PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CECILIO BINONDO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

On May 25, 1990, the Honorable Godardo A. Jacinto, Presiding
Judge of Branch 16, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City rendered a decision in
Criminal Case No. CBU-9795, entitled ”People of the Philippines vs. Cecilio
Binondo, Rosendo Binondo, Valentina Binondo, Nicolasa Binondo, Severino
Dinopol, and Damian Soriano”, finding Cecilio Binondo guilty of murder and
acquitting the rest of his co?accused as follows:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds the
accused Cecilio Binondo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, for which he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to further
indemnify the Heirs of Domiciano Dinopol in the sum of P30,000.

“On the ground of reasonable doubt, a verdict of acquittal is
hereby entered for the accused Rosendo Binondo, Valentina Binondo, Nicolasa
Binondo, Damian Soriano and Severino Dinopol, and their bail bonds are
therefore cancelled.

“Costs against Cecilio Binondo.

“SO ORDERED.”^[1]

On appeal, the accused-appellant raised the following errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE AND FINDING HIM GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED APPELLANT.

The facts as may be gathered from the records of the case are as follows:

At about 10:00 or
11:00 o’clock in the evening of February 23, 1986, prosecution witnesses Maximo
Dinopol and his wife Pablita, who were neighbors of the accused-appellant
Cecilio, saw accused-appellant with seven other persons carrying a naked body of a dead person into
his (Cecilio) yard. The aforesaid
witnesses alleged having heard
accused-appellant tell his companions that they should have nothing to worry
about because he will take sole responsibility for the death of the victim.

On that same evening,
accused-appellant brought the head of
the decapitated victim to the
police station at the municipal building. This was received by Pat.
Esmeraldo dela Peña who was at the station during that time although his tour
of duty would yet start at 8:00 o’clock in the morning of the following
day. He asked preliminary questions to
the accused-appellant. When the Station
Commander arrived, the latter took over the investigation. After a brief interview with the accused-appellant, he sent Pat. Franklin
Aniñon and CHDF Boy Padilla to retrieve the body of the victim from the house
of the accused-appellant. The Station
Commander ordered Rosendo and Valentina, companions of the accused-appellant to
bring the air rifle (esoopita) and bolo used by accused-appellant to the
Municipal building.

Dr. Ferraren, Municipal
Health Officer of Ginatilan Cebu, conducted the autopsy examination and issued
the Medical Certificate which reads as follows:

“This certifies that at about 1:45 o’clock p.m. of February 24,
1986, a human head, severed from its body, identified by Pfc. Rotillo Sifieres
of the Simboan Police Force as that of Pat. Domiciano Dinopol of same force,
had been examined by the undersigned at the Municipal building, Simboan, Cebu,
and findings were as follows:

a) eyes half closed;.

b) wound incised, about 4 inches long, lower jaw, with underlying
bone cracked;

c) wound, lacerated about 1/2 inch parietal, left;

d) wound, lacerated about 1/2 inch parietal, right.

“On the same day, at about 2:20 in the afternoon, a beheaded human
body had also been examined at the residence of the parents of Pat. Domiciano
Dinopol in Samboan and the significant findings are as follows:

a) Wound, incised, 4-1/2” x 1” anterior, thorax, right;

b) wound, incised about 4” x 1” at the level of the Xphoid, right;

c) wound, incised about 4-1/2” x 1/2”, left lateral side of the
body;

d) wound, incised about 4” x 1/2” deltoid, left;

e) wound, incised about 4 inches supraeliao, left;

f) wound, incised about 8 inches, abdomen, some intestines exposed and some portions severed.

“Sgd.
TRIFANA M. FERRAREN, M.D.

March 6, 1986.”^[2]

The accused-appellant
Cecilio Binondo declared that he killed Pat. Domiciano Dinopol in self-defense
and presented his version of what transpired, as follows:

At about 8:00 o’clock in
the evening of February 23, 1986, he, together with his wife, Valentina
Binondo, his son, Rosendo, and Brgy. Councilman Severino Dinopol went to the
house of the spouses Bilanghilot to drink tuba thereat. They left said house at about 11:00 o’clock
in the evening. When they were near the
Barangay Health Center of Basak, the victim, carrying a gun with the left hand
and a bolo in his right hand, suddenly emerged from under the mango tree and
approached him in an angry mood at the same time brandishing his bolo as if in an act of charging him, saying: “Why are you looking for me? What
is your purpose?”^[3]
Valentina interceded and tried to pacify Domiciano. To avoid getting into trouble with the enraged victim, he opted to walk away from him and
proceeded home with his son Rosendo. Severino also went home
ahead of Valentina.

About five minutes after he and Rosendo arrived at their house,
Valentina came gasping for breath telling him to close all windows and doors
because Domiciano was following her
and he said he would kill Cecilia and Rosendo. Right away he secured the front door, shut off all the lights and got his air
gun and bolo to defend himself and his
companions should Domiciano
carry out his threat. He also
asked Rosendo to go upstairs to take care of his (Rosendo) wife and
children on the second storey.

Pat. Domiciano Dinopol finally arrived and he tried to force open the main door but failed. He asked Cecilio to come out, shouting: “Cilio, come out I will
break your head.”^[4]
Domiciano went towards the kitchen door. Cecilio, on the other
hand, positioned himself in the dark,
close to the kitchen door, awaiting the attack by Domiciano.

Domiciano forced
open the kitchen door. When he was about to enter with his head protruding inside the kitchen, Cecilia
aimed his rifle at the head of Domiciano. From a distance of
about one and one half (1-1/2) feet, he fired the rifle. When this happened, Domiciano was still
holding his firearm and his bolo.

After a single shot from the air gun, Domiciano turned his head
towards him and aimed his gun at him. Before Domiciano could
fire his gun, Cecilio attacked
him with his bolo, his purpose being to let the latter loosen his hold on his weapons. This was followed by five or six more strokes on the neck and
body to be sure that Domiciano would drop his weapons. Domiciano finally dropped his weapons and fell to the floor. Except for the skin on the nape, the head was almost severed from the
body. Knowing Domiciano of having an amulet which could revive him if
his body is doused with water, he finally decided to cut off his head completely. Immediately thereafter, he carried the victim’s body to the
municipal building and surrendered to the police authorities.

The trial court refused to give credit to his plea of
self-defense and convicted him of murder on the basis of his admission of
killing Domiciano Dinopol.

We find this appeal to be without merit and find the defendant’s
plea of self-defense as completely incredible.

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that when
the accused admits having killed the victim, but invokes self-dense, the burden
of proving the elements of that defense by clear and convincing evidence lies
with the accused. To do that, he must
rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. For even if the
evidence of the prosecution were weak, it may not be disbelieved after the accused admitted responsibility for the
killing.^[5]

Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a
question of fact. Being so and in the
absence of any showing that the court a quo failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and heard the
witness during the trial, was in a better position to evaluate their
testimonies. No compelling reason,
therefore, existed for this Court to disturb the trial court’s findings that
appellant did not act in self-­defense.^[6]

The accused-appellant did not present clear and convincing
evidence for the court to sustain the claim of self-defense. The trial court refused to give credence to
accused-appellant’s story that the deceased went to his house purposely to kill
him. There were no findings that the
victim was guilty of unlawful aggression or unjust provocation.

Even assuming that his story were true, the oral threat made by
Domiciano to kill him unaccompanied by any other unequivocal act clearly
showing his intent to carry out his threat does not constitute unlawful
aggression. Mere shouting threats and
poundings on the door of the accused?appellant’s house were not held by this Court to constitute unlawful
aggression.^[7] Furthermore, as the accused-appellant
himself testified that he extinguished all sources of light inside the house,
there could not have possibly
been any form of attack which may be said to be immediate and imminent from the
victim upon the person of the accused-appellant. Putting out the lights inside the house threw the house in total
darkness that the victim could not be in a position to locate him
physically.

Not only was there an
absence of unlawful aggression
in the case at bar, but the
claim of self-defense is likewise negated by the physical evidence. The accused-appellant suffered no harm or
injury physically. The number and nature
of the wounds inflicted on the victim proved that if at all, the attack came
from the accused-appellant. The victim
had no chance to defend himself even if armed. The medico-legal certificate issued by the municipal health officer
attests to a total of seven wounds all of which were located on the vital parts
of the body. The means employed becomes
unreasonable and unnecessary when after the aggression had ceased and the
victim no longer posed any threat of further attack, the accused-appellant
continued inflicting injuries on the victim who fell to the ground
helpless. From his testimony it was
evident that when he delivered the blows with his bolo, he was aiming at his
victim’s body and not simply on the victim’s hand which he claimed was aiming
the gun at him.^[8] It was also clear that he was aware that his
blows were hitting the victim;^[9] that his victim was profusely bleeding;^[10] and that even before his victim fell to his kitchen floor, the
victim’s weapons had already dropped and he was defenseless.^[11] What absolutely negated the existence of a
“reasonable necessity of the means employed in repelling the attack” was the fact that the appellant decapitated the
victim. The claim that the victim
possessed an amulet which could revive him did not Justify that, last and final act of
cutting off the victim’s head. A dead
man could not have possibly posed any further resistance or launch an attack,
be it imminent or remote.

Having found the absence
of self-defense, what is incumbent upon us is to determine whether or not there was any
attending circumstance which will qualify
the killing to murder.

We hold that the crime committed was murder.

The presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was evident from the testimony of the
accused-appellant himself. According to
him, his wife arrived ahead of the victim and he
was apprised of the fact that the victim was on his way to their house and was
threatening to kill him and his son. He
had enough time to prepare himself, his weapons and surroundings in a way that he would have the advantage of
position and could deliver the first blow without risk to himself from his
unwary victim. This he accomplished by
putting off all the lights inside the house and by positioning himself near the
kitchen door where he could not be seen at once. The accused-appellant employed means, methods or forms in the
execution of the offense which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. These facts established
by evidence on record clearly constitute treachery, which raised the crime to
murder.

Furthermore, when the
killing was done with cruelty, by
deliberately or inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging
or scoffing at his person or corpse,^[12] it was likewise qualified to murder. (Underlining supplied). No greater outrage, insult or abuse can a
person commit upon a corpse than to sever the head therefrom. The head represents the dignity of the
person and any violence directed towards it cannot be interpreted in any other
manner than an outrage to his corpse.

As regards the mitigating
circumstances claimed by the accused-appellant, We hold that the trial court
erred in not appreciating voluntary surrender in favor of the accused. This may be off-set by the
aggravating circumstance of treachery under Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code. The accused-appellant could not,
however, claim incomplete self-defense as there was no unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim.

However, the killing was
accompanied by the qualifying circumstance of outraging at the corpse of the
victim, thus constituting the crime into murder. Treachery may be considered as a mere aggravating circumstance which may be set off by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

For reasons indicated, and in the light of the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter,
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict finding the
defendant guilty of the crime of murder as charged. The judgment of conviction is affirmed subject to the
modification that the defendant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00, with costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Records, p. 672.

^[2]
Exhibit “B”, Records, p. 13.

^[3]
T.S.N., May 5, 1989, p. 12.

^[4]
T.S.N., August 23, 1989, p. 21.

^[5]
People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772 (1946); People vs. Libed, 14
SCRA 410, (1965); People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 634 (1972); People vs. Kindo, 98 SCRA 553 (1980); People
vs. Bayocot, 174 SCRA 285 (1989); People vs. Maceda, 197 SCRA 499 (1991).

^[6]
People vs. Maceda, supra.

^[7]
People vs. Masangkay, 157 SCRA 320 (1988).

^[8]
T.S.N., August 23, 1989, p. 27.

^[9]
Ibid., pp. 27-28.

^[10]
Ibid., p. 29

^[11]
Ibid., p. 30.

^[12]
Revised Penal Code, Article 248, par.
6. See also Article 14, paragraph 16.