G.R. No. 96266. July 18, 1991
ERNESTO M. MACEDA, PETITIONER, VS. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
In G.R. No. 96266, petitioner Maceda seeks
nullification of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) Orders dated December 5 and
6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional
increase in oil prices did not allow him substantial cross-examination, in
effect, allegedly, a denial of due process.
The facts of the case are
as follows:
Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 2, 1990, private respondents
oil companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil price
increases (docketed as ERB Case Nos. 90-106, 90-382 and 90-384, respectively).
On September
21, 1990, the ERB
issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda
filed a petition for Prohibition on September 26, 1990 (E. Maceda v. ERB,
et al., G.R. 95203), seeking to nullify the provisional increase. We dismissed the petition on December
18, 1990, reaffirming
ERB’s authority to grant provisional increase even
without prior hearing, pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172, clarifying as
follows:
“What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No.
172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering,
ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here,
subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or
increase it further; or (3) to deny the application. Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
attachment issued by the
courts, which are given ex-parte and which are subject to the resolution of the main case.
“Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each
other, or otherwise, operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may
resort to one but not to both at the
same time. Section 3(e) outlines the
jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price
adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under
Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject
to the final outcome of the proceeding.
The Board, of course, is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the
grant of provisional authority — which is of course, the better procedure —
however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one. (pp. 129-130, Rollo)
(Emphasis Ours)
In the same order of September 21, 1990, authorizing
provisional increase, the ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice
to all interested parties on October
16, 1990. Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said hearing as well as on the
second hearing on October 17, 1990.
To afford registered oppositors the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses, the ERB set the continuation of the hearing to October 24, 1990. This was postponed to November 5, 1990, on written notice of petitioner
Maceda.
On November
5, 1990, the three
oil companies filed their respective motions for leave to file or admit
amended/supplemental applications to further increase the prices of petroleum
products.
The ERB admitted the
respective supplemental/amended petitions on November 6, 1990 at the same time requiring applicants to
publish the corresponding Notices of
Public Hearing in two newspapers of general circulation (p. 4, Rollo and Annexes “F” and “G,” pp. 60 and 62, Rollo).
Hearing
for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief commenced on November 21, 1990 with ERB ruling that
testimonies of witnesses were to be in the form of Affidavits (p. 6, Rollo).
ERB subsequently outlined the procedure to be observed in the reception
of evidence, as follows:
“CHAIRMAN FERNANDO:
“Well, at the last hearing, applicant Caltex
presented its evidence-in-chief and there is an understanding or it is the
Board’s wish that for purposes of good order in the presentation of the
evidence considering that these are being heard together, we will defer the
cross-examination of applicant Caltex’s witness and ask
the other applicants to present their evidence-in-chief so that the oppositors will have a better idea of what all of these
will lead to because as I mentioned earlier, it has been traditional and it is
the intention of the Board to act on these applications on an industry-wide
basis, whether to accept, reject, modify or whatever, the Board will do it on
an industry wide basis, so, the best way to have (sic) the oppositors
and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are asking for is to have
all the evidence-in-chief to be placed on record first and then the
examination will come later, the cross-examination will come later. x x x (pp. 5-6, tsn., November 23,
1990, ERB Cases Nos. 90-106, 90-382 and 90-384).” (p. 162, Rollo)
Petitioner Maceda
maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his
cross-examination of Petron’s witnesses and denied
him his right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of Caltex
and Shell. He points out that this
relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of due process.
We disagree. The Solicitor General has pointed out:
“x x x The
order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular
witness and to the general course of the trial is within the
discretion of the court and the exercise of this discretion in
permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not
improper (88 C.J.S. 206-207).
“Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative
bodies, such as the ERB, which in matters of rate or
price fixing, is considered as exercising
a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function. As such administrative agency, it is not
bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings (Sec.
29, Public Service Act; Dickenson v. United States, 346, U.S. 389, 98 L. ed.
132, 74 S. St. 152). (Emphasis Ours)
“In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides
that —
“These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure
before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry, study, hearing,
investigation and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the
Board. However, in the
broader interest of justice, the Board
may, in any particular matter, except
itself from these rules and apply such
suitable procedure as shall promote the
objectives of the Order.”
(pp. 163-164, Rollo)
Petitioner Maceda also claims that there is no substantial evidence on
record to support the provisional relief.
We have, in G.R. Nos.
95203-05, previously taken judicial notice of matters and events related to the
oil industry, as follows:
“x x x
‘(1) as of June 30, 1990, the OPSF has incurred a deficit of P6.1 Billion; (2) the exchange rate has fallen to
P28.00 to $1.00; (3) the country’s balance of payments is expected to reach $1 Billion; (4) our trade
deficit is at $2.855 Billion as of the first nine months of the year.’
“x x x x x x x x
x” (p. 150, Rollo)
The Solicitor General likewise commented:
“Among the pieces of evidence considered by ERB in the grant of the contested
provisional relief were: (1) certified
copies of bills of lading issued by crude oil suppliers to the private
respondents; (2) reports of the Bankers Association of the Philippines on the
peso-dollar exchange rate at the BAP oil pit; and (3) OPSF status reports of
the Office of Energy Affairs. The ERB
was likewise guided in the determination of international crude oil prices by
traditional authoritative sources of information on crude oil and petroleum
products, such as Platt’s Oilgram and Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly.” (p. 158, Rollo)
Thus, We
concede ERB’s authority to grant the provisional
increase in oil price, as We note that the Order of December 5, 1990 explicitly stated:
“in the light, therefore, of the rise in crude oil importation
costs, which as earlier mentioned, reached an average of $30.3318 per barrel at
P25.551/US $ in September-October 1990; the huge OPSF deficit which, as
reported by the Office of Energy Affairs, has amounted to P5.7 Billion (based on filed claims only
and net of the P5 Billion OPSF)
as of September 30, 1990, and is estimated to further increase to over P10
Billion by end-December 1990; the decision of the government to discontinue
subsidizing oil prices in view of inflationary pressures; the apparent
inadequacy of the proposed additional P5.1
Billion government appropriation for the OPSF; and the sharp drop in the
value of the peso in relation to the US dollar to P28/US $, this Board is left
with no other recourse but to grant applicants oil companies further relief by
increasing the prices of petroleum products sold by them.” (p. 161, Rollo)
Petitioner Maceda together with petitioner Original (G.R. 96349) also
claim that the provisional increase involved amounts over and above that sought
by the petitioning oil companies.
The Solicitor General has
pointed out that aside from the increase in crude
oil prices, all the applications of the respondent oil companies
filed with the ERB, covered claims from the OPSF.
We shall thus respect the ERB’s Order of
December 5, 1990 granting a provisional price increase on petroleum products
premised on the oil companies’ OPSF claims, crude cost peso differentials, forex risk for a subsidy on sale to NPC (p. 167, Rollo), since the oil companies are “entitled
to as much relief as the fact alleged constituting the course of action may
warrant,” (Javellana v. D.O. Plaza Enterprises,
Inc., G.R. No. L-28297, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 261 citing Rosales v. Reyes, 25
Phil. 495; Aguilar v. Rubiato, 40 Phil. 470) as
follows:
Petron |
Shell |
Caltex |
Per |
|
|
Crude Cost |
P |
P3.6047 |
P2.9248 |
P3.1523 |
|
Peso Cost Diff’l. |
2.1747 |
1.5203 |
1.5669 |
1.8123 |
|
Forex |
-0.1089 |
-0.0719 |
-0.0790 |
-0.0896 |
|
Subsidy on Sales to NPC |
0.1955 |
0.0685 |
0.0590 |
0.1203 |
|
Total Price Increase Applied for |
P 5.3713 |
P5.1216 |
P4.4717 |
P4.9954 |
|
P1.3333 |
P1.42 |
2.1269 |
|
|
||||
|
||||
|
.7069 |
|||
|
||||
|
||||
|
.6264 |
|||
|
||||
|
Net Price Increase Applied for |
2.8685 |
|||
Nonetheless,
it is relevant to point out that on December 10, 1990, the
ERB, in response to the President’s appeal, brought back the increases in
Premium and Regular gasoline to the levels mandated by the December 5, 1990
Order (P6.9600 and P6.3900, respectively), as follows:
“Product In Pesos
Per Liter
OPSF
Premium Gasoline 6.9600
Regular Gasoline 6.3900
Avturbo 4.9950
Kerosene 1.4100
Diesel Oil 1.4100
Fuel Oil/Feedstock 0.2405
LPG 1.2200
Asphalt 2.5000
Thinner 2.5000
In G.R.
No. 96349, petitioner. Original additionally claims that if the
price increase will be used to augment the OPSF this will constitute illegal
taxation. In the Maceda
case, (G.R. Nos. 95203-05, supra) this Court has already ruled that “the
Board Order authorizing the proceeds generated by the increase to be deposited
to the OPSF is not an act of taxation but is authorized by Presidential Decree
No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137.
The petitions of E. O.
Original et al. (G.R. No. 96349) and C. S. Povedas,
Jr. (G.R. No. 96284), insofar as they question the ERB’s
authority under Sec. 8 of E.O. 172, have become moot and academic.
We lament Our helplessness over this second provisional increase in
oil price. We have stated that this
“is a question best judged by the political leadership” (G.R. Nos.
95203-05, G.R. Nos. 95119-21, supra). We
wish to reiterate Our previous pronouncements therein
that while the government is able to justify a provisional increase, these
findings “are not final, and it is up to petitioners to demonstrate that
the present economic picture does not warrant a permanent increase.”
In this regard, We also note the Solicitor General’s comments that “the
ERB is not averse to the idea of a presidential review of its decision,”
except that there is no law at present authorizing the same. Perhaps, as pointed out by Justice
Padilla, our lawmakers may see the
wisdom of allowing presidential review of the decisions of the ERB, since,
despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still “an
administrative body under the Office of the President whose decisions should be
appealed to the President under the established principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies,” especially on a matter as transcendental as oil
price increases which affect the lives of almost all Filipinos.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., see separate dissent.
Padilla, J., see dissenting opinion.
Sarmiento,
J., see separate opinion.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., joins Justice Padilla’s dissent.
Cruz, J., joins Justice Paras and Padilla in their
dissent.
Davide., J., in the result.
Fernan, C.J., no part, former counsel for one
of the respondents.
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I regret that I can not concur in the majority opinion.
In the matter of price increases of oil products, which vitally
affects the people, especially those in the middle and low income groups, any
increase, provisional or otherwise, should be allowed
only after the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) shall have fully determined,
through bona fide and full-dress hearings, that it is absolutely
necessary and by how much it shall be effected. The people, represented by reputable oppositors, deserve to be
given full opportunity to be heard in their opposition to any increase in the
prices of fuel. The right to be heard
includes not only the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in
support thereof, but also the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
of the adverse parties.
Because of the procedure adopted by the ERB, in the reception of
evidence leading to the price increases of 5 and 6 December 1990, petitioner
Maceda was not able to finish his cross-examination of Petron’s sole
witness. And, even before each of the
witnesses of Shell and Caltex could be cross-examined by petitioners and before
they could present evidence in support of their opposition to the increase, the
ERB had already issued its 5 December 1990 order allowing a “provisional
increase” sought by the oil companies in their respective supplemental
applications.
That there were postponements of scheduled hearings before the
ERB, at the instance of oppositor Maceda, did not justify a denial of the right
of oppositors to be heard. The
postponements were not intended to delay the proceedings. In fact, the resetting of the scheduled
hearings on November 14, 15 and 16 to a later date, upon motion of petitioner
Maceda, was to
enable him to file a written opposition to the supplemental applications filed
by the oil companies.
The ERB acted hastily in granting the provisional increases
sought by the oil companies even before the oppositors could submit evidence in
support of their opposition. The fact that
the questioned orders merely allowed a provisional increase is beside the
point, for past experiences have shown that so-called “provisional
increases” allowed by the ERB ultimately became permanent.
ERB’s claim that the second provisional increase was duly
supported by evidence, is belied by its own act of modifying said order (of
provisional increase) not only once but twice, upon the “request” of
the President. First, the ERB rolled
back the prices of fuel just a day after it issued the questioned order,
altering the allocation of the increase. Second, on 10 December 1990, the ERB further modified the price of
petroleum products resulting in reduction of the weighted average provisional
increase from P2.82 to P2.05 per liter, but only after the President had
announced that she would meet with the leaders of both Houses of Congress, to
discuss the creation of a special fund to be raised from additional taxes, to
subsidize the prices of petroleum products.[1]
These acts of the ERB, ostensibly sparked by “presidential
requests” clearly demonstrate that the evidence did not, in the first
place, justify the price increases it had ordered on 5 and 6 December
1990. Furthermore, the ERB never came
out with a categorical and official declaration of how much was the so-called
deficit of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and how much of the oil
price increases was intended to cover such deficit.
In the midst of a national crisis related to oil price increases,
each and every one is called upon to assume his/its share of continuing
sacrifices. The public, the government,
as well as the oil companies
should work hand in hand in solving the present problem that confronts us. We are not unmindful of the fact that the
oil companies are profit-oriented. However,
profits should not be their only concern in times of deepening inability of the
people to cope with their prices with “built-in margins”. A reduction of profits during these crucial
and trying times, is certainly in order considering that in the past, the oil companies had
unquestionably made tremendous profits.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition for the
nullification of the 5 and 6 December 1990 orders of the ERB and for a
roll-back of the prices of oil products to levels existing before 5 and 6
December 1990 until hearings before the ERB are finally concluded.
Before closing, I also would like to submit for congressional
consideration two (2) proposals in the public interest. They are:
(1)
to do away with the present scheme of allowing provisional
price increases of oil products. This
scheme, to my mind, misleading and serves as an excuse for unilateral and
arbitrary ERB-action. As already noted,
these provisional price increases are to all intents and purposes, permanent
when fixed. To that extent, the scheme
is a fraud on the people.
(2)
all decisions and orders of the ERB should be expressly
made appealable by statute to the President of the Philippines whose decisions
shall be final, except in cases involving questions of law or grave abuse of
discretion which may be elevated to the Supreme Court in a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
While at present, decisions and orders of the ERB are, in my
considered opinion, appealable to the President under the principle of
“exhaustion of administrative remedies”, it is nevertheless desirable
that the appealability of ERB decisions and orders to the President be placed
beyond any and all doubts. In this way, the President of the Philippines
has to assume full responsibility for all price increases in oil products,
which should be the case because the matter involved is not only one of
national interest but profoundly one of people’s survival.
[1]
Comment by Public Respondent ERB, Rollo, p. 152
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
DISSENTING OPINION
PARAS, J.:
I dissent. As I have long
previously indicated, the ERB has absolutely no power to tax which is solely
the prerogative of Congress. This is what the ERB is precisely doing by
getting money from the people to ultimately subsidize the ravenous oil companies. Additionally, the stubborn refusal of the
ERB to effectively rollback oil prices is a continuing bestial insult to the
intelligence of our countrymen, and a gross abandonment of the people in their
hour of economic misery, I therefore
vote for a complete and effective rollback of all oil prices.
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
SEPARATE OPINION
SARMIENTO, J.:
I would like to point out a few things in view of the majority’s
reliance on the first Maceda case.[1]
The first Maceda case was a challenge on provisional oil price
increases decreed by the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). This Court sustained the Board, as it is
sustaining the Board in this case, on a few economic outputs, namely, the Oil
Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) deficit, the deteriorating exchange rate, and
the balance of payments and trade gaps.
As I held in my dissent in yet another Maceda case, Maceda v.
Macaraig,[2]
the current oil price increases were (are) also the result of the devaluation
of the currency, since a devalued peso forced oil companies to pay more pesos
for oil worth in dollars.
I simply wish to state what has apparently been left unstated in
the course of debate and perhaps, the real score behind recurring oil price
hikes and why the ERB has been very quick in granting them.
The truth is that petroleum prices have been dictated by the
Government’s economic maneuvers, and not rather the vagaries of the world
market. The truth is that the recent
oil hikes have nothing to do with Saddam Hussein or the Gulf crisis (during
which oil prices in fact dropped) and are, rather, the natural consequences of
calculated moves by the Government in its effort to meet so called
International Monetary Fund (IMF) targets.
In 1989, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
submitted its letter of intent to the IMF outlining the country’s economic
program from 1989 through 1992. In its
paragraph 19, it states that:
The Government intends to continue with the floating exchange rate
system established in October 1984…[3]
Since exchange control was abolished and the floating rate system
was established, the Philippine peso has seen a series of devaluations that
have progressively pushed up prices, significantly, prices of petroleum. According to one authority, devaluation has
been a “standard prescription” to correct balance of payments (BOP)
deficits.[4]
It makes dollars expensive, discourages import and encourages exports, and
forces dollars conservation.[5]
It is a matter of opinion whether or not devaluation has been
good for the country and whether or not it has realized these objectives. The truth is that, whatever it has
accomplished, oil — which is imported — has been subject to the effects of
devaluation.
Early this year, Governor Jose Cuisia of the Central Bank,
Secretary Jesus Estanislao of the Department of Finance, and Secretary
Guillermo Carague of the Budget and Management Department, wrote Mr. Michael
Camdessus of the International Monetary Fund (the letter of intent) and
informed him of the country’s “Economic Stabilization Plan,
1991-92”. The Plan recognized
certain economic imbalances that have supposedly inhibited growth, in
particular, inflation and an increasing balance of payments deficit, and drew a
program centered on “a strong effort to bring down the overall fiscal
deficit” through, among other things, “the gradual elimination of the
deficit of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund.”[6] It
spelled out, among other things, a “[r]estoration of a sustainable
external position requir[ing] the continuation of a flexible exchange rate
policy…”[7]
and described in detail an “Oil Price and Energy Policy” focused on
wiping out the OPSF deficit, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
A substantial erosion in the overall fiscal position occurred in
1989 and 1990 as a result of official price support for oil products provided
through the OPSF. Despite a lowering of
the excise tax on oil in September 1990 and average domestic oil price
increases of about 30 percent in September and 32 percent in December 1990, the
fund continued to incur a deficit during the second half of 1990. The cumulative OPSF deficit (excluding
unfiled claims) at end-December 1990 is estimated at P8.8 billion, and this
deficit will rise in the first part of 1991. However the cumulative OPSF deficit is to be eliminated by the end of
the third quarter of 1991. To this end,
the Government intends to follow a pricing policy that ensures attainment of
zero balance within the specific time. In particular, the Government will maintain present price levels despite
projected world price declines. In
addition, a budgetary transfer of P5 billion will be provided in 1991 to settle
outstanding claim of the OPSF.
15. Full deregulation of oil prices continues to
be an important objective of the Government once calm has been restored to
world oil markets. Meanwhile the
technical and legal groundwork is being laid with a view to full deregulation
as soon as practicable.
16. The principal objectives of the Government’s
policy in the energy sector are: (i)
the development of economically viable indigenous energy resources, mainly
thermal, geothermal and hydro-electric power, together with ensuring adequate
maintenance of existing facilities; (ii) promoting more efficient use of energy
resources through various energy conservation measures; and (iii) the
elimination of distortions in every resource allocation through appropriate
pricing policies.[8]
xxx xxx xxx
As I said, Philippine oil prices today have nothing to do with
the law on supply and demand, if they had anything to do with it in recent
years. (I also gather that the
Government is intending to readjust the prices of gasoline and diesel fuel soon
since apparently, low diesel prices have reduced the demand for gasoline
resulting in “distortions”.)
As the Court held in the first Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board,[9]
oil pricing “is a question best judged by the political leadership”
and oil prices are (and have been apparently), political, rather than economic,
decisions.
I am not to be mistaken as accepting the “letter of
intent” as a correct prescription — much less a necessary medicine —
although I will be lacking in candor if I did not say that it is a bitter pill
to swallow. What I must be understood
as saying is that “oil” is a political card to be played on a
political board rather than the courts, so long, of course, as nobody has done
anything illegal.
The “politics of oil” as spelled out in the
Government’s letter of intent likewise bring to light the true nature of the
ERB. Under the Memorandum on Philippine
Economic Stabilization Plan:
xxx xxx xxx
In the past, energy prices had been set to broadly reflect the
average cost of supply. However, the
lack of transparency of the pricing mechanism and subsidization of consumption
have increasingly become a cause for concern. To alleviate some of these problems, in mid-1987, the Government
established the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), a quasi-judicial body empowered
with the setting and regulation of the pricing of petroleum products and
electricity tariffs, the regulation of additions to oil refining capacity, and
the regulation of importing, transporting, processing and distributing all
energy resources. (Petroleum pricing
policy is described in paragraphs 14 and 15.) In addition to the full
pass-through of changes in oil prices to power tariffs, the Government is
committed to the adoption of long-run marginal cost pricing for
electricity. To this end, NPC intends
to introduce a marginal cost based tariff structure to ensure that it meets its
target of achieving a rate of return of eight percent on its rate base.[10]
it is apparent that the Board, in spite of
its “independence” (from the Office of the President), is bound by
the terms of the program and that it has after all, no genuine discretion to
deny requests for price adjustments by oil companies. I seriously doubt whether or not it is possessed of that
discretion judging, first, from its performance since 1987 (in which it has not
overruled the Government on “oil cases”) and the fact that the
exchange rate, the balance of payment deficit, and the OPSF deficiency are
matters of simple arithmetic.
And certainly, the Board can not possibly overrule the
Government’s “letter of intent.”
The first Maceda case sustained the grant of provisional price
increases ex parte not only because Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172
authorized the grant of provisional relief without a hearing but because
fluctations in the foreign exchange rates, for instance, were, and are, a
matter of judicial notice, and a hearing thereafter was necessary only to see
whether or not the ERB determined the rates correctly.
This likewise brings to light the necessity for an ERB to fix
rates since it does not, after all, fix (meaning decide) rates but merely
announces their imminence-based on demonstrable figures — of higher
rates. The Court however can not
question the wisdom of a statute and after all, I suppose the Government can
make use of an accountant.
I agree with Justice Padilla insofar as he refers to the
“present scheme of allowing provisional price increase” as a
“scheme [to defraud] the people.” I would like to go further. As I indicated, the ERB does no more than to
punch calculators for the Government — which decides oil price increases. The comedy of December, 1990, when the Board
adjusted prices in a matter of days, is a confirmation of this point. As Justice Padilla noted, the readjustment
of December 10, 1990 was in fact prompted by “presidential requests”
which does not speak well of the Board’s independence and which in fact bares
the truth as to who really makes the decision. (The readjustment, consisting in the reduction in diesel fuel and a
corresponding increase in gasoline, sought to mollify the indignation of the
public.)
I agree with Justice Padilla that it amounts to fraud on the
people to make them believe that the ERB can give them a fair hearing, indeed,
if it can do anything at all.
I agree, finally, with Justice Padilla that the nation is one in
crisis, and evidently, the “ravenous” oil companies Justice Paras
refers to, have not helped any. I
submit however that we have not succeeded in fingering the real villain — the
letter of intent. Saddam’s Middle East
folly has nothing to do with that.
[1]
G.R. Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990.
[2]
G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991.
[3]
Memorandum on Economic Policy of the Government of the Philippines, March 6,
1989, Bulletin Today, March 15, 1989, p. 35, col. 5.
[4]
Henares, Hilarion, “Devaluation, the last resort,” Bulletin Today,
June 1, 1984.
[5]
Id,.
[6]
Memorandum on Philippine Economic Stabilization Plan, 1991-92, February, 1991,
Daily Globe February 4, 1991, p. 10.
[7]
Id., emphasis supplied.
[8]
Id., emphasis supplied.
[9]
Supra; see fn. 1.
[10]
Memorandum on Philippine Economic Stabilization Plan, id.