THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ORLANDO ARBOLANTE Y LAGUNDI, TEODULFO LORENZO AND MAXIMO CATABAY, DEFENDANTS, TEODULFO LORENZO DEFENDANT- APPELLANT.

1.      The house, valued at ————————————————-	P100,000.00
2.      149 cavans of palay, valued at  ————————————	18,000.00
3.      Furniture , valued at ————————————————–	5,000.00
4.      Jewelries, valued at ————————————————–	5,000.00
5.      Cash money amounting to —————————————–	7,000.00
6.      Appliances, valued at ————————————————	6,000.00
7.      Corn, valued at ——————————————————–	1,000.00
8.      Plows, valued at ——————————————————	1,000.00
9.      Kitchen wares, valued at ——————————————–	1,000.00
10.    Steel Harrow, valued at ———————————————-	700.00
11.    Female carabao, valued at —————————————–	2,500.00
12.    Clothings, valued at ————————————————–	3,000.00
13.    Electrical wirings, valued at —————————————-	600.00
14.    Two (2) batteries, valued at —————————————-	2,000.00
15.    One pig, valued at —————————————————-	500.00
========= P153,980.00`

with the total value/amount of P153,980.00 (should
be P153,300.00) and all belonging to Albino C. Miranda, to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner, Albino C. Miranda in the aforesaid amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P153,980.00) (should be ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THREE THOUSAND, THREE HUNDRED (P153,300.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency.” (Rollo, p. 6)

At the arraignment, both the accused-appellant and co-accused
Arbolante pleaded not guilty while the other co-accused Catabay eluded arrest and
has remained at large up to the present.

After trial, the accused-appellant
and co-accused Arbolante were adjudged guilty of arson in a decision promulgated by the trial court
on March 6, 1990 with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby sentences the
accused Orlando, Arbolante and Teodulfo Lorenzo to suffer the maximum penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua as provided
for under the pertinent provisions of P.D. 1613 above-cited and to pay the
complainant Albino Miranda jointly and solidarily by way of civil liability the
total amount of P153,980.00 representing the value of the house burned down by
the accused and their cohorts together with the other articles which were
destroyed as a result of the burning as enumerated and itemized in the
Information and proven to have been either lost or burned as a result thereof
during the trial of this case. With
costs.” (RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 24-25)

The antecedent facts as presented by the prosecution are
summarized in the People’s brief, as follows:

“At around 9:30 in the evening of April 7, 1987; complainant
Albino Miranda was at his house situated at Bulagao, Tuao, Cagayan, together
with his wife, Virginia, his nephews and nieces, Engr. Anguluan, Yolanda
Espinosa and Emilio Arbolante, brother of accused Orlando Arbolante. While they were resting, a sudden burst of
gunfire hit the windows at the southern portion of Miranda’s house (TSN,
December 15, 1987, pp. 4-6). The other
portions of the house were likewise fired upon (Id., p. 7). Thereafter, a group of about seventy (70)
persons shouted for Miranda to come down from his house and bring out his gun,
otherwise, they would burn his house. Since Miranda refused to go down, his granary, located about ten (10)
meters away from his house, was set on fire by the group, which he suspected to
be composed of members of the New People’s Army (NPA) (Id., p. 9).

“When his nephews and nieces tried to jump from the window to
escape, Miranda approached the window and prevented them from going out. It was
at this point that he saw appellant and his co-accused
Arbolante inside his (Miranda’s) premises climbing the extension roof of his
house, holding bundles of cogon which they placed against the window of
the house and near the walls (Id., April 14, 1988, p. 33). Arbolante then set the cogon on fire and
burned Miranda’s house. Accused Maximo
Catabay was likewise present, but he was merely standing, doing nothing, (Id.,
p. 42). Miranda and his companions then
hid in a portion of the house near the door which was not burning. (Id., December 15, 1987, p. 18)

The firing by appellant’s companions continued while the house
burned. For fear for their lives,
Miranda and his companions inside the house did not go out. However, when the
roof of Miranda’s house collapsed, he was constrained to go out ‘for the sake
of the children,’ who were with him then (Id., April 14, 1988, p. 37). Later, policemen and soldiers stationed at
Tuao, Cagayan, arrived at the scene of the crime and conducted an investigation
which led to the apprehension of appellant and his co-accused. A photographer called by the policemen,
named Federico Sion, took pictures of what remained of the house of Albino
Miranda (Id., December 14, 1988, pp. 45-47)

“The value of the Miranda’s house that was burned down
amounted to One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) while that of the granary
was Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) [Id., December 15, 1987, pp. 20-21]. Among those destroyed during the
conflagration were two (2) carts of unhusked corn, one hundred forty-nine (149)
cavans of palay valued at Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00), one (1) carabao
worth Four Thousand Five Hundred (P4,500.00), plow and harrow worth One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), kitchen utensils, electric wirings and batteries,
and a cassette recorder worth Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), cash amounting
to Seven Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00), a watch worth Three Hundred Pesos
(P300.00), and jewelries worth Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00). Likewise, twenty (20) cavans of palay and
seventeen (17) sacks of cement owned by NIA employees, who were boarding in
Miranda’s house, were gutted by the fire (Id., pp. 22-25)

“Another witness for the prosecution, Violeta Miranda,
sister-in-law of Albino Miranda, was at the time of the incident, with her
husband in her house, about thirty (30) meters away from Albino’s residence,
when they heard shouting and gun reports. Fearing for their lives, they ran towards
the banana plantation and hid themselves there (Id., December 6, 1988, p.
9). They saw appellant, accused
Arbolante and their companions breaking into the house of Danny Talattad, about
fifteen (15) meters away from the banana plantation (Id., p. 8). Subsequently, the group went eastward to the
house of Albino Miranda, about thirty (30) meters away from where Violeta
Miranda and her husband were hidden (Id., p. 10). According to Violeta, the group of men who were with appellant
fired their guns and shouted at Albino Miranda to come out of his house. When Albino refused to come out of his
house, appellant and his companions burned Albino’s granary and later, his
residence (Id., pp. 11-12)” (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 5-9; Rollo, p. 77)

Upon the other hand, the defense evidence as stated in the brief
for the accused-appellant reads:

“Accused Orlando Arbulante (should be Arbolante) testified
that he knew Albino Miranda because they were neighbors at Bulagao, Tuao, Cagayan. The allegations of Albino Miranda that he and Teodulfo Lorenzo were the
ones who brought the two bundles of cogon and set it on fire on wall of the
house of Albino Miranda was not true. He was at home at the time of the commission of arson. The reason why Albino filed a case against
him was due to his refusal to stay at Albino’s house and protect him (Albino)
from the threat of certain Rafael Liggayu whom Albino hacked. He was not a member of the NPA. He knew that his brother Emilio Arbulante, a
farm helper of Albino, was at the house when it was burned. (TSN., pp. 63-67, May 26, 1989). On the night of April 7, 1987, he was at
home with his wife when people whom he believed to be NPA barged into the house
of Albino Miranda. He heard several gun
reports and shouts telling Albino to bring out his gun so that nothing would
happen to him. After the gun reports
and shouts, he went out of his house and saw the house of Albino already
burning. Jose Casibang, his neighbor
asked his help to bring to safety his (Jose)
two children so he brought the two children to his father’s (Alejandro
Arbulante) house. When there were no
more gun reports, he, his father and Jose Casibang went out and watched the
burning of the house from a mango tree. After the fire was extinguished, he went home and slept. (TSN., pp. 4-8, June 23, 1989).

“On cross-examination, he testified that on the night of April
7, he did not see Teodulfo Lorenzo. (Ibid, p. 14)

“Accused-appellant testified that the allegation of Albino
that he and Orlando Arbulante were the ones who brought and lighted the cogon
at the roof of Albino’s house was not true. He was not at the place when the burning of Albino’s house
occurred. The testimony of Violeta
Miranda alluding him and Orlando Arbulante as the guide of armed men who burned
the house of Albino was also not true. He was a member of the NPA. On
April 7, 1987, he was at Conner, Kalinga Apayao along with other NPAs headed by
one Ka Randy. At about 10:00 A.M. of
said date, he and his companions left their headquarters in Bambang and
proceeded to Sipang to patrol and look for government soldiers. They continued their patrol by proceeding to
Mawigi and spent the night on said date in the mountains of Mawigi and Bambang.

“On April 5, 1987, he was at Bulagao, Tuao, Cagayan to visit
his parents. He left Bulagao, Tuao,
Cagayan in the morning of April 6, 1987 by hiking in the mountains with some of
his companions on their way back to Conner Kalinga-Apayao. It took them two (2) days to arrive at their
destination. (TSN., pp. 73?80,
August 2, 1989).

“On cross-examination, he testified and corrected that it was
not on April 7, 1987 that he was at Conner, Kalinga, Apayao but on April 8,
1987 because on April 7, 1987, they were still on their way to Conner Kalinga­-Apayao
from Bulagao, Tuao, Cagayan. (Ibid, p.
85)

“Guadalupe Arbulante testified that on the night of
April 7, 1987, she together with her two children and husband were about to
sleep when they heard gun report towards the direction of the house of Albino
Miranda. Her daughter called for help
so Orlando carried the children and brought them to the house. Jose Casibang, Florida, Marcelino and the
children also came to her house. They
also heard shouts saying, Berto bring out your gun, if not, we will burn your house. After a few minutes, the house was
burned. They went out of the house and
from a mango grove watched the burning house of Albino. While the house was burning, Orlando was at
her house and after the burning he went to his own residence. (TSN, pp. 29-33, September 15, 1989)”
(Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6-7; Rollo; pp. 52-53)

The trial court gave more
credence to the prosecution’s version and dismissed the defenses of alibi and
denial as ineffectual after weighing both documentary and testimonial evidence
submitted before it.

Inasmuch as co-accused
Arbolante jumped bail before the trial court rendered its decision, only the
accused-appellant appealed in due course assigning as errors, to wit:

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF ARSON ANCHORING ITS VERDICTS OF GUILT ON
THE INCONSISTENT, CONTRADICTING AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE
WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE RATHER THAN ON THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE
FOR THE PROSECUTION.

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT. (Appellant’s Brief,
p. 1; Rollo, p. 47)

All the assigned errors
call for a re-examination of the evidence on record to determine whether or not
the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused was duly established by the prosecution.

Questioning the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the accused-appellant points out the
following inconsistencies and contradictions in their testimonies,
namely: (1) that prosecution witness Albino Miranda testified that he saw both the
accused- appellant and co-accused Arbolante with cogon bundles which
they placed near the walls of his house after which Arbolante lighted the cogon
thereby starting the fire that gutted Miranda’s house while another prosecution
witness Violeta Miranda, Albino’s sister-in-law, stated in court that she saw
the accused?appellant climbing
the roof of Albino’s kitchen and thereafter placing the lighted cogon which
caused the burning of Albino’s house (TSN, December 15, 1987, pp. 7-8;
TSN, December 6, 1988, pp. 11-13); (2) that while Albino Miranda declared that
the fire that gutted his house started on its walls, his sister-in-law,
Violeta, related that the burning of Albino’s house proceeded from the lighted
cogon atop the roof of Albino’s
kitchen; [Ibid] (3) that in his direct testimony, Albino Miranda asserted that
he and his companions stayed inside the house during the conflagration and it
was only upon the arrival of the policemen and soldiers that they went
out of the burning house while on cross-examination, he said that they went out
of the house even before the policemen and soldiers arrived (TSN, December 15, 1987, pp. 13-14; TSN, April 14,
1988, pp. 37-38); and (4) that
while Albino Miranda testified
that there was an exchange of gunfire between the policemen/soldiers and the
group of about seventy (70) persons, another prosecution witness Corporal
Fernandez who was among the policemen at the scene of the crime for
investigation purposes denied in open court that there was any fight or
encounter between his group and the accused-appellant’s group. [TSN, December 15, 1987, pp. 12-13; TSN,
January 25, 1989, pp. 58-59] (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-9)

Decisional law, in a plenitude of cases, lays down the doctrine
that inconsistencies on minor details do not affect the credibility of a
witness as long as his narration is coherent in its essential parts and intrinsically believable as a
whole. (People v. Paciano dela Torre,
G.R. Nos. 90804-05, July 1, 1991; People v. Felipe Santiago, G.R. No. L-46132,
May 28, 1991; People v. Eric Ansing y Cabanban, G.R. No. 86641, April 26, 1991)

In the case at bar, the inconsistencies and contradictions do not
detract from the fact that Albino Miranda’s house was intentionally set on fire
by perpetrators who were positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses. The discrepancies in the declarations made in open court
by Albino and his sister-in-law, Violeta, can be readily explained on the basis
of human experience which shows that when two persons both claim witness to a
certain incident, each of them will have a different account as to the details
of that same incident since it is not possible for their senses of perception
to be synchronized in such a way that one sees or hears exactly as the other
does. Thus, while Albino Miranda
focused his senses on the lighted cogon being placed by the accused Arbolante
near the wall of the former’s house, Violeta Miranda centered her attention on
the accused-appellant who was climbing the kitchen roof where he placed the
lighted cogon he was then holding. While Albino Miranda perceived the shots he heard at the time of the
burning incident as an exchange of gunfire between the two groups present then,
Corporal Fernandez’ account of the gunshots fired at the time of the incident
was based on the assessment he made as to where the gunshots actually came
from. Hence, it bears reiterating our
ruling in the case of People v. Noguerras (181 SCRA 19, 24-25 [1990]) that:

“x x x discrepancies in minor details are to be expected from
an uncoached witness (People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 24, 31). Such minor variations would rather show the sincerity
of the witness and the absence of connivance between them to make their
testimonies tally in every respect. (People v. Pielago, 140 SCRA 418, 423) Truth to tell, such trivial
differences constituted fail-safe reliability (People v. Dollantes, 151 SCRA
592, 603)”

The accused-appellant further insinuates that the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses constituted deliberate falsehoods inasmuch as their narrations did not jibe in
the important details so that the doctrine of “falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus” is applicable.

The contention is not worthy of merit. Even granting arguendo that the court declarations of the
prosecution witnesses allegedly containing inconsistencies referred to by the
accused-appellant are disregarded, the rest of their testimonies with respect
to the fact that the crime of arson was committed by authors who were
positively identified stands trustworthy in the absence of any ill-motive on
the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely implicate the
accused-appellant and his co-accused with the crime as charged. If it were not true that the fire started
from the wall where Albino Miranda saw the accused Arbolante placed the lighted
cogon or that the said fire emanated from the kitchen rooftop where as Violeta
Miranda asserted, the accused-appellant put the lighted cogon, the fact that
Albino’s house and rice granary were gutted by fire for which the accused?appellant
and co-accused Arbolante were responsible as categorically attested to by
Albino and Violeta remains. Whether or
not Albino truly withstood the resultant heat from his house where he opted to
stay while it was ablaze or whether there was an actual encounter between the
group of the accused-appellant and that of Corporal Fernandez’ or there was
none are matters which are not relevant to the determination of the presence of
the elements of the crime of arson as charged in the information. As we have held in the case of People v. Virgilio
Osias y Mallari, et al., (G.R. No. 88872, July 25, 1991):

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a
witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other
facts. And it has been aptly said that
even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated
testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be
credited. (People v. Mozar, 130 SCRA
568, 579 [1984] citing People v. Malillos, 24 SCRA 133 [1968]).”

The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the
scene of the crime and that he positively identified (the accused) as one of
the perpetrators of the crime charged (People v. Gacho, 124 SCRA 671 [1983] x x
x.”

The information charges the crime of arson under Section 3,
subparagraph 2 in relation to section 4, subparagraphs 3 and 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1613 (Amending the Law on Arson) which we quote as follows:

“SEC. 3. Other Cases
of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any
of the following:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

2. Any
inhabited house or dwelling.

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“SEC. 4. Special
Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. –
The penalty in any case shall be imposed in its maximum period:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

3.     
If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the
owner or occupant of the property burned;

4.     
If committed by a syndicate.

The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons.”

The elements of the crime of arson under section 3 of P.D. No.
1613 as aforecited simply include: (1)
that there is intentional burning; and (2) that what is intentionally burned is
an inhabited house or dwelling. From
the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution, there is
clear and convincing quantum of proof sufficient to convict the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson as the two
elements aforementioned are proven present. The pictures of the burnt house where Albino Miranda and his wife used
to reside before the fire incident were submitted and duly marked as Exhs.
“B”, “B-1”, “B-2”, and “B-3” (Records,
pp. 6-9). Prosecution witness, Federico
Sion who took the said pictures testified that in the early morning of April 8,
1987, he used his Nikon 135 camera
to shoot from different angles whatever was left of Albino’s burnt house
located at Bulagao, Tuao, Cagayan in the presence of the Station Commander of
Tuao Integrated National Police (INP), some policemen, some soldiers and Albino
Miranda (TSN, December 14, 1988, pp. 3-5) Both prosecution witnesses Albino
Miranda and Violeta Miranda positively named the accused-appellant as one of
the persons who brought bundles of lighted cogon which started the fire that
consumed Albino’s house and rice granary (TSN, December 15, 1987, pp. 7-8; TSN,
December 6, 1988, pp. 11-13). Corporal
Ernesto Fernandez, Station Commander of Tuao, INP who was summoned to investigate
the burning incident on April 7, 1987 at Albino’s place described in open court
what he saw and made an estimate of the amount of actual damages that resulted
therefrom after conducting an investigation which became the basis of a
criminal complaint for arson marked as Exhibit “D”, (TSN, January 25,
1989, pp. 3-6; Records, p. 1)

Against the overwhelming prosecution evidence, the
accused-appellant merely interjects the defenses of bare denial and alibi
positing that the former is the only evidence available to an innocent person
and maintaining that the claim of physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime was amply
corroborated by his co-accused Orlando Arbolante (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 12-13;
Records, pp. 58-59)

We find this an occasion to rule once more that the positive
identification of the authors of a crime by the prosecution witnesses should
prevail over the former’s denials of the commission of the crime imputed to
them for denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and can easily be
defeated by the affirmative and credible testimonies of prosecution witnesses
pointing to the accused as the perpetrators of the crime for which they are
charged. (People v. Edwin Belibet, et. al., G.R. No. 91260, July 25, 1991
citing People v. Marcos, 185 SCRA 154 [1990]; People v. Payumo, 187 SCRA 64 [1990]; see also People v. Cipriano Caballes, G.R. Nos.
93437-45, July 12, 1991 citing People v.
Biago, 182 SCRA 411 [1990])

Moreover, we are further
persuaded by the trial court’s finding that the accused-appellant’s alibi
cannot stand the test of credibility. Extant from the evidence on record is the accused-appellant’s
vacillating testimony as regards
his whereabouts at the time of the fire incident. Thus, on direct examination, the accused-appellant declared that:

“ATTY. DALANAO:

Q.   On
April 7, 1987 in the
morning, where were you?

A.    I
was at Bangbang, sir.

Q.   What
were you doing there?

A.    We
stayed in our hut or our headquarters.

Q.   Where
at Bangbang?

A.    Bangbang,
Coner, sir.

xxx                        xxx                               xxx

Q.   Now,
in the evening of April 7, 1987, specificaly 9:30 P.M. where were you, Mr.
Witness?

A.    I
was in Coner, sir.

Q.   Where
in Coner?

A.    Ripang,
sir.

Q.   What
were you doing there?

A.    We
just went there to visit, sir.

Q.   You
said we, whom are you referring to as your companions?

A.    My
armed NPA companions, sir.

Q.   You
said you went to Ripang, were you able to reach Ripang?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   At
what time did you arrive at Ripang, and what time did you leave your quarters?

A.    We
left there at 10:00 in the morning and then we arrived at Ripang at 11:00.

Q.   After
you arrived at Ripang, what did you do next, if any?

A.    We
went to patrol and find (sic) if there are enemies.

xxx                                    xxx                               xxx

Q.   You
said you returned to Bangbang, were you able to reach Bangbang?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   What
time did you reach Bangbang?

A.    12:00
noon.

Q.   After
you arrived at Bangbang, what else did you do, if any?

A.    We
rested.

Q.   After
resting, what else did you do?

A.    We
walked and continued our patrol.

Q.   Towards,
where?

A.    We
went towards Manag.

Q.   How
far is Manag from Bangbang?

A.    Far,
sir.

Q.   Can
you estimate the distance?

A.    More
than one kilometer.

Q.   Did
you reach Manag?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   What
time did you reach Manag?

A.    Around
3:00.

xxx                        xxx                               xxx

Q.   At
that day April 7, where did you sleep during night time?

A.    In
the mountains, sir.

Q.   Which
barangay?

A.    Between
Manag and Bangbang.

xxx                        xxx                               xxx

COURT:

Q.   During
the time you have been staying in Coner, Kalinga-Apayao and in the barrios you
have just mentioned Manag, Bangbang, Ripang, did you ever have an occasion here
in Tuao?

A.    I
had my vacation April 5, 1987.

Q.   So,
you were in Tuao on April 5, 1987?

A.    In
Bulagao, sir.

Q.   And
you stayed in Bulagao, Tuao, Cagayan?

A.    On
the 6th, I left immediately, I just went to visit my parents.

ATTY. DALANAO:

Q.   You
said you left Bulagao on April 6, 1987, where did you go from Bulagao?

A.    I
went back to Coner.

Q.   How
did you go back to Coner?

A.    We
hiked the mountains.

Q.   Which
mountain, if you know?

A.    Mawigi.

COURT:

Q.   How
did you come on vacation, did you ride or you hiked?

A.   
We walked because some of my companions stayed in Mawigi.

Q.   And
when you went back to Coner and following day as you say, you also hiked?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Now,
in going to Bulagao, Tuao, Cagayan from your station in Coner by hiking as you
say, how long will it take you?

A.    It
might be more than one day.

Q.   How
many hours or what time did you leave Coner when you took your vacation here in
Tuao?

A.    6:00
P.M.

Q.   What
time did you reach Bulagao?

A.    2:00
P.M.

Q.   Afternoon
or early morning?

A.    2:00
in the afternoon.

Q.   How
many hours?

A.    I
don’t know how many hours, I only heard from the radio that it’s 2:00 P.M.

Q.   You
said that you left Coner 6:00 P.M.

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   You
walked the whole night?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Until
the whole morning up to 2:00 P.M.?

A.    Yes,
sir.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. DALANAO:

Q.   Coming
from Bulagao, you said you left for Coner April 6,1987 in the morning, what
time did you leave Coner?

A.    6:30
in the morning.

Q.   And
what time did you reach Coner?

A.    It
took us two days because we stand by.

COURT:

Q.   What
do you mean by stand by?

A.    We
took time.

Q.   So,
it took you two days?

A.    Yes,
sir.” (TSN, August 2, 1989, pp. 5-9; Underlining Supplied)

When asked clarificatory questions by the trial court, the
accused-appellant gave a different
account of where he actually was on the day the crime of arson transpired,
thus:

“COURT:

xxx                        xxx                               xxx

Q.   You
stated in the direct examination that on April 7, 1987, you stayed in Bangbang
which you later on corrected because you said you arrived only at Bangbang on
April 8, in the morning coming from Bulagao, Tuao, Cagayan?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   After
arriving at Bangbang coming from Bulagao, Tuao, Cagayan, you never left
Bangbang anymore?

A.    We
rested.

Q.   Because
you walked for two days?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Now,
you stated again that on April 7, 1987 that (sic) with companions you went to
Ripang to patrol at 10:00 A.M. to look for enemies?

A.    No.

Q.   You
said you left Bangbang early in the morning of April 7, 1987 and went to
Ripang, how can you reach that with the fact that it took you two days to walk
from Bulagao to Bangbang?

A.    My
statement that we arrived at Bangbang on April 7 is not true.

Q.   So,
it is not again correct that on April 7, 1987 between 10:00 to 10:30, you went
to Ripang to patrol to look for
enemies?

A.    No,
sir, it’s not true.” (Ibid, pp. 15-16)

The foregoing testimonies of the accused-appellant render his
defense of alibi suspect. For alibi to
prosper in support of an
accused’s reliance on the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor as regards a crime for which he is
being made responsible, there must be substantial proof considering that the
defense of alibi is generally weak, very easy to concoct and crumbles most
frequently in case of positive identification of the accused. (People v. Danilo Mesias, G.R. No. 67823,
July 9, 1991 citing People v. Pecato, 151 SCRA 14 [1987] and People v. Hermosa
177 SCRA 574 [1989]; People v. Rolando Godines, G.R. No. 93410, May 7, 1991;
People v. Demecillo, 186 SCRA 161 [1990] citing People v. Tamayo, 183 SCRA 375
[1990])

We do not find any compelling reason to disregard the trial
court’s findings of fact on the credibility of the witnesses in this case as it
had ably made use of the advantage of observing their actuations while they
were testifying before it and consequently, it had effected a firsthand
discernment concerning the veracity of their statements. (People v. Rosalino Dungo, G.R. No. 89420,
July 31, 1991 citing People v. Claudio, 160
SCRA 646 [1988]; People v. Rafael Velaga, Jr., G.R. No. 87202, July 23, 1991 citing People v. Olalia,
G.R. No. 50669, 128 SCRA 139 [1984]; People v. Guillermo Sanchez alias
“Genaro”, G.R. No. 88750, July 18, 1991 citing People v. Orita, 184
SCRA 105 [1990]; People v. Edgardo Maceda, G.R. No. 91106, May 27, 1991 citing
People v. Alvarez, 163 SCRA 745 [1988]).

The crime of arson under section 3 of P.D. No. 1613 is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death and the maximum penalty is imposable when the
crime is attended by any of the special aggravating circumstances under section
4 of the same Decree.

In the present case, the trial court found that the crime of
arson was committed by a syndicate of more or less seventy (70) persons armed
with guns but with respect to the aggravating circumstance under subparagraph 3
of section 4 aforecited, no pronouncement in relation thereto was made. The prosecution failed to substantiate the
claim that the accused in the instant case
were motivated by spite or hatred towards Albino Miranda and his
family. Considering that the crime was
committed by a syndicate of more or less seventy (70) persons, there is ample
basis to infer the presence of conspiracy from the acts of the accused-appellant
and his other co-accused that tend to show community of criminal purpose. (see People v. Joven Bausing, et al. G.R.
No. 64965, July 18, 1991 and People v. Vivencio Sabellano, et al., G.R. Nos.
93932-33, June 5, 1991) As we have stated in People v. Elanito Ouijano. et al., (G.R. No. 84361, May 31,
1991):

“Thus, too, in People v. Taaca, L-35652, September 29, 1989,
this Court held that a conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. The objective then
on the part of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by
law. What is required is assent to the
perpetration of such a misdeed. That
must be their intent. There is need for
concurrence of wills or unity of action or purpose, or common and joint purpose
and design. x x x x x If there is a
chain of circumstances to that effect, conspiracy has been established. If such be the case then, the act of one is
the act of all the others involved and each is to be held to the same degree of
liability as the others.” (At pp. 12-13)

Finally, the amount of actual damages suffered by Albino Miranda
as a result of the crime of arson was erroneously totalled as P153,980.00 when
the proper sum adds up to P153,300.00 only. After a careful review of the records of this case, we hold that only
the amount of P153,000.00 was proven as damages inasmuch as with respect to the
149 cavans of palay, although Cpl. Fernandez indicated that the same was worth
P18,680.00, the information only
valued the said cavans at P18,000.00. We cannot grant more than what the
information claims. With respect to the
kitchen wares valuded at P1,000.00 in the information only the amount of
P700.00 was duly proved by the prosecution. (TSN, January 25, 1989, p. 5)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the total amount of civil
liability to be paid jointly and severally by the accused-appellant and his co­-accused
who failed to exercise his right to appeal be reduced to ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY-THREE THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P153,000.00)

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.