to meet the age requirement for retirement under
the law, is entitled to full retirement benefits under R.A. 910 because his
accrued leave credits would have entitled him to go on leave until beyond the
age requirement for retirement.

The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application for Retirement under Rep. Act
No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, Adm. Matter No. 6484-Ret., May 15, 1989. By liberally interpreting Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended, in
favor of the persons intended to be benefited by them, the Court also allowed
the conversion of the application for disability retirement of Justice Ruperto
Martin under said Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended (10-year lump sum without
the lifetime annuity) into an application for voluntary retirement under
Section 1 (5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after his
disability retirement was approved on January 10, 1978 (In Re: Application for Life Pension under Rep. Act
910. Ruperto G. Martin, applicant, 187
SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which
he had received was considered by the Court as payment under Section 1 of the
five-year lump sum, to which he was entitled, and of his monthly pensions for
the next five years.

However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm. Matter No. 2076-RET., July 13, 1990, and
its six (6) companion cases, 187 SCRA 469, that when the Court allows seeming
exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices, there are
ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of
required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on a case to case basis.

There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary
employees in the Executive Branch, on a case to case basis, to continue in the
service to complete the 15-year service requirement to avail of the old-age
pension under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. By limiting the extension of service to only one (1) year would defeat the
beneficial intendment of the retirement provisions of P.D. 1146.

In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory
retiree to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service, there must
be present an essential factor before an application under Section 11 par. (b)
of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the employer or government office
concerned. In the case of officials of
the Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of required
age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by
competence, integrity, and dedication to the public service (Re: Gregorio Pineda, supra). It must be so in the instant case.

It is interesting to note that the phrase “he shall be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years” found in
Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146 is a reproduction of the phrase in the original
text found in Section 12 (e) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, otherwise
known as the “Government Service Insurance Act” approved on November 14,
1936. There is nothing in the original
text as well as in the revised version which would serve as the basis for
providing the allowable extension period to only one (1) year. There is likewise no indication that Section
11 par.(b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory
retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15 years
of government service., i.e. only a few months short of the 15-year requirement
which would enable him to collect an old-age pension.

While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given
the Civil Service Commission the authority “to take appropriate action on
all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including
extension of service beyond retirement age”, the said provision cannot be
extended to embrace matters not covered by the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382,
citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority
referred to therein is limited only to carrying into effect what the special
law, Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement law
being invoked provides. It cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in
the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle
that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions
(People vs. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585;
Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660;
Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusto Toledo vs.
Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No-92646-47, October 4, 1991, squarely
applies in the instant case. We
declared in the case of Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-year old persons
from employment, reinstatement, or re-employment in the government service
provided under Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel
Actions and Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity, because it is
entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law
itself which it was meant to implement and it cannot be related to or connected
with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into
effect. The Court, speaking thru
Justice Edgardo L. Paras, stated, thus:

“The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to
implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law
into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. ‘By its administrative regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations cannot amend an
act of Congress.’ (Teoxon v. Members of
the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585,
589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos v.
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223?224 [1989] in turn
citing Teoxon).

“The considerations just expounded also conduce to the
conclusion of the invalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said section, relative to
57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil
Service Commission since the rule has no relation to or connection with any
provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or extension
of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect.” (Emphasis supplied)

The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146
otherwise known as the “Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977”. The rule on limiting to only one
(1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service under Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded
validity because it has no relation to or connection with any provision of P.D.
1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode
of carrying it into effect. The Civil
Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.

As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par.
(b) of P.D. 1146 in two (2) recent cases where We allowed two employees in the
Judiciary who have reached the age of 65 to continue in the government service
to complete the 15-year service requirement to be entitled to the benefits
under P.D. 1146.

In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC,
We allowed Mrs. Florentina J. Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Dagami, Leyte, who at the time she reached the age of 65 years on October 16,
1987 had only 10 years of government service, to continue her services until
October 10, 1992. Thus, she was given a
period of 5 years, to complete the 15-year service requirement to be entitled
to the retirement benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The Court observed that Mrs. Bocade is still
performing her duties without any adverse complaints from her superior and that
she is physically fit for work per report of the Medical Clinic.

The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No.
91-3-003-SC.-Re: Request for the
extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, allowed Mrs. Crisanta T.
Tiangco, Budget Officer V, Budget Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office
of the Supreme Court to continue her services until February 10, 1995. She was granted a period of 3 years, 10
months and 13 days because she has to her credit only 11 years, 1 month and 17
days of government service at the time she reached the age of 65 years on March
29, 1991 in order that she be entitled to the retirement benefits under P.D.
No. 1146.

It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11
years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, Section 12, par. (b) of P.D.
1146 which provides that “a member who has rendered at least three (3) years
but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, x x x upon
separation after age sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% of his average
monthly compensation for every year of service.”

The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows him to extend his 11
years, 9 months and 6 days to complete the 15-year of service consistent with
the beneficial intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to the
discretion of the government office concerned.

Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of
herein petitioner Cena, because he opted to continue in the service to complete
the 15-year service requirement pursuant to Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.
1146. The completion of the 15-year
service requirement under Section 11 par. (b) partakes the nature of a
privilege given to an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of
65 years, but has less than 15 years of service. If said employee opted to avail of said privilege, he is entitled
to the benefits of the old-age pension. On the other hand, if the said employee opted to retire upon reaching
the compulsory retirement age of 65 years although he has less than 15 years of
service, he is entitled to the benefits provided for under Section 12 of P.D.
1146, i.e. a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for
every year of service.

The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees
similarly situated, so it does not offend the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the law. There is nothing
absurd or inequitable in rewarding an employee for completion of the 15-year
service beyond the retirement age. If
he would be better off than the one who has served for 14 years but who is
separated from the service at the age of 64, it would be only just and proper
as he would have worked for the whole period of 15 years as required by law for
entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, a longer service should merit a greater reward. Besides, his entitlement to the old-age
pension is conditioned upon such completion. Thus, if the service is not completed due to death or incapacity, he
would be entitled to the benefit under Section 12, par. (b), i.e. a cash
equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of
service.

Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section
11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146, petitioner Cena should not be covered by Memorandum
Circular No. 65 issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig on June
14, 1988. Memorandum Circular No. 65
allowing retention of service for only six (6) months for “extremely
meritorious reasons” should apply only to employees or officials who have
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time,
have completed the 15-year service requirement for retirement purposes. It should not apply to employees or
officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who
opted to avail of the old-age pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146,
in which case, they are allowed, at the discretion of the agency concerned, to
complete the 15-year service requirement.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) of the
Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to
extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service to complete the
15-year service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par.
(b) of P.D. 1146.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Padilla, see concurring
opinion.

Grino-Aquino, Romero, JJ., see
separate dissenting opinion.