HON. ARTURO C. CORONA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, IN HIS CAPACITY, AS GENERAL MANAGE…

The instant petition for
review on certiorari once again puts in
issue the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
Secretary’s power to discipline employees of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) below the rank of Assistant General
Manager in his capacity as alter ego of the President.

On May 15, 1987, President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 25 creating a Presidential
Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability, Sec. 1 of which declares as a
policy that:

“The Department Secretary shall be directly responsible to the
President in eradicating graft and corruption in his Department and the
offices, agencies, government-owned or controlled corporations attached to or
under his Department. The Department
Secretary shall likewise be responsible to the President for the implementation
of policies and programs to minimize or prevent graft and corruption and to
promote the ethical standards of public service.”

Pursuant to the mandate
of A.O. No. 25, former DOTC Secretary Rainerio Reyes issued Office Order No.
88-318 creating the Administrative Action Board (AAB) “to act, decide and
recommend to the Secretary appropriate measures on cases of administrative
malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the
Department.”

On August 26, 1988, two
PPA police officers; Rosmelito del Mundo and Geronimo Gorospe, filed in the AAB
which was then presided by Chairman Onofre Villaluz, a complaint for dishonesty
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against Leopoldo
Bungubung, District Manager of the Port of Manila (AAB-031-88).

Bungubung filed his
answer but later, he filed a motion to dismiss assailing the jurisdictional
competence of the AAB on the ground that it was the General Manager of the PPA
who had jurisdiction over the case. AAB
denied the motion to dismiss in a written order which was issued by Secretary Reyes
himself upon the recommendation of the AAB.

Subsequently, the PPA
General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed another “formal charge”
against Bungubung and one Mario Tan for dishonesty, inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties, willful violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Docketed as Adm. Case No.
11-01-88, the case was indorsed to the AAB for appropriate action.

Questioning the
jurisdiction of the AAB over the administrative cases against him, Bungubung
filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order with this Court (G.R. Nos. 86468-69). In the resolution of January 26, 1989, the
Court required the respondents to file their comment on the petition and issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining the AAB from further acting on the
administrative cases.

Meanwhile, on August 26,
1988 or on the same date that the first administrative case against Bungubung
was filed, Secretary Reyes also filed a complaint with the AAB against
Cristeto Dinopol, then Manager of the Port of Davao, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for violation of the Anti-Graft
Law (Adm. Case No. AAB-006-88). PPA
General Manager Dayan then issued a preventive suspension order against
Dinopol. On September 19, 1988, said
PPA General Manager also filed Adm. Case No. AAB-016-88 against Dinopol for
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

At
the hearings conducted by the AAB, Dinopol actively participated. He presented his evidence therein although
he asserted that the PPA General Manager, not the AAB, had jurisdiction to
initiate and conduct an administrative investigation under Sec. 8 of P.D. No.
857; the PPA Charter.

On
October 27, 1988, the AAB rendered a decision in Adm. Case AAB-006-88 finding
Dinopol guilty as charged and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the
service with cause plus the accessory penalties of cancellation of
eligibilities, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification for re-employment in the government service. On November 23, 1988, AAB rendered its
decision in Adm. Case AAB-016-88 also finding Dinopol guilty as charged. He was also meted the same penalty and its
accessories as those imposed on him in Adm. Case AAB-006-88.

Copies
of said decisions were mailed to Dinopol on December 6, 1988 but on that day,
Dinopol filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,^[1] a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order challenging the jurisdiction of the AAB over
the administrative cases against him. The following day, said court issued an order directing the respondents
therein (petitioners herein) “to desist from continuing the proceedings of
the Administrative Action Board” and “to observe the status quo on
the situation prior to (Dinopol’s) suspension.”

Respondents
therein opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but on January 9, 1988, the
court issued a resolution ordering the reinstatement of Dinopol to his former
position of Port Manager of Davao and the payment to him of back salaries and
other emoluments during his preventive suspension. The court also issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for by Dinopol.

A motion praying for the
reconsideration of the said resolution and for the dissolution of the writ was
filed by the respondent officials therein. On the other hand, Dinopol filed a motion to cite the PPA General Manager in contempt of court for failing to
reinstate him and pay his back salaries. On January 26, 1989, the court denied the motion and directed the
immediate implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction with a warning
that in case of non-compliance therewith, respondent officials, therein shall
be fined P1,000.00 and imprisoned for a period not exceeding one month.

This prompted the said
respondents to file with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction. Acting
on the petition which was captioned as “Hon. Rainerio O. Reyes, etc., et
al. v. Engr. Cristeto E. Dinopol, et al.” and docketed as G.R. No. 86646,
on February 2, 1989, this Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed
for and enjoined the lower court to cease and desist from implementing the
resolution and writ of preliminary injunction both dated January 9, 1989 as
well as the order of January 26, 1989.

G.R. Nos. 86488-69 (the
Bungubung case) and G.R. No. 86646 (the Dinopol case) were later consolidated
upon the submission of the petitioners in the latter case that the two
petitions present the common issue of whether or not the Secretary of the DOTC
and/or the AAB have jurisdiction to initiate and hear administrative cases
against PPA personnel whose rank are below that of an assistant general
manager. After their consolidation, the
two cases were referred to the Court of Appeals “for appropriate
action.”

The cases were docketed
in the Court of Appeals as CA – G.R. No. SP-17195. Asserting that the periods of their preventive suspension had
been unduly extended, Bungubung and Dinopol moved for their immediate
reinstatement pendente lite. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolutions of July 5 and
20, 1989. Hence, then DOTC Secretary
Oscar Orbos, PPA General Manager Dayan and then AAB Chairman Villaluz
interposed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
with this Court, submitting the issue of whether or not Dinopol and Bungubung
were entitled to immediate reinstatement and payment of backwages pending
adjudication on the merits of their cases by the Court of Appeals.

Acting on said petition
which was docketed as G.R. No. 92358, on March 20, 1990, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the Court of Appeals from implementing
its resolutions of July 5, 1989, July 20, 1989 and January 19, 1990. In due course, on November 21, 1990, the
Court En Banc rendered a decision granting the petition.^[2]

On December 17, 1990, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision in CA-G.R. SP-17195.^[3] In substance, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the DOTC Secretary is without jurisdiction over the
administrative cases against Bungubung and Dinopol for two reasons:

First. While the Civil Service Law
vests upon the Department heads “jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction,”^[4] said law cannot
prevail over Sec. 8, Art. V of
the PPA Charter (P.D. No. 857) which states that “(t)he General Manager
(of the PPA) shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint and remove
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.” The Court of
Appeals explained:

“The above-quoted provision is in the nature of a special law
while the present Civil Service Law granting jurisdiction to department heads,
is in the nature of a general law. Special law prevails over general law. Being a special rule limited to the creation and functions of the Philippine
Ports Authority, PD No. 857 prevails over the Civil Service Law, insofar as it
involves jurisdiction to remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Manager as specifically lodged in the PPA General Manager. The Civil Service Law authorizes a
department head to commence and
try administrative cases, but this general provision must yield to the specific
provision found in the PPA Charter. The
particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken
to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the
provisions of the particular enactment (25 R.C.L., p. 1010, citing numerous
cases).”

The appellate court also stressed that, not only is
the PPA Charter a particular law – said Charter, having been enacted on
December 23, 1975, is a more recent enactment than P.D. No. 807 which was
issued on October 6, 1975.

Second. The power of review
by the Office of the President has been repealed by P.D. 1409. The DOTC Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, can no longer exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over
PPA personnel:

“x x x. Further, the
power of review by the Office of the President under P.D. No. 807 was repealed
by P.D. 1409 creating the Merit Systems Board in the Civil Service Commission (Meran v. Edralin, 154
SCRA 235). The theory that Secretary
Reyes, acting as alter ego of the President, can no longer be sustained. The Administrative Action Board (AAB) of the
DOTC must yield to the jurisdiction of the PPA General Manager.”

Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the
motion was denied. Hence, the instant
recourse through a petition for review on certiorari submitting that the Court
of Appeals’ decision is contrary to law and settled jurisprudence because: (a) it effectively deprived the DOTC
Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, of the authority to control
and/or supervise personnel actions involving employees of the PPA; (b) it nullified
the proceedings of the AAB for want of jurisdiction, notwithstanding that
respondent Dinopol submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the body, and (c)
it granted writs of certiorari in favor of respondents who, on the other hand, failed to exhaust available and adequate remedies.^[5]

The issue of the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB over administrative
cases involving personnel below the
rank of Assistant General Manager of the PPA has been raised and settled
in Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals.^[6] The
Court, after discussing the nature of an attached agency and its relationship with the Department to which it
is attached, held:

“Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the
management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free from Departmental interference and
control. This is more explicitly shown
by P.D. No. 857 which provides:

”SEC. 8. Management and Staff.

a) The President
shall, upon the recommendation of the Board, appoint the General Manager and
the Assistant General Managers.

b)  All other
officials and employees of the Authority shall be selected and appointed on the
basis of merit and fitness based on a comprehensive and progressive merit
system to be established by the Authority immediately upon its organization and
consistent with Civil Service rules and regulations. The recruitment transfer promotion,
and dismissal of all personnel of the Authority, including
temporary workers, shall be governed by
such merit system.

c) The General
Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, determine the staffing
pattern and the number of personnel of the Authority, define their duties and
responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments. For professional
and technical positions, the General Manager shall recommend salaries and
emoluments that are comparable
to those of similar positions in other government-owned corporations, the
provisions of existing rules and regulations on wage and position
classification notwithstanding.

d)  The General Manager shall,
subject to the
approval by the Board, appoint and remove
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.

x x x       x x x        x x x.’

(Underscoring supplied.)

Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a
mechanism for an administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the
power to remove erring employees on the General Manager, with the approval of
the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly grants said officials the power
to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant (General) Manager who
may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated,
may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in
accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. Only after gathering sufficient facts may
the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is
the latter action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of
Directors.

From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board
of Directors, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the
Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission. The permissive recourse to the Department
Secretary is sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807) under the following provisions:

‘SEC. 37. Disciplinary
Jurisdiction. –

(a) The Commission
shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. A
complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which
case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or
agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed
or other action to be taken.

(b) The heads of
departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. The decisions shall be
final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days’ salary. In
case the decision rendered by
a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may he initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by
the department head.

x
x x       x x x  x x x.’

(Underscoring supplied.)

It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by
the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first conducted an
investigation, made the proper recommendation
for the imposable penalty and sought its approval by the PPA Board of
Directors. It was discretionary on the
part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary
Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.”

Petitioners’ contention,
therefore, that the DOTC Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, has jurisdiction over PPA
personnel like the private respondents herein, is correct only to a certain
extent. The DOTC Secretary’s
jurisdiction is circumscribed by the aforequoted provisions of the PPA Charter
and the Civil Service Law which give
him only appellate jurisdiction over
disciplinary matters involving personnel below that of Assistant General
Manager. He does not have the power to initiate proceedings against a
subordinate official of the PPA; otherwise, we shall witness the absurd
spectacle of the DOTC Secretary acting as complainant-initiator of an administrative case which later falls upon him to review.

What is prescribed by the
law and the Beja case
is that all complaints against a PPA official or employee below the rank of Assistant
General Manager shall be filed before the PPA General Manager by the proper
officials, such as the PPA police or any aggrieved party. The aggrieved party should not, however, be
one and the same official upon whose lap the complaint he has filed may
eventually fall on appeal. Nemo potest
esse simul actor judex. No man can be at once a litigant and judge. Unless, of course, in an exceptional case, such
official inhibits himself or expresses his willingness at the outset to waive
his right to review the case on appeal.

Moreover,
the fact that the PPA is a government agency “attached” to the DOTC
extensively affects the extent of whatever control and supervision the said
Department’s Secretary may exercise. In
Beja, the Court said:

“Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three
administrative relationships mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control, and
administrative supervision. ‘Attachment’ is defined in Sec. 38 thereof as follows:

‘(3)  Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral
relationship between the department or its
equivalent and the attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The
coordination shall be accomplished by having the department represented in the
governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as
a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter;
having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic
reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having
the department
or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the
board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency;

x x x       x x x        x x x.’

An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental
supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the ‘lateral relationship’ between the Department and the
attached agency. The attachment is merely for
‘policy and program coordination.’ With respect to administrative matters, the
independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is
further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department’s
administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect
to appointments and other personnel actions “in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions’ under the Administrative Code of
1987. Moreover, the Administrative Code
explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book VI on
supervision and control shall not apply
to chartered institutions attached to a
Department.”
(Underscoring supplied.)

Thus, while PPA personnel are, as mandated by P.D.
868, “embraced in the Civil Service,” the DOTC may not “act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate.”^[7]

It
should be noted that in AAB-031-88, the complaint against Bungubung was
erroneously filed directly with the AAB and it was no less than DOTC Secretary
Reyes who, upon the recommendation of the AAB, denied Bungubung’s motion to
dismiss. The PPA General Manager also
errodeously indorsed to the AAB Adm. Case No. 11-01-88, the complaint he
himself filed against Bungubung, without having conducted an investigation and
recommending the appropriate penalty as required by the facts found at said
investigation.

With
regard to Adm. Case No. AAB-006-88 against Dinopol, it was filed with the AAB
by Secretary Reyes himself while the other case against Dinopol, Adm. Case No. 016-88, was filed by the PPA General
Manager directly with the AAB without said PPA official’s appropriate
investigation and corresponding recommendation. Under these circumstances, the absurd situation mentioned above
could ensue: the DOTC Secretary
deciding on appeal his own complaint. On the other hand, in Adm. Case No. 016-88, the PPA General Manager
abdicated his duty of conducting an investigation and submitting his
recommendation, as demanded by his factual findings.

Filing a case directly
with the AAB may be a shortcut to accomplish the laudable purpose of A. O. No.
25. However, whatever advantage may
accrue therefrom in terms of time element, may be offset by the denial of the
right to a fair and unbiased proceeding insofar as the personnel complained
against is concerned. At the very
least, he should be afforded the opportunity of confronting the charges against
him in the forum where the law requires that they should be ventilated. If at all, this procedure may deprive the
DOTC Secretary of control and supervision over personnel of the PPA below the
rank of Assistant General Manager but only at the initial
stage of an administrative proceeding. Should the defendant employee be
dissatisfied with the ruling of the PPA General Manager, he can always elevate
his case to the DOTC Secretary wherein the AAB will play a pivotal role or, at
his option, go directly to the Civil Service Commission. Hence, the Court of Appeals is less than accurate in
its sweeping statement that the DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of
the President, has completely lost control and supervision over disciplinary
matters involving the PPA employees concerned. In fact, in the administrative hierarchy set up under both the PPA
Charter and the Civil Service Law, the DOTC Secretary has the ultimate say
before recourse to the courts may be made.

The
Court, however, agrees with the Court of Appeals’ ratiocination in arriving at
the conclusion that Sec. 8, Art. V of the PPA Charter should prevail over Sec. 37(b) of the Civil Service Law,
considering that where a later special law on a particular subject is repugnant
to, or inconsistent with, a prior general law on the same subject, a partial
repeal of the latter will be implied to the extent of the inconsistency, or an
exception grafted upon the general law.^[8] Since, in a sense,
the two laws are in pari materia, both should be construed as to harmonize with
each other. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi. Every statute must be so construed and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.^[9]

For the assumption is
that whenever the legislature enacts a law, it has in mind the previous
statutes relating to the same subject matter, and in the absence of any express
repeal or amendment, the new statute is
deemed enacted in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in
those prior statutes.^[10]

Applying the foregoing
rules on statutory construction, the DOTC Secretary has not entirely
relinquished his power of control and supervision over an attached agency, such
as the PPA. The PPA Charter merely
defined and, to a certain extent, delimited such power which, under the Civil
Service Law is of general application.

Petitioners’
claim that the private respondents are estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the AAB as they actively
participated in the proceedings therein deserves scant consideration. While it is true that a party may be
estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction on appeal,^[11] such estoppel may be invoked successfully
only if the party failed to raise such question in the early stages of the
proceedings. The records show that Bungubung
did not wait for the rendition of an AAB decision before he questioned its
jurisdiction. After filing his answer,
he filed a motion to dismiss on the issue of jurisdiction and even went to the
extent of elevating the issue to this Court. For his part, Dinopol also filed a motion to dismiss the case against
him and, upon its denial, filed a motion for reconsideration.^[12] In the absence of proof of laches on the
part of the private respondents, the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy^[13] upon which petitioners rely, is
inapplicable. As correctly pointed out
by counsel for respondent Dinopol, it has been clearly held in People
v. Eduarte^[14] that
the ruling in the Tijam case is but an exception to the general rule
that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal.

Neither is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
applicable in this case. Besides the
fact that the AAB was patently without jurisdiction to act on the
administrative complaints filed against respondents Dinopol and Bungubung, the
instant petition raises only questions of law, one of the exceptions to the
general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Most enlightening is the following portion of
the decision in Quisumbing v. Gumban:^[15]

“x x x. The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been repeatedly held that the
principle requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable where the question in dispute is purely
legal one: where the
controverted act is patently illegal or
was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an
alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter;
where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention;
or where the respondent has acted in disregard of due process. The rule does not apply where insistence on
its observance would result in nullification of the claim being asserted; and
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.”
(Underscoring supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED. The decisions of the
Administrative Action Board in AAB-­006-88 and AAB-016-88 against Cristeto E.
Dinopol are hereby declared NULL AND VOID and, together with the cases against Leopoldo F. Bungubung, AAB-031-88 and Adm.
Case No. 11-01-88, they shall be REMANDED to the General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority for immediate reinvestigation.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., and
Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., on official
leave.

^[1]
Presided by Judge Armie E. Elma.

^[2]
191 SCRA 563. The Court found that
there were still 38 days remaining of Bungubung’s preventive suspension. On the other hand, the Court found that
having been in suspension for 103 days in AAB-006-88, Dinopol’s preventive
suspension therein had run out. However, there were still 11 days remaining of Dinopol’s preventive
suspension in AAB-016-88.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 89. Penned by Justice
Abelardo M. Dayrit, the decision was concurred in by Justices Nathanael P. de
Pano, Jr. and Celso D. Magsino.

^[4]
Sec. 37(b), P.D. 807.

^[5]
Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 20.

^[6]
G.R. No. 971490, March 31, 1992.

^[7]
This is part of the definition of “supervision and control” under
Sec. 38(1) of the Administrative Code of 1987.

^[8]
National Power Corporation v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. XXV, G.R. No.
72477, October 16, 1990, 190 SCRA 477; Lagman v. City of Manila, G.R.
No. 233050, June 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 579.

^[9]
Agpalo, R.E., Statutory Construction, p. 192.

^[10]
Ibid.

^[11]
See: Bañaga v. Commission
on the Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 66386, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA
599.

^[12]
Respondents’ Comment, p. 14, Rollo, p. 126; Dinopol’s Memorandum, p. 16, Rollo, p. 217.

^[13]
L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29. Petitioners claim the applicability of the doctrine enunciated in this
case that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

^[14]
G.R. No. 88232, February 26, 1990, 182 of SCRA 750.

^[15]
G. R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991, 193 SCRA 520, pp. 523-524.