JULIA L. TAN AND JAMES L. TAN, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review the decision as well as the
resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order dated June 16, 1989 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 88 in Civil Case No. Q-89­-2357 convicting petitioners Julia L. Tan and James L. Tan of
indirect contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer a penalty of
imprisonment of ten (10) days and to pay
a fine of P500.00 each.

Petitioner Julia L. Tan is an 84 year old widow who is the Principal of Grace Christian High School offering
both elementary and secondary courses while petitioner James L. Tan is the Administrative Consultant
of the school.

This case arose from the refusal of the petitioners to admit and
enroll certain students for the school year 1987-1988 because heated
controversies, acts of misbehavior, and a refusal to dialogue with the school
administration led the school authorities to believe that it would be best for
all concerned if these children enrolled in other schools.

Two separate petitions for mandamus with prayers for
preliminary mandatory injunction were eventually filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. 
The first case docketed as Civil Case No. Q-51039 was assigned to Branch
79 of the court.  The second case which
led to the present petition was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 and was
assigned to Branch 88.  The latter case
was filed by Vicente Luy and his daughter Vonette Luy, who were
also petitioners in Civil Case No. Q-51039.

On July 1, 1987,
Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-­51039 issued an order
granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.  The school and the petitioners were ordered
to allow enrollment of the subject children.

While the two cases were pending in court, the children were
enrolled and continued their studies. 
During the enrollment period in May, 1989, however, the petitioners
refused the enrollment in the first year high school
of Carmelea Ang
See, Michael Robert Ang,
Karen Gay Dipasupil and Vonette
Luy on the ground that the school was under no legal
duty to still accept them in the high school after graduating them from the
elementary course.

On May 23, 1989,
Vicente Luy (father of Vonette
Luy) together with other parents Josefina Ang, Teresita Ang
See and Teresita Dipasupil
filed in Branch 79, a motion to hold in indirect contempt the petitioners for
refusing to enroll their children in alleged disobedience of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued on July
1, 1987.

On May 25, 1989,
Branch 88 issued an order in the second case granting the prayer for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordering the
petitioners to enroll Vonette Luy
in the first year high school.

In the meantime, the herein petitioners challenged in the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 13179) the order granting the writ of a preliminary
mandatory injunction by Branch 79.

On June 26, 1989,
the Court of Appeals set aside the order prompting the respondents to file a
petition for certiorari with us. 
The case was docketed as G.R. No. 90063.

In a resolution dated December 12, 1989, we dismissed the
petition for lack of merit and resolved “that x x
x the children here affected shall be allowed to
finish the current school year (including the summer term if any), as the
questioned order of the Court of Appeals shall take effect only as of the
beginning of school year 1990-1991.”

Meanwhile, the case in Branch 88 continued its independent
course.  Thus, on June 16, 1989, the trial court upon motion of
Vicente Luy issued the questioned order.  This order is now challenged by the
petitioners in this case.

The facts of the controversy which led to the two cases against
the petitioners are stated in this Court’s Resolution in G.R. No. 90063,
“Yap Chin Fah, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al.”, December 12, 1989,
as follows:

“Sometime in 1986, private respondent Grace
Christian High School
(‘Grace Christian’) applied with the then Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports (MECS) for a tuition-fee increase of fifteen percent (15%) for the
School Year (SY) 1986-87.  Private
respondent Grace Christian had applied for, and been granted, yearly increments
in tuition fees from SY 1973-74 (except for SY 1983-84) until SY
1985-1986.  On 18 December 1986, Grace Christian received a
notice from the MECS that its fee-increase application had been definitively
approved on 10 November 1986.

Meanwhile, a group of parents whose children are enrolled in Grace
Christian, allegedly alarmed by what they perceived to be deterioration —
despite the periodic fee increases  — in academic standards and physical
facilities of the school, formed the Grace Christian High School
Parents-Teachers Association (‘Association’). 
The Association, composed of a majority of the parents (despite its
name, no faculty member sits on the executive committee) demanded:  (a) recognition as an organization; and (b)
representation in Grace Christian’s policy-making process, viz., faculty
selection and improvement of the physical plant.  Feeling that their demands had been largely
ignored, the Association in October 1985 asked for a formal dialogue with the
school administration.  During a heated
exchange in this dialogue, one of the petitioners herein, William Tiu, stood up and pointed a finger and shouted at Grace
Christian’s vice-principal, and later spat on the latter.

On 23 September 1986,
Grace Christian had been granted provisional authority by the MECS to impose a
fifteen percent (15%) increase in tuition fee for SY 1986-1987.  Thereupon, some of the above-mentioned group
of parents lobbied with the other parents urging non­-payment of the fee
increase.  During the enrollment period for
the second semester of SY 1986-1987, a number of parents, among them
petitioners (comprising nine [9] members or officers of the 19-member executive
committee, of the Association) refused to pay the incremental fee:  Grace Christian in turn refused to receive
these parents’ payment of regular (i.e., the fee before the fifteen [15%]
increase) tuition fee for that semester. 
On 16 December 1986,
Grace Christian reminded the parents about the payment of the approved
increased tuition fee for the second semester.

From 23 February to 5 March
1987, a group of parents, petitioners included, staged a rally
outside the school gates.  Banners and
placards critical of the school administration were set up.  The latent animosity between the Association
(or some members thereof) and Grace Christian began to
flare up.  Petitioners first came out
with statements in the print and broadcast media attacking Grace Christian’s
periodic fee increases and allegedly deteriorating academic standards.  Some of the petitioners, armed with videocameras, forced their way into the school premises and
interrupted a class in session, urging students therein to speak — using the
allotted class hour — against school policies. 
Some of the students walked out of their classrooms to join their
parents in the rally outside.

On 27 February 1987,
the Association through a letter asked Secretary Quisumbing
of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) to reconsider the 23 September 1986 (as well as the 10 November 1986) order granting the
school’s application for a fee increase.  On 12 March 1987, the Association obtained a
‘freeze-order’ from the DECS, enjoining Grace Christian from imposing the
already approved fifteen percent (15%) fee increase, until the DECS shall have
received proof that sixty percent (60%) of the increase had been apportioned to
salaries of Grace Christian’s faculty. 
After submission by Grace Christian of proof of payment of salary
increases to the faculty, the DECS in an Indorsement
dated 16 March 1987 lifted
the ‘freeze-order,’ thereby allowing the school to resume collection of the
fifteen percent (15%) fee increase.

Meanwhile, the already adversarial relationship between Grace
Christian and the Association further deteriorated when the school
administrators overheard several of the Prep (preschool) students chanting
slogans against the school and its teachers, indicating that their parents had
imbued them with hostility or at least disdain and scorn for the school.

During the period 14-18 April 1987, petitioners were individually
and personally informed through a letter by the principal of Grace Christian
that, as they were severely critical of the school’s policies, it would be best
for all concerned if their children enrolled in some other school.  On 25
May 1987, the first day of the enrollment period for SY 1987-88,
petitioners were informed that as their respective children were in the list of
‘referral’ cases, the school principal would confer with them either in the afternoon of 29 May 1987, the last day of
enrollment, or on 30 May 1987.  Petitioners felt that their children were
being singled out by the school and decided not to see the principal and
instead proceeded to the DECS for advise.  The DECS in a 1st Indorsement
dated 1 June 1987 ordered
private respondent School to enroll petitioners’s
children.  The latter however refused to
enroll these students, prompting petitioners to file an action for mandamus
in court.  The trial court on 11 June 1987, to maintain the status
quo between the parties, ordered the temporary enrollment of petitioners’
children.” (Resolution – G.R. No. 90063, pp. 1-4)

While Civil Case No. Q-51039 was being considered on appeal by
the Court of Appeals and later the Supreme Court, the
proceedings were also going on in Civil Case No. Q-89-2357,
which had been filed by Vonette C. Luy and her father Vicente Luy and assigned to Branch 88 on April 26, 1989.

The Luy petition alleged:

x x x                                                                      x
x x                                                                 x x x

“x
x x.  [T]hat during the school year 1989­-1990 appellants
unjustifiably refused to admit her in the High School Department, despite the
fact that she was given a reservation slip which she was instructed to fill up
and ‘return not later than April 15, 1989 together with report card for this
year.’ Before April 15, 1989,
she submitted the reservation slip to the school principal, but the principal
informed her that she would no longer be admitted because her father was very
vocal against certain school policies and activities.  As the school principal refused to allow her
to enroll in the High School Department, her father wrote a letter?complaint
dated April 7, 1989 to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).  The Department indorsed the letter to the
school for immediate comment and/or appropriate action (Exhibits ‘E’ and
‘D’).  In reply, the lawyer of the school
wrote the DECS to reiterate the school’s decision not to enroll Vonette Luy in its High School
Department (Exhibit ‘E’).” (Rollo, pp. 40-41)

The school and herein petitioners Julia and James Tan opposed the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on the grounds that:

x x x                                                                      x
x x                                                                 x x x

“x x x (a) the right of a student to
enroll in a private school is riot absolute; (b) Vonette
C. Luy failed to exhaust all administrative remedies;
and (c) there is no clear legal basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.” (Rollo, p. 41)

On May 25, 1989,
Judge Tirso D. C. Velasco issued the writ, stating:

“’In view of the foregoing, the petitioner has clearly
established her right to be admitted to the First Year, High School Department,
Grace Christian School, Quezon City and the
unmitigated duty of respondents to admit the petitioner to the aforesaid High
School Department:

The Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is hereby GRANTED and
the respondents are ordered to allow the enrollment of petitioner in the High
School Department, Grace Christian High School, Quezon
City, after posting a bond of Five Thousand Pesos of compliance to this Court within
three (3) days from receipt hereof.  (pp.
73-74, Records.)’” (Rollo, pp. 41-42)

A motion for reconsideration was filed followed by a supplemental
motion for reconsideration.  The
petitioners stated that the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports had
decided their administrative case upholding the right of the school to refuse
enrollment in the first year high school
of Vonette Luy
as well as the other students similarly situated.  (See Annex “D”, Rollo,
pp. 52-53)

Significantly, the petitioners also pointed out to the court that
Vicente Luy and his daughter were engaging in forum
shopping because Civil Case No.
Q-­51039 had been filed earlier by Mr. Luy himself
and various other parents.  There was
pending exactly the same cause of
action on contempt and both cases were
raising the same issues.

As earlier stated, the
first case on the grant of mandatory injunction was at that time already
with the Court of Appeals.

On June 9, 1989,
Vicente Luy filed a motion to declare the petitioners
in contempt of court for refusing to enroll Vonette Luy in high school.

We note that on this same date, June 9, 1989, the other court
presided over by Judge Godofredo Legaspi
denied the similar motion for contempt filed by Mr. Luy,
Josefina Ang, Teresita Ang See, and Teresita Dipasupil.

On June 13, 1989,
Judge Tirso Velasco ordered the petitioners to comply
with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction or he would act on the motion
for contempt.  The petitioners opposed
this order stating that Judge Legaspi had just denied
the similar motion for contempt in the other case (Civil Case No. Q-51039).  In this
opposition, the petitioners again charged Mr. Luy
with forum shopping contending that the first case he filed with others should
take precedence over Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 pending before
Judge Velasco’s court.

On June 16, 1989,
Judge Velasco issued the order questioned in this petition, stating:

“IN VIEW WHEREOF, and for continuously defying not only the writ of
this court but also the three Orders of June 7, June 13 and June 15, 1989, the
Court finds the two respondents Julia L. Tan and James Tan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of indirect contempt and hereby sentences each of them to
suffer a penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) days and to pay the cost.  They are likewise fined P500.00 each.

The Court orders that a warrant of arrest be immediately issued and
served upon them to start service of sentence. 
The Court will determine whether, during this period of time, petitioner
Vonette Luy shall have been
enrolled in respondent school for if not a determination shall be made whether
respondents shall be continuously held in custody until compliance by them of
the court’s writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.” (Rollo, p. 57)

Only ten (10) days later, on June 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals
set aside the writ issued by Judge Velasco which had commanded the herein
petitioners to enroll the protesting school children.  It lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
it had issued.  A motion for
reconsideration was denied.

The parents went to our
Court.  We initially issued a status
quo order, enjoining the parties to maintain the situation existing
before the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered.

On December 12, 1989,
however, we decided the controversy in favor of herein petitioners and the school. 
The Court in G.R. No. 90063 declared the petition of the parents and
their children unmeritorious.  We stated:

“’ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for
lack of merit.  However, the children
here affected shall be allowed to finish the current school year (including the
summer term, if any), as the questioned Order of the Court of Appeals shall
take effect only as of the beginning of SY 1990-91.’  Padilla, J., took no part, Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on official
leave).” (at p. 7)

The petition in this case is impressed with merit.

Our ruling in Yap Chin Fah,
et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals,
et al. was already long final when the Fourth Division of the
Court of Appeals rendered its October
22, 1990 decision practically ignoring and rendering naught the ratio
decidendi which impelled us to dismiss the
earlier petition.  This cannot be
countenanced.

We stressed in Ver v. Quetulio (163 SCRA 80
[1988]), citing Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Br. 40 (154 SCRA 77 [1987]):

“As early as 1922, this Court declared in Shioji
v. Harvey (43 Phil. 333) that ‘the
only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a higher court is returned
to it, is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution.  A lower court is without supervisory
jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court.’

This is especially true where it is a Supreme Court decision or
resolution which states with finality how the particular case before it has
been resolved.  We ruled in Tugade v. Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226):

‘Respondent
Court of Appeals
is really devoid of any choice at all.  It could not have ruled in
any other way on the legal question raised.  This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey.  It is
as simple as that. 
There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (34 SCRA 98
[1970]).  ‘The delicate task of
ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive
order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the
judiciary.  It thus discharges a role no
less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the
maintenance of the rule of law.  To
assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with
one voice.  It does so with finality,
logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court.  What it says then should be defini­tive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial
hierarchy.  They have to defer and to
submit.’ (Ibid, 107). 
The opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point:  ‘Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion
of Justice J. B. L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words:  ‘Judge Gaudencio
Cloribel need not be reminded
that the Supreme Court, by tradition and
in our system of judicial administration,
has the last word on what the law
is; it is the final arbiter of
any justiciable controversy.  There is only one
Supreme Court from whose decisions all
other courts should take their bearings.  (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v.
Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI, 23 SCRA 948, 961).’” (Emphasis
supplied)

The respondent Court of Appeals should have been aware that in the
related case (G.R. No. 90063), we had already set aside the writ of preliminary
injunction similar to the writ from which emanated the contempt order directing
that the petitioners be imprisoned and made to pay fines.  If this Court had already found a preliminary
injunction invalid and sustained the school’s position that there was no
unmistakable and indubitable right to enroll the petitioners’ children, any
lower court’s decision to the contrary is not only unenforceable and
ineffective, but certainly cannot be the basis for a contempt order.

Our ruling in the related case of Yap Chin Fah, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals,
et al., states:

“As the Court of Appeals pointed out, petitioners here failed
to exhaust their administrative remedies before resorting to court action, as
they had failed to:  (a) see the
principal of Grace Christian on 29 May 1987, their scheduled conference date;
(b) wait for the resolution of the letter of reconsideration/clarification of
1st Indorsement dated 1 June 1987 filed by Grace
Christian with the DECS Assistant Regional Director; and (c) appeal to the DECS
Secretary to finally resolve their disagreements with Grace Christian, the
right to appeal from the decision of a subordinate officer to a superior one
constituting ‘a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law’ within the meaning of the Rules of Court. 
The Education Act of 1982 vests in the DECS the primary authority to
hear and resolve disputes by and among members of the educational community
similar to those between petitioners and Grace Christian.

Moreover, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction lies only when
the right sought to be enforced is clear, unmistakable and indubitable (Rivera
v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643 [1986]).  In the instant case, no such clear right was
shown.  It is true that private schools
— not unlike public utilities and other private corporations whose businesses
impinge on the public interest — are subject to reasonable regulation and
supervision of the State (Const., Art. XIV [4] [1]).  At the same time, however, private schools
have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission,
discipline and promotion of students.  This right to establish and enforce
reasonable rules and regulations extends as well to parents and parent-teacher
associations, as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal)
obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the
schools.  In the instant case, since
petitioners have failed to comply with the conditions and prerequisites for
admission, i.e., registration within the prescribed dates, payment of
duly-approved­ tuition fees, and compliance with school rules and regulations,
Grace Christian cannot be regarded as having acted arbitrarily or capriciously
in refusing to re-enroll petitioners’ children.

x x x                      x x x                 x x x

“Lastly, where relations between parents and students on the
one hand, and teachers and administrators upon the other hand, have
deteriorated to the level here exhibited, a private school may, in the interest
of the rest of the student body and of the faculty and management as a whole,
and of the children of the parents affected, require the affected children to
be enrolled elsewhere.  The maintenance
of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperilled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace
Christian is forced to admit petitioners’ children and to reintegrate them to
the student body.  It may even be argued
that petitioners’ children have been innocent victims in a deplorable
confrontation between some parents and respondent School, but the situation
here finds some analogy in labor cases where, because of pre-existing and
supervening strained relations, reinstatement is not always a feasible
solution.” (G.R. No. 90063, December 12, 1989, pp. 5-6; 7)

The issue before us was the right to enroll in high school of
students who graduated from the elementary department of the same
institution.  Exactly the same issue is
raised in the case which gave rise to the contempt order and to the present
petition.  Under the common facts of the
two cases, both the DECS and this Court have found the petitioners’ position
valid.

We cannot close this case without deploring the action of Vicente
Luy and his counsel for filing Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 in 1989 when exactly the same issues were already before
Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-51039 filed by, among others, Mr. Luy in 1987.  This
results not only in unnecessarily clogging the heavily burdened dockets of our
courts but also in the unseemly sight of two Branches of the same trial court,
and two Divisions of the Court of Appeals issuing contradictory decisions – one
in favor of the school and the other in favor of the students and their
parents.  This problem of forum-shopping
is now before our Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court.

Pending any amendment of the Rules or a circular remedying this
problem, lawyers and litigants alike are warned to be more candid with courts
of justice and not engage in
forum-shopping through deliberate splitting of actions or appeals in the hope
that even as one case is dismissed, another would still be open.

The Court of Appeals in this case was also misled.  It ruled:

“It is important to note that Civil Case No. Q-51039 was filed
for the purpose of requiring appellants to maintain the eight (8) students in
the roll of students in the Elementary Department.  This prayer was granted when the court issued
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction asked for.  Herein appellants thereafter complied with
the said order.  It was only when the
school refused to admit the eight (8) students in its High School Department
that they filed the motion for contempt. 
Said motion was denied because what the initial petition prayed for was
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to maintain the
enrolment in the Elementary Department of the students and not their admission
in the High School Department of said school. 
Therefore, the right of the students to be admitted in the High School
Department was not in issue hence, the court was correct in ruling that it had
no jurisdiction to declare the appellants in contempt of court for the act
complained of, thereby dismissing the charge without considering its merits.”
(Rollo, pp. 45-46)

Civil Case No. Q-51039 was filed by
Vicente Luy and other parents not only to continue
enrolling their children in the elementary department but also to compel the
enrollment of their other children in the high school department of Grace
Christian School.  As pointed out by the petitioners, there were
eighteen (18) students involved in Civil
Case No. Q-51039, not
eight (8) as stated by the Court of
Appeals.  Vonette
Luy had two sisters, Vivian Luy
and Virna Luy who were high
school students and who joined in the petition.  The case involved not only elementary grade
but also high school students.

No thinking person can dispute the fact that our country is
suffering from the effects of a serious deterioration of academic and other standards
in our educational system.  This Court is
disturbed by the big number of
candidates taking the bar examinations who, after six (6) years in the
elementary grades, four (4) years in high school, and eight (8) years in
college appear to be functionally semi-illiterate judging from the answers they
give to bar examination questions.  The
same is true of other disciplines, professions, and occupations.  A
drastic upgrading of educational standards especially in the elementary and
high school levels is imperative.

It is for the above reason that Government should uphold and
encourage schools and colleges which endeavor to maintain the highest standards
of education.  We have consistently
sustained the rights of students to legitimately address their grievances both
to school authorities, media, and the general public to the extent of sometimes
countenancing uncivil and rowdy behaviour.  However, we have not hesitated to strike down
violence and anarchy when certain students and their inevitable supporters
misuse the grant of “ordered liberty” mandated by the
Constitution.  Educators who insist on
high standards and who enforce
reasonable rules of discipline deserve support from courts of justice and other
branches of Government.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The questioned DECISION and RESOLUTION of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 
The petitioners are ACQUITTED of the offense of indirect contempt of court.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Paras,
Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., see
dissent.

Padilla, J., no part,
petitioner’s counsel is an associate of his former law firm.

Sarmiento, J., no
part, did not take part in the deliberations because he was on leave.

Gancayco, J., on leave.