PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. HONORIO G. MABUNGA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The Court views with grave concern what appears to be an
increasing incidence of incestuous rape, as reported in the media and actually
lodged in criminal charges before the prosecutorial agencies and in the
courts. How many more are unreported,
due to understandable reluctance or fear just like cases of domestic violence
against wives which remain shrouded in familial secrecy, we can only
surmise. The matter of spousal abuse is
now the subject of congressional concern, and it is just as imperative that
incest perpetrated on innocent children should
now be addressed firmly, not only by the courts but jointly by
legislators, spiritual authorities and social workers. The proliferation of incestuous rape of
minors, a crime which figuratively
scrapes the bottom of the barrel
of moral depravity, is a revolting phenomenon in a Catholic country like ours such that it was not even
anticipated in specific penal laws. Yet, once again, we have such a case before us.

In a complaint dated August 11, 1986, accused-appellant Honorio
G. Mabunga y Gulog was charged with the crime of rape against his own daughter,
committed as follows:

“That on or about the 20th day of January 1984 in Kalookan
City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force and intimidation and with the use of a
kitchen knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
have sexual intercourse with JENELYN MABUNGA Y JAVA (daughter), against the
latter’s will and without her consent.”^[1]

and trial thereafter proceeded upon a plea of not guilty entered by
appellant at his arraignment.

We have carefully scrutinized the records in this case and we
find that the evidence for the prosecution substantiates the documented
synthesis of facts set out in appellee’s brief and which we have decided to reproduce herein to portray the sordid
details of the crime.

“On January 20, 1984, Benilda Mabunga was sent by her husband,
appellant herein on an errand to Malabon to get the papers he needed for going
abroad. Appellant was a security guard
assigned to the night shift. Benilda
left their house in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City at around 9:30 A.M. leaving
behind appellant and their children, the thirteen-year old complainant and
six-year old Chennelyn” (pp. 5-6, TSN, July 8, 1987; p. 3, TSN, December
20, 1989).

“At around 10:00 A.M., appellant told Chennelyn to go out and
play (p. 6, TSN, December 20, 1989). As
soon as complainant was left alone with appellant (her father) in their
one-room house (pp. 4, 6, ibid.), appellant told complainant to take off
her clothes and that if she would not do it, he would kill her. He pointed a knife on her neck and told her
to lie on the floor. When complainant had already lain down, he
took off her skirt, her upper garment, and her panty (p. 5, ibid.) and
told her not to tell anybody especially her mother about what he was doing (p.
4, ibid.). Appellant then took
off his own clothes, pants and brief, went on top of complainant while pointing
the knife on her neck, inserted his penis into her private part and kissed her
while she cried. While appellant was on
top of complainant, the lower part of his body went up and down and stopped
when his semen spouted out. After the
sexual intercourse, appellant told complainant who was still crying to dress up and not to tell her
mother about it or else he would kill them all (pp. 5-6, ibid.).

“When her mother arrived, complainant did not tell her what
happened because appellant was in the house. Appellant told his wife that he would bring complainant to his place of
work at the Airport Motel, Baclaran so that she could wash his clothes and cook for him. Complainant went with him that same
afternoon (p. 6, ibid.).

“In the evening of
that same day, at around 8:00
P.M., complainant was again raped
by appellant, this time at the guardhouse of the Airport Motel where he made
complainant lie down.

“Complainant stayed with appellant in the guardhouse of the
Airport Motel, Baclaran where she washed his clothes and cooked for him. She also sold candies, cigarettes and
vegetables near the guardhouse (pp. 8-9, 13, ibid.).

“During her stay with appellant at the guardhouse, she was
repeatedly raped by him but she could not resist because he kept threatening
her that he would maul her or hurt her bodily (pp. 8-9, ibid.).

“During complainant’s stay at the guardhouse of the Airport
Motel, she was able to disclose
the fact that she was being raped by appellant to an old woman who was also
working in that place. The old woman, however, could not do
anything but promised complainant that she would bring her to the old woman’s
relatives in Olongapo City but this plan
did not materialize (p. 22, ibid.). Complainant was also able to talk to one of her relatives
about what appellant was doing to her but the relative did not believe her (p.
23, ibid.).

“On July 7, 1986, complainant left the guardhouse after
appellant told her that he was going to impregnate her. Before she left, however, she wrote a letter
addressed to her mother stating that she
had to leave their house because she would be raped again by appellant
who told her that they would live together in Batangas (Exhibit ‘B’). She placed the letter inside the bag of her
mother when the latter went to the Airport Motel although her mother testified that complainant placed this
letter inside her bag when she was in their house (p. 9, ibid.).

“Complainant took a bus where she befriended an old woman by
the name of Aling Florencia. The latter
asked her what was her problem as she was crying. After complainant related to Aling Florencia what her own father
had done to her, Aling Florencia invited complainant to live with her in
Novaliches. Complainant stayed in the
house of Aling Florencia until July 31, 1986 when she asked permission to go
home (p. 9, ibid.).

‘When complainant arrived
at their house in Bagong Silang on July 31, 1986, her mother told her that they
were going to Diliman, Quezon City to the house of her mother’s brother,
Felimon Java, who was a policeman. Her mother had found the letter which complainant placed in her bag
and had confronted appellant about the
matter. Appellant first admitted having
raped complainant but later denied it (p. 10, ibid.).

“After complainant told her uncle, Felimon Java, what
happened, they went to the police station in front of Nepa Q-Mart, Quezon
City. There, complainant filed a
complaint for rape against appellant. On the same day, the Quezon City Police referred her to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where she underwent a physical examination (pp.
10, 21, ibid.).

“After the examination, they went back to the police
headquarters in Quezon City and they made a request that her case be
transferred to Caloocan City (p. 11, ibid.).

“On August 8, 1986, complainant executed a written statement
(Exhibit ‘E’) at the Caloocan City Police Station in connection with the
case. Her mother, Benilda, also gave a
statement (Exhibit ‘D’); then her father was arrested (p. 12, ibid.).

“Thereafter, complainant stayed in her uncle’s place in
Diliman, Quezon City (p. 12, ibid.).

“After the complaint was filed, appellant told Benilda in one
of their encounters to give complainant to him so that he will not anymore
bother Benilda. The latter told
appellant that she will keep her daughter, Jennelyn, and that he could get
their son, Arnel. Appellant, however,
insisted on getting complainant and
even threatened Benilda and mauled her. While Benilda was testifying on this fact, she cried very hard (pp.
10-12, ibid.).

“Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, a supervising medico-legal officer at
the NBI, examined complainant on July 31, 1986 and issued a Living Case Report
No. NG 86-454 (Exhibit ‘D’, p. 6, ibid.).

“Dr. Reyes testified that his most important finding was that
complainant’s genital organ had an ‘old healed deep laceration’ which meant
that the hymen, the membraneous (sic) covering
of the vaginal canal, had been lacerated and the laceration was inflicted a long time ago which could be more than
six (6) months ago (pp. 4-6, ibid.) and that she has experienced repeated sexual intercourse because the vaginal
walls were lax and the rugosities were
shallow (p. 9, ibid.).”^[2]

On the other hand, appellant’s version of the case against
him was duly and fully summarized by the trial court in its decision and which, for dialectic contrast and in equal measure, is likewise quoted
hereunder.

“Evidence for the defense shows that the accused was employed
as a security guard of the Securicor Watchman Agency, Inc.; that as per Certification (Exhibit ‘1’) by
Personnel Officer, Ma. Corazon B.
Agbulos, it shows that from January 1, 1984 to April 1984, he was assigned at
the Bolanos Estate Detachment in Tatalon, Araneta Avenue, Quezon City, and then transferred to Mercury Drug
Store cor. Washington and Buendia from July 9, 1984 until August 18, 1984, and on
January 19, 1985 was assigned at the Airport Motel in Baclaran.

“On the evening of January 19, 1984, he (the accused) reported
for duty at the Bolanos Estate Detachment, that is from 7:00 in the evening of
January 19, 1984 until 7:00 in the morning of January 20, 1984; that after his
duty he went to their barracks where he was staying, ate his breakfast, talked
to his co-guards and was told that it was their payday and then rested. At about 12:00 noon, he was awakened by one
of his co-guards and was told that his wife ha(d) arrived to get his salary. Since his salary ha(d) not yet arrived, his wife waited until 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, in which
(sic) she was able to get his salary and then went home.

“That everytime he was assigned in far places, he did not go home and instead stayed in
their barracks in order to save. That
when he was assigned at the Bolanos Estate, he did not go home. His wife was the one who went to get his
salary and sometimes together with their children. When he was assigned in Airport Motel in Baclaran, he did not go
home. When his wife visited (him) to
get his salary, together with Jennelyn* and Arnel
(their children), on June 20, 1985, his wife requested that the two children be left with him in order that they
could sell some food but he did not want to agree because it was prohibited for
them to have other people sleep in their barracks except the guards. But in the middle of August of 1985, Jenelyn
was able to sell bread, coffee
and others in front of his post. That
he made for her (Jenelyn) a cart
so that she could place her
goods and at the same time where she could sleep at night. That on June 7, 1986, she (Jenelyn) left for
reason or reasons he did not know. Together with his wife,
they looked for Jenelyn but to no avail.

“That on August 8, 1986, he went home (to) Bagong Silang,
Caloocan City, in order to find out if his daughter Jenelyn had already come
back. That he was arrested by some
policemen and was brought to Sikatuna Police Headquarters in Quezon City where
he was asked to admit the crime imputed to him by Jenelyn ([his] daughter) but
refused to admit. Neither did he give
any statement. Then he was transferred
to the Caloocan City Jail.

“That during the hearing of this case, he talked to Jenelyn
and asked her about her life and why she was pregnant. She (Jenelyn) told him that she was already
married. Also he asked her why she
destroyed his honor. And she (Jenelyn
replied that she could not do anything
because she was only forced by her mother to file a rape case against him and
was threatening her. That the reason
why a case was filed against him was because he had discovered that his wife
has a ‘kalaguyo’ (lover). That he
discovered it because their son told him that there was a man who was sleeping in their house and the
man was sleeping beside her.”^[3]

On August 29, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision convicting appellant of two crimes of rape,
one committed in Caloocan City and the other at the guardhouse of the Airport Motel in Baclaran, with the following
decretal portion:

“WHEREFORE, finding the prosecution evidence ­to have
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in the two
offenses of rape, the Court, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
hereby imposes the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each crime of rape, which,
under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, must be served successively but the
total duration shall not exceed forty (40) years.”^[4]

Appellant seasonably filed an urgent motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial with the trial court, assailing said decision on these
grounds:

1.    The
decision is vitiated by error of law and irregularity in the trial which
violated the right of the accused to due process and prejudiced his defense
when he was tried and convicted for two alleged offenses of rape one of which
was not and may not be charged in
the criminal complaint and allegedly was committed in a place outside the
court’s territorial jurisdiction.

2.   
The decision is contrary to the facts and evidence, because:

(a) There is no clear, positive evidence on record that the alleged carnal
intercourse with the complainant was perpetrated against her will.

(b) Complainant’s testimony, the main
prosecution evidence, is rendered unworthy of credence by improbabilities,
self-contradictions and contradictions from other witnesses.^[5]

In an order dated September 25, 1990, the court below modified
its aforesaid decision in this wise.

“Accordingly, the ‘Motion for New Trial’ is hereby DENIED.

“The Decision is hereby amended to the effect that all the
findings and conclusions reached by the Court with respect to the second
offense of the rape committed in the guardhouse, at the Airport Motel, Baclaran
Pasay City, and the judgment rendered therein convicting the accused on said second rape, are hereby SET ASIDE.

“The Decision as to the conviction of the accused for rape
committed in Caloocan City on the basis of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution which as stated, has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, as well as
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua imposed against the accused under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, STANDS FIRM.”^[6]

Not satisfied therewith, appellant is now before us and, by way of assignment of errors in his brief,^[7] repeats
substantially the same grounds adduced in his aforestated motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial earlier filed in the trial court.

There is no merit in this appeal.

The first assignment of error
raised by appellant as to the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court on the
alleged second rape committed in Baclaran is now moot and academic. The trial court had already rectified the
oversight when it modified its previous decision in its aforequoted order of
September 25, 1990, convicting
appellant only of the rape
committed in Caloocan City which is the subject of the present proceedings.

The other assigned error hinges on the issue of credibility.

Well-settled is the
rule that conclusions as to credibility in rape cases lie heavily on the trial court. Unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that
would have affected the result of the case, the appellate court will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower court. For, having had the opportunity
of observing the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses while
testifying, the trial court, more than the reviewing tribunal, is in a better
position to gauge their credibility and properly appreciate the relative weight
of the often conflicting evidence for both parties.^[8]

In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from this general
rule. A careful review of the records
of the case shows that the prosecution evidence was correctly appreciated by
the court a quo to establish the guilt of appellant
beyond peradventure of a doubt.

The contention of appellant that there was insufficient evidence
of resistance on the part of the
victim against the sexual assaults against her is untenable. In her testimony, complainant narrated that
appellant threatened to kill her and poked a knife at her as he was abusing her
and this indisputably constitutes sufficient
intimidation. This Court has repeatedly
ruled that intimidation includes the moral kind, such as the fear caused by
threatening the girl with a knife or pistol.^[9]

Moreover, in cases of rape, the manner, form and tenacity of
resistance of the victim therein are dependent on a number of factors, among
which are the age and size of the victim, as well as of the aggressor himself; the degree of actual force and
intimidation employed; and, of utmost importance, the relationship between the
rapist and his prey.^[10]

In the instant case, the victim at the time of the incident was a
mere thirteen-year old girl and the one who raped her was her own father. Hence, even
assuming that force or intimidation had not been actually employed, the crime of rape was nevertheless
committed. The absence of violence or
offer of resistance would not be significant
because of the overpowering and
overbearing moral influence of the father over the daughter which takes the
place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by
an accused having no blood relationship with the victim.^[11]

We reject the
pretension of appellant that the
complainant was just forced by
her mother to file this case against him because the former had a lover. There is nothing novel nor imaginative in such a contrived defense. As we have heretofore held,
it is unbelievable that a daughter would agree to charge her own father with
rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a
public trial, and subjecting her private parts to examination, just to keep a
mantle over her mother’s alleged
liaison with another man,^[12] or
for a mother of a thirteen-year old child
to fabricate a rape charge, knowing fully well that such an experience would damage her daughter’s psyche and
tar her for life, unless it is the
truth.^[13]

Appellant further contends that it is improbable, if in fact
complainant was sexually assaulted by him, that at such tender age of less than
fourteen years she did not
exhibit nor made mention of any vaginal bleeding; that after the alleged rape, she still willingly went with him to his
alleged place of work in Baclaran and stayed with him there for more than two
years up to 1986; that she did not tell her mother or her mother’s brother, a
Quezon City policeman, of the alleged rape earlier; that when she allegedly ran
away from her father in July, 1986, she went
somewhere else and not straight home to her mother; that she wrote and
left a letter to her mother about the alleged rape instead of telling her
directly; and that it took her more than two years to go to the authorities to
complain against him.^[14]

Aside from the foregoing attempt to undermine complainant’s
credibility by the foregoing supposed improbabilities, appellant also contends
that complainant’s reliability has likewise been destroyed by
self-contradictions and the testimonies of and the evidence presented by other
witnesses.

We have ruled in a number
of cases that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with
respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. In fact, these inconsistencies, if only in
minor details, reinforce rather than weaken their credibility.^[15]

In the present case, the alleged flaws or discrepancies in the
testimony of the complainant are
on minor details which do not destroy the substance of her testimony or the
other circumstances that point unerringly to the guilt of appellant.

Complainant’s failure to state that there was bleeding in her
vagina is immaterial. Vaginal bleeding
or virginity is not an element in rape. What is important is the victim’s testimony that appellant sexually abused her.^[16]
When a victim says that she had been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed
and if her testimony meets the test of credibility,
the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.^[17]

The fact that complainant, after the first rape, still went with
appellant to the guardhouse of the Airport Motel where she was repeatedly raped
by him and left the place only in 1986, does not affect her
trustworthiness. She was only thirteen
years old then and dependent upon her parents for sustenance, not to speak of
appellant’s unquestionable moral ascendancy over her. She had no option but to go with appellant when ordered to do
so. Aside from that, there was that
continuing threat by appellant against her life and the lives of the other
members of her family, the fear of which was ingrained in her consciousness.

Consequently, the failure of the complainant to immediately report the incident to the
authorities does not cast doubt on the
credibility of the charge, since the foregoing circumstances satisfactorily
explain the unintended delay. One
should not expect such a young girl to act like an adult or like a mature and experienced woman who would know what to do
under such difficult circumstances, and who would have the courage and
intelligence to disregard a threat on her life and the members of her family
and complain immediately that she had been forcibly deflowered.^[18]

It is not uncommon
for young girls to conceal, for
some time, the assaults on their honor because of the rapist’s threat on their lives.^[19] An intimidated person cowed into
submitting to a series of repulsive acts may acquire some courage but only when she grows older and can finally state that enough is enough, the depraved malefactor
must be punished.^[20] That
is what happened in this case. Lamentably, however, the tragedy herein is that the criminal is her own father.

Furthermore, the defense of appellant is anchored on denial. We need
not belabor the entrenched doctrine that alibi is the weakest defense that can
be availed of by the accused because it
can easily be manufactured and fabricated.^[21]
Suffice it to state that appellant’s defense
of alibi does not inspire belief. Firstly, he was positively identified by complainant as the person who
abused her, with complainant having no dubious motive at all to make such a
serious imputation. Secondly, his alibi
does not preclude the possibility that he was present at the scene of the crime
when it was committed.

Incestuous rape of a daughter by a father has heretofore always been bitterly and vehemently
denounced by this Court as more than just a shameful and shameless crime. And, as we recently reiterated, rape is a
nauseating crime that deserves the condemnation of all decent persons who
recognize that a woman’s
cherished chastity is hers alone to surrender of her own free will. Whoever violates that will descends to the
level of the odious beast. The act becomes doubly repulsive where the outrage
is perpetrated on one’s own flesh and blood for the culprit is reduced to lower
than the lowly animal, and
forfeits all respect as a human
being.^[22]

The execrable crime of herein appellant is made more odious by
the total lack of remorse or even a penitential gesture on his part. It displays the nadir to which the beast in
man can sink. Such a transgressor of basic human norms of
conduct does not deserve to live in a decent human society, and that society
has the right to exclude from its membership anyone cursed with such an
atavistic and subhuman
propensity.

On the foregoing considerations and in light of the present law
in force, we uphold the findings and conclusions of the lower court. We note, however, that it failed to award
civil indemnity to the offended party as provided by Article 345 of the Revised
Penal Code. Accordingly,
accused-appellant is hereby further ordered to indemnify the offended party which,
under the circumstances of this case, should be in the amount of P40,000.00 in accordance with the current policy
of the Court.^[23]

WHEREFORE, with the modification above indicated, the
amended judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Nocon, and
Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on
leave.

^[1]
Rollo, 11.

^[2]
Ibid., 87-93.

* The complainant’s name
is also spelled “Jenelyn” in the decision a quo.

^[3]
Ibid., 23-24.

^[4]
Ibid., 27.

^[5]
Original Record, 347.

^[6]
Rollo, 29.

^[7]
Ibid., 38.

^[8]
People vs. Ablaza, 30 SCRA 173 (1969); People vs. Payumo, 187
SCRA 64 (1990); People vs. Sendon, G.R. Nos. 95903-­05, June 8, 1992.

^[9]
People vs. Garcines, 57 SCRA 653 (1974); People vs. Copro, 126
SCRA 403 (1983); People vs. Cabilao, G.R. No. 62999, June 25, 1992.

^[10]
People vs. Savellano, 57 SCRA
320 (1974); People vs. Bruca, 179 SCRA 64 (1989); People vs.
Natan, 193 SCRA 355 (1991).

^[11]
People vs. Erardo, 127 SCRA 250 (1984); People vs. Ramos, 167 SCRA 476
(1988); People vs. Bruca,
supra.

^[12]
People vs. Gargoles, 83 SCRA 282
(1978); People vs. Avila, 192 SCRA 635 (1990); People vs. Vinas, 202 SCRA 720
(1991).

^[13]
People vs. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571 (1990); People vs. Telio, G.R. Nos. 72786-88, June 22, 1992.

^[14]
Rollo, 51.

^[15]
People vs. Talla, 181 SCRA 133
(1990); People vs. Buka, et al., 205 SCRA 567 (1992); People vs.
Sendon, supra.

^[16]
People vs. Lamberte, 142 SCRA
685 (1986); People vs. Poculan, 167 SCRA 176 (1988).

^[17]
People vs. Budol, et al., 143
SCRA 241 (1986); People vs. Avero, 165 SCRA 130 (1988).

^[18]
People vs. Sonico, 156 SCRA 419
(1987).

^[19]
People vs. Oydoc, 125 SCRA 250
(1983); People vs. Natan, supra.

^[20]
People vs. Molero, 144 SCRA 397
(1986).

^[21]
People vs. Pacada, Jr., et al.,
142 SCRA 427 (1986); People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47 (1990); People vs.
Hatague, et al., G.R. No. 97308, April 7, 1992.

^[22]
People vs. Ramos, 165 SCRA 400
(1988); People vs. Telio, supra.

^[23]
People vs. Yambao, supra;
People vs. Tongson, 194 SCRA 257
(1991); People vs. Santiago, 197 SCRA 556 (1991).