HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE & SPORTS, DR. ERLINDA LO­LARGA, IN HER CAPACITY AS SUPERINTEND­ENT OF CITY SCHOOLS OF MA…

The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as
follows:  where the relief sought from
the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and
reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or
government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the
Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief?  Stated otherwise, where a particular
subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other
government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment,
may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter
for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the
respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling
on the legal questions posed in the present action.  These facts,^[1]
together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court,^[2]
or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.

1.   On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class
day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
what they described as “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize
and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought
to the latter’s attention.  According to
them they had decided to undertake said “mass concerted actions”
after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as
a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had
elicited no response from the Secretary of Education.  The “mass actions” consisted in
staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang
Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies,
etc.  Through their representatives, the
teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.  Those directives notwithstanding, the mass
actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that
followed.^[3]

Among those who took part in the “concerted mass
actions” were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed
to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA.^[4]

2.   “For failure to heed the return-to-work
order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged
on the basis of the principal’s report and given five (5) days to answer the
charges.  They were also preventively
suspended for ninety (90) days ‘pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807’ and
temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H).  An investigation committee was consequently
formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807.”^[5]

3.   In the administrative case docketed as Case
No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario
Esber were, among others, named respondents,^[6]
the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also
moved “for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution
by ** (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order.” But when their motion for suspension
was denied by Order dated November 8,
1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their
motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, “the respondents led by
their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings.”^[7]
The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño
dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits
and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the
service of Apolinario Esber
and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.^[8]

4.   In the meantime, the “MPSTA filed a
petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed
(unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I).  Later,
the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to
nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking
teachers’ right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No.
95445, supra.  The ACT also filed
a similar petition before the Supreme Court ** docketed as G.R. No.
95590.”^[9]
Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations,
a few named individuals, and “other teacher-members so numerous
similarly situated” or “other similarly situated public school
teachers too numerous to be impleaded.”

5.   In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers
submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human
Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions,
they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without
notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.^[10]

6.   Their Complaints — and those of other
teachers also “ordered suspended by the ** (DECS),” all numbering
forty-two (42) — were docketed as “Striking Teachers CHR Case No.
90-775.” In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a
“dialogue” on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein.^[11]

On the day of the “dialogue,” although it said that it
was “not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño)
received the subpoena which was served at his office, ** (the) Commission, with
the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R.
Mallillin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;” it heard the
complainants’ counsel (a) explain that his clients had been “denied due
process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not
join the mass leave,” and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were
“the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes
they (CHR complainants) sympathize.”^[12]
The Commission thereafter issued an Order^[13]
reciting these facts and making the following disposition:

“To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be
accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter,
considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of
their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño,
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda
Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the
Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are
hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19,
1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the
allegations aforestated herein to assist the
Commission in this matter.  Otherwise,
the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants’
evidence.

* * * .”

7.   Through the Office of the Solicitor General,
Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to file
a motion to dismiss the case.  His motion
to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, “that the complaint states no cause of
action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case.”^[14]

8.   Pending determination by the Commission of
the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the “striking teachers”
were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

a)  The Decision dated December 17, 1990 of
Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082,
decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo;^[15]
and

b)  The joint Resolution of this Court dated
August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions
“without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual
petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained
of,”^[16]
and inter alia “ruling that it was prima
facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue
return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants,
preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges.”^[17]

9.   In an Order dated December 28, 1990,
respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño motion to
dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga “to
submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days ** (after which) the
Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or
without respondents counter affidavit.”^[18] It held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due
process of law; * * they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply
to the administrative charges;” there had been a violation of their civil
and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and
while expressing its “utmost respect to the Supreme Court ** the facts
before ** (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme
Court” (the reference being ummistakably to this
Court’s joint Resolution of August, 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990
that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cariño,
has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.

The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that
it does not feel bound by this Court’s joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590, supra.  It has also made
plain its intention “to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits.” It intends, in other words, to try
and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over
the following general issues:

1)   whether or not the striking teachers were
denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative
disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and

2)   whether or not the grievances which were
“the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes
they (CHR complainants) sympathize,” justify their mass action or strike.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that
is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same
issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education,
Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this
Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected
may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still
timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human
Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a
court of justice,^[19]
or even a quasi-judicial agency,^[20]
it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human
rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights.  But
fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official.  The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.  To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions
to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law.^[21]
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.^[22]

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions
specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an
independent office.^[23]
Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee
on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity
of the Constitution.^[24]
Its powers and functions are the following:^[25]

“(1)   Investigate, on its own or on complaint by
any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights;

(2)   Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court;

(3)   Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;

(4)   Exercise visitorial
powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5)   Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6)   Recommend to the Congress effective measures
to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations
of human rights, or their families;

(7)   Monitor the Philippine Government’s
compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8)   Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary
or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;

(9)   Request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10)   Appoint its officers and employees in
accordance with law; and

(11)   Perform such other duties and functions as
may be provided by law.”

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment.  The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.  It can exercise that power on its own
initiative or on complaint of any person. 
It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may
adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court.  In
the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may
grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth.  It may also request
the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings.^[26]

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes)
as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do.  To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge.  Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

“Investigate,” commonly understood, means to
examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.  The dictionary definition of “investigate” is
“to observe or study closely: 
inquire into systematically: 
“to search or inquire into: 
* * to subject to an official probe ** : 
to conduct an official inquiry;”^[27]
The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn,
obtain information.  Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy
involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of “investigate” is essentially the
same:  “(t)o follow up step by step
by patient inquiry or observation.  To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;”^[28]
“to inquire; to make an investigation,” “investigation”
being in turn described as “(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 
2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; * * an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a
certain matter or matters.”^[29]

“Adjudicate,“ commonly or popularly
understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve,
rule on, settle.  The dictionary defines
the term as “to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: ** to pass judgment on:  settle judicially:  ** act as judge.”^[30]
And “adjudge” means “to decide or rule upon as a judge or with
judicial or quasi-judicial powers:  ** to
award or grant judicially in a case of controversy ** .”^[31]

In the legal sense, “adjudicate” means:  “To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority.  To determine finally.  Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;” and “adjudge” means: 
“To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence
or condemn.  ** Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment.”^[32]

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely
the power “to investigate,” cannot and should not “try and
resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot
do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the
DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed.  More particularly, the
Commission has no power to “resolve on the merits” the question of
(a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers
constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b)
whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the
failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their
classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what were the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said
acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction
of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated,
already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them,^[33]
and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties
to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to
pass upon said issues.^[34]

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions
reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are
adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves
are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed “human
rights violations involving civil and political rights,” are matters which
may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration
addressed to the Secretary of Education himself, and in the event of an adverse
verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually by the
Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme
of things.  It has no business intruding
into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil
Service Commission.  It has no business
going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment
on the questions involved.  This would
accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers strategy to
abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the
administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to
them.

This cannot be done.  It
will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights
would serve no useful purpose.  If its
investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by
Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to
reverse the Secretary’s conclusions. 
Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and
lastly by this Court.  The only thing the
Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño
was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or
tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission.^[35]
It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December
29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human
Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited “to hear and
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-­775) on the
merits.”

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., and
Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the
result.

Paras, J., see separate concurring opinion.

Padilla, J., in his dissent.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 6-13

^[2]
G.R. No. 95445 (Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al. v.
Hon. Perfecto Laguio, Jr., etc., et al) and G.R. No.
95590 (Alliance of Concerned Teachers [ACT], et al. v. Hon. Isidro Cariño, etc., et al.)

^[3]
(Joint) Resolution, G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, prom. Aug. 6, 1991, pp. 3-4

^[4] Rollo, p. 7

^[5] Id.,
p. 7

^[6]
Also impleaded as respondents were other teachers, Adelaida dela Cruz, Ma. Teresa Rizardo, Rita Atabelo and Digna Operiano (Rollo, p. 77)

^[7] Rollo, pp. 77-78

^[8] Id.,
pp, 77-81

^[9] Id.,
pp. 7-8, and 47-50 (Annex “I,” petition:  Decision of Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio in Civil Case No. 90-54468 of the RTC of Manila
[Branch 18] entitled ‘Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al. v.
Hon. Isidro Cariño and Hon. Erlinda
Lolarga)

^[10] Id.,
pp. 8; 51-52 (Annex J, Petition:  Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of 7 affiants including respondents Budoy, Babaran, and del
Castillo), and 53-54 (Annex K, petition: 
sworn statement given by Apolinario Esber under questioning by Nicanor
S. Agustin, CHR)

^[11] Id.,
p. 56:  Order in Striking Teachers CHR
Case No. 90-775, 1st par., p. 1

^[12] Id.,
1st and 2nd pars., p. 1

^[13] Id.,
pp. 56-57

^[14] Id.,
pp. 11, 58-76 (Annex M, petition)

^[15]
SEE footnote 8 and related text, supra

^[16]
SEE footnote 3, supra

^[17] Rollo, p.11

^[18] Id.,
pp. 12-13

^[19]
Including Regional Trial Courts designated and acting as Special Agrarian
Courts, and the Court of Tax Appeals. 
SEE Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 eff. April 1, 1991.

^[20] Vested
with judicial authority or quasi-judicial powers are such agencies, boards or
officers like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform, Government Service Insurance System,
Employees Compensation Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission.  SEE Circular No. 1-91, supra Also
possessed of quasi-judicial authorities are department heads and heads of
office under the Civil Service Law, and the Ombudsman

^[21]
The nature of a “judicial function” was inter alia
described in Republic of the Philippines (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 90478 as follows:  “The resolution of controversies is, as
everyone knows, the raison d’etre of
courts.  This essential function is
accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and
relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties,
and second, after that determination of the facts has been completed, by
the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be
settled authoritatively, definitively and finally.”

” * * ‘It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law
is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.’ * * .” Mun. Council of Lemery v. Prov. Board of Batangas, 56 Phil.
260, 270, citing State ex rel. Boards of Commrs. v. Dunn, 86 Minn.
301, 304.

It has been held that a special
civil action of certiorari “would not lie to challenge action of
the ‘Integrity Board’ set up by Executive Order No. 318 of May 25, 1950,
because that board, like the later Presidential Complaints and Action
Commission, was not invested with judicial functions but only with power to
investigate charges of graft and corruption in office and to submit the record,
together with findings and recommendations, to the President.” Ruperto v. Torres, G.R. No. L-8785, Feb. 25, 1957 (Unrep.,
100 Phil. 1098) (Rep. of the Phil. Digest, Vol. 1, Certiorari, Sec. 22,
p. 430)

Ballentine’s
Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., treating of “jurisdiction” in relation to a
criminal case, states it to be “the power of a court to inquire into the
fact, to apply the law, and to declare the punishment, in a regular course of
judicial proceeding ** .” In Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.,
“adjudge” is defined as: 
“To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence
or condemn. ** Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of
a judgment (italics supplied).”

^[22]
A distinguished Member of the Constitutional Commission that drew up the 1987
Constitution, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., citing the
Commission’s official records, states that the “principal function of the
Commission (on Human Rights) is investigatory. 
In fact, in terms of law enforcement, this pretty much is the limit of
its function.  Beyond investigation, it
will have to rely on the Justice Department which has full control over
prosecutions.  Thus, under Section 18 (9)
it can only request assistance from executive offices.” (Bernas,
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, a Commentary, 1988
ed., Vol, II p. 503/)

^[23]
ART. XIII, Sec, 17. (1)

^[24] Id.,
Sec. 17. (3)

^[25] Id.,
Sec. 18

^[26]
E.g.:  the prosecution of persons guilty
of crimes, or institution of civil or administrative proceedings; exercise of visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention
facilities; the submission of recommendations to the Congress of measures to
promote human rights and provide for compensation to victims of violations
thereof, etc.

^[27]
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is:  “To search or inquire into; to examine (a
matter) systematically or in detail; to make an inquiry or examination
into.” The American College Encyclopedic Dictionary (1959 ed.) defines (a)
“investigate” as “to search or examine into the particulars of;
examine in detail;” and (b) “investigation,” an act or process
of investigating; a searching inquiry in order to ascertain facts; a detailed
or careful examination.”

^[28]
Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed.

^[29] Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.

^[30]
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is “To adjudge;
to award; ‘to give something controverted to one of
the litigants, by a sentence or decision. ** To try and determine judicially;
to pronounce by sentence of court. ** To sit in judgment and pronounce
sentence; to act as a judge, or court of judgment.”

^[31]
Id.; the Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is “To
settle, determine, or decide judicially; to adjudicate upon; ** To pronounce or
decree by judicial sentence **. ** To award judicially; to grant, bestow, or
impose by judicial sentence ** .”

^[32]
Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed.; in Ballentine’s Law
Dictionary, “adjudicate” is defined as:  “To give judgment; to render or award
judgment,” and “adjudge” as: 
“To give judgment; to decide, to sentence.” In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary Third Revision (8th Ed.),
“adjudication” is defined as “A judgment; giving or pronouncing
judgment in a case.  Determination in the
exercise of judicial power.”

^[33]
SEE footnotes 6 to 8, and 15, and related text, supra

^[34]
SEE footnotes 16 and 17 and related text, supra

^[35]
SEE footnote 26, supra

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