UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND THE ALL U.P. WORKERS’…

In this special civil action of certiorari the University
of the Philippines seeks the nullification of the Order dated October 30, 1990
of Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations holding that
“professors, associate professors and assistant professors (of the
University of the Philippines) are ** rank-and-file employees ** ;”
consequently, they should, together with the so-called non-academic,
non-teaching, and all other employees of the University, be represented by only
one labor organization.^[1] The
University is joined in this undertaking by the Solicitor General who “has
taken a position not contrary to that of petitioner and, in fact, has
manifested ** that he is not opposing the petition **.”^[2]

The case^[3] was
initiated in the Bureau of Labor Relations by a petition filed on March 2, 1990
by a registered labor union, the “Organization of Non-Academic Personnel
of UP” (ONAPUP).^[4]
Claiming to have a membership of 3,236 members — comprising more than 33% of
the 9,617 persons constituting the non-academic personnel of UP-Diliman, Los
Baños, Manila, and Visayas, it sought the holding of a certification election
among all said non-academic employees of the University of the
Philippines. At a conference thereafter
held on March 22, 1990 in the Bureau, the University stated that it had no
objection to the election.

On April 18, 1990, another registered labor union, the “All
UP Workers’ Union,”^[5] filed
a comment, as intervenor in the certification election proceeding. Alleging that its membership covers both
academic and non-academic personnel, and that it aims to unite all UP
rank-and-file employees in one union, it declared its assent to the holding of
the election provided the appropriate organizational unit was first clearly
defined. It observed in this connection
that the Research, Extension and Professorial Staff (REPS), who are academic
non-teaching personnel, should not be deemed part of the organizational unit.

For its part, the University, through its General Counsel,^[6]
made of record its view that there should be two (2) unions: one for academic, the other for non-academic
or administrative, personnel considering the dichotomy of interests, conditions
and rules governing these employee groups.

Director Calleja ruled on the matter on August 7, 1990.^[7]
She declared that “the appropriate organizational unit ** should embrace
all the regular rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching, of the
University of the Philippines, including all its branches” and that there
was no sufficient evidence “to justify the grouping of the non-academic or
administrative personnel into an organization unit apart and distinct from that
of the academic or teaching personnel.” Director Calleja adverted to
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 180, viz.:

“SEC. 9. The
appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit consisting of
rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise require.”,

and Section 1, Rule IV of the Rules
Implementing said EO 180 (as amended by SEC. 2, Resolution of Public Sector
Labor Management Council dated May 14,
1989, viz.:

“* * *  * * *

“For purposes of registration, an appropriate organizational
unit may refer to:

“* * *  * * *

d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.”

She went on to say that the general
intent of EO 180 was “not to fragmentize the employer unit, as “can
be gleaned from the definition of the term “accredited employees’
organization,” which refers to:

“ ** a registered
organization of the rank-and-file employees as defined in these rules
recognized to negotiate for the employees in an organizational unit headed by
an officer with sufficient authority to bind the agency, such as *** *** state colleges and universities.”

The Director thus commanded that a certification election be
“conducted among rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching”
in all four autonomous campuses of the UP, and that management appear and bring
copies of the corresponding payrolls for January, June, and July, 1990 at the
“usual pre-election conference**.”

At the pre-election conference held on March 22, 1990 at the
Labor Organizations Division of the DOLE,^[8] the
University sought further clarification of the coverage of the term,
“rank-and-file” personnel, asserting that not every employee could
properly be embraced within both teaching and non-teaching categories since
there are those whose positions are in truth managerial and policy-determining,
and hence, excluded by law.

At a subsequent hearing (on October 4, 1990), the University filed a Manifestation seeking the
exclusion from the organizational unit of those employees holding supervisory
positions among non-­academic personnel, and those in teaching staff with the
rank of Assistant Professor or higher, submitting the following as grounds
therefor:

1) Certain “high-level employees” with policy-making,
managerial, or confidential functions, are ineligible to join rank­-and-file
employee organizations under Section 3, EO 180:

“SEC. 3. High-level
employees whose functions are normally considered as policy-making or
managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential nature shall not be
eligible to join the organization of rank-and file government employees;

2) In the University hierarchy, not all teaching and non-teaching
personnel belong to the rank-and file: just as there are those occupying managerial positions within the
non-teaching roster, there is also a dichotomy between various levels of the
teaching or academic staff;

3) Among the non-teaching employees composed of Administrative
Staff and Research personnel, only those holding positions below Grade 18
should be regarded as rank-and-file, considering that those holding higher
grade positions, like Chiefs of Sections, perform supervisory functions
including that of effectively recommending termination of appointments or
initiating appointments and promotions; and

4) Not all teaching personnel may be deemed included in the term,
“rank-and-file;” only those holding appointments at the instructor
level may be so considered, because those holding appointments from Assistant
Professor to Associate Professor to full Professor take part, as members of the
University Council, a policy-making body, in the initiation of policies and
rules with respect to faculty tenure and promotion.^[9]

The ONAPUP quite categorically made of record its position: that it was not opposing the University’s
proferred classification of rank-and file employees. On the other hand, the “All UP Workers’ Union” opposed
the University’s view, in a Position Paper presented by it under date of
October 18, 1990.

Director Calleja subsequently promulgated an Order dated October
30, 1990, resolving the “sole issue” of “whether or not
professors, associate professors and assistant professors are included in the
definition of high-level employee(s)” in light of Rule I, Section (1) of
the Implementing Guidelines of Executive Order No. 180, defining “high
level employee” as follows:

“1. High Level Employee – is one whose functions are normally
considered policy determining, managerial or one whose duties are highly
confidential in nature. A managerial function
refers to the exercise of powers such as:

1. To effectively recommend
such managerial actions;

2. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions; or

3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or
discipline employees.”

The Director adjudged that said teachers are rank-and-file
employees “qualified to join unions and vote in certification
elections.” According to her –

“A careful perusal of the University Code ** shows that the
policy-making powers of the Council are limited to academic matters, namely,
prescribing courses of study and rules of discipline, fixing student admission
and graduation requirements, recommending to the Board of Regents the
conferment of degrees, and disciplinary power over students. The policy-determining functions
contemplated in the definition of a high-level employee pertain to managerial,
executive, or organization policies, such as hiring, firing, and disciplining
of employees, salaries, teaching/working hours, other monetary and non-monetary
benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment. They are the usual issues in collective
bargaining negotiations so that whoever wields these powers would be placed in
a situation of conflicting interests if he were allowed to join the union of
rank-and-file employees.

The University seasonably moved for reconsideration, seeking to
make the following points, to wit:

1) UP professors do “wield the most potent managerial
powers: the power to rule on tenure, on
the creation of new programs and new jobs, and conversely, the abolition of old
programs and the attendant re-assignment of employees.”

2) To say that the Council is “limited to (acting on)
academic matters” is error, since a academic decisions “are the most
important decisions made in a University ** (being, as it were) the heart, the
core of the University as a workplace.

3) Considering that the law regards as a “high level”
employee, one who performs either policy-determining, managerial, or
confidential functions, the Director erred in applying only the
“managerial functions” test, ignoring the
“policy-determining-functions” test.

4) The Director’s interpretation of the law would lead to absurd
results, e.g.: “an administrative officer of the College of Law is a high
level employee, while a full Professor who has published several treatises and
who has distinguished himself in argument before the Supreme Court is a mere
rank-and-file employee. A dormitory
manager is classified as a high level employee, while a full Professor of
Political Science with a Ph. D. and several Honorary doctorates is classified
as rank-and-file.”^[10]

The motion for reconsideration was denied by Director Calleja, by
Order dated November 20, 1990.

The University would now have this Court declare void the
Director’s Order of October 30, 1990 as well as that of November 20, 1990.^[11]
A temporary restraining order was issued by the Court, by Resolution dated
December 5, 1990 conformably to the University’s application therefor.

Two issues arise from these undisputed facts. One is whether or not professors, associate
professors and assistant professors are “high-level employees”
“whose functions are normally considered policy determining, managerial or
** highly confidential in nature.” The other is whether or not, they, and other
employees performing academic functions,^[12]
should comprise a collective bargaining unit distinct and different from that
consisting of the non-academic employees of the University,^[13]
considering the dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules existing between
them.

As regards the first issue, the Court is satisfied that it has
been correctly resolved by the respondent Director of Bureau Relations. In light of Executive Order No. 180 and its
implementing rules, as well as the University’s charter and relevant
regulations, the professors, associate professors and assistant professors
(hereafter simply referred to as professors) cannot be considered as exercising
such managerial or highly confidential functions as would justify their being
categorized as “high-level employees” of the institution.

The Academic Personnel Committees, through which the professors
supposedly exercise managerial functions, were constituted “in order to
foster greater involvement of the faculty and other academic personnel in appointments,
promotions, and other personnel matters that directly affect them,”^[14]
Academic Personnel Committees at the departmental and college levels were
organized “consistent with, and demonstrative of the very idea of
consulting the faculty and other academic personnel on matters directly
affecting them” and to allow “flexibility in the determination of
guidelines peculiar to a particular department or college.”^[15]

Personnel actions affecting the faculty and other academic
personnel should, however, “be considered under uniform guidelines and
consistent with the Resolution of the Board (of Regents) adopted during its
789th Meeting (11-26-69) creating the University Academic Personnel
Board.”^[16]
Thus, the Departmental Academic Personnel Committee is given the function of
“assist(ing) in the review of the recommendations initiated by the
Department Chairman with regard to recruitment, selection, performance
evaluation, tenure and staff development, in accordance with the general
guidelines formulated by the University Academic Personnel Board and the
implementing details laid down by the College Academic Personnel
Committee;”^[17]
while the College Academic Personnel Committee is entrusted with the following
functions:^[18]

1. Assist the Dean in
setting up the details for the implementation of policies, rules, standards or
general guidelines as formulated by the University Academic Personnel Board;

2. Review the
recommendations submitted by the DAPCs with regard to recruitment, selection,
performance evaluation, tenure, staff development, and promotion of the faculty
and other academic personnel of the College;

3. Establish departmental
priorities in the allocation of available funds for promotion;

4. Act on cases of
disagreement between the Chairman and the members of the DAPC particularly on
personnel matters covered by this Order;

5. Act on complaints and/or
protests against personnel actions made by the Department Chairman and/or the
DAPC.

The University Academic Personnel Board, on the other hand,
performs the following functions:^[19]

1. Assist the Chancellor in
the review of the recommendations of the CAPC’S.

2. Act on cases of
disagreement between the Dean and the CAPC.

3. Formulate policies,
rules, and standards with respect to the selection, compensation, and promotion
of members of the academic staff.

4. Assist the Chancellor in
the review of recommendations on academic promotions and on other matters
affecting faculty status and welfare.

From the foregoing, it is evident that it is the University
Academic Personnel Committee, composed of deans, the assistant for academic
affairs and the chief of personnel, which formulates the policies, rules and
standards respecting selection, compensation and promotion of members of the
academic staff. The departmental and college
academic personnel committees’ functions are purely recommendatory in nature,
subject to review and evaluation by the University Academic Personnel
Board. In Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines vs. Trajano,^[20] this Court reiterated the principle
laid down in National Merchandising
Corp. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,^[21] that the power to recommend, in order
to qualify an employee as a supervisor or managerial employee “must not
only be effective but the exercise of such authority
should not be merely of a routinary or clerical nature but should require the
use of independent judgment.” Where such recommendatory
powers, as in the case at bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final
action by the department heads and other higher executives of the company, the
same, although present, are not effective and not an exercise of independent
judgment as required by law.

Significantly, the personnel actions that may be recommended by
the departmental and college academic personnel committees must conform with
the general guidelines drawn up by the university personnel academic
committee. This being the case, the
members of the departmental and college academic personnel committees are not
unlike the chiefs of divisions and sections of the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority whom this Court considered as rank-and-file employees in National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority
vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions,^[22] because “given ready policies to
execute and standard practices to observe for their execution, * * * they have little freedom of action, as
their main function is merely to carry out the company’s orders, plans and
policies.”

The power or prerogative pertaining to a high-level employee
“to effectively recommend such managerial actions, to formulate or execute
management policies or decisions and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, dismiss, assign or discipline employees”^[23]
is exercised to a certain degree by the university academic personnel
board/committees and ultimately by the Board of Regents in accordance with
Section 6 of the University Charter,^[24]
thus:

(e) To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the
University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the
University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties
and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them in its discretion leave of
absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after
investigation and hearing shall have been had.

Another factor that militates against petitioner’s espousal of
managerial employment status for all its professors through membership in the
departmental and college academic personnel committees is that not all
professors are members thereof. Membership and the number of members in the committees are provided as
follows:^[25]

Section 2. Membership in
Committees. – Membership in committees
may be made either through appointment, election, or by some other means as may
be determined by the faculty and other academic personnel of a particular
department or college.

Section 3. Number of
Members. – In addition to the
Chairman, in the case of a department, and the Dean in the case of a college,
there shall be such number of members representing the faculty and academic
personnel as will afford a fairly representative, deliberative and manageable
group that can handle evaluation of personnel actions.

Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the
professors to the status of high-level employees. Sections 6 (f) and 9 of the UP Charter respectively provide:^[26]

Sec. 6. The Board of
Regents shall have the following powers and duties * * *:

* * *             * * *

(f) To approve the courses of study and rules of discipline drawn
up by the University Council as hereinafter provided; * * *

Sec. 9. There shall be a
University Council consisting of the President of the University and of all instructors
in the university holding the rank
of professor, associate professor, or assistant professor. The Council shall have the power to
prescribe the courses of study and rules of discipline, subject to the
approval of the Board of Regents. It shall fix the requirements for admission to any college of the
university, as well as for graduation and the receiving of a degree. The Council alone shall have the power to
recommend students or others to be recipients of degrees. Through its president or committees, it
shall have disciplinary power over the students within the limits prescribed
by the rules of discipline approved by the Board of Regents. The powers and duties of the President of
the University, in addition to those specifically provided in this Act shall be
those usually pertaining to the office of president of a university.

It is readily apparent that the policy-determining functions of
the University Council are subject to review, evaluation and final approval by
the Board of Regents. The Council’s
power of discipline is likewise circumscribed by the limits imposed by the
Board of Regents. What has been said
about the recommendatory powers of the departmental and college academic
personnel committees applies with equal force to the alleged policy-determining
functions of the University Council.

Even assuming arguendo that UP professors discharge
policy-determining functions through the University Council, still such
exercise would not qualify them as high-level employees within the context of
E.O. 180. As correctly observed by
private respondent, “Executive Order No. 180 is a law concerning public
sector unionism. It must therefore be
construed within that context. Within
that context, the University of the Philippines represents the government as an
employer. ‘Policy-determining’ refers
to policy-determination in university matters that affect those same matters
that may be the subject of negotiation between public sector management and
labor. The reason why
‘policy-determining’ has been laid down as a test in segregating rank-and-­file
from management is to ensure that those who lay down policies in areas that are
still negotiable in public sector collective bargaining do not themselves
become part of those employees who seek to change these policies for their
collective welfare.”^[27]

The policy-determining functions of the University Council refer
to academic matters, i.e. those governing the relationship between the
University and its students, and not the University as an employer and the
professors as employees. It is thus
evident that no conflict of interest results in the professors being members of
the University Council and being classified as rank-and-file employees.

Be that as it may, does it follow, as public respondent would propose,
that all rank-and-file employees of the university are to be organized into a
single collective bargaining unit?

A “bargaining unit” has been defined as a group of
employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.^[28]

Our labor laws do not however provide the criteria for
determining the proper collective bargaining unit. Section 12 of the old law, Republic Act No. 875 otherwise known
as the Industrial Peace Act, simply reads as follows:^[29]

Section 12. Exclusive
Collective Bargaining Representation for Labor Organizations. – The labor organization designated or selected for the purpose of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of all the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment;
Provided, That any individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer.

Although said Section 12 of the Industrial Peace Act was
subsequently incorporated into the Labor Code with minor changes, no guidelines
were included in said Code for determination of an appropriate bargaining unit
in a given case.^[30]
Thus, apart from the single descriptive word “appropriate,” no
specific guide for determining the proper collective bargaining unit can be
found in the statutes.

Even Executive Order No. 180 already adverted to is not much
help. All it says, in its Section 9, is
that “(t)he appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit
consisting of rank­-and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise
require.” Case law fortunately furnishes some guidelines.

When first confronted with the task of determining the proper
collective bargaining unit in a particular controversy, the Court had perforce
to rely on American jurisprudence. In Democratic
Labor Association vs. Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., decided on February 28, 1958,^[31] the Court observed that “the issue of
how to determine the proper collective bargaining unit and what unit would be
appropriate to be the collective bargaining agency” * * * “is novel
in this jurisdiction; however, American precedents on the matter abound ** (to
which resort may be had) considering that our present Magna Carta has been
patterned after the American law on the subject.” Said the Court:

” * * Under these precedents, there are various factors which
must be satisfied and considered in determining the proper constituency of a
bargaining unit. No one particular
factor is itself decisive of the determination. The weight accorded to any particular factor varies in accordance
with the particular question or questions that may arise in a given case. What are these factors? Rothenberg mentions a good number, but the
most pertinent to our case are: (1)
will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unit of employees’ interest,
such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation
and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees. * *.

” * * * * * *

“An enlightening appraisal of the problem of defining an
appropriate bargaining unit is given in the 10th Annual Report of the National
Labor Relations Board wherein it is emphasized that the factors which said
board may consider and weigh in fixing appropriate units are: the history, extent and type of organization
of employees; the history of their collective bargaining; the history, extent
and type of organization of employees in other plants of the same employer, or
other employers in the same industry; the skill, wages, work, and working
conditions of the employees; the
desires of the employees; the eligibility of the employees for membership in
the union or unions involved; and the relationship between the unit or units
proposed and the employer’s organization, management, and operation. * *.

” * * In said report, it is likewise emphasized that the basic
test in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit, to be
appropriate, must affect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual
interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective
bargaining (citing Smith on Labor Laws, 316-317; Francisco, Labor Laws, 162). *
*. “

The Court further explained that “(t)he test of the grouping
is community or mutuality of interests. And this is so because ‘the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not
it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights’ (Rothenberg on Labor Relations,
490).” Hence, in that case, the Court
upheld the trial court’s conclusion that two separate bargaining units should
be formed, one consisting of regular and permanent employees and another
consisting of casual laborers or stevedores.

Since then, the “community
or mutuality of interests” test has
provided the standard in determining the proper constituency of a collective
bargaining unit. In Alhambra
Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company, et al. vs. Alhambra Employees’
Association (PAFLU), 107 Phil. 23,
the Court, noting that the employees in the administrative, sales and
dispensary departments of a cigar and cigarette manufacturing firm perform work
which have nothing to do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the
raw lead (malalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precintera) and engineering and
garage departments, authorized the formation of the former set of employees
into a separate collective bargaining unit. The ruling in the Democratic Labor Association case, supra, was reiterated in Philippine
Land-Air-Sea Labor Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 110 Phil. 176, where casual employees were
barred from joining the union of the permanent and regular employees.

Applying the same “community or mutuality of interests”
test, but resulting in the formation of only one collective bargaining unit is
the case of National Association of Free Trade Unions vs. Mainit Lumber
Development Company Workers Union-United Lumber and General Workers of the
Phils., G.R. No. 79526, December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 598. In said case, the Court ordered the
formation of a single bargaining unit consisting of the Sawmill Division in
Butuan City and the Logging Division in Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan Norte
of the Mainit Lumber Development Company. The Court reasoned:

“Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the
employees of the Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way
that the company needs them both. There
may be difference as to the nature of their individual assignments but the
distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining
unit.”

In the case at bar, the University employees may, as already
suggested, quite easily be categorized into two general classes: one, the
group composed of employees whose functions are non-­academic, i.e., janitors,
messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists, carpenters, electricians,
grounds-keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics, plumbers;^[32]
and two, the group made up of those performing academic functions, i.e.,
full professors, associate professors, assistant professors, instructors — who
may be judges or government executives — and research, extension and
professorial staff.^[33] Not
much reflection is needed to perceive that the community or mutuality of
interests which justifies the formation of a single collective bargaining unit
is wanting between the academic and non-academic personnel of the
university. It would seem obvious that
teachers would find very little in common with the University clerks and other
non-academic employees as regards responsibilities and functions, working
conditions, compensation rates, social life and interests, skills and
intellectual pursuits, cultural activities, etc. On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in
the nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and working
conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel dictate the separation of
these two categories of employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The formation of two separate bargaining
units, the first consisting of the rank-and-file non-academic personnel, and
the second, of the rank-and-file academic employees, is the set-up that will
best assure to all the employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights. These special circumstances, i.e., the dichotomy of interests and
concerns as well as the dissimilarity in the nature and conditions of work,
wages and compensation between the academic and non-academic personnel, bring
the case at bar within the exception contemplated in Section 9 of Executive
Order No. 180. It was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Labor Relations Director to have ruled otherwise,
ignoring plain and patent realities.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of October 30, 1990 is
hereby AFFIRMED in so far as it declares the professors, associate professors
and assistant professors of the University of the Philippines as rank-and-file
employees. The Order of August 7, 1990
is MODIFIED in the sense that the non-academic rank-and-file employees of the
University of the Philippines shall constitute a bargaining unit to the
exclusion of the academic employees of the institution — i.e., full
professors, associate professors, assistant professors, instructors, and the research,
extension and professorial staff, who may, if so minded, organize themselves
into a separate collective bargaining unit; and that, therefore, only said non­-academic
rank-and-file personnel of the University of the Philippines in Diliman,
Manila, Los Baños and the Visayas are to participate in the certification
election.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, and
Nocon, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., retired.

---

^[1]
A subsequent Order, dated November 20, 1990, denied reconsideration of the Order
of October 30, 1990; SEE footnote 11, infra

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 105 (Manifestation and Motion), and 222 (Compliance)

^[3]
Docketed as BLR No. 3-08-90

^[4]
Registered in accordance with Executive Order No. 180 as evidenced by
Registration Certificate No. 038 dated Nov. 10, 1987

^[5]
Registered on April 8, 1988 per Registration Certificate No. 048

^[6]
Mr. Demaree Raval

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 26-31

^[8]
Presided over by Atty. Johnny Garcia

^[9]
In the University Charter, (ACT 1870), as amended, and Chapter 2 (Secs. 1 and
2) of the University Code, the composition and functions of the University
Council are spelled out insofar as the policy-determining functions of its
members are concerned, and this was reiterated in a Resolution of the UP Board
of Regents during its 828th Meeting held on Dec. 21, 1972.

^[10]
These arguments notwithstanding, the University proposed that the election
might proceed but that the ballots of the challenged voters (professors down to
assistant professors) be sealed and segregated pending resolution of the issue.

^[11]
SEE footnotes 1 and 2, supra

^[12]
E.g., Employees engaged in teaching, who may include judges, government
officials, executives of business, commercial and industrial enterprises, and
research, extension and professorial staff

^[13]
Including: janitors, messengers, typists, receptionists, clerks of various
types, laboratory aides or helpers, nurses, medical aides, carpenters,
grounds-keepers, chauffeurs, electricians, mechanics, plumbers

^[14]
Executive Order No. 6, as amended by Executive Order No. 9, dated August 31,
1979, Annex “A”, Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 215, Rollo

^[15]
Whereas Clause, Unnumbered Executive Order, Series of 1988 on the Constitution
of Academic Personnel Committees, Annex “B”, Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 217, Rollo

^[16]
Ibid.

^[17]
Section 7, Ibid., p. 218, Rollo, underscoring supplied

^[18]
Section 11, Ibid., pp. 218-219, Rollo

^[19]
Section 12, Ibid., p. 219, Rollo

^[20]
G.R. No. 75039, January 28, 1988, 157 SCRA 416

^[21]
G.R. No. 18710, March 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 598

^[22]
G.R. No. L-18938, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 766

^[23]
Rule 1, Section (1) of the Implementing Guidelines of Executive Order No. 180

^[24]
Act No. 1870, as amended, Annex “A”, Comment of Public Respondent, p.
149, Rollo

^[25]
Unnumbered Executive Order, supra

^[26]
Underscoring supplied

^[27]
p. 18, Memorandum for respondent U.P. Union, p. 188, Rollo

^[28]
(Rothenberg on Labor Relations, 482, cited in Fernandez & Quiazon, The Law of Labor Relations, 1963 ed., p. 281).

^[29]
Underscoring supplied

^[30]
Section 12 of the Industrial Peace Act was
incorporated as Art. 256 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Renumbered Art. 255 by subsequent
amendments, it now reads:

“Art. 255. Exclusive Bargaining Representation and
Workers Participation in Policy and Decision-Making. – The labor
organization designated or selected by Majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of
the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer.

^[31]
G.R. No. L-10321, an unreported case, cited in 103 Phil. 1103, the decision
having been written for the Court by Justice Felix Bautista Angelo and
concurred in by all the other ten (1) justices except the Chief Justice, who
took no part

^[32]
SEE footnote 13, supra

^[33]
SEE footnote 12, supra