PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. REYNALDO BALAJADIA Y PESTAÑO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In a sworn complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon, Metro Manila by the offended party, Marlene Zinampan y de Jesus, on 22
December 1989,^[1]
the accused was charged with the crime of robbery with rape. The complaint recounts that:

“on or about the 16th day of December, 1989, in Malabon, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent of (sic) gain and by means of force and
intimidation employed upon the person of one MARLENE ZINAMPAN y DE JESUS, that
is, by pointing an icepick at the latter, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away cash money amounting to P200.00 and one (1) earring worth P500.00, with the total amount of
P700.00; that in the course of said robbery,
said accused, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse
with said MARLENE ZINAMPAN Y DE JESUS, against the latter’s will and without
her consent.”

The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 8759-MN and was raffled off to Branch 72 of the said court.

Trial ensued after the accused entered a plea of not guilty. The witnesses presented by the prosecution
were Dr. Louella T. Nario, Dolores Zinampan — the offended party’s mother and
the offended party herself. Those
presented by the defense were Luis Andaya, Wilson Zamora, Rodel Cantos, Cecilia
Zamora and accused Reynaldo Balajadia.

In a decision promulgated on 3 September 1990,^[2]
the trial court found the accused guilty as charged. The decretal portion thereof reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
rape defined and penalized under Article 294, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code. It having been committed with the
use of a deadly weapon, said accused is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua (as provided for in
P.D. No. 767 dated August 15, 1975), together with all the accessory penalties
thereof.

The accused who is a detention prisoner shall be credited in full
the period of detention he had already undergone in connection with this case
if he signed the agreement allowing himself to be treated while still in detention in the same manner
and subject to the same rules and regulations governing prisoners serving
sentence by virtue of final judgment. Otherwise, he shall only be credited
with 4/5 thereof.”

The prosecution’s evidence, upon which the judgment of conviction
is anchored, is condensed in the Appellee’s Brief as follows:

“Complainant, Marlene Zinampan, is a twenty (20) year old
graduate of Medical Technology who works as Production (sic) Coordinator in
Interphase Electronics Corporation (TSN, January 10, 1990, p. 2; TSN, July 30, 1990, p. 16). On the other hand, appellant Reynaldo
Balajadia is a five foot seven (5’7″) high school drop-out who works
allegedly as a jeepney driver (Record, p. 72). Victim and appellant are strangers to each other although both lived
within Sto. Rosario Village, Bgy. Baritan, Malabon (TSN, July 23, 1990, p. 2).

At about ten thirty (10:30) in the evening of December 16, 1989,
complainant, by means of public transportation, headed for home after attending
her office’s Christmas party celebration. By the time she reached the corner of Gov. Pascual and General Luna
Streets, Malabon, the place where she used to wait for tricycles to bring her
home, it was already 11:30 P.M. As it
was already late, there were few tricycles that plied the streets.

At any rate, desirous of reaching her home soonest, complainant
boarded a passing pedicab which was driven by a young man and in which a male
passenger (later identified as appellant) was already seated. As appellant manifested that he would be the
first one to alight, complainant acquiesced to take the inner seat, between
appellant and where the pedicab driver was astride.

While passing through the dimly-lit street fronting Jose Rizal High
School, appellant swiftly placed
his left arm around complainant’s neck and, with an icepick thrust on her right
side, demanded from complainant to immediately hand over to him her
valuables. Complainant, fearful for her
safety, acceded without any resistance by delivering to appellant her watch,
earrings and wallet containing two hundred (P200.00) pesos (TSN, February 28,
1990, pp. 23-24). Entertaining lustful
desires upon complainant, appellant directed the pedicab driver to go straight
to the direction of Ginza Lodge. The
pedicab driver objected to appellant’s plan as complainant was pleading for her
freedom but the pedicab driver and
complainant’s protestations were silenced when appellant wielded his icepick
against them.

Upon arrival at Ginza Lodge, appellant alighted and forcibly pulled
complainant out of the pedicab. Wrapping his arm around her shoulder and holding her upper arm
presumably to show a normal behavior of any consenting couple checking in, but
squeezing hard said upper arm at the slightest resistance on the part of
complainant, appellant and complainant thus proceeded to the cashier for room
(sic) assignment.

Appellant brought complainant to the room assigned, locked the door
and placed a chair thereto. Brandishing
the icepick, appellant then ordered complainant to remove her clothing. Overcome by fear, complainant docilely obeyed
appellant’s peremptory order and stripped herself of her intimate
garments. After removing his own
clothing, appellant shoved complainant to the bed in the room. Against her vigorous but futile
protestations and struggle, appellant succeeded in having carnal intercourse
with complainant.

The despicable act swiftly consummated, appellant ordered his
weakened victim to put on her dress. Either stricken with a pang of conscience, or assured that an
‘insurance’ or ‘leverage’ had served its purpose, or most probably being of no
material use to him, appellant returned to complainant the wristwatch, piece of
earring, and the wallet but minus the cash money of P200.00 in it which he had
earlier forcibly taken from the latter
(TSN, January 10, 1990, p. 18). Thereafter, in the same manner that he entered the motel, appellant
together with complainant checked out and boarded the waiting pedicab. Before appellant alighted at Tonsuya St., he
sternly warned complainant never to report the incident to the police.

It was two o’clock in the morning of the following day (December
17, 1989), when complainant finally reached her home. Immediately, she woke up her mother, Dolores Zinampan and related
the harrowing experience she had just undergone. Seeing her daughter’s skirt messed up with her own blood, she
instructed her daughter to clean and dress up. Thereafter complainant, accompanied by her uncle and grandfather, went
to the Malabon Police Station to report the incident (Exhibit F, Record, p.
84).

Upon official request made by police investigator Daniel Cruz
(Exhibit C, Record, p. 14), NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Louella Nario on
December 18, 1989 or less than 48 hours after the commission of the crime,
conducted an examination of the body of complainant. The physician found complete lacerations on her vagina, and the
hymen was ruptured at 1:00 o’clock and 7:00 o’clock, a circumstance highly
indicative of the probable fact that complainant was a virgin at the time of
the commission of the rape (TSN, February 14,
1990, p. 17). The lacerations on the
hymen were likewise edematous and bled on slight manipulation. After the examination, the physician issued
a medical certificate (Exhibit A, Record, p. 11).

On December 20, 1989, appellant was apprehended within the vicinity
of his residence (Exhibit D, Record, p. 15; TSN, January 10, 1990, p.
27).”^[3]

Finding this summary to be fully supported by the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the other records, we hereby adopt
the same as our own.

On the other hand, the defense presented a different version
which the trial court summarized
as follows:

“Accused Reynaldo Balajadia on the other hand, maintained that
he was already on board the pedicab on his way home when a woman, who turned
out to be the herein complainant, requested for a ride. The woman took the inner seat and was
noticed by the accused to be well-dressed with make-up but somewhat
intoxicated. As the complainant was
leaning on him, the accused asked her if she will go with him to a motel. The complainant replied by asking what they
will be doing thereat, to which the accused replied that they will do what a husband and a wife usually do. The complainant did not say anything to
this, but her silence the accused interpreted as conformity to his
proposal. The accused then told the
pedicab driver to go to the Ginza Motel which took them twenty (20) to thirty
(30) minutes to reach.

At the Ginza Motel, the pedicab stopped near the guardhouse and the
accused and the complainant went to the counter to pay and were guided to room
No. 45 at the second floor of the hotel. Thereat, the complainant undressed first afterwhich the accused kissed
her, touched her breast and eventually put himself on top of her to have sexual
intercourse with the complainant. After consumating (sic) the act, the accused
and the complainant dressed up and the accused told the complainant that he
will be bringing her home which the accused did, on the same pedicab that
brought them to the hotel.

The accused added that it was the complainant who told the driver
of the pedicab to wait for them and she even left her bag at the pedicab when
she returned thereto to tell the driver thereof to wait for them.

Employees of the hotel corroborated the testimony of the accused
and they added that in the process of alighting from the pedicab and the
returning thereto by the complainant, in the making of the payment at the
counter and in the leading by roomboy (sic) of the complainant and the accused
to their assigned hotel room, they (hotel personnel) did not notice anything
unusual in the accused as well as in the complainant particularly the
latter. The (sic) claimed that had they
noticed anything unusual, or involuntariness on the part of the complainant,
they would have refused admission of the couple to the hotel.

The accused, however, admitted that he and the complainant were
total strangers not having met nor seen
each other before this incident.”^[4]

The trial court rejected the defense’s version thus:

“The complainant is single, with a stable and promising
employment. She has a boyfriend and was
in probable state of virginity. She was
noticed by the Court to be a normal person not suffering from any visible mental
or vice related defect. Under ordinary
and normal circumstances, the complainant would not have agreed to the proposal
of a total stranger that they go into a motel and thereat do the thing a
husband and a wife usually do, which was to have sexual intercourse with one
another.

At the first opportunity, which was at 2:00 o’clock in the morning
of December 17, 1989, the complainant and her relatives were already at the
police headquarters to report that the complainant was raped at the Ginza
Hotel. This is very much consistent
with what a true victim of rape will do under ordinary circumstances.”^[5]

Accused appeals from the judgment of conviction,^[6] and in his Brief for the Accused-Appellant, avers that the trial court erred:

“I

X X X IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WILLINGLY AND
WILFULLY WENT WITH THE ACCUSED AND HAD
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH HIM.

II

X X X IN BELIEVING PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT’S VERSION WHICH IS PATENTLY
FALSE.

III

X X X IN NOT DECLARING COMPLAINANT’S ACCUSATION AS A MERE
CONCOCTION UNDESERVING OF ANY CONSIDERATION.

IV

X X X IN NOT DISMISSING THE ROBBERY ASPECT OF THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE SAME.”

At the bottom of these assigned errors lies the issue of the
credibility of witnesses. The defense
suggests that because of its four witnesses
— all employees of the Ginza Hotel — who testified on the actuations of the
complainant and the accused shortly before
the alleged rape, it was clearly proven that the complainant willingly and
wilfully went with the accused and had sexual intercourse with him. Settled of course is the rule that in the
determination of values and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered.^[7]
Accordingly, the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a
conviction if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable.^[8]
If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the
accused.^[9]
Also firmly established is the doctrine that when the issue of the credibility
of witnesses is raised,
appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court
considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of value have been plainly
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.^[10]

Our own review of the evidence yields no compelling reason to
depart from the aforementioned rules. On the contrary, we have found more reasons to accord full faith and
credence to the complainant’s
story.

There is absolutely no evidence to show that the complainant,
then 20 years old, single, a virgin and a Medical Technology graduate working
as a Production Coordinator in the Interphase Electronics Corporation, is a
woman of loose morals, a sex pervert or a prostitute. Nor is there any credible evidence to indicate that she was under
the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time she boarded the pedicab at around
10:30 o’clock in the evening of 16 December 1989. We cannot therefore accept the fantastic tale woven by the
accused — a high school drop-out and jeepney driver totally unknown to the
complainant — that the complainant immediately welcomed his suggestion that
they proceed to a motel to do what a husband and wife would do; voluntarily
went with him to the motel; told the pedicab driver to wait for them; left her
bag with the said pedicab driver; followed the accused from the motel’s
guardhouse, through the cashier’s office, then up to Room 34 at the second
floor where she then sat on the bed; undressed ahead of the accused; and had
sexual intercourse with him after he kissed her, fondled her breasts and laid
on top of her.

If indeed the complainant had voluntarily agreed to accept a
stranger’s lewd suggestion that she savor the pleasures of illicit sex, she
would have then kept the experience, whether the same was one of excruciating
pain or indescribable ecstasy, completely to herself. As borne out by the records, however, what the complainant
immediately did thereafter belies all suggestion that her participation in the
sexual act was voluntary and with her consent. Upon reaching home at 2:00 o’clock in the early morning of 17 December
1989 with her skirt messed up by her own blood, the complainant woke her mother
up and related to her the harrowing ordeal that she had just undergone. Then, after complying with her mother’s
instruction to clean herself and dress up, the complainant, accompanied by her
uncle and grandfather, proceeded to the Malabon Police Station to report the
incident. On 18 March 1989, pursuant to
an official request made by police investigator Daniel Cruz, the complainant
submitted to a medical examination conducted by NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr.
Louella Nario. The latter then
discovered complete lacerations in the complainant’s vagina with the hymen
ruptured at 1:00 o’clock and 7:00 o’clock, a circumstance highly indicative of
the probable fact that the complainant was a virgin at the time she was raped.

On 21 December 1989, the complainant signed the complaint for
robbery with rape which was then filed with the court a quo on 22
December 1989. Thereafter, she
testified in court, described how the crime was committed — publicly exposing in the process her defloration and the
dishonor suffered in the hands of the accused — and underwent the ordeal of a
rigorous cross-examination.

The complainant’s behavior after the commission of the crime is
entirely consistent with the natural and logical reaction to the wrong
committed against her without her consent, and further enhanced and
strengthened the truthfulness of her story, demonstrated her courage to expose
the evil deeds of the accused and stressed her urgent cry for justice. In this regard, it is apropos to
re-state the summary we made in People vs. Tismo^[11]
of certain rules in rape cases:

“However, equally settled is the rule that when a woman says she has been raped, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and that
if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on
the basis thereof.

The reason for this seems quite obvious, especially with respect to
the Filipina. Considering a Filipina’s
inbred modesty and antipathy in airing publicly things that affect her honor,
it is hard to conceive that she would assume and admit the ignominy she had
undergone if it were not true. A
complainant would not risk ruining her future and exposing herself to ridicule
if her charge were not true. If she
does undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, suffer
the scandals, embarrassments and humiliation such action would indubitably
invite, as well as allow an examination of her private part, it is to bring to
justice the person who had abused her. Indeed, if a complainant had voluntarily consented to have sex with the
accused, her most natural reaction would have been to conceal it and keep it as
this would bring disgrace to her honor and reputation as well as to her
family.”

Accused wants this Court to give credence to the net effect of
the testimonies of the defense witnesses. According to him, the complainant “did not offer any resistance nor
make any vocal protestation to prevent the accused from accomplishing his
alleged odious intention” and that “there was no immediate danger to
her [complainant’s] person as the accused did not have any assault weapon in
his hand at the time they alighted from the pedicab as well as at the time the
accused was registering and paying in the presence of the cashier on duty,
CECILIA ZAMORA and the roomboy, RODEL CANTOS.”^[12]
We simply cannot accept these suggestions as it was established that the
accused armed himself with an icepick and actually threatened the complainant
with death. The latter testified as
follows:

“FISCAL:

x x x

Q    And
what happened after that?

A Nothing happened until we reached the place near the Jose Rizal
Highschool and all of a sudden he placed his arm around my neck and the other
hand with an icepick pointed by my rightside and said: ‘This is a hold-up’ and told to me to give
him my money and jewelry.

Q    What
did you do after he placed his arm around your neck and pointed an icepick on
your ribs?

A I was surprised when he said that, so I immediately removed my earrings
and my watch and even my wallet inside my bag and other valuables, I gave it to
him.

Q    Why
did you give it all to him?

A Because I got scare (sic), when he announced the hold-up, so I gave it
all to him because I was advised by my grandfather always that in case I will
be held-up, I would rather give all my belongings so that I would be safe.

Q    Thereafter
what happened?

A     After
that he instructed the tricycle boy to go straight towards Governor
Pascual. The tricycle driver was at
first objecting but then the accused pointed the icepick to him.

Q    After that what happened?

A     While
the tricycle was going on, I pleaded to him to set me free anyway he has taken
all my valuables.

Q    Did
he heed to (sic) your plea to set you free?

A     No,
sir he told me to keep quiet or else I will be killed.

Q    What
else happened after that?

A     He
told the tricycle boy to go on and said we will go to Ginza Motel. I still pleaded to him to set me free.

Q    How did you register your plea to the
accused?

A     I
pleaded for his mercy and I cried but he would not listen to me at all.

Q    What
happened after that?

A While traveling whenever we would meet a vehicle he would tighten his
hold on me and his icepick was placed hard telling (sic) me to keep quiet.

Q    What
happened after that?

A     The
tricycle boy was objecting but he is (sic) insisting that we go to the motel
until we reached the said place.

Q    Do
you know the motel where you were brought?

A     Accordingly
it is Ginza (sic) Motel.

Q    How
did you know that it was Ginza (sic) Motel?

A     Because
he mentioned that name before and I saw the sign upon entering it.

Q    What
happened there upon your arrival at the Ginza Motel?

A     We
alighted from the tricycle and his arm was still around me upon paying the
(sic) counter.

Q    In
what part of your body was he holding?

A     On
my left upper arm.

INTERPRETER:

Witness demonstrating
her left upper arm.

FISCAL:

Q    What
did you do while he was paying the counter boy?

A     I
was ‘pumapalag’ but he kept on tightening his hold.

Q    Did
you not inform the counter boy where the accused was paying that you were being
brought there against your will?

A     No,
sir because I was scared and I know (sic) that he was armed.

Q    What
then if you know (sic) that he was armed, did you not run away?

A     Because
I am afraid that I might be overtaken me (sic) and I might be killed.

Q    What
happened after the accused paid the counter boy at the Ginza Motel?

A     Then
I saw (sic) the roomboy had left, I was brought upstairs then he closed the
door even (sic) placed a chair against the door.

Q    Of
course, you have to walk the
stairs in going up, did it not occur to your mind to run away while he was
bringing you up inside the room?

A     I
cannot run away because he was tightening his hold on my left shoulder and I
was afraid that I might be killed, as what I have read in the newspapers that
they kill the victim.

Q    Once
inside the room at Ginza Motel what transpired there?

A     He
was forcing me to undress and was even brandishing the icepick to me. I continued pleading for his mercy and said
‘Mama maawa na kayo.’ He did not listen to me at all and he said just keep
quiet or else he will kill me.

Q    What
happened after that?

A     Despite
my plea for mercy because I was scared I removed my dress and he continuously
pointing (sic) the icepick to me.”^[13]

At the police station in the early morning hours of 17 December
1989 where she reported the robbery with rape, the complainant spontaneously
revealed to the investigator that her assailant was armed with an icepick. This fact was recorded in the police blotter
at “0310H” of 17 December 1989 (Exhibit “F”).

Against the complainant’s positive testimony, nothing but a
self-serving denial was offered by the accused.

We thus affirm the trial court’s finding and conclusion that the
accused is guilty as charged.

The lower court sentenced the accused to “life imprisonment
or Reclusion Perpetua.” We have repeatedly declared that
life imprisonment is not the same as or synonymous with reclusion perpetua.^[14]

Pursuant to the proviso in the second paragraph of Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of robbery with rape is reclusion
perpetua to death. In view of
the first paragraph of Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, only reclusion perpetua
may be imposed.

The trial court failed to award the complainant moral
damages. Under the circumstances in
this case, and conformably with recent case law, the latter should be awarded
moral damages in the sum of P40,000.00.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the
challenged decision of Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro
Manila in Criminal Case No. 8759-MN, subject to the modifications above
indicated. As modified, the words
“life imprisonment” in the dispositive portion thereof are deleted
and the accused is hereby ordered to pay the complainant, Marlene Zinampan y de
Jesus, the sum of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) as moral damages.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), and
Romero, JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., joins J. Melo in his dissenting opinion.

---

^[1]
Original Records (OR), 1-2. The sworn
complaint contains a certification by 2nd Assistant City Fiscal Bayani Jamias
that he had conducted an examination of the complainant and her witnesses and
that on the basis of her statement and other evidence, there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.

^[2]
OR, 163-169. Per Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr.

^[3]
Brief for the Appellee, 4-10.

^[4]
OR, 166-167.

^[5]
OR, 168.

^[6]
Id., 170.

^[7]
People vs. Candado, 84 SCRA 508
[1978].

^[8]
People vs. Salazar, 58 SCRA 467
[1974]; People vs. Boduso, 60 SCRA 60 [1974]; People vs. Lazo,
198 SCRA 274 [1991].

^[9]
People vs. Aquino, 197 SCRA 578
[1991]; People vs. Sarol, 198 SCRA 286 [1991].

^[10]
People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440
[1979]; People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 [1991]; People vs. Simon,
209 SCRA 148 [1992].

^[11]
Supra., at 553-554. Citations omitted.

^[12]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 27.

^[13]
TSN, 10 January 1990, 7-12.

^[14]
People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 [1991]; People vs. Penillos, 205
SCRA 546 [1992]; People vs. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 [1992].

---

105

6 pt
6 pt
0
3