EMILIANO S. CASIPIT AND ANTONIA C. CASIPIT VDA. DE BEATO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (FORMER SECOND DIVISION), SPOUSES SEVERINO B. DIAZ AND ZENAIDA ALZONA-DIAZ, ROS…

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking
reversal of the adverse decision of public respondent Court of Appeals dated
August 22, 1990, in C.A. G.R. CV-No. 22671, entitled “Emiliano S. Casipit,
et al. v. Spouses Severino B. Diaz and Zenaida Alzona?Diaz, et al.,”
which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint by the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna and ordered them to vacate the questioned property and
pay to private respondents rentals, damages and attorney’s fees; and its
resolution dated January 11, 1991, which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.

The antecedent facts, as found by the trial court are, as
follows:

On July 21, 1919, Urbano Casipit, father of petitioner Emiliano
S. Casipit, bought Lot No. 144 (questioned property) located at Sinalhan, Sta.
Rosa, Laguna, containing an area of 661 square meters from the government
(Exhibit “2”).  On June 7,
1923, he assigned his rights to the questioned property to Gabriel Beato
(Exhibit “3”) due to his (Urbano Casipit) default in paying the
installments due thereon (Exhibits “2-A” and “2-B”).  In 1932, Tax Declaration No. 7233 over the
questioned property (Exhibit “4”) was issued in the name of Gabriel
Beato.  On February 23, 1933, Patent No.
31464 over the questioned property was issued by Friar Lands Agency No. 2 in
his name (Exhibit “3-A”).  On
October 7, 1945, Gabriel Beato died.

In 1945, Tax Declaration No. 2561 (Exhibit “C”) over
the questioned property was issued in the name of petitioner Emiliano S.
Casipit, but covering an area of 330 square meters only.  On February 9, 1949, he paid real estate
taxes thereon for the years 1945 to 1949. 
He also paid taxes thereon for the years 1950 and 1954 (Exhibit
“B”).

On November 25, 1961, the heirs of Gabriel Beato namely, Ricardo,
Rosa, Narciso, Fortunata and Domingo, all surnamed Beato, executed a document
entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati” wherein they
adjudicated to themselves the properties of Gabriel Beato.  In the same document, they sold to private
respondents spouses Severino B. Diaz and Zenaida Alzona-Diaz the questioned
property (Exhibits “F” and “1”).  At the time of the sale, there was no
occupant on the questioned property and petitioner Emiliano S. Casipit was then
residing in an adjoining lot.

On January 6, 1962, Narciso Beato filed before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna a Petition for Reconstitution of Titles, which was granted
on July 17, 1963.  On August 30, 1963,
TCT No. RT-7880 over the questioned property was issued in the name of Gabriel
Beato (Exhibit “7-B”).  On
September 20, 1963, TCT No. RT-7880 was cancelled by TCT No. T-27996 in the
name of the heirs of Gabriel Beato (Exhibit “8”) which was in turn
cancelled by TCT No. T-27997 in the name of private respondents Diaz
spouses.  (Exhibit “9”).

In 1965, petitioner Antonia C. Casipit Vda. de Beato and Julian
Almadovar erected their respective houses on a portion of the questioned
property.  On October 8, 1981, a criminal
complaint for violation of P.D. No. 772 (Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar
Acts) was filed before the Municipal Court of Sta. Rosa, Laguna against them by
private respondent Severino B. Diaz (Exhibit “5”).  This complaint was dismissed at the instance
of the fiscal on March 26, 1985 because the questioned property is not among
the areas approved for inclusion in the slum improvement and resettlement
program of the government thus, said decree does not apply (Exhibit
“5-A”).  On June 6, 1985, a complaint
for ejectment (Civil Case No. 1601) was filed against petitioner Antonia C.
Casipit Vda. de Beato by private respondents Diaz spouses before the Municipal
Trial Court of Sta. Rosa, Laguna (Exhibit “6”).

On April 27, 1987, a complaint was filed by petitioners against
private respondents Diaz spouses, Rosa Beato Vda. de Diaz and Fortunata S.
Beato mainly for recovery of ownership over the questioned property before the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna (pp. 1-14, Records).  On June 23, 1987 (pp. 84-98, Records) and
April 15, 1988 (pp. 173-188, Records), the complaint was amended.  The ejectment case (Civil Case No. 1601) was
then suspended due to the filing of the present case.  In their complaint, it was alleged that
petitioner Emiliano S. Casipit is the true and lawful owner of the questioned
property by virtue of continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful, open and public
possession in the concept of owner since 1930. 
Petitioners were deprived of ownership thereof by the Beatos through
Narciso Beato, who filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Titles in the name of
Gabriel Beato, using fictitious documents. 
Petitioners therefore prayed that TCT No. RT-7880 and other succeeding
titles be cancelled, as well as Tax Declaration No. 7192 (sic) and succeeding
tax declarations; that the questioned property be reconveyed to them; that the
document entitled, “Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati,” insofar as
it included the questioned property be rescinded; and that private respondents
be ordered to pay damages and attorney’s fees.

Private respondents disputed these allegations in their answer
and by way of counterclaim, prayed for petitioners and all persons deriving
title from them to vacate the questioned property, and to pay reasonable
rentals, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

On July 11, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which, reads (p. 571, Records):

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiffs and the Second Amended Complaint is
dismissed.  Further, the plaintiffs are
ordered to pay jointly and severally the Spouses Severino Diaz and Zenaida Diaz
the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees. 
With costs against the plaintiffs.

“SO ORDERED.”

In support of this ruling, the trial
court ratiocinated (pp. 569-571, Records):

“It must be noted that the plaintiffs’ claim of ownership over
Lot No. 144 is based on their alleged continuous possession of the same and on
Tax Declaration No. 2561 (Exhibit ‘C’) in the name of Emiliano Casipit, as well
as on the receipts showing payments of real estate taxes for the years starting
1945 to 1949, 1950 and 1954.

“Such claims of the plaintiffs cannot be sustained by the
Court for the following reasons:  (1) the
testimonies of Antonia Casipit and Clara Casipit Calderon to the effect that
they and their predecessor-in-in­terest have been in continous possession of
Lot No. 144 since time immemorial are self serving; (2) Tax Declaration No.
2561 (Exhibit ‘C’) in the name of Emiliano Casipit has been (sic) issued only
in 1945 and does not indicate the previous tax declaration it cancelled.  Likewise, it only covers 330 square meters of
Lot No. 144.  On the other hand, tax
declaration No. 7233 (Exhibit ‘4’) in the name of Gabriel Beato was issued in
1932 and it covers the whole of Lot No. 144; (3) the testimony of Antonia
Casipit that her father Emiliano Casipit inherited from Urbano Casipit the land
covered by tax declaration No. 2561 can not overcome the ancient documents
introduced by the defendants showing that Urbano Casipit after defaulting in
the payment of installments due the government assigned in 1923 his rights over
Lot No. 144 to Gabriel Beato (Exhibits ‘2-A’, ‘2-B’ and ‘3’); and (4) the
possession by the plaintiffs of a portion of Lot No. 144 can not ripened (sic)
into ownership, for land registered under the Torrens System may not be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

“Manifestly, the defendants have a better right over Lot No.
144 than the plaintiffs.  Besides, the
cause of action of the plaintiffs being based on fraud, has prescribed for it
must be filed within four(4) years after the cause of action arose.  The issuance of the reconstituted title over
Lot No. 144 and its registration in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna, in 1973 (sic) is the starting date for the prescriptive period to
commence.

“Anent the second issue, the Court finds no justifiable reason
to order the cancellation of TCT No. (T-27997) T-13161, since the plaintiffs
have failed to prove that they are the owners of the land covered by the said
title.  The fact that the Petition for
Reconstitution of Titles was granted by the Court of First Instance of Laguna
in LRC Record No. 23313 and such order having become final and executory, it is
now conclusive on Gabriel Beato’s title over Lot No. 144.

“As to the third issue, the records show that the plaintiffs’
(sic) have miserably failed to present evidence to establish bad faith on the
part of the defendants Severino Diaz and Zenaida Diaz.  On the contrary, Zenaida Diaz declared that
when they bought Lot No. 144 nobody was residing thereon and that Emiliano
Casipit was then living at the adjoining lot. 
Therefore, said defendants are buyers in good faith and for value, for
good faith is presumed unless the contrary is shown.

“Regarding the last issue, definitely, the plaintiffs are not
entitled to damages, attorney’s fees and costs, however, the defendants
Severino Diaz and Zenaida Diaz are.  The
Diazes since 1985 have been trying to eject from the land in question the
plaintiffs but have been unsuccessful. 
For this reason, the Diazes are entitled to actual damages and
attorney’s fees.  Unfortunately, the
Diazes have not presented competent evidence to prove the actual damages they
sustained although as to attorney’s fees they are entitled to the amount of
P5,000.00.  The Court can not award moral
damages in favor of the Diazes since no bad faith or malice has been proven on
the part of the plaintiffs.”

Both parties appealed to public respondent Court of Appeals.  Petitioners questioned the dismissal of their
complaint by the trial court whereas private respondents questioned the failure
of said court to grant them their prayer for reasonable rentals, actual and
moral damages.  On August 22, 1990,
respondent court resolved the appeal in favor of private respondents, the
dispositive portion of which, reads (p. 32, Rollo):

“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dismissing the complaint
should be as it is hereby AFFIRMED.  On
the counterclaim of defendants, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiffs
to vacate lot No. 144, and to pay reasonable rental in the amount of P300.00
from October, 1981 until they should have vacated the (sic) premises; to pay
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00, and 
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00.  No costs.

“SO ORDERED.”

In  affirming the trial
court’s decision, respondent court expounded (pp. 27-29, Rollo):

“x x x.  To make it
worse, on its face the tax declaration (No. 2561) appears to have been
cancelled by provincial form No. 183 in 1966. 
Thereafter, no other tax declaration or any proof of ownership was
issued in the name of plaintiffs-appellants.

“The payment of realty taxes by plaintiffs-appellants do not
give any added weight to their claim of ownership of the lot in dispute.  This is so considering the doctrine that
‘payment of land taxes is not an evidence of ownership of the parcel of land
for which payment is made.’  (Reyes vs.
Serra, 93 SCRA 472; Director of Lands vs. C.A. 133 SCRA 701).  During the pre-trial on November 2, 1988, the
parties agreed, among other things –

‘5.     That Emiliano Casipit on February 9, 1949
paid the land taxes for lot 144 for the years 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1948;
and on August 5, 1950 paid the land taxes for the said lot for 1950 and on
October 13, 1954 paid the land taxes for the said lot for 1954.’ (pp. 492-493,
rec.)

“Admittedly, therefore, it would appear that
plaintiff-appellants paid realty taxes for the land in dispute only 3 times and
no more.  Certainly that kind of payment
cannot convey the idea of ownership.

“x x x.  Then, the
record shows that on October 8, 1981, Severino Diaz filed charges of
anti-squatting against Casipit and Almadovar. 
On June 6, 1985, the Diaz spouses again filed an ejectment suit against
Antonia Casipit.  These undisputed facts
would disprove the claim of the plaintiffs?appellants to uninterrupted
possession that would have ripened to ownership.

“x x x.

“x x x.  Plaintiffs-appellants,
x x x, failed to explain how Emiliano Casipit acquired a right over 1/2 of lot
144.  x x x.

“x x x.  Then, tax
declaration 7232 (sic) shows on its dorsal side that it was the very first or
original tax declaration issued for lot 144, as shown by the notation:  ‘New’. 
Thereafter, in the same year, tax declaration 142 (sic) was issued in
the name of the heirs of Gabriel Beato, and, unlike tax declaration 2561 of
Casipit, clearly stated that is was cancelling tax declaration 7232 (sic) in
the name of Gabriel Beato.”

On January 11, 1991, the motion for
reconsideration was denied (p. 17, Rollo).  Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners assign as errors committed by respondent court the
following (pp. 7-8, Rollo):

“First Assignment
of Error

“THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS AS THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN WERE NOT SQUARELY AND THOROUGHLY
THRESHED OUT IN THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 11, 1991 AS
THE CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS OR ANNEX ‘F’ OR EXHIBIT ‘D’ HAS
PROBATIVE VALUE TO BE GIVEN FULL CREDENCE AS THE SAME HAS BEEN ADMITTED BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEREBY DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE ‘KASULATAN NG
PAGMAMANA AT PAGHAHATI’ OR EXHIBIT ‘1′ EXECUTED ON NOVEMBER 25, 1961 FOR WHICH
REASON THE ACTION OF PETITIONERS IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.

“Second Assignment
of Error

“THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN PROMULGATING ITS RESOLUTION OR ANNEX ‘B’ WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF PETITIONERS AS THE QUESTIONED ‘KASULATAN NG PAGMAMANA AT
PAGHAHATI’ EXECUTED ON NOVEMBER 25, 1961 CANNOT BE MADE AS BASIS IN CANCELLING
RECONSTITUTED TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. RT-7880 WHICH WAS RECONSTITUTED
ONLY ON AUGUST 30, 1963 AND NON-EXISTING ON NOVEMBER 25, 1961 WITHIN THE
KNOWLEDGE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DIAZES MAKING THEM AS BUYERS IN BAD FAITH AND
BESIDES THE SAID ‘KASULATAN NG PAGMAMANA AT PAGHAHATI’ HAS TO BE DECLARED NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO.

“Third Assignment
of Error

“THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PROMULGATING ITS RESOLUTION OR ANNEX ‘B’ AND
ITS DECISION OR ANNEX ‘E’ ORDERING THE EJECTMENT OF THE PETITIONERS FROM THE
PREMISES AND AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES AS SAID ORDER OF EJECTMENT IS
EQUIVALENT TO VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND
THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD WHICH THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED AS PETITIONER EMILIANO
CASIPIT IS NOT A PARTY TO SAID EJECTMENT SUIT AND THE TRIAL COURT FINDS NO
EVIDENCE TO WARRANT EJECTMENT.”

They allege that pursuant to the
Certification issued by the Bureau of Lands (Exhibit “D”) that Patent
No. 31464 over the questioned property has not been issued to Gabriel Beato,
the “Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati” is therefore a void
contract.  This being the case, the
action taken by petitioners is imprescriptible. 
Private respondents Diaz spouses were buyers in bad faith because they
had full knowledge that Emiliano Casipit has been in actual possession in the
concept of owner of the questioned property and paid the real property taxes
thereon.  Private respondent Zenaida
Alzona-Diaz testified that (pp. 46-48, tsn, March 20, 1989):

“ATTY. NOYNAY:

“x x x

“Q   So,
when was that year, if you still remember when Emiliano Casipit came from lot
144?

“A    I
saw in 1948, that is my first year in teaching, I saw the house of Emiliano
Casipit situated on that Lot 144.

“x x x.

“Q   So,
in other words, Mrs. witness before 1948 you have seen the house of Emiliano
Casipit in lot 144?

“A    Yes,
sir.”

Likewise, private respondents Diaz
spouses were aware that the Beatos had no title over the questioned property as
of November 25, 1961 when the “Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati”
was executed because TCT No. RT-7880 was issued only on August 30, 1963.  This was revealed by Zenaida Diaz in her
testimony (pp. 45-46, supra):

“ATTY. NOYNAY:

“x x x.

“Q   So,
when you answered a while ago that during the time when this Kasulatan was
executed in 1961 and which according to you, you were shown titles by the
Beatos’ is not (sic) correct?

“WITNESS:

“A    At
that time, sir, there was no title yet.

The ejectment of petitioners from the
questioned property and the award of damages and attorney’s fees are violative
of due process of law because petitioner Emiliano S. Casipit is not a party to
the ejectment suit before the trial court (Civil Case No. 1601).

The petition is not impressed with merit.

There is no dispute that an action for reconveyance based on a
void contract is imprescriptible (Castillo, et al. v. Madrigal, et al., G.R.
No. 62650, June 27, 1991; Baranda, et al. v. Baranda, et al., G.R. No. 73275,
May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 59).  However, We
simply cannot apply this principle to the present case because the action filed
by petitioners before the trial court was 1) for reconveyance based on fraud
since the ownership of private respondents over the questioned property was
allegedly established on “false assertions, misrepresentations and deceptive
allegations” (p. 182, Records); and 2) for rescission of the
“Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati” (pp. 173, 187, Records).  Besides, as against said Certification issued
by the Bureau of Lands (Exhibit “D”) dated March 18, 1987, which
petitioners harp on, is the explicit Certification of Friar Lands Agency No. 2
of the same Bureau dated June 17, 1951, that “x x x according to the
records of this Office, Lot No. 144 of the SANTA ROSA (DETACHED) ESTATE, was
deeded under Patent No. 31464 dated February 23, 1933 in the name of Gabriel
Beato of Sinalhan, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.” Thus, the action for reconveyance
bated on fraud filed by petitioners before the trial court is subject to
prescription.  In this regard, respondent
court shares the same view as the trial court that (p. 29, Rollo):

“x x x.  The issuance of the
reconstituted title over lot No. 144 and its registration in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna in 1973 (sic) is the reckoning point for the
prescriptive period to commence.  The 4-year
period within which to file this case for cancellation of title based on
fraud must be done within 4 years after the cause of action
arose.  Here, more than 4 years
has elapsed.” (underscoring supplied)

We were categorical in the case of Caro,
et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 76148, December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA
401 citing the case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No.
L-33261, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 396 that the prescriptive period for the
reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10)
years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of
title.  We even said in the case of Heirs
of Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
93507, July 12, 1991 that:

“x x x, after numerous illuminating decisions by this Court,
nobody can successfully claim ignorance of the rule that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10)
years.  x x x.”

Conformably with these settled
jurisprudence, the prescriptive period for petitioners’ action for reconveyance
is ten (10) years from August 30, 1963, the date of the issuance of TCT No.
RT-7880 (Exhibit “7-8”). 
Obviously, Our discussion on this subject matter is not beneficial to
petitioners because they filed the action for reconveyance only on April 27,
1987.

While private respondent Zenaida Alzona-Diaz saw the house of
petitioner Emiliano S. Casipit on the questioned property before 1948, at the
time of the sale, there was no occupant on the questioned property and he
(Emiliano S. Casipit) was then residing in an adjoining lot (supra).  When she testified that there was no title
yet when the “Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati” was executed in
1961, she was referring to there reconstituted torrens title thereon.  The other portions of her testimony which
were conveniently deleted by petitioners read (pp. 44-45, tsn, March 20, 1989):

“Q   In
1961, you mean to say that the Beatos had already told you that they have
already a reconstituted title over the portion that was sold to you?

“A    None
yet, sir­.

“Q   What
(sic) is it that you were answering (sic) Atty. Noynay that you were told about
the reconstituted title?

“A    My
husband and I were informed that they will file a petition for reconstitution
on Lot No. (sic) 132, 134 and 144.”

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys
the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other person in the property (Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, et al., G.R. No.
L-26083, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 196 citing Cui and Joven v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606
and Fule v. De Legare, 7 SCRA 351).  In consonance
with this definition, private respondents Diaz spouses were purchasers in good
faith.  They bought the property of
private respondents Beatos without notice that some other person has a right
to, or interest in, the questioned property and paid the full price therefor at
the time of such purchase.  In addition,
respondent court said (pp. 29-30, Rollo):

“The Diaz spouses who bought the land in question from the
Beatos are buyers in good faith.  We find
no need for an extended discussion on this issue, considering that
plaintiffs-appellants failed to show a better title to the lot than that of the
defendants-appellees Beatos.  However, We
shall dwell briefly on this matter if only to erase any doubt as to the good
title of the Diazes over the property which they now own.  When the Diazes bought the property in
question for a valuable consideration, they were shown the Beatos’ documents
which show and prove how the latter acquired ownership thereof.  These consisted of Exhibits 2, 2-A, 3, and 4,
which are all ancient documents.  Then,
when the Diaz spouses purchased the lot in question, there was no house or
structure built thereon, nor anyone living in the premises.  Under the circumstance, the Diaz spouses
cannot be imputed with notice of this adverse claim of the plaintiff (sic) or
any flaw, assuming there is any, in the title of the vendors.”

Regarding the last allegation of petitioners, We adopt respondent
court’s reasoning thereon (pp. 31-32, Rollo):

“x x x, the herein defendants-appellants are entitled to lot
144, and thus, in effect, plaintiffs-appellees are unlawfully occupying
portions of the said lot.  The trial
court thus may award actual (sic) damages in every case where a property right
has been invaded (Article 2222 of the New Civil Code).  Defendant-appellant Zenaida Diaz testified
that the reasonable rental for the area occupied by Antonio (sic) Casipit is
P300.00 a month (p. 40, tsn; Mar. 20, 1987 (sic)).  This testimony of Diaz was unrebutted.  It is also unrebutted that on October 8, 1981,
Severino Diaz filed a criminal complaint against Antonio (sic) Casipit and
Julian Almadovar for violation of P.D. 772, but was dismissed by the
prosecuting fiscal on the ground that the said law applies to urban land only.  And on June 5, 1987 (sic), a complaint for
ejectment was filed by the Diazes against Antonia Casipit before the Municipal
Trial Court which was suspended due to the filing of this instant case.  Thus, October 8, 1981, should be the
reckoning point for the awrd (sic) of P300.00 a month in the form of reasonable
rentals to compensate the Diazes for the loss of enjoyment of property that
lawfully belongs to them.

“An award of moral damages is justified since the evidence
indicate (sic) bad faith in the filing of this complaint by plaintiffs-appellees.  Apparently, plaintiffs-appellees are not even
convinced of the validity of their claim since they permitted a period of more
than 30 years to lapse before they went to court.  It would seem that this complaint filed by
plaintiffs-appellees was merely an afterthought in order to counteract the
ejectment suit filed by defendants-appellants Diazes on June 6, 1985.  The numerous court cases relative to the lot
in dispute have caused the Diazes sleepless nights and thus they should be
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00.

“In order to give complete relief to the Diazes,
plaintiffs-appellees must vacate the lot in dispute.  True, there is now a pending ejectment case
in the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Rosa, Laguna.  However, the pendency of the said ejectment
case should not constitute a bar to the grant of the relief prayed for by
appellants Diazes in their answer, i.e., to vacate the premises.  In the case at bar, the issue of ownership has
in effect settled the issue of possession which would be litigated upon in the
ejectment suit.  The trial court took
into account the fact that appellants Diazes first filed a criminal complaint
against plaintiffs?appellees in 1981; and, in 1985, a complaint for
ejectment.  The Diazes, therefore, being
the lawful owners of the property in dispute, and in this case, the issue of
possession having been properly ventilated, should be awarded immediate
possession of the property.  This is
necessary in order to finish once and for all the controversy between the
defendants-appellants and the plaintiffs-appellees.  To leave the issue of ejectment in the hands
of the Municipal Trial Court where a complaint has been pending, would be to
deny complete relief to defendants-appellants. 
It is best to grant the relief prayer (sic) for, that of ejectment, in
the case at bar, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits.  It will not only save the parties and the
court the rigors and expenses of multiple (sic) litigations, but also avoid the
remote probability that there might be conflicting decisions relative to one
and the same issue.”

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED.  The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 22, 1990 and its resolution dated January 11, 1991 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Cruz, Feliciano, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.