LOLITA B. JAVIER, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN OF HER SIX MINOR CHILDREN, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., AND FIDEL E. DIÑOSO, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul and
set aside the decision dated June 13, 1990 of the Court of Appeals^[1]
dismissing Civil Case No. 88-976 for lack of jurisdiction as well as the
Resolution dated December 18, 1990^[2]
denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in the assailed decision.

It appears on record that
on December 3, 1986, Normito Javier, the husband of petitioner Lolita
Javier, was employed by private respondent Jebsens Maritime, Inc. as a
boatswain for its vessel M/V “General Campos”.

At around 9:10 p.m., September 23, 1987, the shipmaster, private
respondent Fidel Diñoso, ordered Javier to prepare the pilot ladder on the
vessel’s starboard side. While about
his task, a sudden swell hit the vessel and, as a result, Javier, who did not
have his life jacket on, fell into the deep sea waters off Corona, Spain. A search and rescue operation initiated by
private respondent failed to yield Javier.

On October 1, 1987, some fishermen found the lifeless body of
petitioner’s husband in La Corona, Spain where he was buried on October 3, 1987
without the knowledge and consent of the petitioner and her six (6) minor
children. Thereafter, petitioner
learned from a fellow crew member of said vessel about the untimely death of
her husband.

Acting on said information, petitioner went to private respondent
company and the latter promised to give the corresponding death benefits for
the untimely death of her husband.

However, upon the failure of the private respondent company to
pay the promised death benefits to the petitioner, the latter on May 30, 1988,
filed a complaint for herself and on behalf of her six (6) minor children,
against private respondents with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145
in Civil Case No. 88-976 for a sum of money.

While said case was still on trial, private respondents changed
their counsel who, instead of continuing with the trial of this case, filed on
January 24, 1989, a Motion to Dismiss and/or Expunge on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction by the trial court over the subject matter as said case falls
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) which was denied on January 31, 1989 in an
Order issued by the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, defendants’ motion to dismiss etc. is hereby denied. The previous setting on February 20 and 27, 1989, are hereby
maintained.”^[3]

On February 20, 1989, private respondents and their counsel
failed to appear and the trial court issued an Order^[4]
declaring them as having waived their right to cross-examine the petitioner.

Consequently, private respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on February 24, 1989 which was denied in an Order^[5]
issued on February 27,1969.

On May 30, 1989, private respondents filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
preliminary injunction against petitioner which was granted by the appellate
court in its decision promulgated on June 13, 1990, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a) GRANTING the
Petition; (b) ENJOINING respondent Judge from further taking cognizance of
Civil Case No. 88-976 and directing him to desist from further proceeding therewith;
(c) ANNULLING the proceedings had before the court a quo; and, (d)
ORDERING respondent Judge to dismiss Civil Case No. 88-976 for lack of
jurisdiction, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action by
private respondent in the proper forum.” ^[6]

On July 2, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied in a Resolution promulgated on December 18, 1990.

Hence, petitioner instituted this petition for certiorari
alleging that the regular court has jurisdiction to hear and decide claim for
damages under the Civil Code even if the
case involved arose from an employer-employee relationship.

Section 3(d) of Executive Order No. 247, promulgated on July 24,
1987 provides that the POEA shall:

“(d) Exercise
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out
of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment including the disciplinary
cases; x x x.”

Under the aforementioned provision all claims, whether money
claims and/or claims for contractual benefits of any nature, involving an
employer-employee relationship would necessarily and properly fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA. In
the instant case, petitioner’s husband, who died while in the performance of
his official duty, is admittedly an employee of the private respondent company
and jurisdiction should therefore be vested upon the POEA since a case cannot
have a civil aspect cognizable by the regular court and at the same time a
labor aspect cognizable by the labor tribunal. To rule otherwise would result in a multiplicity of suits which is
frowned upon by this Court. As
correctly held by the respondent appellate court in its Resolution to
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration:

“Where jurisdiction is conferred in express terms upon one
court, and not upon another, it has been held that it is the intention that the
jurisdiction conferred shall be exclusive (21 C.J.S., p. 730). Under the sense-making and expedient
doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, “x x x the courts cannot or
will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered” (42 Am.
Jur., 698, cited in Pambiyan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co.,
Inc., 94 Phil. 941 [1954]). In this
era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of
grave abuse of discretion, has become well-high indispensable x x x x ” (Malayan
Integrated Industries Corp. v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 75238, Sept. 30, 1987, 154
SCRA 548).”^[7]

Petitioner’s contention that private respondents are estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court considering that the latter
had actively participated in the proceedings before said court is unavailing
since private respondents had raised the question of jurisdiction in the trial
court. The doctrine of estoppel cannot
be properly invoked by the petitioner despite the participation of the private
respondents at the initial stages of the trial proceedings as the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action. Thus, this Court has held that:

“x x x The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a
court is not a simple matter. It can
raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of
the land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the
same. The point simply is that when a
party commits error in filling his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed
sufficient basis of estoppel. It could
have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of
doubtful legal provisions. If any fault
is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame
should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling
the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct
forum. Under the rules, it is the duty
of the court to dismiss an action ‘whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.’ (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should
the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached
or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10)
years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code)”^[8]

“It is well settled that the decision of a tribunal not
vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.”^[9]

WHEREFORE, finding
no irreversible error in the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, this
petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Regalado, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 31-34. Ponente: Justice Josue N. Bellosillo with the concurrence of
Justice Alfredo M. Marigomen and Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy.

^[2]
Id., at pp. 36-38.

^[3]
Ibid.

^[4]
Id., at p. 51.

^[5]
Id., at p. 52.

^[6]
Id., at p. 34.

^[7]
Id., at p. 37.

^[8]
Calimlim vs. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399 [1982].

^[9]
Dy vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 145 SCRA 211 (1986).