G.R. No. 96697. March 26, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAIME COMPETENTE AND JESUS COMPETENTE, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The “fiesta” of Barangay Bano, Tiwi, Albay, on 15 May
1986, was marred by the death of Nestor Dacir, a Barangay Tanod. Charged with Murder for having strangled and
stabbed him to death were accused-appellants Jesus Competente and Jaime
Competente, father and son, respectively. They were alleged to have conspired and helped each other in
treacherously attacking said Victim. On
their plea of “not guilty,” they were tried and convicted to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the deceased’s heirs in the sum of P30,000.00 as
compensatory damages. They are now
before this Court appealing that verdict of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco,
Albay.[1]
Prosecution eyewitnesses, Rosita Galan, Sonny Dacir, the Victim’s
8-year old son, and Antonio Calmada, narrated the occurrence more or less in
the following tenor: The houses of the
Victim, the Competentes, and one Eddie Gutierrez, in Barangay Bano, are near
one another. On 15 May 1986, Rosita
went to Eddie Gutierrez’ house at Barangay Bano to attend the fiesta. The latter is her brother-in-law. She knows accused-appellants, they being
neighbors of her brother-in-law. She
likewise knew the Victim, being her brother-in-law’s friend. At about 1:00 o’clock P.M. of 15 May 1986,
at Barangay Bano, while she was attending to Eddie Gutierrez’ children in the
front yard, she heard the Victim’s house stoned thrice by four men, whom she
failed to identify. The victim went out
to verify and saw the perpetrators run towards the house of the
Competentes. The Victim followed
them. As the latter was approaching,
Rosita and Antonio Calmada heard appellant-father (Jesus), who was then at
their yard, say “Here he is, here he is.” As fate would have it, the
victim tripped and fell flat on his face. Immediately, the appellant-father sat astride the Victim’s back and
strangled him on the neck. Suddenly, the
appellant-son (Jaime) arrived at the scene and positioning himself behind his
father, stabbed the Victim with a kitchen knife on the right side of his body,
slightly above the hip bone. The son
hurriedly retreated to their house but the father continued strangling the
victim until his wife, Aurora, told him: “Jesus, Jesus tama na, nakadamay na ang aqui mo” (Jesus,
Jesus, that is enough, your son is already involved). Only then did appellant-father release his hold on the Victim’s
neck. Aurora also confronted her son as
to why he had to join his father. Prosecution witness Antonio Calmada saw the strangling of the Victim by
appellant-father but did not see the stabbing.
Seeing the incident, Rosita Galan shouted and screamed for
help. Eddie Gutierrez and Antonio
Calmada responded and seeing the Victim flat on his face and bloodied, put him
on a tricycle and took him to the hospital where he died upon arrival.
Appellants-father-and-son denied the charges against them
claiming that one Feliciano Bacho was the culprit; that the latter had admitted
the commission of the crime, and was accordingly charged with Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 2495.
Appellant-father contended that at about 1:00 o’clock P.M. on the
day of the fiesta, while he was in the “sala,” Emerita Colina, one of
his visitors, stood and said “there is a quarrel outside the house.”
Emerita went out and said “Ay, Nestor was stabbed by Bacho.” He went
out of his house and saw the Victim chasing Bacho. When he sensed that the Victim was approaching his house, he went
inside and closed the door. The Victim
tapped on the door and asked that he be allowed inside thinking that Bacho was
also therein. He opened the door and
pushed him out but the Victim, in turn, pushed him in. He then advised the Victim to go to the
hospital. Defense witness Loreto
Rodrigueza corroborated the foregoing version.
P/Sgt. Wilfredo Bermas also declared that in the course of the
investigation he had conducted, Bacho confided to him that he had stabbed the
Victim. Appellant-son, for his part,
claimed that after the baptism of his child, he had a drinking spree with the
latter’s sponsor. He got drunk and fell
asleep at about 11:30 in the morning and after he woke up at around 3:30 in the
afternoon he heard that the Victim was stabbed by Bacho.
Assessing the different versions, the Court a quo
accorded more credence to that of the prosecution and, as initially stated,
rendered a verdict of guilt.
The errors that accused-appellants fault the Trial Court with
center on the issue of credibility, as well as on the finding that the
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and superior strength
attended the commission of the offense.
We find no room for reversal.
The defense insists that it was Feliciano Bacho who committed the
crime. It stresses that the Victim’s
wife, Teresita Dacir, even cooperated with the INP Tiwi Police in filing
Criminal Case No. 2495 for Homicide against Bacho et als., only to change her
mind after the preliminary investigation had been conducted and thereafter
pinpointing father and son instead.
The records disclose, however, that in her Affidavit, taken on 16
May 1986 (Exh. 5), or the day after the fatal incident, she had already
disclosed:
“6. Q: Who were those person or persons responsible to (sic) the death of your
husband, if you know?
“A: I am suspecting JESUS COMPETENTE and his son, JAIME COMPETENTE as I’ve
witnessed NESTOR DACIR strangled on his neck by JESUS COMPETENTE, and his
companions who (sic) I do not know their names.
“8. Q: Why did you happen to suspect JESUS COMPETENTE and his son JAIME to be
the suspect in this particular case to include their companions?
A: Because I have seen JESUS COMPETENTE
strangle my husband. While JAIME
COMPETENTE was also there and several others.
10.
Q: Showing to you, persons in the name
(sic) of FELICIANO BACHO, JESUS BACHO, JUSTINIANO BACHO and DANNY COMPETENTE,
what can you say about them?
A: They were the same persons who stoned our house.”
Evidently, therefore, even the day after the fateful occurrence,
the Victim’s wife had already identified accused-appellants as the assailants
of the husband and Feliciano Bacho as one of those who had stoned the Victim’s
house.
Moreover, in the Re-investigation of Crim. Case No. MT-2495
against Feliciano Bacho, and I.S. No. 86-1924 against father and son, the Provincial
Fiscal concluded, in a Resolution dated 28 November 1986, that he was
“firmly convinced that Feliciano Bacho was not the one who stabbed Nestor
Dacir, despite his demonstration and extra-judicial confession.” He then
ordered the case against Bacho dismissed and “that an information for
murder be filed against Jesus Competente and Jaime Competente with the Regional
Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay (Original records, pp. 58-61).
That should settle the matter of Bacho’s culpability irrespective
of the asseverations of the defense to the contrary and the alleged
“change of mind” of the Victim’s widow.
Eyewitness Rosita Galan’s failure to report the incident until 18
May 1986 because she did not want to be involved is not a sufficient basis for
rejecting her testimony. The initial
reluctance of witnesses and their unwillingness to be involved in criminal
investigations, are common and have been judicially declared not to affect
credibility (People v. Pacia, No. 69543, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 529).
The defense further assails Rosita Galan’s testimony that at
about 1:00 P.M. she was attending to the Gutierrez children at the front yard
of the latter’s residence as being inconsistent with physical facts in that it
was very hot at the time. That is not
necessarily so, however, as there were trees in the area (Exh. D, p. 48,
original record).
Accused-appellants also attack as hearsay Rosita’s testimony that
when the victim was approaching, she heard appellant-father say “here he
is, here he is” and heard Aurora Competente confront her son Jaime
“why do you have to join your father?” For one, however, the failure
of accused-appellants to object to hearsay evidence, constitutes a waiver of
the right to cross-examine the actual witness to the occurrence, thereby rendering
the evidence admissible (People v. Garcia, L-44364, 27 April 1979, 89 SCRA
440). For another, the testimonies
aforesaid were offered to prove the fact of utterances regardless of their
truth and, therefore, were not hearsay. In any case, the utterances can be considered as part of the res
gestae, having been made during the incident (Rule 130, sec. 36, Rules of
Court).
Pursuing their attack on the credibility of prosecution
witnesses, accused-appellants further aver that the testimony of the Victim’s
eight (8)-year-old son, Sonny Dacir, is unreliable because of his failure to
immediately reveal to his mother the identity of his father’s assailants, which
is allegedly contrary to human conduct. The fact remains, however, that he knew that his mother had witnessed
the incident herself. And if he did not
tell the police or the barangay authorities, it was because they did not ask
him any questions.
Additionally, the defense further claims that the prosecution
failed to establish the motive behind the incident. The accepted dictum is, however, that motive is not essential to
conviction when the accused as in this case, are positively identified and
there is no doubt as to their identity (Andaya v. People, G. R. No. 75930, 8
June 1990, 186 SCRA 410).
We turn now to the testimonies of accused-appellants and their
witnesses which, according to the defense, were incorrectly rejected by the
Trial Court. The records do not bear
this out.
The mere denial by appellant-father of the act of strangling the
Victim can not prevail over the positive identification of him by prosecution
witnesses. Moreover, the autopsy
findings confirm that fact of strangulation. To quote:
“I – External -?
1. Neck at the level of the
Adam’s Apple
Right — Wounds, superficial, near each other, 6 in number, 3 of which
are abraded and 3 are scratches.
Left — Abrasion 3 in number, near each
other.”
That autopsy report also supports the Provincial Fiscal’s
conclusion that Bacho could not have been the culprit as the latter never
mentioned the strangling in his demonstration contrary to the physical finding
of the examining physician. Of note as
well is the circumstance that appellant-father’s version of the incident is
contrary to human experience. After
having been stabbed, the Victim could not be expected to still run after Bacho,
who was then allegedly armed with a kitchen knife, and to knock on the door of
the Competente house. Said Victim was
so badly wounded that he died soon after arrival at the hospital. He was in no position, therefore, to run
after his alleged assailant.
Appellant-son’s defense of alibi contains no semblance of
truth. Aside from the fact that it can
not prevail over positive identification, it has been held that alibi is weak
if established merely by the accused themselves and their relatives and not by
credible persons (People v. Solis, G. R. No. 93629, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA
405). It also taxes credulity that
appellant-son would have slept from 11:30 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. while their guests
were celebrating the baptism of his son and at the height of the barangay
“fiesta.”
Correctly rejected by the Trial Court, too, were the testimonies
of the other defense witnesses. Thus,
the testimony of Roberto Cope that he saw eyewitness Rosita Galan in the house
of her father-in-law Dioscoro Galan at nearby Barangay Sugod from 11:00 A.M. to
2:00 P.M. can hardly be given weight. The fiesta was in Barangay Bano not in Barangay Sugod. Besides, it is strange for Roberto to have
kept watch on the exact whereabouts of Rosita from 11:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M.
The testimonies of Loreto Rodrigueza, Emerita Colina and Domingo
Dacoco, Jr. echo appellant-father’s version that it was Bacho who had stabbed
the Victim and can neither be appreciated in the light of the findings of the
Provincial Fiscal. There is the added
consideration that most of them are close relations of accused-appellants who
can normally be expected to be biased in their favor, absent credible
indications to the contrary.
Nor can the testimony of P/Sgt Wilfredo Bermas be treated
differently. He stated that it was
Bacho, not the Competentes, who was the culprit; that when he investigated
Bacho, the latter confided to him that he had killed the Victim; and that a criminal
complaint was filed against Bacho, which complaint did not include
appellant-father-and-son; subsequently, though, they were included because of
the insistence of the Victim’s wife. However, considering the result of the re-investigation by the Provincial
Fiscal, it is clear that P/Sgt. Bermas’ investigation was hasty and the
complaint he filed the next day after the incident unreliable. The re-investigation report likewise rebuts
the presumption that P/Sgt Bermas performed his duties in a regular manner.
The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not
the one who heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the
verdict of conviction. Even a cursory
perusal of the Decision would show that it was based on the evidence presented
during trial and that it was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and
cross examination as well as questions from the Court carefully passed upon.
We agree with the defense, however, that evident premeditation
was incorrectly considered by the Trial Court as a generic aggravating
circumstance. There is insufficient
showing that father and son had previously conceived of the commission of the
crime and had manifestly indicated that they had clung to their determination. In fact, the evidence is hazy as to whether
or not they had taken part in the stoning.
But treachery was, indeed, present. Appellant-son’s act of stabbing the Victim while his father was
strangling the latter who was lying face down flat on the ground indicates that
both father and son had employed means tending to as it did insure the
execution of the act of killing without risk to themselves which could have
arisen from the defense which the Victim could have made. Having tripped and fallen flat on his face
on the ground, the Victim was in no position to defend himself. Apropos it is to recall that the Victim was
hit on the back above his right hip bone. The crime has been correctly categorized, therefore, as Murder.
The Court notes with dismay, however, that the Court a quo
“allowed provisional liberty on the same bail bond” to
accused-appellants (Original record, Order, p. 730). That is a clear reversible error considering that they were
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and that with their conviction
evidence of their guilt can not but be strong. For this act, the Trial Judge deserves the severest censure, which we
are constrained to impose on her in this case.
WHEREFORE, except for the modification of the indemnity to
the heirs of the victim, Nestor Dacir, which is hereby increased to P50,000.00
in line with current jurisprudence, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Let a Warrant of Arrest issue immediately against
accused-appellants Jaime Competente and Jesus Competente.
They shall each bear one-half of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Regalado, and
Nocon, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Judge Milagros JB. Marcaida in Criminal Case No. T-1592.