LORENZO P. LESACA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ALFREDO RAVELO, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, from the decision dated November 29, 1990 of the Court of
Appeals which sets aside the decisions of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch III, and remands the case
to the MeTC for further proceedings and reception of the parties’ evidence as
provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure.

On February 23, 1990, the petitioner, as plaintiff, filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) a complaint for ejectment against the
private respondent, Alfredo Ravelo, to oust him from the commercial premises
located at 671 Sales Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, on the grounds of: (1) expiration of the month-to-month lease
contract between the parties; and (2) non-payment of rentals. Ravelo filed an answer to the complaint.

During the first preliminary conference on April 19, 1990, all
the parties were present and duly represented by their respective counsel. However, the preliminary conference was
reset to May 3, 1990, upon request of both parties, to give them time to
explore the possibility of an amicable settlement and submit a compromise
agreement.

On the scheduled date of the next conference, May 3, 1990, only
the plaintiff (now petitioner) appeared. On motion of plaintiff’s counsel, the MeTC declared defendant Ravelo
“as in default” for failure to appear at the preliminary conference
despite previous notice. The court
considered the case submitted for decision “as warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint”
(p. 35, Rollo).

On May 23, 1990, the MeTC rendered a decision ordering the
defendant, Ravelo, to vacate the premises in question.

Said defendant appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila. After the submission of the
parties’ respective memoranda, the RTC promulgated a decision affirming in
toto the decision of the MeTC.

Ravelo filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for annulment of
the decisions of the MeTC and RTC and to remand the case to the MeTC for
reception of evidence.

On November 29, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Metropolitan Trial Court decision
and the respondent court’s decision are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Manila, Branch III for further proceedings and reception of the
evidence of the parties as provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure.” (p.
21, Rollo.)

Hence, the present petition for review alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred:

1. when it ruled that the only instance (when)
Section 5 of the Summary Rule can be applied is when the defendant fails to
answer.

2. when it ruled that should a party fail to
attend/comply with the preliminary conference mandated under Section 6 of the
Summary Rule, the court below is powerless and has no discretion but to still
proceed under Section 6 of same rule to issue an order clarifying and defining
the issues of the case and to proceed under Section 7 of same Rule for
submission of affidavits of parties.

3. when it ruled that
“as in default” declaration is prohibited by
the Rule on Summary Procedure.

We find no merit in the petition for review.

Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure provides:

“Sec. 6. Preliminary conference –
Not later than thirty (30) days after
the last answer is filed, the case shall be
calendared for a preliminary conference. Among other matters, should the parties fail to arrive at an amicable
settlement, the court must clarify and define the issues of the case, which
must be clearly and distinctly set forth in the order to be issued immediately
after such preliminary conference, together with the other matters taken up
during the same.”

As found by the Court of Appeals, when the private respondent
(then defendant) and his counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial conference
and no compromise agreement was reached by the parties despite the opportunity
given them by the court, the situation was similar to that provided in Section
6 of the Summary Rule above quoted. The
Court should have issued a “preliminary conference order” defining
the issues in the case as provided in Section 6. Thereafter the parties should have submitted their affidavits and
other evidence as provided in Section 7 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, to
wit:

“Sec. 7. Submission
of affidavits. – Within
ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of witnesses and other
evidences on the factual issues defined therein, together with a brief
statement of their positions setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by
them.”

Only when the defendant failed to answer the complaint may the
Court proceed to judgment. Thus does
Section 5 provide:

“Sec. 5. Effect
of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint, crossclaim
or permissive counterclaim within the reglementary 10-day period herein
provided, the court motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff,
shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint
and limited to what is prayed for therein except as to the amount of damages
which the Court may reduce in its discretion.”

In this case, since Ravelo did file an answer to the complaint, the trial court may not declare him as
in default (despite his absence and that of his counsel at the pre-trial
conference on May 3, 1990) because a motion to declare the defendant in default
is a prohibited pleading under Section 15 (h) of the Rule on Summary Procedure.

It is the policy of the law to have every litigated case tried on
the merits. It is for this reason that
judgments by defaults are generally looked upon with disfavor. As this Court observed in the “case of
Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil. 446: a
default judgment does not pretend to be based upon the merits of the
controversy. Its existence is justified
on the ground that it is the one final expedient to induce the defendant to
join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so without
unnecessary delay. A judgment by
default may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant;
and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful
examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set
aside.” (Trajano vs. Cruz, 80 SCRA 712, 713.)

The same doctrine was laid down by this Court in Rosario vs.
Alonzo, 8 SCRA 397, where we ruled that “the defendants could, not
be in default after they had answered the complaint.”

WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 1990 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22801 is hereby AFFIRMED. Let the record of this case be remanded to
the MeTC of Manila for further proceedings and reception of evidence in
accordance with the Rule on Summary Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Medialdea, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., no part, related
to petitioner.