ATTY. MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HON. SILVESTRE H. BELLO III, ATTY. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, HELEN B. CANOY AND REBECCA B. TAN, RESPONDENTS.

Paderanga versus Drilon

The Case

This is a special civil action for mandamus and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order, brought by Attorney Miguel Paderanga against the Secretary of Justice, Undersecretary Silvestre Bello the Third, State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, and private complainants Helen Canoy and Rebecca Tan. Paderanga, a lawyer, was about to be impleaded as an accused in a multiple murder case because his own client, Felizardo Roxas, had implicated him in a sworn affidavit. He asked the Supreme Court to stop the prosecutors from including him in a second amended information and from prosecuting him. The case matters because it fixes the boundaries of a preliminary investigation: what it is for, how much evidence it requires, and which rights an accused may and may not demand at that stage.

Procedural History

An information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, but venue was later transferred to Cagayan de Oro City. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted; the other accused remained at large, and Galarion himself escaped from detention. Felizardo Roxas was later added as a co-accused in an amended information, and he retained Paderanga as counsel. When Paderanga filed an omnibus motion to dismiss, to quash the warrant of arrest, and to nullify the arraignment, the trial court denied the motion but directed the City Prosecutor to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation so that the accused could present evidence. During that reinvestigation, Roxas executed an affidavit implicating Paderanga. The City Prosecutor inhibited himself, and State Prosecutor Gingoyon was designated to continue the investigation. Gingoyon issued a resolution directing that the information be amended to include Paderanga as an accused. Paderanga's motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice, which was dismissed through Undersecretary Bello. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Paderanga then went directly to the Supreme Court by the present petition for mandamus and prohibition.

Facts

On the first of May, 1984, Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag the Second were killed. On the sixteenth of October, 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, and several John Does. Only Galarion was tried and found guilty; the rest remained at large, and Galarion later escaped from detention.

In an amended information filed on the sixth of October, 1988, Felizardo Roxas was included as a co-accused, and he retained Paderanga as his counsel. Paderanga filed an omnibus motion to dismiss, to quash the warrant of arrest, and to nullify the arraignment. The trial court denied the motion but ordered a reinvestigation so the accused could present evidence. In the course of that preliminary investigation, Roxas executed a signed affidavit implicating Paderanga in the crime.

The City Prosecutor inhibited himself, and State Prosecutor Gingoyon took over. Gingoyon issued a resolution directing that the information be amended to include Paderanga as an accused. Paderanga moved for reconsideration, arguing that the investigation was not yet complete and that he had been deprived of his right to file a counter-affidavit and to present evidence. The motion was denied. He elevated the matter to the Department of Justice, which dismissed his petition for review, and his motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the preliminary investigation against Paderanga was complete, such that he was deprived of a full and fair preliminary investigation.
• Whether or not there exists prima facie evidence or probable cause to justify his inclusion in the second amended information.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3, paragraph b, of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, on the respondent's right to file a counter-affidavit, provides:

If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.

The Court used this provision to hold that Paderanga's earlier counter-affidavit already satisfied the procedural requirement.

Section 3, paragraph e, of Rule 112, on clarificatory questions, provides:

If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.

This provision shows that the right to propound clarificatory questions belongs to the investigating officer's discretion, not to the respondent as a matter of right.

Section 1 of Rule 112 defines a preliminary investigation:

A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

This definition supplies the standard of evidence the Court applied to the finding of probable cause.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the preliminary investigation was not incomplete. Paderanga had already filed a counter-affidavit in response to the subpoena issued to him, and this was sufficient compliance with the Rules. He failed to show that the later subpoena involved a separate complaint charging a different offense. The Court also held that the veracity and credibility of witnesses are matters of defense best addressed to the trial court. On clarificatory questions, the Court ruled that the right to ask them is not absolute; the fiscal has discretion whether to propound them, as the quoted provision plainly states. Finally, the Court noted that the proper forum to ventilate the absence of a preliminary investigation is the trial court, because such absence does not affect jurisdiction but only the regularity of the proceedings, and it may even be waived.

On the second issue, the Court held that a preliminary investigation does not require the full and exhaustive display of evidence. It is enough that the evidence engender a well founded belief that an offense was committed and that the accused is probably guilty. The Court agreed with the state prosecutor that prima facie evidence of Paderanga's involvement existed. On the claim that the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol were inadmissible against him for lack of cross-examination, the Court held that an accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the complainant's witnesses. The admissibility of that evidence should be raised before the trial court during the trial proper. The Court also stressed that technical rules of evidence do not bind the fiscal, and that the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court.

Doctrine

A preliminary investigation is not a trial on the merits. It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty, and it does not place the person in jeopardy. The quantum of evidence required is only such evidence as engenders that well founded belief, not the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence.

The respondent in a preliminary investigation has the right to submit a counter-affidavit and to examine the evidence of the complainant, but has no right to cross-examine the complainant's witnesses. The right to propound clarificatory questions belongs to the investigating officer's discretion. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction; it goes only to the regularity of the proceedings, may be waived, and should be raised before the trial court.

As a general rule, an injunction will not issue to restrain a criminal prosecution, save only in the recognized exceptions, none of which was present here.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, so the public respondents prevailed and Paderanga was not shielded from inclusion in the amended information.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a preliminary investigation requires only evidence sufficient to engender a well founded belief of the crime and the respondent's probable guilt, and that the accused has no right to cross-examine at that stage. Examiners use this case to test the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigation and the limits of the accused's rights therein.