JOSE REYNANTE, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN, BRANCH VIII, AND THE HEIRS OF LEONCIO…

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks
the reversal of: a) decision* of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 1990 in
CA-G.R. No. 19171 entitled “JOSE REYNANTE versus HON. VALENTIN CRUZ,
Judge, RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, and HEIRS OF LEONCIO AND DOLORES CARLOS, et
al.”, affirming the decision** of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 8, Third Judicial Region which
reversed the decision*** of the
Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch I, Third Judicial Region in
Civil Case No. 1526 entitled “HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS & DOLORES A.
CARLOS and HEIRS OF GORGONIO A.
CARLOS & CONCEPCION CARLOS versus JOSE REYNANTE: and b) the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows:

More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as
tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law of herein private
respondents, over a fishpond located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
with an area of 188.711 square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 25618, Land Registry of Bulacan.

During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa
hut where he and his family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he
had planted on lots 1 and 2
covering an area of 5.096 square meters and 6.011 square meters
respectively. These lots are located
between the fishpond covered by
TCT No. 25618 and the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Petitioner harvested and sold said nipa
palms without interference and prohibition from anybody. Neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos
question his right to plant the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest and
appropriate them as his own.

After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs (private
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest) entered into a written agreement
denominated as “SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
NG PAGSASAULI NG KARAPATAN” dated November 29, 1984 with petitioner
Jose Reynante whereby the latter for and in consideration of the sum of
P200,000.00 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme
Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as Caretaker or
“bantay-kasama at tagapamahala” (Rollo, p. 77).

Pursuant to the said written agreement, petitioner surrendered
the fishpond and the two huts located therein to private respondents. Private respondents thereafter leased the
said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz. Petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots
1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted therein.

On February 17, 1988, private respondents formally demanded that
the petitioner vacate said portion since according to them petitioner had
already been indemnified for the surrender of his rights as tenant. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner refused
and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2.

Hence, on April 22, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint
for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner
alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over the
physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of
the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or
disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto.

On January 10, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint and finding that petitioner had been in prior
possession of lots 1 and 2.

Private respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court and on
August 8, 1989 it rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:

“WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against defendant and hereby reverses the decision of the Court a
quo. Accordingly,
the defendant is ordered to restore possession of that piece of land
particularly described and defined as Lots 1 & 2 of the land survey
conducted by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan on March 2, 1983, together with
the sasa or nipa palms planted thereon. No pronouncement as to attorney’s fees. Each party shall bear their respective costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 55; Decision, p. 4).

From said decision, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review (Rollo, p. 30; Annex “A”). On February 28, 1990, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo,
being consistent with law and jurisprudence, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. The instant petition seeking to issue a
restraining order is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.” (Rollo,
p. 30; Decision, p. 3).

On November 5, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner (Rollo, p. 35; Annex “B”).

Hence, this petition.

In its resolution dated May 6, 1991, the Second Division of this
Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to file their
respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 93).

The main issues to be resolved in this case are: a) who between the petitioner and private
respondents has prior physical possession of lots 1 and 2; and b) whether or
not the disputed lots belong to private respondents as a result of accretion.

An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and
actual title to the property is never determined. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has
in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain
on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right
by accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria
(German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216,
September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495, 498, 499). On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical
possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if
he should be the owner of the property (Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil. 469 [1942]).

Hence, the Court of Appeals could not legally restore private
respondents’ possession over lots 1 and 2 simply because petitioner has clearly
proven that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2.

The evidence on record shows that petitioner was in possession of
the questioned lots for more than 50 years. It is undisputed that he was the caretaker of the fishpond owned by the
late Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and that he constructed a nipa hut
adjacent to the fishpond and planted nipa palms therein. This fact is bolstered by the “SINUMPAANG
SALAYSAY” executed by Epifanio Lucero (Records, p. 66), Apolonio D. Morte
(Records, p. 101) and Carling Dumalay (Records, p. 103), all of whom are
disinterested parties with no motive to falsify that can be attributed to them,
except their desire to tell the truth.

Moreover, an ocular inspection was conducted by the trial court
dated December 2, 1988 which was attended by the parties and their respective
counsels and the court observed the following:

“The Court viewed the location and the distance of the
constructed nipa hut and the subject ‘sasahan’ which appears exists (sic) long ago, planted and stands (sic) adjacent
to the fishpond and the dikes which serves (sic) as passage way of water river
of lot 1 and lot 2. During the course
of the hearing, both counsel observed a muniment of title embedded on the
ground which is located at the inner side of the ‘pilapil’ separating the
fishpond from the subject ‘sasa’ plant with a height of 20 to 25 feet from
water level and during the ocular inspection it was judicially observed that
the controversial premises is beyond the titled property of the plaintiffs but
situated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River it being a part of the public
domain.” (Rollo, p. 51; Decision,
p. 12).

On the other hand,
private respondents based their claim of possession over lots 1 and 2 simply on the written agreement
signed by petitioner whereby the latter surrendered his rights over the
fishpond.

Evidently, the trial
court did not err when it ruled that:

“An examination of the document signed by the defendant (Exhibit
‘B’), shows that what was surrendered to the plaintiffs was the fishpond and
not the ‘sasahan’ or the land on which he constructed his hut where he now
lives. That is a completely different
agreement in which a tenant would return a farm or fishpond to his landlord in return for the amount that the landlord would
pay to him as a disturbance compensation. There is nothing that indicates that the tenant was giving other matters
not mentioned in a document like Exhibit ‘B’. Moreover, when the plaintiffs leased the fishpond to Mr. Carlos de la
Cruz there was no mention that the lease included the hut constructed by the
defendant and the nipa palms planted by him (Exhibit ‘1’), a circumstance that
gives the impression that the nipa hut and the nipa palms were not included in the lease to Mr. de la Cruz, which
may not belong to the plaintiffs.” (Rollo, p. 49; Decision, p. 9).

With regard to the second issue, it must be noted that the
disputed lots involved in this case are not included in Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 25618 as per verification made by the Forest Management Bureau,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. That tract of land situated at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan containing an area of 1.1107 hectares as described in the plan prepared
and surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan for Jose Reynante falls within
Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond
development) under Project No. 15 per B.F.L.C. Map No. 3122 dated May 8, 1987
(Rollo, p. 31; Decision, p. 2).

The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that lots 1 and 2 were
created by alluvial formation and hence the properly of private respondents
pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

“Art. 457. To the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites
are present: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current
of the water; and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to
the bank of a river (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61647, October
12, 1984, 132 SCRA 514, cited in Agustin
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA
218).

Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by
alluvial formation and while it is true that accretions which the banks of
rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property
of the owner of the banks, such accretion to registered land does not preclude
acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription.

This Court ruled in the case of Ignacio Grande, et al. v. Hon.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962, 115 Phil. 521 that:

“An accretion does not automatically become registered land
just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens
Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion received by the
land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under
the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to the
land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed
by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection the land must
be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain
judicial procedures have been provided.”

Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit
(the lot in question), by accretion, still their failure to register said
accretion for a period of fifty (50) years subjected said accretion to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.

It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the
subject lots for more than fifty (50) years and unless private respondents can show
a better title over the subject
lots, petitioner’s possession over the property must be respected.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated February 28, 1990 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch I, is hereby,
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Associate Justice
Abelardo M. Dayrit and concurred in by Associate Justices Luis A. Javellana and
Felipe B. Kalalo.

** Penned by Judge Valentin R.
Cruz.

*** Penned by Judge Orlando C.
Paguio.