REYNALDO ABAYA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Reynaldo
Abaya, together with Rolando Acedo and Francisco de la Cruz, was originally
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide and physical injuries^[1]
before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10.

Rolando Acedo remained at
large while Francisco dela Cruz died during trial, hence trial proceeded only
against the petitioner.

The prosecution’s
evidence is narrated by the trial court in its decision:

“The evidence for the prosecution is anchored principally on
the testimony of a lone eyewitness, Alexis Bensorto y Coloyan, which is
summarized as follows:

“Before 10:00 in the night of September 3, 1984, Bensorto and six (6) others
were drinking gin in the house rented by the victim, Luis Bartolome, which is
located at Sampaguita St., Masagana Homes Subdivision, Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan. Between 10:00 to 11:00 p.m. of the same night, Bensorto was asked by the
victim to buy softdrinks and was given P50.00. He was not able, however, to buy softdrinks because he was accosted and
blocked at the junction of Gumamela St., which is not far from Sampaguita St.,
and also robbed of his money by Rolando Acedo, who together with Reynaldo
Abaya, who were both drunk then, helped each other in mauling him with the use
of their hands and fists, after knowing that he resided in the house of Luis
Bartolome (TSN, pp. 4-10, January 16, 1985).

“Bensorto was able to escape and reported the incident to Luis
Batolome who told him to dress up so
that they can report the incident to the police. (TSN, p. 12, Ibid).

“Bensorto and Bartorome boarded the Isuzu pick-up and on their
way to the police headquarters stopped by the house of Rolando Acedo, at
Gumamela St., to take along Eufrocinio Acedo, the formers nephew (TSN, p. 15, Ibid). When Bensorto called out ‘Bongbong’ (a.k.a. Eufrocinio Acedo), Rolando
Acedo went out of his house pointing a revolver at them, followed by Francisco
dela Cruz (TSN, pp. 15-16, ibid). Bensorto was able to see Rolando Acedo with a firearm followed by
Francisco dela Cruz as the place was bright due to the light coming from the
Meralco lamp post (TSN, p. 19, Ibid) and also from the house of Rolando Acedo
(TSN, p. 5, February 20, 1985). Bensorto was hit by Acedo on the breast three times with the latter’s
gun and was also struck (‘kinulata’) by Francisco dela Cruz with a long firearm
several times in almost all parts of his body (TSN, pp. 20-23, January
16, 1985). It was at this time that
Bensorto saw Reynaldo Abaya coming out of the post of the gate of Acedo’s
house, pointing a .45 caliber gun at Luis Bartolome who was standing at the
side of the Isuzu pick-up near the driver’s seat (TSN, p. 29, Ibid); Luis
Bartolome who saw Bensorto suffering, shouted, `why are you doing that to him?’
and ‘why don’t we go to the police precinct?’ (TSN, p. 30, Ibid). At this point, dela Cruz gave the order to
Reynaldo Abaya to shoot Bartolome and Abaya shot Bartolome (TSN, p. 31, Ibid).

“The victim was wearing maong short pants, sweat shirt and
jewelries at the time he was shot by Abaya (TSN, p. 4, Jan, 24, 1985). The latter frisked the victim who fell after
being hit. Abaya took two wads of 100
peso bills from the pocket of the short pants of the victim and also the
latter’s bracelet (TSN, p. 5, Ibid). Said money was given by the father of Luis Bartolome for the payroll of
the security guards assigned at Bataan and Isabela (TSN, pp. 5-6, Ibid).

“Bensorto was then dragged
(“binitbit’) by Francisco dela Cruz and Acedo to the front seat of the
Isuzu pick-up (TSN, p. 7, Ibid).
At
that time, Bensorto heard dela Cruz say to Abaya ‘you shoot this one inasmuch
as you have already shot the other one.” (TSN, p. 7-9, Ibid). At this point, Bensorto slipped (‘usod’) on
the side door of the vehicle and there he saw Luis Bartolome lying prostrate
(TSN, p. 10, Ibid). He cuddled
(‘kinalong’) Luis Bartolome in his arms and when he noticed the latter already
lifeless, he ran away leaving the victim at the side of the pick-up which was
in front of the house of Rolando Acedo, at Gumamela St. (TSN, pp. 13-14,
Ibid). Bensorto was running for more or
less than a half kilometer from the place of the incident when he lost
consciousness. When he regained
consciousness, he walked to an outpost of
a precinct pointed to him by an old man. No person was there in the precinct so he boarded a jeep and proceeded
to the Office of A-1 General Protective Agency, an agency of security guards
owned by the victim’s father (TSN, pp. 15-16, Ibid). Bensorto, with two others, proceeded to the PC Headquarters at
Malolos, Bulacan (TSN, pp. 18-19, Ibid). He was brought to the hospital for treatment and then brought back to
the PC Headquarters for investigation (TSN, p. 19, Ibid). After an investigation of the incident,
Bensorto, accompanied by several soldiers, pointed to the place of the incident
(TSN, pp. 20-21, Ibid). Bensorto was
asked who were the persons involved and pointed to the houses of Reynaldo Abaya
and Rolando Acedo, which were both inspected by the soldiers but no person was
found there except a laundry woman in the house of Rolando Acedo (TSN, pp.
22-24, Ibid). They were informed that
both Rolando Acedo and Francisco dela Cruz left early and Rolando Acedo left
with his family (TSN, p. 25 Ibid).

“As proof that the accused could not be found in their
residence, Godofredo Vivas, a process server in the Office of the Fiscal at
Malolos, Bulacan, was presented as witness by the prosecution. Witness testified that when he served the
subpoenas (Exhibits ‘B’, ‘B-1’ and ‘B-2’) on the three accused at the Masagana
Homes Subdivision, Guiguinto, Bulacan, he found that Rolando Acedo’s house was
closed with nobody inside, Francisco dela Cruz was not residing in the place,
and Reynaldo Abaya was also no longer residing in the place. It was the ‘latter’s step-father, Geronimo
Fortaleza, who received copy of the subpoena.’ Vivas made a return of service
accordingly (TSN, pp. 27-42, May 30, 1985). (pp. 2-4, Decision; Rollo, pp. 35-37)

The trial court also gave a summary of the defense version:

“The version of the defense, as presented by Reynaldo Picazo,
Teresita Vivas, Reynaldo Abaya and Evangeline Abaya is as follows:

“Reynaldo Picazo, a resident of Old Sta. Mesa, Manila,
testified he knows accused Reynaldo Abaya and he has often gone to the latter’s
house at Gumamela St., Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan, even before September 3,
1984. At about 9:00 in the evening of
the same date (September 3, 1984) he went to the house of Reynaldo Abaya who
was not then at home. After waiting for
about an hour, Abaya’s wife told him to go to the place of their compadre named
‘Rollie’, saw there (sic) at the ‘dead end’ of Gumamela St. On his way to the place indicated by Mrs.
Abaya and after passing the gate of the Abayas, witness noticed two persons
about three (3) arms length ahead of him
at the right side of the road whom he did not recognize as it was dark. The place of Rollie is about 200 to 400 ordinary steps from the
house of the Abayas, as he passed there before. Half way to the house of Rollie, he saw an Isuzu pick-up
in front of house with three to four
men standing on the left side of the pick-up and two on the right side. The place was lighted because of the light
coming from the lamp post and the houses in the vicinity. He was not able to reach the house of Rollie
as he heard a shot fired from a gun of one of the two men walking ahead of
him. A man wearing a shirt with long
sleeves talking to Abaya was shot. He
was able to recognize Abaya when the latter turned his face towards witness
(‘napalingon, si Boy Abaya’). The one
who fired the gun was left handed after the shot was fired, the two men ran
towards a vacant lot while Abaya ran towards his home. He did not notice Abaya holding
anything. Picazo panicked (‘nasiraan nq
loob’) and followed Abaya inside his house, the latter admonishing him to
return some other so as not to get involved in the problem. After that incident on September 3, 1984,
Picazo saw accused only in December 1985. He agreed to be a witness when asked by Abaya. He talked to
Abaya’s counsel, Atty. Crescini, only on June 17, 1986 (TSN, pp. 3-19, June 18, 1986).

“Witness Picazo declared on cross-examination that he did not
even ask Abaya with whom the latter was talking after the explosion. Neither he ask Abaya what the three persons on the other side of the
vehicle were doing. He did not
also ask Abaya the name of the person who fell after the explosion and up to
the time he was testifying he did not know the person’s name. Witness further declared that Abaya did not
render assistance to the victim. When
Picazo asked Abaya in December 1985 what the incident was all about, Abaya
answered that they were attacked or ‘nilusob’ and that he was trying to settle
something with that person (TSN, pp. 2-13, July 23, 1986).

“Teresita Vivas, another defense witness and a resident of
Masagana Homes, Phase III, Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan, declared that she knows
the accused Reynaldo Abaya since 1984, and Acedo since 1983, both of whom are residing
at Gumamela St., in Masagana subdivision. On September 3, 1984, between 9:00 and 10:00 in the evening, witness was
in her house located at Rosal St., conversing with the laborers of her sister. As the laborers were drinking and they were
short of “pulutan” the sister of witness asked the latter to buy
“pulutan” which she was not able to buy as the store in the corner of
Dalia and Gumamela Sts. was already closed. Witness intended to go to a second store also located at Gumamela St.
but before she can reach it she heard a shot. Witness saw two persons walking on her right walking ahead of her whom
she was not able to recognize and she saw also another one walking on her
left. Witness also saw two persons near
a vehicle. The first two persons were
going to the place where the vehicle was and were already near the vehicle when
witness heard the shot and they both ran towards the vacant lot. One of the two persons standing near the
vehicle ran towards witness when she heard the shot and she recognized him to
be Reynaldo Abaya (TSN, pp. 2-9, August 27, 1986). Witness did not inquire from Abaya or from anybody what the
incident was all about neither did she report this incident immediately to the
barangay or municipal officials. She
only learned the name of the person who was shot from Atty. Crescini (TSN,
pp. 7-34, Sept. 26, 1986).

“The accused Reynaldo Abaya testified that he is “an
advertising businessman” and a resident of Masagana Homes, Phase III,
Guiguinto, Bulacan. His business in
1984 was buying and selling second hand cars. His place of business was in 4872 Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. He knows a certain person by the name of
Reynaldo Picazo and their acquaintanceship dates back to 1980-1981. The latter had gone to his residence twice
or three times, on birthdays and when Picazo wants to offer a vehicle for sale.

“In the evening of September
3, 1984, he was invited by Rolando Acedo his “kumpare” to see his
“inaanak”. He went to Acedo’s
house around 9:00 or past 9:00. When he
was leaving Acedo’s place at 10:00 or past 10:00, Acedo saw a man who was just
wearing maong pants, was barefooted, and moving suspiciously. Acedo accosted the man, who turned out to be
Bensorto, but who was not known
to them at that particular time. When
asked who he was, Bensorto answered Acedo, “Putang-ina mo, you have no
business even if from where I was” (sic). Abaya was 1 1/2 meters away from Bensorto. He noticed the latter was drunk as he smelled liquor every time
he answered. Acedo boxed Bensorto on
the chest and kept on boxing him until Bensorto fell in the canal
(“putikan”). Bensorto did not
fight back and when Abaya was able to pacify Acedo. Bensorto ran away. Acedo
went back to his house with Abaya, to change his clothes which became dirty
when Bensorto clang to him. Abaya
declared he did not know Luis Bartolome before September 3, 1984 (TSN, pp.
2-12, October 27, 1966).

“Abaya further declared that Eufrocinio Acedo arrived and told
Acedo, ‘Tiong’, why did you do that to my friend”. Rolando Acedo replied that he does not like
the “undressed attire” (“nakahubad”) of Bensorto. Acedo’s nephew warned his “Tiong”,
“you must be prepared, they will
return.” Suddenly, an Isuzu pick-up parked in front of the gate of Rolando
Acedo. Abaya was able to identify the
vehicle in the picture (Exhibit “5”, for the defense). As the vehicle stopped in front of the gate
of Rolando Acedo, somebody moved the gate (“niyuyugyog”) and cursed
Acedo. Abaya went out to pacify
Bensorto who was banging the gates. Bensorto told Abaya angrily not to interfere after the latter told
“Pare ayusin na natin ito sa magandang paraan.” Abaya felt afraid,
then he heard a whistle from Luis Bartolome who was beckoning him. While he was approaching Luis Bartolome, the
latter angrily said, “Why did your friend do that to my boy?”;
“didn’t you know who I am?”. While Abaya was approaching and explaining to Luis Bartolome what really
happened, he noticed that the ratter was holding a kitchen knife (“kutsilyo”) in his hand pointing
downwards. Bartolome was wearing short
pants, long sleeved white shirt and a hat with no jewelries in his person, except a watch. While Abaya was talking to Luis Bartolome,
with his attention focused on the knife as he may be stabbed, somebody suddenly
cursed, “Putang-ina mo” and simultaneously there was a shot,
both coming from Abaya’s back. When
Abaya looked at the place where
the curse and shot came from, he saw two persons running fast towards the
vacant lot in his left side. Upon seeing Bartolome prostrate on
the ground, Abaya ran home because he was afraid he might get involved in the
shooting incident. On his way home, he passed by
somebody who turned out to be Rey Picazo. Abaya told his wife about the
incident but he did not report it to the police. Abaya went the next day to Plaridel to see his
“kumpadre” regarding a transaction. His wife was also there at around 10:00 to 10:30 a.m. Abaya and his wife decided that he should go to his
uncle in Manila. Abaya finally
voluntarily surrendered in November 1984 to the CIS where he was detained. He was finally granted bail in December
1985. Abaya denied having shot the
victim and inflicting physical injuries
on Bensorto. He likewise denied
having taken P50.00 from the latter and divesting Luis Bartolome of his
jewelries and cash. Abaya also denied
owning a firearm or any airgun or any other weapon (TSN, pp. 2- 24, November
26, 1986).

“Abaya’s wife, Evangeline Fortaleza, declared that she is the
president of the Homeowners’ Association at Masagana Homes. Between 8 and 9 in the evening of September
3, 1984, she was at home. At about nine
in the evening of the same day, Reynaldo Picazo arrived offering to sell a
vehicle. Witness asked Picazo to go to
Rolando Acedo’s house as her husband was there.

“Witness declared that she tried to report the incident the next
day, September 4, 1984, to Atty. Hermin
Arceo and Mayor Estrella of Guiguinto, but the two were both out. She did not report the matter to the police
authorities as she was tired and was thinking of her small child, although she
proceeded to the PC in Malolos where she told Col. Mejia, the Provincial Commander,
about the incident. (TSN, pp. 3-12,
December 23, 1986). (pp. 4-7, Decision,
Rollo, pp. 38-41)

On February 1, 1988, the
lower court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, Reynaldo Abaya alias
‘Boy’, guilty of the crime of Homicide. Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor with no aggravating
circumstance, and applying the indeterminate sentence law, said accused is
sentenced to suffer indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00 (Aniceto Ibabao v.
People of the Philippines and Hon.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-36957, September 28, 1984 and People v. Bernal,
G.R. No. L-29016-18, April 5, 1984) and to pay the costs.” (Rollo, p. 49)

The petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision. His motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the appellate court.

In this petition for
review, the petitioner raises one issue: whether or not the lone testimony of Alexis Bensorto should suffice to
convict the petitioner of the crime of homicide (Memorandum for the Petitioner,
p. 14).

Abaya stresses that
Bensorto’s testimony that the former shot the victim, Luis
Bartolome should not be given credence since the trial court disbelieved the
latter’s testimony that Abaya also robbed the victim.

We find that this matter
has already been exhaustively discussed by the appellate court. Thus:

“To be sure, Bensorto did make conflicting statements as set
forth in appellant’s brief, though some of them are minor ones. The fact that he lied before the trial court
is best exemplified by his efforts to attribute to appellant the crime of robbery
which the court a quo found
as without support in the evidence. Despite however, Bensorto’s failed efforts at prevarication, he remained
steadfast in positively pointing to the appellant who, at point-blank range,
fired the fatal shot that culminated in the death of the deceased. We have gone thru the record several times
and find nothing to convince Us that Bensorto lied in this regard or that
anyone other than the appellant fired the fatal shot at the deceased.

“The principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has long been discarded by the Supreme Court as an absolute,
and inflexible rule. The recognized and
more practical rule is the testimony of
a witness may be disbelieved in part and believed in part. The fact that a witness may have at one
instance on a certain point does not make his entire testimony totally
incredible and therefore inadmissible, in the light of sufficient evidence to
establish the commission of the crime, the eyewitnessing of the criminal act
committed in his presence and the spontaneous identification of the criminal
(People v. Espinosa, 141 SCRA 110). As
pointed out in said case:

‘It is ‘perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness
with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when
witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated
testimony be rejected. (People v.
Mozar, 130 SCRA 579, citing People v.
Malillos, 24 SCRA 133). (p. 121, supra)

“The rule was reiterated in People v. Pacada, Jr., 142 SCRA
427:

`While it may be that the lower court disbelieved Alfonsa Patnon’s
identification of accused Cesario Maur, who was acquitted, it does not follow
that the Court should have discredited her entire testimony under the principle
of ‘falsus in uno falsus in omnibus.’ Suffice it to state that the rule is not
an absolute one, and it is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a
witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. The rule is not mandatory but permissive and
the Courts may or may not draw the inference, depending on the circumstances,
such as, the corroborative evidence, the ‘probabilities and improbabilities of
the case, the general character of the witness his manner and demeanor on the
stand, his intelligence and means of knowledge, and his willingness to speak the
truth.’ (p. 434, Supra)

“Only recently, the Supreme Court in People v. Gohol, 170 SCRA
585, held:

`The fact that the trial court did not give credence to the
testimony of Siervo, implicating Loreto Gohol in the killing of Eriberto Gohol,
is not sufficient justification for rejecting the entire testimony of
Siervo. The prevailing rule is that
even where a witness is found to have
deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that
the whole of his testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be
credited. The testimony of a witness
may be believed in part and disbelieved in part.’ (p. 593, Supra).

The positive testimony of Bensorto spontaneously and unhesitatingly
identifying the appellant as the person who fired the fatal shot at the
deceased is sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction given the conditions of visibility, the presence of the
witness and the appellant at the place and time of and the insufficiency of
appellant’s evidence to support his claim that persons other than the appellant
had committed the killing which he tried to corroborate with the testimonies of
persons whose congruence on minute details open themselves to the suspicion
that they are rehearsed witnesses.” (Rollo, pp. 135-137).

The petitioner avers that
Bensorto’s identification of Abaya as the triggerman is in itself suspect,
considering that in his first statement before the Philippine Constabulary, he
claimed that he could not determine the caliber of the gun used by the
petitioner whereas in his second statement, he specifically identified the
weapon as a .45 firearm (Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 16). We find that such inconsistency is too minor
to cast doubt on the witness’ testimony that Abaya shot the victim. This discrepancy does not undermine Bensorto’s positive identification of the petitioner as
the assailant.

Moreover, contrary to the
petitioner’s contention, it is not altogether impossible for Bensorto to witness the shooting of Bartolome even if he was at the same time
being mauled by the other accused, Acedo and dela Cruz, since the place where
the shooting took place was well-lighted.

The petitioner’s defense
is much too weak and incredible as pitted against Bensorto’s positive
identification of the petitioner as the culprit. We quote with approval the lengthy
disquisition by the trial court respecting infirmities in the defense version:

“1)  The averments of the three defense witnesses
dovetail in all material aspects creating suspicion of coaching and
rehearsal. The court noted that both
Picazo and Teresita Vivas testified that at about past ten, when they were
walking on the street, they noticed 2 persons about 3 arms length away from
them on the right side of the road whom they did not recognize as it was
dark. They saw a vehicle in front of
Rollie’s house with 6-7 persons beside it. The two persons walking ahead of
them went to the place where the vehicle was and they heard an explosion. The said two persons were seen running
towards a vacant lot. One of the two
persons standing near the vehicle ran towards them when they heard the shot and
they recognized him to be Abaya. Both
did not inquire from Abaya what the incident was all about.

“Both Picazo and Abaya testified that accused Abaya was
obliquely facing Bartolome. With these
statements the Court can only surmise that their declarations the relative
positions of the accused and the victim were coached and rehearsed to make it
appear that somebody behind Abaya could have gunned down the victim.

“The foregoing testimonies of the defense witnesses show that
they are ‘completely congruent with one another rendering them suspect
considering that different persons obtain
different impressions.’ (PP. v. Gutierrez, 112 SCRA 409).

“2)  Abaya testified that when he ran away from the scene of the crime, he ran towards the
direction taken by the two persons he saw running
after he heard the shot. The Fiscal was
correct in doubting Abaya’s statement, for the latter took a more perilous
route in leaving the scene of the crime, considering that he took the same
direction taken by the killers. His
normal reaction would have been to join his companions who were at the scene of the crime or run towards the
opposite direction.

“3)  The fact that Abaya did not report the
incident to the police renders him suspect. He was expected to report the matter as he was at the scene of the crime
as well as a member of the community where the incident took place and
considering further his previous statement that he wanted to peace in the
vicinity as his wife is the president of the Homeowners’ Association in the
place. The fact that he asked his wife
to report the incident immediately, which she did not (TSN, pp. 2-27, December 3, 1986) is not good reason enough to
excuse him from not reporting the matter himself.

“4)  The actuation of Abaya in not helping or
asking his companions to render assistance to a wounded person by bringing the
latter to a hospital (which should be a person’s normal reaction) is something
which does not work in Abaya’s favor.

“5)  The behavior of Abaya and Acedo in leaving
their houses early the next day after the incident and Abaya’s reaction in
taking flight immediately from the scene of the killing, showing nervousness, panic, confusion and
uneasiness, and his going to Manila soon afterwards (TSN, pp. 2-25, November
26, 1986) are eloquent manifestations of a guilty conscience and a perturbed psyche. It has been held in the case of People v.
Bermoy (G.R Nos. L-48502-03, June 17, 1981, 105 SCRA 106, cited in UPLC, Index Digests 1981 Supreme Court Decisions, p. 256) x x x ‘flight from the
scene of the crime was indicative of x x x guilt.”

“6)  The testimony of Abaya that he does not own a
firearm or any other weapon (TSN, pp. 2-25, November 26, 1986) is hardly
credible considering that he is a businessman who has so much property to
protect. Besides, non-possession of a
firearm is not an exculpatory factor for a killer may use somebody else’s gun
for the commission of a crime.

“7)  The court cannot also accord credence to the
testimony of Picazo that he was a witness to the incident of September 3,
1984. The reason he gave for his
presence at that late hour in Guiguinto was he was selling Abaya a
vehicle. The court considers it a
falsity for the offer of a vehicle is a very trivial matter which could have
waited another day. A cloud of doubt
has already permeated Picazo’s credibility when during cross examination he
testified that he is an `estimator of one Ricardo Azaldo with office at 4872
Old Sta. Mesa, Manila’, but he was not able to show definitely that he was so
employed by Mr. Azaldo or that he is a member of the SSS.

“8)  The most telling lie given by witness Picazo
is his statement that he did not inquire from Abaya what happened that night of
September 3, 1984. It is indeed
unnatural and inconsistent with human experience not to ask a close friend what
occurred after a frightening and unusual occurrence like a Picazo and Abaya were friends and they knew
each other very well. Picazo had all
the chances to inquire what transpired when they were on their way to Abaya’s
house and also when they were already in Abaya’s house. It took Picazo more than a year later
(sometime in December 1985) to ask Abaya about the incident.

“9)  The court likewise entertains some doubt as to
the veracity of the testimony of Teresita Vivas, another defense witness, who
claims she was also near the scene of the crime. She averred that at around past ten in the evening of September
3, 1984, she went out of their house upon instructions of her sister, to buy
‘pulutan’ for the laborers of her sister. Why should her sister send her on an errand at that late hour of the
night? The sister could very well have
asked one of the laborers instead.

“10)
Then again re Teresita Vivas’ declaration that
she did not ask Abaya, whom she knows very well, what the incident was
all about, is beyond belief. She heard
a shot, saw 6-7 men beside a vehicle, 2 on the other end and Abaya was running
towards her after the explosion, asking the latter no question would not be a normal reaction, especially so of a
female who is more inquisitive and nosier than a male. Even for curiosity’s sake alone, Teresita
should have asked Abaya what happened whether the latter be a friend or a
stranger.

“11)  Abaya testified that when he heard the shot
which came from his back, while talking to and facing the victim, he still looked
behind at the person who fired the shot,
instead of ducking or failing to the ground for his own protection. It may be recalled that Abaya previously
alleged that he felt afraid when he passed by Bensorto after he tried to pacify
him and also when he was approaching Luis Bartolome, who beckoned him (TSN, pp.
2-25, November 26, 1986). When a shot
was fired, however, Abaya has shown extraordinary valor by still looking behind
to see who fired the shot. This
behavior manifested by Reynaldo Abaya seemed abnormal and incongruent with
human experience thus making his declarations unworthy of credence.

“Said the court in the case of People v. Pisalvo (G.R. NO.
L-32886, Oct. 23, 1981, UPLC, 1981 Supreme Court Decisions, Index and Digests, p,
438) ‘Being suddenly fired upon from a dark place, an average person would immediately duck and run for cover. x x x Aniceta’s testimony x x x is so
humanly unnatural and unrealistic that her credibility is heavily
damaged.”

“Abaya vehemently denied having shot the victim but ‘x x x The
defense of denial x x x could not prevail over (the) positive identification by
the prosecution witness(es) as the
author of the crime.’ (People v. Dava, et al., G.R. Nos. L-416224-25, May 15,
1984, citing People v. Esmael, 37 SCRA 601, etc.).

“12)  A last ditch effort of accused Abaya to escape
from culpability was his attempt to frame up Bensorto by claiming that Bensorto
went to the Office of Atty. Crescini sometime in May, 1986, informing that he would recant the
testimony he gave, incriminating Abaya, if the latter will give him P30,000.00,
which he badly needs for the operation of his sister. Bensorto allegedly accepted a counter offer of P10,000.00 but he
did not return to get the money and recant his testimony. The defense never presented any written
paper signed by Bensorto to that effect. Besides, if Bensorto was really in dire need of the
money as alleged, he should have returned to get it.” (Rollo, pp. 43-46)

True, the trial court
judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision. This, however, does not impair the validity
of the latter’s finding since we have held in the case of People of
Juanga, (189 SCRA 226 [1990]), that:

“xxxThe fact that the Judge who decided the case was not the
one who heard the witnesses testify does not weaken the finding that the evidence is conclusive of the guilt of the
accused-appellant. In People v. Abaya,
G.R. No. 80885, May 17, 1990 we stated that ‘xxx the mere fact that Judge
Alfredo C. Flores did not preside at
the trial of this case in its entirety, having taken over only when the last
defense witness was to be presented did not detract from the vaIidity, much
less the correctness of this decision. The full record was available to him. It is evident from the knowledgeable and analytical decision he has
written that he thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence
before him and carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses with the
seasoned perceptiveness he has developed as a trial judge.”

For the same reason, the
court does not subscribe to the petitioner’s view that the appellate court had
“nothing but the cold words of the transcript before it” and hence
could not conclude that the positive identification made by Bensorto was “spontaneous,
unhesitating, clean or even positive.” (See Memorandum for the
Petitioners, p. 18) The appellate court, in its decision, had even stressed
that “we have gone through the record several times and find nothing to convince Us that Bensorto lied in this regard or that anyone other than the appellant fired
the fatal shot at the deceased.” (Underlining Ours, Rollo, p. 135)

The petitioner also
assails the rejection by the two courts below of the testimonies of the defense
witnesses on the ground that their testimonies “dovetailed in all material aspects creating the suspicion of
coaching and rehearsal.” He advances the propositions that there is
nothing wrong with a rehearsal, and
that it is undeniable that good lawyers rehearse their witnesses, not to teach
them what to say, but to make sure that their testimony comes out clear,
coherent and unambiguous in court. (Memorandum for the Petitioners, p. 20)

There is actually no semblance of impropriety where a lawyer informs his prospective witnesses of
the questions that will be asked in court. But when the witnesses’ testimonies are congruent even to the minutiae,
there arises a very strong presumption that not only were these witnesses
briefed beforehand about the questions to be propounded during trial but the
witnesses were likewise coached to give answers that would parallel the version
of the accused. In such a case, the
witnesses no longer speak from memory or experience. Their testimonies become fabricated and hence forfeit their
probative value.

Aside from the marked
congruity in the testimonies of the
defense witnesses, the two lower courts likewise detected major flaws in these
testimonies, as earlier discussed.

In fine, we agree with
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the guilt of the petitioner
in committing the crime of homicide was established beyond reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is
dismissed. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 29, 1990 affirming the judgment of conviction of the trial
court and its ‘resolution dated December 5, 1990 denying the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED, except that the indemnity for
death of the victim is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with recent
jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, and
Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
There is no such crime as robbery with homicide and physical injuries. In People v. Mendoza, 96 SCRA 601
(1980), the court held that the robbery with homicide absorbed the physical
injuries. Also in several cases, the
court has ruled that the offense is denominated as robbery with homicide
regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed. (People v. Urquia, 203 SCRA 735
[1991]), People v. Nunag, 196 SCRA 206 [1991], People v. Pedrosa,
115 SCRA 599 [1992]).