ERNESTO NAVALLO, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

On 11 May 1978, an information charging petitioner with having
violated Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, was filed with
the then Court of First Instance (“CFI”) of Surigao del Norte (docketed
Criminal Case No. 299). It read:

“That on or before January 27, 1978 in the municipality of del
Carmen, Province of Surigao del Norte and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused who is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the
Numancia National Vocational School, which school is also located at del
Carmen, Surigao del Norte and while a Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the
aforestated school therefore was holding in trust moneys and/or properties of
the government of the Republic of the Philippines and holding in trust public funds
with all freedom, intelligence, criminal intent and intent of gain, did then
and there voluntarily, unlawfully, feloniously and without lawful authority
appropriate and misappropriate to his own private benefit, public funds he was
holding in trust for the Government of the Philippines in the total sum of
SIXTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS and SIXTY-TWO CENTAVOS
(P16,483.62), Philippine Currency, which total sum accused failed to account
during an audit and failed as well to restitute despite demands by the office of the Provincial Auditor, to
the damage and prejudice of the Government equal to the amount misappropriated.

“Act contrary to par. 4 of Article 217, of the Revised Penal
Code with a penalty of Reclusion Temporal, minimum and medium periods and in
addition to penalty of perpetual special disqualification and fine as provided
in the same Article.”^[1]

A warrant of arrest was issued, followed by two alias warrants of arrest, but accused-petitioner Ernesto Navallo
still then could not be found.

Meanwhile, on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took
effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code.

On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was, however, later released on
provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court
(“RTC”) on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. On 22 May 1986, upon motion of the
prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the
Sandiganbayan. On 27 January 1989,
Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already
been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC
should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held
otherwise. The information was docketed
(Criminal Case No. 13696) with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo’s arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned
with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. The bond, having been later found to be defective, on 30 August
1989, a new bond was approved and transmitted to the Sandiganbayan.

Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the
accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the
attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double
jeopardy. On 15 September 1989, the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying Navallo’s motion. On 20 October 1989, Navallo was arraigned;
he pleaded, “not guilty,” to the charge. Trial ensued.

Evidence
for the Prosecution:

On 27 January 1978, the Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Norte,
Antonio Espino, made a preliminary audit examination of cash and other accounts
of Ernesto Navallo (then Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National
Vocational School). Espino found Navallo to be short of
P16,483.62. The auditor, however, was
then merely able to prepare a cash count sheet since he still had to proceed to
other municipalities. Before departing,
Espino sealed the vault of Navallo.

On 30 January 1978, Leopoldo A. Dulguime was directed by Espino
to complete the preliminary examination and to conduct a final audit. Dulguime broke the seal, opened the vault,
and made a new cash count. Dulguime
next examined the cashbook of Navallo. Dulguime did not examine the official receipts reflected in the
cashbook, said receipts having been previously turned over to the Office of the
Provincial Auditor. After the audit, he
had the cashbook likewise deposited with the same office. The audit covered the period from July 1976
to January 1978 on the basis of postings and record of collections certified to
by Navallo. Dulguime confirmed
Navallo’s shortage of P16,483.62. Dulguime made a Report of Examination and wrote Navallo a letter
demanding the restitution of the missing amount. The latter neither complied nor offered any explanation for the
shortage. The official receipts and
cashbook, together with some other records, were subsequently lost or damaged
on account of a typhoon that visited the province.

Evidence
for the Defense:

The accused, Navallo, testified that in 1970, he was a Clerk I in
the Numancia National Vocational School. In 1976, he was appointed Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the
school. His duties included the
collection of tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers
and employees, and remittance of collections exceeding P500.00 to the National
Treasury. Even while he had not yet
received his appointment papers, he, together with, and upon the instructions
of, Cesar Macasemo (the Principal and Navallo’s predecessor as Collecting and
Disbursing Officer of the school), was himself already doing entries in the
cashbook. Navallo and Macasemo thus
both used the vault. Navallo said that
he started the job of a disbursement officer in June 1977, and began to
discharge in full the duties of his new position (Collection and Disbursement
Officer) only in 1978. There was no
formal turn over of accountability from Macasemo to Navallo.

Gainsaying the prosecution’s evidence, Navallo continued that the
charge against him was motivated by a personal grudge on the part of
Espino. On 25 January 1978, he said, he
was summoned to appear at the Numancia National Vocational School where he saw
Espino and Macasemo. The safe used by
him and by Macasemo was already open when he arrived, and the cash which was
taken out from the safe was placed on top of a table. He did not see the actual counting of the money and no actual
audit of his accountability was made by Espino. Navallo signed the cash count only because he was pressured by
Macasemo who assured him that he (Macasemo) would settle everything. The collections in 1976, reflected in the
Statement of Accountability, were not his, he declared, but those of Macasemo
who had unliquidated cash advances.

Navallo admitted having received the demand letter but he did not
reply because he was already in Manila looking for another employment. He was in Manila when the case was filed
against him. He did not exert any
effort to have Macasemo appear in the preliminary investigation, relying
instead on Macasemo’s assurance that he
would settle the matter. He, however,
verbally informed the investigating fiscal that the shortage represented the
unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo.

The Appealed
Decision:

On 08 November 1990, after evaluating the evidence, the
Sandiganbayan reached a decision, and it rendered judgment, thus:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERNESTO NAVALLO y
GALON GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of malversation
of public funds defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4, of the
Revised Penal Code.

“Accordingly and there being no modifying circumstances nor
reason negating the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended,
the Court imposes upon the accused the indeterminate sentence ranging from TEN
(10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to SIXTEEN
(16) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of reclusion temporal
as maximum; the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and a fine in
the amount of SIXTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS AND SIXTY-TWO
CENTAVOS (P16,483.62), Philippine Currency.

“The Court further orders the accused to restitute the amount
malversed to the Government.

“SO ORDERED.”^[2]

Accused-petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its resolution of 05
February 1991.

Hence, the instant petition.

Four issues are raised in this appeal –

1. Whether or not the
Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the offense filed against
petitioner in spite of the fact that long before the law creating the
Sandiganbayan took effect, an Information had
already been filed with the then Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte.

2. Whether or not
double jeopardy set in when petitioner was arraigned by the Regional Trial
Court on July 18, 1985.

3. Whether or not
petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification
prepared by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo
Dulguime.

4. Whether or not
the guilt of petitioner has been established by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt as to warrant his conviction for the offense imputed against him.

We see no merit in the petition.

On 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect
providing, among other things, thusly:

“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over:

“(a) Violations
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;

“(b) Crimes
committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and

“(c) Other
crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
office.”

“x x x             x x x                 x x x

“SEC. 8. Transfer
of cases. – As of the date
of the effectivity of this decree, any case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
within its exclusive jurisdiction where none of the accused has been arraigned shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan.”

The law is explicit and clear. A case falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be
transferred to it so long as the accused has not as yet been properly arraigned
elsewhere on the date of effectivity of the law, i.e., on 10 December
1978. The accused is charged with
having violated paragraph 4, Article 217, of the Revised Penal Code –

“Art. 217. Malversation
of public funds or property. –
Presumption of Malversation. – Any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of
the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

“x x x       x
x x           x x x.

“4. The penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds
the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua.“

an offense which falls under Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code and, without question, triable by the
Sandiganbayan. Navallo’s arraignment
before the RTC on 18 July 1985 is several years after Presidential Decree No.
1606, consigning that jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan, had become effective.

Accused-petitioner, invoking Section 7, Rule 117, of the Revised
Rules of Court, pleads double jeopardy. We cannot agree. Double jeopardy
requires the existence of the following requisites:

(1) The previous complaint or information or
other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;

(2) The court has jurisdiction
to try the case;

(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and

(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the
case is dismissed without his express consent.

When all the above elements are present, a
second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the
said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense
which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense
charged, can rightly be barred.

In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it
conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been
conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or
acquittal nor was it dismissed.

Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his
constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution.^[3]
Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused
is under “custodial investigation,” or is “in custody investigation,”^[4]
which we have since defined as any “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.”^[5] A
person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial
investigation. An audit examiner
himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having
been “pressured” to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime
appears to be belied by his own testimony. To quote:

“Q. How were you pressured?

“A. Mr. Macasemo told me to sign
the report because he will be the one to settle everything.

“xxx        xxx              xxx

“Q. Why did you allow yourself to
be pressured when you will be the one ultimately to suffer?

“A. Because he told me that
everything will be all right and that he will be the one to talk with the
auditor.

“Q. Did he tell you exactly what
you will do with the auditor to be relieved of responsibility?

“A. No, your Honor.

“Q. Why did you not ask him?

“A. I was ashamed to ask him, your
Honor, because he was my superior. “^[6]

Navallo may have been persuaded, but
certainly not pressured, to sign the auditor’s report. Furthermore, Navallo again contradicted
himself when, in his very petition to this Court, he stated:

“Bearing in mind the high respect of the accused with his
superior officer and taking into consideration his gratitude for the favors
that his superior officer has extended him in recommending him the position he
held even if he was not an accountant, he readily agreed to sign the auditor’s
report even if he was not given the opportunity to explain the alleged
shortage.”^[7]

Finally, accused-petitioner challenges the sufficiency of
evidence against him. Suffice it to say
that the law he contravened itself creates a presumption of evidence. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code states
that “(t)he failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use.” An accountable officer,
therefore, may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof
of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts
which he is unable to explain.^[8] Not
least insignificant is the evaluation of the evidence of the Sandiganbayan
itself which has found thusly:

“The claim that the amount of the shortage represented the
unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo does not inspire belief. No details whatsoever were given by
the accused on the matter such as, for instance, when and for what purpose was the alleged cash advance granted, what
step or steps were taken by Navallo or Macasemo to liquidate it. In fact, Navallo admitted that he did not
even ask Macasemo as to how he (Navallo) could be relieved of his
responsibility for the missing amount when he was promised by Macasemo that
everything would be all right. When
Navallo was already in Manila, he did not also even write Macasemo about the
shortage.

“As to the collections made in 1976 which Navallo denied having
made, the evidence of the prosecution shows that he assumed the office of
Collecting and Disbursing Officer in July 1976 and the cashbook which was
examined during the audit contained entries from July 1976 to January 1978,
which he certified to. Navallo
confirmed that indeed he was appointed Collecting and Disbursing Officer in
1976.

“Finally, the pretense that the missing amount was the
unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo and that Navallo did not collect tuition
fees in 1976 was advanced for the first time during the trial, that is, 12 long
solid years after the audit on January 30, 1978. Nothing was said about it
at the time of the audit and immediately thereafter.”

Findings of fact made by a trial court
are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent
a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the
results of the case, those findings should not be ignored. We see nothing on record in this case that
can justify a deviation from the rule.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of
respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 28.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 52.

^[3]
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

x x x                 x x x                 x x x

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

^[4]
See People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47; People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379.

^[5]
People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2;
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 19-20.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 6.

^[8]
De Guzman vs. People, 119 SCRA 337.