🎧 Case Brief Lecture

THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. BIBIANO CAPISONDA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 960. December 19, 1902 December 19, 1902

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United States versus Capisonda

The Case

This is a criminal case from the early years of the American regime in the Philippines. The United States, as complainant and appellee, prosecuted Bibiano Capisonda, a sergeant of police of the town of Gumaga, for the killing of Lucila Marasigan, a girl of fifteen years, by a shot from a gun. The charge was homicide under the old Penal Code. The case matters because it is a classic teaching case on the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty: an officer who admits the killing must satisfy the court that he acted in the bona fide discharge of his duty, and the Court here shows how that defense collapses when the surrounding facts contradict the officer's own account.

Procedural History

The defendant was tried and adjudged guilty by the lower court, which condemned him to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessories and the costs of suit, and in case of insolvency to subsidiary imprisonment, while reserving to the family of the deceased the right to indemnification. From that judgment the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and the judgment of the Court of First Instance, modified the penalty and the civil liability, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

Facts

On the evening of the twelfth of February, at eight o'clock at night, the defendant, then sergeant of police of Gumaga, was standing in front of the municipal presidencia, which served as the police quarters. Directly across the street, in front of the presidencia, stood Lucila Marasigan. The defendant fired at her, and she was struck in the left shoulder, the wound producing almost instant death. She was in front of the house of her sister, where she lived, and was about to enter the house when the shooting occurred.

The defendant admitted the killing and sought to justify it under paragraph eleven of article eight of the Penal Code, which exempts from criminal liability an officer who acts in the fulfillment of his duty. He testified that orders had been given that after eight o'clock at night no person should be permitted on the streets, and that any person found after that hour should be given the order to halt three times, and if the person refused to obey, he should be fired upon. He claimed that he saw a person advancing toward him at a distance of about thirty varas, that he gave the word halt three times, that the reply insurrecto was made, and that, not being able to distinguish the person, he discharged his gun.

The policemen who were present or nearby gave testimony that did not bear him out. One testified that the deceased was only about seven steps away, that there was a lamp in the house of the deceased giving light sufficient to recognize a person by, and that the shooting occurred just as the clock was striking eight. Another testified that the deceased was about six varas from the defendant, that the lamp shone clearly in the street, that the deceased could have been recognized by the light, and that the defendant said nothing before the shooting. The witnesses fixed the hour for halting persons at eight thirty or nine o'clock, not eight. The defendant was known to be personally acquainted with the deceased, who was well known in the town.

Issues

  • Whether or not the defendant was acting in the bona fide discharge of his duty as sergeant of police at the time of the killing, so as to be exempt from criminal liability.
  • Whether or not the killing of the deceased was wrongfully and intentionally done, making the defendant liable for homicide.
  • Whether or not subsidiary imprisonment may be imposed upon a person condemned to a penalty higher in the general scale than that of presidio correccional.

Applicable Provisions

Paragraph eleven of article eight of the Penal Code, as invoked by the defense, provides:

The following are not criminally liable: A person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

This is the justifying circumstance on which the defendant rested his entire defense, and which the Court found he failed to establish.

Article four hundred four of the Penal Code, under which the defendant was charged and convicted, defines the crime:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article eight, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide.

This is the provision under which the defendant was adjudged guilty of homicide and sentenced.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the defendant failed to establish that he acted in the bona fide discharge of his duty. The defendant, having admitted the killing, assumed the task of establishing his defense to the satisfaction of the court, not that the burden of proof shifted, but because it was necessary for him to prove his defense. The Court found a material contradiction: the defendant claimed his orders were to halt all persons found on the streets at eight o'clock, but he was contradicted by all the witnesses, who fixed the hour at eight thirty or nine. The deceased met her death precisely at eight o'clock, as the church clock was finishing the eight o'clock stroke. The Court reasoned that halting the deceased a half hour before the time fixed raised a very serious doubt as to the good faith of the defendant. The Court also found it highly improbable that the deceased, a girl of fifteen, would have uttered the word insurrecto, and that the defendant ought to have been able to distinguish her voice from that of a man. The claim that he could not distinguish her in the dark was disproved by the testimony that a lamp gave sufficient light to recognize a person. The Court concluded that the testimony was entirely sufficient to disprove the defense.

On the second issue, the Court held that the killing was wrongfully and intentionally done. The motive remained a mystery, but it was sufficient that the accused killed the deceased and had not established his defense, so he must suffer the consequences which the law imposes for the taking of human life. He was adjudged guilty of homicide as defined in article four hundred four.

On the third issue, the Court held that personal subsidiary liability on account of insolvency cannot be imposed upon a person condemned to a penalty higher in the general scale than that of presidio correccional. The judgment of the lower court on this point was erroneous.

Doctrine

An accused who admits the killing and invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph eleven of article eight of the Penal Code must establish that defense to the satisfaction of the court. The burden does not shift from the prosecution, but the accused must prove the facts that would exempt him. Where the evidence contradicts the officer's account, the defense of fulfillment of duty fails, and the killing is homicide under article four hundred four. Subsidiary imprisonment cannot be imposed upon a person condemned to a penalty higher in the general scale than that of presidio correccional.

Disposition

The Court adjudged Bibiano Capisonda guilty of homicide, fixed his punishment at seventeen years of reclusion temporal with the corresponding accessories and costs, condemned him to pay one thousand pesos indemnification to the heirs of the deceased, and affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance with that modification.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: an officer who admits killing another must prove to the satisfaction of the court that he acted in the bona fide fulfillment of his duty, and contradictory evidence destroys that defense. Examiners use this case to test the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty and the rule that subsidiary imprisonment cannot be imposed where the penalty is higher than presidio correccional.