THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MELENCIO “BAROC” MENDOZA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

On May 21, 1984, the accused-appellant
Melencio Mendoza was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Branch 172 with the crime of Robbery with Homicide
and Serious Physical Injuries in an Information which reads:

“The undersigned Asst. Provincial Fiscal accuses Melencio
‘Baroc’ Mendoza of the crime of robbery with homicide and physical injuries,
penalized under the provisions of Art.
294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 9th day of June, 1981, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Melencio ‘Baroc’
Mendoza, with Romeo Esquillo y Cabacang, Roberto Marquez y Dionisio, and Jose
Ramos y Austria who are already charged of the same crime in Crim. Case No.
4109-V-81 and another person who is still at large, armed with unlicensed
firearms, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the
spouses Felipe Alkuino and Eufrocina Trajano­-Alkuino, take, rob and carry away
with them a lady’s handbag containing cash amounting to P30,545.00 and checks
with total face value of P18,167.85 or a grand total of P48,712.85, belonging
to the said spouses Felipe Alkuino and Eufrocina Trajano-Alkuino, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owners in the total amount of P48,712.85;

“That by reason or on the occasion of the said robbery and for
the purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away the said amount of
P48,712.85 in cash and in checks, the herein accused Melencio ‘Baroc’ Mendoza,
together with his co-accused and another person still at large, in pursuance of
their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of their superior
strength, attack, assault and shoot with firearms they were
then provided the said spouses Felipe Alkuino and Eufrocina
Trajano-Alkuino, thereby inflicting fatal physical injuries on said Felipe
Alkuino which directly caused his death and serious physical injuries on said
Eufrocina Trajano­-Alkuino which required medical attendance for a period of
one (1) to two (2) months and incapacitated her from performing her customary
labor for the same period of time.

Contrary to law.”
(Original Records, pp. 1-2)

Upon arraignment on March
9, 1985, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial proceeded and a decision convicting
the accused was rendered by the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Melencio ‘Baroc’ Mendoza guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and
physical injuries and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to suffer all the
accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the heirs of Felipe Alkuino
in the sum of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.” (Rollo, p. 36)

The antecedent facts as
stated in the Appellee’s Brief are as
follows:

“In the morning of June 9, 1981, Romeo Esquillo, a painter,
was in his house at Barangay San Gabriel, Malolos, Bulacan when he decided to
go to a store nearby. At the store, he
was approached by a certain Roberto Marquez, who convinced him to go to the
latter’s house. While in the house of
Marquez, a person by the name of Romeo Magtoto arrived and he was introduced to
Esquillo (TSN, May 31, 1985, pp. 8-12)

“Marquez, Esquillo and Magtoto on board a motorcycle driven by
Marquez, went to Malanday. When they
reached Malanday, a person, who was riding in a car approached them. Marquez told Esquillo that the man was Barok
Mendoza (TSN, Ibid, pp. 16-17).

“The group thereafter went to the house of a friend of Barok
Mendoza where they took some drinks. After the drinking session, they proceeded to Polo where they just stood
by the street purportedly waiting for a friend to pass by (TSN, Id., pp. 26-27)

“When a red jeep (Isuzu pick-up KB) suddenly appeared, the
group scrambled, boarded their vehicles and chased the vehicle which turned out
to be that of the Alkuinos. Appellant
rode in the car together with Ramos and Magtoto while Esquillo rode at the back
of the motorcycle driven by Marquez (TSN, Id. pp. 33-34)

“When the motorcycle was already very close to the pick-up
vehicle of the Alkuinos, appellant gave Esquillo a gun and told him that the
occupants of the jeep have money and if he will not get the money he will kill
him (Esquillo) (TSN, Id., pp. 40-41)

“Esquillo did what was commanded of him. When he jumped into the red jeep as ordered
by Marquez, Esquillo poked the gun at the occupants of the vehicle and
announced the holdup (TSN, Id., p. 40)

“Esquillo grabbed the
bag containing money and checks worth P48,712.85. Eufrocina Alkuino and Esquillo grappled for possession of the bag
when suddenly the gun went off. Eufrocina Alkuino felt that her middle finger was injured. At this point, Felipe Alkuino, the husband
of Eufrocina, joined in the grapple until it went off again hitting him in the
chest (See RTC Decision, p. 4).

“Esquillo ran with the bag but the contents thereof spilled
out. Esquillo, Marquez and Ramos helped
each other pick up the money and placed them inside the bag. (Ibid.)

“Eufrocina summoned for help and the people arrived
immediately and brought Felipe to the hospital where he later expired. The cause of death, as found by Dr.
Bienvenido Muñoz, supervising medico-legal officer of the NBI, is hemorrhage,
acute, severe, secondary to gunshot wound. The victim suffered only one gunshot wound. Eufrocina later identified the man who poked the gun at them as
Romeo Esquillo and the two others she saw in front of their vehicle when it
suddenly stopped as Roberto Marquez and Jose Ramos. (Id.)

“In the meantime, Esquillo ran with the bag. He looked for his companions but they already left him. He was chased by the barrio people and was later arrested by a certain Sgt. Avelino Francisco (TSN, May 31,
1985, p. 48)

“Esquillo was brought to the Valenzuela Municipal Building
where he was investigated. In the
investigation conducted on him, after he regained consciousness, he named his
companions in the robbery holdup as Roberto Marquez, Romeo Magtoto and Jose
Ramos (TSN, July 7, 1986, p. 6). Esquillo then accompanied the Valenzuela police headed by then Lt.
Carlos Tiquia and proceeded to Catmon, Malolos, Bulacan where Marquez and Ramos
were arrested. Magtoto was able to
elude the police and fled (TSN, September 15, 1986, p. 5)

“An investigation was conducted on Marquez and Ramos. This time Marquez mentioned Melencio Mendoza
as the Mastermind of the robbery holdup allegedly seconded by Esquillo. A team of Valenzuela police was formed and
headed for Catmon, Malolos, Bulacan to track down Mendoza. The team waited for Mendoza as he was not
home yet at that time. At around 10:00
p.m., Mendoza alighted from a passenger jeepney and he was informed about his
alleged involvement in the robbery holdup to which accusation he vehemently
denied. The police brought him to their
headquarters for questioning.

“On June 10, 1981, a day after that robbery incident,
Eufrocina Alkuino arrived at the Valenzuela Municipal Building as she was
informed that the suspects in the robbery holdup were already apprehended and
arrested. In the police line-up,
Eufrocina Alkuino pointed to Esquillo, Marquez, Ramos and Mendoza. She pointed to Mendoza because, according to
her, she heard Marquez and Esquillo telling the police that Mendoza was the
mastermind of the holdup (see Decision, p. 7)

“In the preliminary investigation that was duly conducted by
the Municipal Court of Valenzuela presided by Judge Serapio, Mendoza was
dropped from the charge as no probable cause was found then to indict him to
the crime of robbery with homicide and physical injuries (See Exh. 5).

“Three separate
Informations were duly filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Branch 171; the first one docketed as
Criminal Case No. 4109-V-81 against Esquillo, Marquez and Ramos for
Robbery with Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries, and the second docketed as
Criminal Case No. 4110-V-81 for illegal possession of firearm against Esquillo,
and the third docketed as Criminal Case No. 4111-V-81 for illegal possession of firearms against
Marquez.

“In the course of the trial of Criminal Case No. 4109-V-81 and
Criminal Case No. 4110-­V-81, Esquillo implicated Melencio Mendoza in the
commission of the crime of Robbery. All
the accused in the three criminal cases were convicted of the crimes charged against them.

“Subsequently, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed a
separate Information charging Mendoza with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
Physical Injuries, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6252-V-84.

“In an order dated October 28, 1985 (TSN, October 28, 1985,
pp. 3-4) in Criminal Case No. 6252-V-84, the trial court, acting on the motion
of the prosecution and with the conformity of appellant and his counsel,
allowed the testimonies of the following witnesses in Criminal Case No.
4109-V-81 and in Criminal Case No. 4110-V-81, to be adopted and made part of
the evidence of the prosecution subject to further cross-examination by counsel
for the appellant: (1) Dr. Bienvenido
Muñoz, Supervising Medico Legal Officer, NBI, Manila; (2) Marlene Merdegia?Salangad,
Forensic Chemist, PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City; (3) Vicente de
Vera, Ballistician, PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City; (4) Technical
Sgt. Flordelito S. Basul, Chief Clerk, Firearms Branch and Explosives Unit,
Camp Crame, Quezon City; (5) Eufrocina Trajano-Alkuino; and (6) Jose Martin
(see Decision, pp. 3-6)” (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 4­-10)

The defense of the
appellant is premised on his allegedly having been somewhere else when the
crime was committed. He claimed that he
was working inside the bank on that day and presented the logbook of the
security guard which showed his entering the place at 8:33 a.m. and leaving it
at 5:32 p.m. The robbery happened at
around 1:00 p.m. The appellant stated
that he took his lunch at his place of work.

The accused-appellant now interposes this appeal, assigning the
following as errors allegedly
committed by the court a quo:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF MERE ASSUMPTIONS
AND CONJECTURES.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HAVING TAKEN
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE TESTIMONIES IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 4109-V-81 AND 4110-V-81.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT; AND IN NOT ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL. (Appellant’s Brief, p. 80)

Melencio Mendoza contends that the trial court erred in basing
its judgment of conviction on mere assumptions and conjectures.

The contention of the appellant is bereft of merit.

The records show that the witness, Mrs. Alkuino and the
accused-appellant knew each other well. The latter was a bookkeeper in the bank where the Alkuinos maintained an
account. Mendoza knew the details of
their bank account so much so that
he would make adjustments like transferring of funds from the Alkuino’s savings
account to current account whenever requested by said clients in order to
properly fund checks issued by them.

As stated in the facts of the case, on the day prior to the
incident (June 8, 1981), Mrs. Alkuino inquired from the appellant if the checks
she issued to Alaska in the amount of P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 were already
presented for collection. When the
accused answered in the negative, Mrs. Alkuino informed Mendoza that she will
deposit the necessary amount the following day.

From this, it can be concluded that Mendoza knew that the Alkuino
couple would be depositing a big amount the following day in time before the
checks are presented for collection.

As to Mendoza’s relationship with Marquez, it was shown that the
possibility of conspiracy is not remote. They were townmates and both belong to the same barangay. Thus, it can be said that they knew each
other well.

We see no reason why Marquez would implicate a good
friend in a serious crime if there was no truth to it.

The close relationship between the two and the access of Mendoza
to bank records and his relationship with regular bank clients like the
Alkuinos logically establish the connection between Mendoza and the crime.

The records do not show that Esquillo previously knew
Mendoza. It was Marquez whom Esquillo
knew. Marquez in turn knew Mendoza. Pieced together, the facts bring out a
logical conclusion which is further established by the testimonies of other
witnesses.

The accused-appellant further assails the court’s having taken
judicial notice of Esquillo’s testimony in another case despite its not having
been offered nor admitted because Mendoza was not an accused therein and he did
not conform to the adoption of said testimonies in this case. He further contends that granting it were
admitted as part of the prosecution’s evidence in this case, it cannot be considered because it was repudiated by Esquillo himself.

This contention must
likewise fail.

It is noted that when a
motion to adopt the said testimonies of witnesses was made by the prosecution,
the appellant and his counsel did not object but instead gave their consent.

Moreover, Esquillo was
confronted with portions of his testimonies in the previous cases which he
merely denied or refused to explain. Said portions, thus, became part of his testimony which were duly
subjected to cross-examination by the defense counsel.

When confronted with
statements given in his previous testimony, it became apparent that Esquillo
was trying to hide something but which he was not able to do when cornered by
the judge. Thus, the appellant admitted:

“Q:      Are you telling this court that you never
testified in the sala of Judge Constantino or you testified but you were not
asked those questions, so you did not give those answers?

A:      I testified, your Honor.

Q:      Since you have testified, are you trying
to tell this Court that you were not asked those questions and those were not
your answers, is that what you want this Court to believe?

A:      Those were the questions asked of me, your
Honor.

Q:      How about the answers, were those your
answers?

A:      Yes, your Honor.” (TSN., May 31,
1985, p. 42)

Anent the third assigned error where the appellant claims he was
convicted without the required quantum of evidence because Mrs. Alkuino did not
specify his role in the crime, we find the same wanting of any basis.

Portions of Esquillo’s testimony describe in detail how appellant
and his group hatched their plan. The
same was corroborated by the testimonies of Mrs. Alkuino and other prosecution
witnesses who had no known grudge against him. Thus, it has repeatedly been held that the testimony of witnesses not
actuated by improper motives is entitled to full faith and credit (People v.
Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]; People v. Cruz, 191 SCRA 127 [1990]; People v.
Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 [1990]).

The accused-appellant
likewise contends that conspiracy was not proven.

Conspiracy has been established by the facts on record. The concerted action of each member pieced
together and taken as a whole conclusively shows the existence of conspiracy.

It need not be shown by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the acts of all the
accused (People v. Abueg, 145 SCRA 622 [1986]) and where each performs specific
acts in the commission of the crime with such closeness and coordination that
would indicate a common purpose or design, conspiracy is considered established
beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Petenia, 143 SCRA 361 [1986]).

The accused-appellant
assails the admission of the testimony of Esquillo.

As stated in the case of
People v. Ponce, et al, G.R. No. 83694, May 31, 1991:

“It is true that there are doctrines to the effect that the
testimony of a co­-conspirator is not sufficient for conviction, unless
supported by other evidence. The reason
is that it comes from a polluted source. It must be received with caution because, as is usual with human nature, a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to
put the blame as far as possible on others rather than himself. But the aforesaid rule is not without
exceptions. The testimony of a co-­conspirator
may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in
itself, because it was given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details
which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought
(People v. Cuya, Jr., 141 SCRA
351 [1986]).

In an effort to exculpate
himself, Mendoza claims that he could not have been at the scene of the crime
since he was at his place of work from 8:30 – 11:45 and 11:55 – 5:30 on that
day. He presented as proof a xerox copy
of his time record, the logbook as
prepared by the security guard
on duty and a certification from a bank officer that he
was present that day.

The defense of the
accused is mainly based on alibi which this Court has consistently considered
the weakest of all defenses.

To establish alibi, the
accused must show that it was impossible for him to have been at the place
where the crime was committed at the time of its commission (People v. Abigan,
144 SCRA 130; People v. Coronado, 145 SCRA 250 [1986]).

The appellant has failed to establish
the impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime considering that
the distance between the bank and the place of the crime was only a few
kilometers away. Also, the crime
happened during lunch break where absence of the employees is not noticeable.

In view of the foregoing, we find no reversible error in the
trial court’s finding of conviction. However, as in People v. Nunag, G.R. No. 92570, April 22, 1991, we find
the designation of the crime erroneous.

Thus, the case states:

“x x x there is no special complex crime as robbery with
homicide and less serious physical injuries. The offense is denominated as robbery with homicide regardless of the
number of homicides or injuries committed. These other circumstances merely serve as generic aggravating
circumstances which can be offset by other mitigating circumstances (People v.
Pedroso, 115 SCRA 599 [1982]).”

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED. The appellant is found guilty
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide but indemnity is
increased from THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) to FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) in accordance with recent rulings.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.