G.R. No. 97149. March 31, 1992
FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE REINERIO O. REYES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS; COMMOD…
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction
of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
and/or its Administrative Action Board (AAB) over administrative cases
involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), an agency attached to the said Department.
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr.[1] was
first employed by the PPA as arrastre supervisor in 1975. He became Assistant Port Operations Officer
in 1976 and Port Operations Officer in 1977. In February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of the PPA, he was
appointed Terminal Supervisor.
On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 against petitioner
Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. Beja
and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the loss
of P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the charges. After a preliminary investigation conducted
by the district attorney for Region X, Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 was
“considered closed for lack of merit.”
On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 12-01-88, was filed against Beja by the PPA general
manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and for being notoriously undesirable. The charge consisted of six (6) different specifications of
administrative offenses including fraud against the PPA in the total amount of
P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under
preventive suspension pursuant to Sec. 41 of P. D. No. 807.
The case was redocketed as Administrative Case No.
PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA general manager indorsed it to the
AAB for “appropriate action.” At the scheduled hearing, Beja asked
for continuance on the ground that he needed time to study the charges against
him. The AAB proceeded to hear the case
and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental.[2]
Two days later, he filed with the AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the
hearing of Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency
of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case.
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case
below and proceeded to file before this Court a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 87352
captioned “Fidencio Y. Beja v. Hon. Reinerio O. Reyes, etc., el.” In
the en banc resolution of March 30,
1989, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
“appropriate action.”[3] G.R.
No. 87352 was redocketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 17270.
Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB in Administrative
Case No. PPA-AAB-049-89. Its dispositive
portion reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudging the following, namely:
a) That respondents
Geronimo Beja, Jr. and Hernando Villaluz are exonerated from the charge against
them;
b) That respondent Fidencio
Y. Beja be dismissed from the service;
c) That his leave credits
and retirement benefits are declared forfeited;
d) That he be disqualified
from re-employment in the government service;
e) That his eligibility is
recommended to be cancelled.
Pasig, Metro Manila, February 28, 1989.”
On December 10, 1990, after appropriate proceedings, the Court of
Appeals also rendered a decision[4] in CA
– G.R. SP No. 17270 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit. Hence, Beja elevated the case
back to this Court through an “appeal by certiorari with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order.”
We find the
pleadings filed in this case to be sufficient bases for arriving at a decision
and hence, the filing of memoranda has been dispensed with.
In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for having
“decided questions of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions” of this Court.[5]
Specifically, Beja contends that the Court of Appeals failed to declare
that: (a) he was denied due process;
(b) the PPA general manager has no power to issue a preventive suspension order
without the necessary approval of the PPA board of directors; (c) the PPA
general manager has no power to refer the administrative case filed against him
to the DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-AAB and
DOTC-AAB itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try the
administrative case against him. Simply
put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive suspension and the
jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear
administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Manager.
Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager
cannot subject him to a preventive suspension on the following provision of
Sec. 8, Art. V of Presidential Decree No. 857
reorganizing the PPA:
“(d) The General Manager shall, subject to
the approval of the Board, appoint and
remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.” (Underscoring
supplied.)
Petitioner contends that under this
provision, the PPA Board of Directors and not the PPA General Manager is the
“proper disciplining authority.”[6]
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner
erroneously equates “preventive suspension” as a remedial measure
with “suspension” as a penalty for administrative dereliction. The imposition of preventive suspension on a
government employee charged with an administrative offense is subject to the
following provision of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No. 807:
“Sec. 41. Preventive
Suspension. – The proper
disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct,
or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that
the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the
service.”
Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation,
preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged
may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged
misfeasance while the same is being investigated.[7] Thus,
preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal
from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No. 857. While the former may be imposed on a
respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is
the penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation
or the final disposition of the case.
The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an
administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No.
857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of agencies
the “jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
actions against officers and employees” in the PPA.
Parenthetically, the period
of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted even if the
disciplining authority has not finally decided the administrative case provided
the ninety-day period from the effectivity of the preventive suspension has
been exhausted. The employee concerned
may then be reinstated.[8]
However, the said ninety-day period may be interrupted. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also mandates
that any fault, negligence or petition of a suspended employee may not be
considered in the computation of
the said period. Thus, when a suspended
employee obtains from a court of justice a restraining order or a preliminary
injunction inhibiting proceedings in an administrative case, the lifespan of
such court order should be excluded in the reckoning of the permissible period
of the preventive suspension.[9]
With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC Secretary
and/or the AAB may initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel
below the rank of Assistant General Manager, the Court qualifiedly rules in
favor of petitioner.
The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11,
1974. Under that law, the corporate
powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the
Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec.
5(i) of the same decree gave the Council the power “to appoint, discipline
and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the
Authority and other personnel.”
On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D. No.
857. Sec. 4(a) thereof created the
Philippine Ports Authority which would be “attached” to the then
Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive Order No. 125 dated January
30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications was
issued, the PPA retained its “attached” status.[10]
Even Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 classified the
PPA as an agency “attached” to the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book
IV, Title XV, Chapter 6 of the same Code provides that the agencies attached to
the DOTC “shall continue to operate and function in accordance with the
respective charters or laws creating them, except when they conflict with this
Code.”
Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three
administrative relationships mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and
administrative supervision. “Attachment” is defined in Sec. 38 thereof as follows:
“(3) Attachment. – (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between
the department or its equivalent and
the attached agency or corporation for
purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination shall be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency
or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting
rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or
agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent
provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall
serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or
agency;
(b) Matters of day-to-day administration or all
those pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion or
judgment of the executive officer of the agency or corporation. In the event that the Secretary and the
head of the board or the attached agency or corporation strongly disagree on
the interpretation and application of policies, and the Secretary is unable to
resolve the disagreement, he shall bring the matter to the President for
resolution and direction;
(c) Government-owned or controlled corporations
attached to a department shall submit to the Secretary concerned their audited
financial statements within sixty (60) days after the close of the fiscal year;
and
(d) Pending submission of the required
financial statements, the corporation shall continue to operate on the basis of
the preceding year’s budget until the financial statements shall have been
submitted. Should any government-owned
or controlled corporation incur an operation deficit at the close of its fiscal
year, it shall be subject to administrative supervision of the department; and
the corporation’s operating and capital budget shall be subject to the
department’s examination, review, modification and approval.”
(Underscoring supplied.)
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental
supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the
“lateral relationship” between the Department and the attached
agency. The attachment is merely for
“policy and program coordination.” With respect to administrative
matters, the independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and
supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a
Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference
with respect to appointments and other personnel actions “in accordance
with the decentralization of personnel functions” under the Administrative
Code of 1987.[11]
Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV
on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached
to a Department.[12]
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the
management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free from
Departmental interference and control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which provides:
“SEC. 8. Management and Staff. – a)
The President shall, upon the recommendation of the Board, appoint the General
Manager and the Assistant General Managers.
b) All other officials and employees of the
Authority shall be selected and appointed on the basis of merit and fitness
based on a comprehensive and progressive merit system to be established by the
Authority immediately upon its organization and consistent with Civil Service
rules and regulations. The recruitment, transfer, promotion, and dismissal of all personnel of the Authority,
including temporary workers, shall be governed by such merit system.
c) The General Manager shall, subject to the
approval of the Board, determine the staffing pattern and the number of personnel of the
Authority, define their duties and responsibilities, and fix their salaries
and emoluments. For professional and
technical positions, the General Manager shall recommend salaries and
emoluments that are comparable to those of similar positions in other
government-owned corporations, the provisions of existing rules and regulations
on wage and position classification notwithstanding.
d) The General Manager shall,
subject to the approval by the Board, appoint
and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant
General Manager.
x x x x x x x x x.” (Underscoring supplied.)
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a
mechanism for an administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the
power to remove erring employees on the General Manager, with the approval of
the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly grants said officials the power
to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be
charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated,
may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in
accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807.[13]
Only after gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose the
proper penalty in accordance with law. It
is the latter action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.[14]
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board
of Directors, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the
Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise,
he may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission. The permissive recourse to the Department
Secretary is sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807) under the
following provisions:
“SEC. 37. Disciplinary
Jurisdiction. – (a) The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days,
or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary
or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private
citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and
decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or
group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
“(b) The heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction
to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against
officers and employees under their jurisdiction. The decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days’ salary. In case
the decision rendered by a bureau
or office head is appealable to
the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and
finally to the Commission
and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is
removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by
the department head.
“x x x x x x x x x” (Underscoring
supplied.)
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by
the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first conducted an
investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and
sought its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to
elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.
The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes
under Office Order No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was designed to act, decide
and recommend to him “all cases of administrative
malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the
Department.” Composed of a Chairman and two (2) members, the AAB came into
being pursuant to Administrative Order No. 25 issued by the President on May
25, 1987.[15]
Its special nature as a
quasi-judicial administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not exempt from
the observance of due process in its proceedings.[16]
We are not satisfied that it did so in this case the respondents’ protestation
that petitioner waived his right to be heard notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitioner was
precisely questioning the AAB’s jurisdiction when it sought judicial recourse.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it upholds the
power of the PPA General Manager to subject petitioner to preventive suspension
and REVERSED insofar as it
validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on Administrative
Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and rules that due process has been accorded the
petitioner.
The AAB decision in said case is hereby declared NULL and VOID
and the case is REMANDED to the PPA
whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
The preventive suspension of petitioner shall continue unless
after a determination of its duration, it is found that he had served the total
of ninety (90) days in which case he shall be reinstated immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on leave.
Padilla, J., No part; related
to respondent Honorable Reinerio O. Reyes.
Bellosillo, J., No part.
[1]
Petitioner was referred to as “Fidencio Y. Beja” in the proceedings
below. He appears as “Fidencio Y.
Beja, Sr.” for the first time in this forum.
[2]
Case No. 89-053.
[3]
Two other cases involving substantially the same issues were likewise referred
by the Court to the Court of Appeals: G.R. Nos. 86468-69 (Leopoldo F. Bungubung v. Hon. Reinerio O.
Reyes, et al.) and G.R. No. 86646 (Reinerio O. Reyes, et al. vs. Cristeto O. Dinopol, et al.).
[4]
Penned by Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Fidel
P. Purisima and Abelardo M. Dayrit.
[5]
Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4.
[6]
Petition, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[7]
Bautista v. Peralta, L-21967, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 223, 225-226.
[8]
Sec. 42, P.D. No. 807.
[9]
Orbos v. Bungubung, G.R. No. 92358, November 21, 1990, 191 SCRA 563.
[10]
Sec. 18 (a).
[11]
Sec. 38 (2), par. (b).
[12]
Sec. 39 (2).
[13]
“SEC. 38. Procedure in
Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. – (a) Administrative proceedings may be
commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the head of department
or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of
agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn written complaint of any other
persons.
(b) In the case of a complaint
filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn statements
covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his
documentary evidence. If on the basis
of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the
disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie
case exists, he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against
the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn
statements and other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed
not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the
charges in writing under oath, together with supporting sworn statements and
documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal
investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the
disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.
(c) Although a respondent does not
request a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless be conducted when from
the allegations of the complaint and the answer of the respondent, including
the supporting documents, the merits of the case cannot be decided judiciously
without conducting such an investigation.
(d) The investigation shall be held
not earlier than five days nor later than ten days from the date of receipt of
respondent’s answer by the disciplining authority, and shall be finished
within thirty days from the filing of the charges, unless the period is
extended by the Commission in meritorious cases. The decision shall be rendered by the disciplining authority
within thirty days from the termination of the investigation or submission of
the report of the investigator, which report shall be submitted within fifteen
days from the conclusion of the investigation.
(e) The direct evidence for the
complainant and the respondent shall consist of the sworn statement and
documents submitted in support of the complaint or answer, as the case may be,
without prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary
but was unavailable at the time of the filing of the complaint or answer, upon
which the cross-examination, by respondent and the complainant, respectively,
shall be based. Following
cross-examination, there may be redirect and recross-examination.
(f) Either party may avail himself
of the services of counsel and may require the attendance of witnesses and the
production of ducumentary evidence in his favor through the compulsory process
of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
(g) The investigation shall be conducted only for the purpose of
ascertaining the truth and without necessarily adhering to technical rules
applicable in judicial proceedings. It
shall be conducted by the disciplining authority concerned or his authorized
representative.
The phrase ‘any other party’ shall
be understood to be a complainant other than those referred to in subsection
(a) hereof.”
[14]
Under the last paragraph of Sec. 36 of P.D. No. 807, the disciplining authority
may impose the penalty of removal from the service, transfer, demotion in rank,
suspension for not more than one year without pay, fine in an amount not
exceeding six months’ salary, or reprimand.
[15]
Respondents’ Comment, p. 1; Rollo, p. 85.
[16]
Lupo v. Administrative Action Board, G.R. No. 89687, September 26, 1990,
190 SCRA 69.