G.R. No. 96009. September 15, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDMUND EMPLEO Y MAQUILAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
REGALADO, J.:
In a complaint[1] filed
by Elisa Cordova y Urdaneta, herein accused-appellant Edmund Empleo y Maquilan
was charged with the crime of rape allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about the 14th day of March, 1989, at about 8:20
P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, by the use of force
upon the undersigned complainant, Elisa Cordova y Urdaneta, to wit: by grabbing her under a point of a gun, forced
her to lie on the ground and forcibly tore her underwears, kiss (sic) and with
the use of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with said Elisa Cordova against the latter’s
will.”
on the basis of which he was arraigned
and, on his plea of not guilty, thereafter tried on the merits with the
assistance of his counsel de parte at all stages.
Considering the importance and primacy given by appellate courts
to the factual findings of trial courts, especially on the issue of credibility
of testimonial evidence, we reproduce hereunder the ambient facts of the sexual
assault as culled from the prosecution’s evidence and the submissions of the
defense in its version of the incident, all as perspicaciously synthesized by
the court a quo:
“On March 14, 1989, at 8:00 o’clock in the evening, private
complainant, Elisa Cordova, a 16 year old student in the local university, went
with her friends and classmates, namely: Collen Parreño, Robert de la Cruz and Gemma Amadeo, to the Top Hills in
Lahug, Cebu City, to view the scenic lights of the city. While they were enjoying the scenic
attractions and windy atmosphere atop the hill, three (3) men approached them. One of them, whom complainant later identified, was accused Edmund
Empleo, who dragged her under gun point to the bushes some 24 meters away from
her friends. She was forcibly laid on
the rocky ground amidst the bushes. She
pushed and kicked her attacker on the stomach and struck him with stone, but
the accused, with his gun pointed at her, boxed her in the abdomen or her solar
plexus, causing her to lose consciousness, her skirt was raised, her panty
removed, and she felt excruciating pains on her vagina.
“When the accused left her, she crawled and a person from
nowhere, whom she did not recognize, lifted her and brought her to a house near
the bridge. She was later taken to the
Cebu City Medical Center for the injuries she sustained.
“On the following day, March 15, 1989, she was examined by Dr.
Suga Sotto-Yuvienco, at her clinic. She
reported the incident to the Mabolo Police Station and described to them the
appearance of the person who molested her. She did not know the name of the accused then. She came to know about the arrest of Edmund Empleo when she was
fetched by a PC soldier and brought her to the Mabolo Police Station, where she
was made to indentify the accused. She
readily identified the accused, Edmund Empleo, as the man who ravished her.
“Gilberto Magallon, a Physician of the Cebu City Medical
Center, issued medical certificate, Exh. ‘A’. He treated the victim, Elisa Cordova, on March 14, 1989 when the latter
was admitted to the Emergency Room of the hospital as a victim of rape. He examined the patient’s genitalia and his
examination revealed the following pertinent findings:
Genitalia – Grossly, normal, female
Introitus – Hyperemic, including the labia majora
– Sand particles noted
Hymenal ring –
with old laceration at 6 o’clock (Exh. ‘A-2’)
He explained that the entrance of the
vagina was hyperemic. There was noted an
increase of vast blood flow in the area because of an injury which may have
been caused by hard object. Immediately
after he examined the patient, he referred her to the Surgery Department
because of the bruises which the victim also sustained.
“Collen Parreño,
corroborated the testimony of the victim, Elisa Cordova, being one of the
latter’s companions on the date and time of the incident. She narrated that when the three (3)
unidentified persons approached them, they introduced themselves as PC soldiers
and announced that they were under arrest. Although surprised as they have not committed any crime, they pleaded for
mercy. She was hogtied instead. Gemma Amadeo, likewise. Their male companion, Robert de la Cruz, was
mauled. The victim, Elisa Cordova, was
pulled from (them) to a grassy place about 15 meters away, by one of the men,
whom (they) later recognized as the accused, Edmund Empleo. Her friend, Elisa Cordova, struggled. When the latter was able to free herself,
she ran away. Edmund Empleo overtook
her. From her place she witnessed when
accused forced Elisa Cordova to lie down against the bushes. She did not know what happened thereafter
because Elisa was dragged further to the thicket. They were taken to a place, farther from the scene of the
incident where they were untied by the companions of the accused, who took pity
on them. They asked help from the house
of her friend, Gemma Amadeo, and when they returned to the place, the policemen
were already there and took the victim to the hospital.
“Manuel Ampo, also a
physician, attended to the victim, Elisa Cordova. She was referred to him, from the Obstetrics Gynecology
Department of the Cebu City Medical Center. He conducted a medical examination on the patient, who suffered more or
less 8 injuries, consisting of linear abrasions in the neck, left breast,
anterior chest, right forearm, right hand, left knee and back, as shown in the
Medical Certificate (Exh. ‘B’) he issued. The injuries could have been due to the forcible contact of the skin
with rough objects.
“The gravity of the abrasions in the forearm, chest, breast
and knee indicated that the victim, was held by the hands and those found below
the scapula may have been caused when the patient was forcibly laid down on a
rocky or rough surface. These abrasions
at the time of his examination were fresh. Scab formations were absent. His
findings, as well as that of the OB-GYNE Department were reflected in the
Emergency Logbook of the hospital and it appeared in Entry No. 2,383. The patient, who was a rape victim, was
examined by the OB-GYNE people twice, on March 14, 1989 at 10:30 in the evening
and on March 15, 1989, at 1:30 in the afternoon (Exh. ‘1’).
“The defense, upon the other hand, presented one Reynaldo
Orofeo, a close friend and neighbor of the accused, Edmund Empleo. He averred that on March 14, 1989, at 7:30
o’clock in the morning, while he was on his way to work, he met the
accused. The accused (had) just arrived
from Butuan City. Not having seen his
friend for a year, he wanted to have a longer conversation with him. He invited the accused to his house that
evening. At 6:00 o’clock in the evening
of that same day, after having supper together at his residence, they partook
of drinks and (he) even invited the accused anew for the advanced birthday
celebration of his daughter. During the
time that they were having a drink, he remembered that the accused went out of
the house only to urinate in their yard. They parted at 9:40 in the evening, with his friend going home to the
residence of Col. Tiburcio Fusillero at
Green Valley Subdivision, Capitol Hills,
Cebu City, 40 meters from the
center of Top Hills. The
accused works at the residence of Col. Fusillero.
“They met each other again during the birthday celebration of
his daughter on March 19, 1989 where accused took his lunch and left at 2:00
o’clock in the afternoon. (O)n that
same evening, he learned from his nephew, Arturo Orofeo, that Edmund Empleo was
arrested by elements of the Visayas Command (VISCOM).
“As a very close friend of the accused, he visited the latter
at the Mabolo Police Station and inquired as to the reason of his arrest and
detention. The accused informed him
that he was a suspect in a rape case which happened at the Top Hills and requested him to testify for
him.
“Virgilio Oronan, Security Officer of the Land Bank, and who
resides more or less 100 meters from the Top Hills, could not remember of (sic) any unusual incident that
happened in their vicinity in the evening of March 14, 1989. When accused was flashed on the TV screen,
as the one who committed rape, he could not believe that Edmund Empleo would
commit such crime because there were previous incidents of rape which happened
in the same place while the latter was still in Mindanao. He knew the accused for the first time only
when he visited him at BBRC, because the latter’s brothers and sisters are his
friends.
“Accused, Edmund Empleo, averred that he lives in the house of
Col. Tiburcio Fusillero at Green Valley Subd., Capitol Hills, Cebu City. He enlisted in the Philippine Army and while
waiting for the oathtaking, Col. Fusillero
sent him to Butuan City to work in a logging company owned by a certain
Magsaysay, in July 1988. On March 13,
1989, he left Butuan City, after he received a letter from his brother
informing him that the Civil Engineering Battalion was receiving applicants for
enlistment at Camp Lapulapu of this city. He arrived in Cebu City on March 14, 1989 at 6:00 o’clock in the
morning.
“On his way to the residence of Col. Fusillero, he passed by
the house of his friend, Reynaldo Orofeo in Camputhaw, about 80 to 100 meters
from the Top Hills and which would take him 2 to 3 minutes by walking. They had a brief conversation. He returned to his friend’s house in the evening,
upon the latter’s invitation. After
partaking dinner, they dr(a)nk 5 bottles of ‘macho beer’. After 9:00 o’clock in the evening, he went
straight home and did not leave the house thereafter. On March 19, 1989, he returned to his friends’s house, to attend
the birthday of the latter’s daughter and as usual, they dr(a)nk together until
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon. In the
evening, he met his brother, Edgar, who was in the company of two (2) PC
soldiers.
“Shortly after 8:00 o’clock in the evening, his brother
returned with Sgt. Estelito Parreño. The latter talked to him in private and inquired as to the whereabouts
of a certain Jack, who also lived in the residence of Col. Fusillero, and who
was responsible for a series of robberies at Top Hills.
“When he informed Sgt. Parreño that he has not seen Jack since
his return from Mindanao, he was fingered by said Sergeant, that he was the one
who held up his daughter, Collen Parreño. He was then arrested and brought to VISCOM Headquarters where he was interrogated. He was detained at the Mabolo Police
(Station). On March 20, 1989, he was
brought to the Fiscal’s Office and was investigated regarding the rape and the
robbery cases filed against him. Presently, he is detained at the
BBRC. The case for Robbery which was
filed by Roberto de la Cruz, one of the companions of complainant is now
pending with RTC Branch 13. He came to
know Elisa Cordova and Collen Parreño only at the Fiscal’s Office. But he had no reason to suspect that they
would testify against him.”[2]
On September 28, 1990, the court below rendered judgment[3]
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties, and to indemnify the victim, Elisa Cordova, in the sum of
P30,000.00, as well as to pay the costs.
I. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on the basis of the
testimonies of complainant Elisa Cordova and prosecution witness, Collen
Parreño, which are allegedly replete with contradictions and inconsistencies on
material point. His impugnation of
complainant’s testimony[4] may
be condensed in the following precis:
1. In the second paragraph
of her affidavit, she declared that while she was lying on the ground appellant
tore her underwear and she was denuded but in her testimony on
cross-examination, she told the court that she was not naked when appellant’s
penis penetrated her vagina. Her panty
was removed and she was also undressed.
2. In the third paragraph
of said affidavit, complainant alleged that she became unconscious after the
incident in question happened, but in her direct testimony, she told the court
that while appellant was having carnal knowledge of her, she resisted, but she
was boxed and lost consciousness and when she regained consciousness, appellant
told her to lie down. Again, appellant
boxed her and she lost consciousness.
3. During her testimony,
complainant stated that while she was lying flat on the ground and while
appellant was already on top of her, she picked up a stone and struck his head
but she failed to hit it. She picked up
the stone while the penis of appellant was already inside her vagina. During cross-examination, she testified that
she was forced to lie down and at the point of a gun she was boxed on the
stomach, particularly on her solar plexus, for which reason she became
unconscious. After she was sexually
abused, she was again boxed by appellant on her abdomen because she resisted
and again she became unconscious. She
was boxed only two times, that is, before and after she was sexually
abused. This material matter was never
alleged by complainant in her sworn affidavit.
4. Complainant further
alleged during the cross-examination that she reported the incident to the
police authorities only after appellant was arrested and brought to the police
station, that is, on March 19, 1989 or five days after the incident in
question. Before said date, she did not
execute any affidavit because appellant was not yet arrested and she did not
know whether he was the same person who sexually abused her. In other words, before the arrest of
appellant, complainant did not know his identity until he was arrested and
brought to the Mabolo Police Station, Cebu City. However, in answer to the question propounded by the trial court,
she testified that at the time of the incident she knew the person of appellant
but she did not know his name, which was the reason why she executed the
affidavit only after appellant was arrested.
5. During her
cross-examination, complainant told the court that the scene of the incident
was dark, with no electric light posts, but at the time of the incident the
moon was very bright. However, as shown
by the calendar for the month of March, 1989, the new moon emerged on March 8
and the first quarter was on March 15, 1989, hence it cannot be said that at
the time of the incident the moon was really very bright.
6. Complainant even failed
to present before the court the panty which, according to her, was forcibly
taken from her body and the school uniform she was wearing at the time, to show
how the panty was torn and how the school uniform got dirty since, according to
her, she forcibly resisted by moving her body to evade the sexual attack of
appellant.
Similarly, the testimony of the other prosecution witness, Collen
Parreño, allegedly contradicts that of complainant. Appellant asserts’ that nowhere in the testimony of Parreño can
it be gleaned that the person who allegedly raped the victim had a gun, whereas
complainant claimed that appellant was carrying a gun. Said witness also testified that the place
was then lighted by a 15-watt bulb, contrary to the testimony of complainant
that at the time of the incident there was no illumination, except the light
coming from the moon.
The basic issue posited here primarily devolves on the
credibility of complainant and her witness. As we have earlier noted, the long settled proposition is that when an
appealed conviction hinges on the credibility of witnesses, the assessment of
the trial court is accorded the highest degree of respect. Absent any proper reason to depart from this
fundamental rule, factual conclusions reached by the lower court, which had the
opportunity to observe and evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses while on the
witness stand, should not be disturbed.[5]
In the case at bar, we are persuaded to uphold the finding of
guilt by the trial court in light of its pronouncement as to the demeanor of
the complainant during her testimony which, according to the court, “bears
the hallmark of truth and sincerity,” and “was straightforward,
though punctuated by her shyness, naivet(e) and tearful increments, that stood
the test of rigorous cross-examination by the defense counsel.” Be that as
it may, we shall judiciously discuss and assay the validity of the alleged
errors imputed to the lower court by appellant.
First, while there may exist a variance between some statements
of complainant in her affidavit and her testimony in open court, the alleged
inconsistencies are more apparent than real. The truth is that in her testimony before the trial court, complainant
merely gave a more detailed narration of how appellant sexually abused her on
that fateful night of March 14, 1989. Such fact, of course, does not necessarily signify that her open court
testimony conflicts with her affidavit.
The contradiction between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness may be explained by the fact that an affidavit will not always disclose
all the facts and will oftentimes and without design incorrectly describe,
without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated.[6]
Being taken ex parte, an affidavit is almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and
sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the
witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject.[7] It
has thus been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to
open court declarations because the former are often executed when an affiant’s
mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of
narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the
declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering
officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to him.[8]
The exception to the rule is where the omission in the affidavit
refers to a very important detail such that the affiant would not have failed
to mention it, and which omission could affect the affiant’s credibility. Such exceptive circumstance does not obtain
in the present case. The alleged
omissions in the affidavit of complainant are not that vital and substantial as
to affect her credibility. The more
important detail which is really material to the case, and which is
categorically declared and explained both in the affidavit and in complainant’s
testimony, is the fact that appellant had carnal knowledge of complainant
without her consent.
Second, there is no discrepancy in the statements made by
complainant in her affidavit, where she declared that she was stripped naked
during the assault, and in her oral testimony, where she said that she was not
naked when appellant did the sexual act. This seeming inconsistency was later clarified by complainant in her
testimony where she explained that what she really meant by the word
“naked” is that she had no underwear but she had her uniform on.[9]
Third, the defense claims that if it were true that complainant
was able to recognize her assailant, it is highly questionable why she came to
know the identity of appellant only after the latter had been arrested and
brought to the Mabolo Police Station. The argument is specious.
Complainant testified in no uncertain terms that although she did
not know the name of her assailant at that time, nevertheless she was able to
describe him as a fat person with a big stomach, long hair and dark complexion,
thus:
“Q Did you give any description of (sic) identifying
marks of the person or suspect to the police authorities?
A Yes, sir.
Q What identifying marks did you give or
furnish the police authorities?
A At that time, he was still fat with big stomach.
ATTY. DAITOL:
Q Fat and big stomach. What else?
A Long hair and now his hair is already short.
Q What else?
A Black complexion.”[10]
Even during her cross-examination wherein the defense counsel
tried to mislead and confuse her as to the identity of her assailant, this
excerpt of the transcript shows that complainant did not waver in her identification
of appellant as the one who raped her:
“ATTY. DAITOL:
Q But
he did not mention to you the name of Edmund Empleo?
A No, sir.
Q As
a matter of fact, Miss Cordova, there are several persons residing near Top
Hills. Right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And
you cannot be positive that there is only one (1) person living there at
(sic) with a big stomach, a fat person, long hair and black skin?
A I was informed by the people there that
there is no other person who has a big stomach, long hair and fat.
Q Did you examine or see one by one the
residents living in that locality known as Top
Hills?
A After the incident, I did not go to that place anymore.
Q And
as a matter of fact, the description of a person with a (sic) long hair, big
stomach, black skin and fat was given only to you by somebody?
x x x
WITNESS:
A I
really saw him and (he) has a big stomach.”[11]
More importantly, it is significant that complainant was able to
identify appellant in open court despite the fact that the latter, obviously to
evade identification, had already had his hair cut short and there was a slight
change in his physical build. Hence, by
the bare fact alone that complainant did not know the name of herein appellant,
we cannot safely conclude that the identity of the assailant was not
sufficiently established. In one case
we held that:
“x x x It is
the appellants’ view that the identities of the malefactors of a crime can be
established only if the witnesses know the names of the malefactors.
“This is puerile reasoning. Identification of a person is not established solely through knowledge
of the name of that person. Familiarity
with the physical features, particularly those of the face, is actually the
best way to identify the person.
“x x x One may
be familiar with the face but not necessarily the name. It does not follow therefore, that to be
able to identify a person, one must first know his name.”[12]
Fourth, the fact that complainant testified that she was able to
recognize appellant because at that time the moon was very bright, when in
truth and in fact it was a first quarter moon, does not serve to discredit her
entire testimony. Even where a witness
is found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, and it
was not shown that there was such intended prevarication by complainant in this
case, it is not required that the entire testimony be rejected, since such
portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited.[13] It is perfectly reasonable to believe
the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with
respect to other facts.[14]
At any rate, the declaration of complainant is not really
incredible. The other prosecution
witness, Collen Parreño, testified that the place was lighted by a lamp post
with a 15-watt bulb. It is not
inconceivable that complainant may have wrongly perceived the light coming from
the lamp post as having come from the moon. Furthermore, even assuming that there was no electric light which
directly illuminated the spot where she was sexually abused, that does not
suggest that there was total darkness in the area, preventing her from
identifying her assailant. Appellant
did not conceal his identity with a mask or the like. Evidently, it was during the struggle, between them, which lasted
for some time, that complainant was able to recognize the face of appellant and
to take note of his complexion and physical build.[15]
Finally, the allegation that the failure of the prosecution to
present the underwear and torn uniform of complainant casts doubts on the
latter’s credibility, has no logical or rational leg to stand on. Time and again, we have said that the
non-presentation of the torn dress and underwear of the complainant does not
destroy the case for the prosecution, there being sufficient and convincing
evidence to prove the rape charged beyond reasonable doubt. Those clothes are not essential, and need
not be presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape.[16]
The absence thereof does not negate the truth of a rape complaint and the credibility
of a victim’s testimony.[17]
Contrary to appellant’s pretension, the testimony of complainant
is consistent with and amply corroborated by the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Dr. Manuel Ampo and Collen Parreño. Dr. Ampo declared as follows:
“COURT/to witness:
Q Dr., what must have caused these abrasions
you found on the body?
A The patient there has (sic) some sort of
resistance.
Q What do you mean by your answer?
A Probably as I gathered in this case, this patient was raped.
Q We want facts, what could have caused these
abrasions?
A Actually, these are (sic) forcible contact
with rough objects.
Q When
you said that there was contact of that body with rough objects, how could it
happen on the basis of your findings as to the gravity of the abrasions and the
durations?
A The forearm, the chest, the
breast and the knee.
Q What
must have been done to her?
A Maybe
she was held by the hand.
Q You
mean, she must have been held forcibly?
A Forcibly.
Q That
abrasion you found below the scapula, what must have caused that abrasion?
A Maybe
the patient laid (sic) on the ground, Your Honor.
Q If
she just lay on the ground normally, without the use of force, could that abrasion be indicated therein?
A No, Your Honor.
Q In
other words, that abrasion below the scapula may have been caused when the
patient was forcibly laid down. Is that
what you want to say?
A Yes,
possible.”[18]
Along the same vein, prosecution witness Collen Parreño affirmed
these facts:
“Q What was she doing when you and your other
female companion were tied by an old man, companion of the accused?
A Edmund Empleo forced Elisa to lie down.
Q In other words, you could still see Elisa
being forcibly laid down while you and your companion were being tied by an old
man?
A Yes, sir.
Q The Court heard you say that Elisa Cordova
when forced to lay (sic) down on the ground struggled to free herself and
succeeded in freeing herself, what did Elisa Cordova do in freeing herself from
the clutches of Edmund Empleo?
A So, she ran away going towards us but she
was again chased by Edmund Empleo.
x x x
Q Now, the Court heard you say that Edmund
Empleo caught her up (sic). When she
was caught up (sic) by Empleo, what did the latter do to her?
A Edmund Empleo forced Elisa again to lie
down on the ground.”[19]
On her part, complainant testified in the following manner:
“Q Are you trying (sic) this Court to understand
that while the accused was holding a gun in his right hand, at the same time
the accused held your two (2) hands in his right hand?
A Yes, sir.
x x x
Q And as a matter of fact, when the accused
had his pe(n)is penetrated into your vagina, he was no longer holding your left
and right hands?
A His right hand was still holding me.
x x x
Q When your two (2) legs were released from
his holds (sic), did you use your legs to kick the accused?
A I tried to wriggle from himself (sic) but
he boxed me.
Q You tried to wriggle hard and harder in
order to release from the holds (sic) of the accused. Right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the very place where you were lying down
was a stony place?
A Yes, sir.
Q In other words, it was a rock surface?
A Yes, sir.”[20]
II. Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in not
taking into consideration the results of the medical examination conducted on
private complainant, the report on which was admitted as Exhibit B.
The medical report shows that the complainant gave the
information that she was raped at about 6:00 P.M. of March 14, 1989. However, in her testimony she claimed that
the incident happened at around 8:30 in the evening. Additionally, in the information in Criminal Case No. CBU-15094
for robbery filed against appellant by Roberto de la Cruz, one of the
companions of complainant, it is stated that appellant robbed De la Cruz at
around 9:30 P.M. Appellant contends
that it was impossible for him to have raped the victim at 6:00 P.M. and then
again at 8:30 P.M., and thereafter rob the victim’s companion at 9:30 P.M., all
on the same night. Such sophistry in
reasoning betrays desperation in argument.
An erroneous reckoning or mis-estimation of time is too trivial
and immaterial to discredit the testimony of a complainant,[21]
especially in this case where time is not an essential element or has
substantial bearing on the fact of commission of the crime. Minor inconsistencies are not sufficient to
blur or cast doubt on straightforward attestations. Far from being badges of fraud and fabrication, the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses may on the contrary be justifiably
considered as indicative of the truthfulness on material points of the facts
testified to. These minor deviations
also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid witness may make mistakes
sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair his intrinsic credibility,[22]
more so where the alleged inconsistencies do not touch on the very facts
constitutive of the actual commission of the crime.[23]
Furthermore, where the prosecution witnesses are able to positively identify
the appellant as the author of the crime and the testimonies are, on the whole,
consistent on material points, the contradictions become insignificant.[24]
Also, it is not denied, as in fact complainant admitted, that she
was drinking beer prior to the incident. Appellant now contends that since she was in a state of drunkenness, it
would have been impossible for her to identify her assailant, considering
further that the night was dark.
Such postulation is premised on the erroneous assumption that
complainant was drunk at that time. The
medical findings of the physician who examined complainant shows that she was
positive for alcoholic breath, but this fact alone does not sufficiently
establish that she was in such a state of intoxication as would completely deprive
her of her sense of perception and which would pervert her otherwise coherent
and credible testimony. At most, she
could only have been tipsy and it would not have been impossible for her to
know what was happening, as in fact she was able to vividly recall and narrate
with candidness every important and material detail of the sexual assault
committed against her.
This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that generally a
person under the influence of liquor, even if not to the point of inebriation as in this case, is prone to be
impulsive, irascible, or combative and less inhibited in his reaction to
whatever offends him.[25] Hence, contrary to appellant’s contention,
the physical condition of complainant at that time only served to fortify,
rather than debilitate, her testimony to the effect that she struggled hard to
resist the assault upon her, to wit:
“COURT: /to witness:
Q The Court heard you say that you
resisted. In what did your resistance
consist of?
A I picked up a stone.
Q What
did you do with the stone?
A I struck his head.
Q Was
he hit?
A No,
sir.
Q What
did he do when you struck him?
A He squeezed my hand.
Q When did you strike him with the stone, when
you were already lying on the ground?
A When I was lying flat on the ground.
Q When
he was already on top of you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you pick up a stone?
A Near the place where I was lying flat,
there were plenty of stones.
Q Was it before he inserted his penis (i)n
your vagina, doing the sexual intercourse?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q In
other words, you struck him with a piece of stone while he was on his sexual
act maneuver?
A Yes,
Your Honor.
Q When
you were forced to lie down, did you expect him to do something evil against
you?
A Yes,
Your Honor.
Q What did you expect him to do when you
(were) first made to lie down?
A That he will rape me.
Q So,
expecting him to rape you as you were made to lie down, what did you do?
A I
tried my best to run away.
Q Were
you able to run away?
A Yes, but he chased me.
Q The
Court heard you say that you were already lying flat on the ground; he mounted
on you and he removed your underwear. Why, what was your attire then?
A I
was in uniform, skirt and blouse.
Q Who
removed your underwear?
A (Witness pointing to the
accused Edmund Empleo)
Q What
did he do with your skirt?
A He
opened my skirt.
Q When
he opened your skirt, what resistance did you do to prevent him?
A I kicked him.
Q Was
he hit?
A He
was hit on his stomach but he was strong.”[26]
To round off her account, we present her testimony on
further cross-examination, a part of which has earlier been quoted:
“Q When your two (2) legs were released from his
holds (sic), did you use your legs to kick the accused?
A I tried to wriggle from himself (sic) but
he boxed me.
Q You tried to wriggle hard and harder in
order to release from the holds (sic) of the accused. Right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the very place where you were lying down
was a stony place?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because of wriggling hard and harder in
order to release from the holds (sic) of the accused, you suffered bruises in
your body especially that you were naked at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Particularly at the back of your body?
A In my thighs.
Q Only on your thighs?
A At my back also and my uniform was dirty.
Q In other words, while you were sexually
abused by the accused, your uniform was still there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, your uniform got dirty
because you were still wearing it?
A Yes, sir.”[27]
It is true that while complainant testified that appellant had
sexual intercourse with her, the medical findings showed that she was negative
of sperm cells. However, in People
vs. Balane, et al.,[28] we
held that:
“x x x The
accused-appellants argue that if there was really sexual intercourse, much more
rape, it would be the height of improbability, that nothing unusual was found,
not even a smear of spermatozoa in the vagina of the victim by the examining
physician.
“We ruled in People vs. Selfaison (1 SCRA 235) that such a
defense lacks merit. This Court stated: ‘The absence of such spermatozoa, however,
does not necessarily mean that the complainants had not in fact been
raped. The very authority cited stated
that such absence does not necessarily mean that the girl subject of
examination has not had any sexual intercourse. It need hardly be said here that in the crime of rape, the
slightest penetration is enough.’
“Resolving a similar issue in People vs. Carandang (52 SCRA
259) and People v. Ytac (95 SCRA 644) this Court ruled that the absence of
spermatozoa in the vagina is no legal obstacle to holding that rape has been
committed.”
Consequently, the rule is that the
absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the fact of rape. What is essential is that there was genital
penetration, which was unequivocally testified to by complainant.[29]
III. In the present case,
the defense relies heavily on denial and alibi. We need merely to point out that denials constitute self-serving
negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[30]
On his defense of alibi, appellant avers that at the time of the incident, he
was at the house of his friend, Reynaldo Orofeo, and that he left at past 9:00
P.M. The distance between the house of
Orofeo and Top Hill where the incident took place is more or less 80 to 100
meters and can be negotiated by walking for two to three minutes. From Top Hill to the house of Col. Fusillero,
where accused lives, is a distance of 180 to 200 meters.[31]
It was, therefore, not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Once again, we reiterate that for the defense of alibi to
prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its
vicinity at the time of the commission.[32] The
requisites of time and place must be strictly met.[33]
In this case, alibi cannot prosper where the residence of the accused is within
walking distance from the scene of the crime.[34]
Courts always receive with caution, if not suspicion, evidence of alibi, not
only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because of its easy
fabrication. To overcome the evidence
of the prosecution, an alibi must satisfy the test of full, clear, and
satisfactory evidence.[35]
Furthermore, alibi is held not to be a proper defense where no
improper motive was shown against the witnesses who identified the accused.[36]
In his testimony, appellant admitted that he is not aware of any reason why the
prosecution witnesses, especially complainant herself, would falsely testify
against him.[37]
The absence of any evidence as to the existence of an improper motive sustains
the conclusion that no such improper motive exists, and the testimony of the
witness should be given full faith and credit.[38]
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Nocon, and Puno,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on
leave.
[1]
Original Record, p. 1.
[2]
Ibid., 92-96.
[3]
Per Judge Generoso A. Juaban.
[4]
Appellant’s Brief, 15-19; Rollo, 105-108.
[5]
Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, etc., 198 SCRA 312 (1991).
[6]
People vs. Javier, et al., 182 SCRA 830 (1990).
[7]People
vs. Jutie, 171 SCRA 586 (1989); People vs. Fule, 206 SCRA 652
(1992).
[8]
People vs. Dumpe, et al., 183 SCRA 547 (1990).
[9]
TSN, October 19, 1989, 22.
[10]
TSN, October 19, 1989, 9-10.
[11]
Ibid., id., 12-23.
[12]
People vs. Reception, et al., 198 SCRA 670 (1991).
[13]
People vs. Gohol, et al., 170 SCRA 585 (1989).
[14]
People vs. Arbolante, et al., 203 SCRA 85 (1991).
[15]
Cf. People vs. De Guia, et al., 185 SCRA 336 (1990).
[16]
People vs. Alfonso, 153 SCRA 487 (1987).
[17]
People vs. Poculan, 167 SCRA 176 (1988).
[18]
TSN, January 25, 1990, 7-8.
[19]
Ibid., December 19, 1989, 8-9.
[20]
TSN, October 19, 1989, 17-18.
[21]
Cordial vs. People, et al., 166 SCRA 17 (1988).
[22]
People vs. Manzanares, 177 SCRA 427 (1989).
[23]
Manalaysay, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 99 (1989).
[24]
People vs. Doctolero, et al., 193 SCRA 632 (1991).
[25]
People vs. Aguiluz, 207 SCRA 187 (1992).
[26]
TSN, October 18, 1989, 9-11.
[27]
TSN, October 19, 1989, 18.
[28]
123 SCRA 614 (1983).
[29]
People vs. Bacalso, 210 SCRA 206 (1992).
[30]
People vs. Alcantara, 163 SCRA 783 (1988).
[31]
TSN, July 12, 1990, 5-6.
[32]
People vs. Sato, et al., 163 SCRA 602 (1988).
[33]
People vs. Luardo, et
al., 167 SCRA 685 (1988).
[34]
People vs. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623 (1988).
[35]
People vs. Villanueva, 208 SCRA 810 (1992).
[36]
People vs. De Guzman, et al., 164 SCRA 215 (1988).
[37]
TSN, July 12, 1990, 7.
[38]
People vs. De Guzman, 194 SCRA 618 (1991).