THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARSENIO RAÑOLA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision dated June 18, 1990 of the
Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 45, Masbate, Masbate in
Criminal Case No. 2493 entitled “People of the Philippines v. Arsenio
Rañola,” finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, qualified by treachery, sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and further ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the sum of P30,000.00.

The Information under which appellant was charged was dated
October 30, 1979. It read as follows:

“That on or about August 11, 1977, in the evening thereof, at
Barangay Lalaguna, Municipality of Mobo, Province of Masbate, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and hack with a bolo one Aleto (sic) Sanay
while the latter was sleeping, hitting him on the different parts of the body,
thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death.

“Contrary to law.” (Rollo, p. 4)

Upon arraignment on May 14, 1980, the accused, duly assisted by
counsel de oficio, waived the reading of the information and
entered a plea of “not guilty.”

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on June 18,
1990, the dispositive portion thereof states:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this court finds the accused
Arsenio Rañola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified
by treachery, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the amount of
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos.

“His bond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered
cancelled.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 19)

Hence, this appeal from the lower court’s decision raising the
following assignment of errors:

“A. THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PROSECUTION DESPITE THE INORDINATE AND
UNREASONABLY LONG DELAY IN FILING THE INSTANT CASE GIVING MOST SERIOUS DOUBTS
TO ITS CREDIBILITY.

“B. THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION’S SINGLE
EYEWITNESS DESPITE INCREDIBLE AND ABSURD ALLEGATIONS ON MAJOR POINTS OF SUCH
TESTIMONY.

“C. THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.” (Rollo, p. 49)

The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by prosecution’s
witness Richelda Sanay are as follows:

“xxx. (O)n the night
of August 11, 1977, while she and her family were sleeping in their house at Lalaguna,
Mobo, Masbate, she was awaken (ed) by a noise. She immediately stood up holding her child. She looked around and saw Arsenio Rañola hacking Alito Sanay, her
younger brother. She hid behind the
post which was dark, while her husband and her sons jumped out of the house
passing thru the other door. While
Arsenio kept on hacking Alito, his mother and wife arrived. Arsenio told them, ‘come up, see for
yourselves, Alito, I have already killed him.’ (His) mother answered, ‘good that you have already killed him,’ and she
further said ‘you surrender now.’ Arsenio answered yes and told her (mother-in-law) that he will go home
first to change his clothes. Thereafter, Arsenio went to his house bringing with him the bolo. Arsenio together with his wife
returned. In the yard (there) were
barangay officials. Arsenio informed
the barangay (officials) that he was the one who killed Alito Sanay and showed
them the bolo. The barangay officials
advised Arsenio to surrender to the authority. She further testified that the motive why Arsenio killed Alito is
because Alito was angry because Arsenio attempted to molest Alito’s two
sisters. Also Arsenio and (his)
mother-in-law made copra surreptitiously in the property of Alito’s
parents.” (Rollo, pp. 13-14)

The post-mortem examination conducted by Dra. Conchita Ulanday on
the body of the deceased shows that Alito Sanay suffered twenty-nine (29)
wounds on the different parts of his body, (Exhs. A and “A-1”). Wounds no. 5, 9 and 13 were considered
fatal. (Exh. “B” certificate
of death) (Rollo, p. 18)

The lower court noted that the infliction of as many as
twenty-nine (29) wounds on the deceased raises a very strong possibility that
he was assaulted while asleep, as testified to by his sister-in-law Richelda
Sanay and corroborated by the post-mortem report.

Appellant vehemently denied the charge of murder and interposed
the defense of alibi. He claimed that
at 8 o’clock in the evening of August 11, 1977, he was already resting in their
house at Mabiton, Lalaguna, Mobo, Masbate, up to 11 o’clock when he was
informed by Noli Malayahay that Alito was already dead. (see Rollo, p. 15)

However, the lower court found that the defense of alibi should
fail for the following reasons, to wit:

“1. The accused has
been sufficiently identified by his sister-in-law Richelda Sanay.

“2. The scene of the
crime is about one kilometer away from the house of the accused which can be
negotiated in twenty (20) minutes by hiking, that it was not impossible for the
appellant to be in the former place.

“3. 1st Sgt.
Felizardo Dante testified that he personally knew Arsenio Rañola who
surrendered to their station on August 12, 1977, alleging that he hacked Alito
Sanay with the bolo. Recorded in the
police blotter. (Exh. “C”)
People v. Tome, 123 SCRA 88)” (Rollo, pp. 18-19)

The trial court correctly rejected the appellant’s defense of
alibi in view of the clear and positive identification by the lone witness
Richelda Sanay of the accused-appellant as the killer of her younger
brother.

Courts always receive with caution, if not suspicion, evidence of
alibi, “not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also
because of its easy fabrication. To
overcome the evidence of the prosecution, an alibi must satisfy the test of
‘full, clear, and satisfactory evidence.’ This test requires not only proof
that the accused was somewhere else other than the scene of the crime, but
clear and convincing proof of physical impossibility for the accused to have
been at the place of the commission of the crime.” (People v. Baring, G.R. No. 87017, July 20,
1990, 187 SCRA 629, 635 citing People v. Gaddi y Catubay, 170 SCRA 649).

Aside from the fact that the accused-appellant did not present
evidence to corroborate his defense of alibi, the records of the instant case
are bereft of any showing that the appellant was so far away that he could not
have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.

Appellant claims that at 8 o’clock in the evening of August 11,
1977, he was already resting in
their house when he was informed by Noli Malayahay of Alito’s death. It appears on record that the house of the
deceased is about a kilometer away from the house of the accused-appellant or
about twenty (20) minutes to negotiate
the place by walking as testified to by
defense witness Oscar Abaño. (tsn, p.
5, 7/7/83) Rollo, p. 15). Hence, the
accused-appellant had more than enough time to commute or even walk to and from
his house to the scene of the crime then back to his house again.

If the required physical impossibility of being present at the
scene of the crime is not proved, alibi as a defense becomes unavailing to the accused (People v. Sorio,
G.R. No. 86211, October 17, 1990, 190 SCRA 548, 555).

Besides, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused (People v.
Sorio, ibid, citing People v. Felix Raquipo y Tolentino, G.R. No. 90766,
August 13, 1990). The lone prosecution
eyewitness categorically pointed to the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of
the crime under consideration. The
testimony of a lone prosecution eyewitness, as long as credible and positive
can prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused especially when, as
in the instant case, the evidence for the defense consists merely of denials
and alibis (People v. Sorio, ibid, pp. 555-556).

Appellant submits that the inordinate and unreasonably long delay
in filing the case gives most serious doubts as to its veracity and leads to the conclusion that the prosecution’s
allegation was concocted. He argued
that the alleged incident occurred on August 11, 1977 but the instant case was
filed only on September 27, 1979, or exactly two (2) years, one (1) month and
16 days from the alleged commission of the crime.

Answering this contention, appellee stresses that the alleged
long delay in the filing of the case by the victim’s father against appellant
is justified for the following reasons, to wit:

“1. Appellant is the
son-in-law of complainant and the latter was afraid because he was threatened
by appellant (p. 5, tsn, February 4, 1981).

“2. Complainant’s wife
persuaded him not to file the case immediately (p. 5, tsn, February 4, 1981).

“3. It was only when appellant attempted to kill
complainant that he filed the instant case (p. 5, tsn, February 4,
1981).” (Rollo, p. 93)

It is therefore not true that the long delay is unreasonable, the
same having been sufficiently justified by the circumstances of the case. In the light further of the fact that
appellant gave himself up to the police authorities at Mobo, Masbate, as early
as August 12, 1977 where he surrendered his bolo and admitted hacking Alito
Sanay (pp. 3-4, tsn, November 13, 1980) and which fact is duly recorded in the
police blotter, no serious doubts on the veracity of the complaint can
effectively be raised.

Appellant likewise claims that the trial court erred in giving
credence to the testimony of the prosecution’s single eyewitness despite
incredible and absurd allegations. Appellant claims that the declaration of Richelda Sanay that her husband
and son jumped out of their house passing through the other door and it was not
until morning that her husband returned is absurd since no husband would leave
his wife and child alone while a crime is being committed in their presence.

The argument is untenable because Richelda’s husband could have
jumped out of the house to avoid a possible attack upon him by the
appellant. Besides, there is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident. Different people react differently to a
specific situation.

The fact that Richelda’s estimate of the length of time within
which the hacking took place is too long, i.e., one hour, does not render her
testimony unworthy of belief. It is not
unnatural for a witness who sees a terrifying
scene to perceive that the hacking seemingly lasted like eternity especially
when considered with the post-mortem examination conducted by Dra. Conchita
Ulanday showing that the victim suffered 29 wounds on different
parts of his body. The infliction of
several wounds naturally took a long period of time.

Thus, We see no reason to deviate from the trial court’s
observation that Richelda’s testimony bore the earmarks of truth and sincerity
having been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straight-forward
manner. It is a fairly accurate account
of the crime in question and coincides with the post-mortem report and the
testimony of the investigating officer. In addition, there was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the
part of Richelda Sanay that might have led her to testify falsely against the
appellant.

It is well-settled that the testimony of a single eye-witness, if
found convincing and trustworthy by the trial court, is sufficient to support a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 71626,
March 22, 1991, 195 SCRA 505, 516).

Finally, appellant emphasizes that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on certain major points, which are as
follows:

a. Salvador Halayhay and
his sons were never presented in court giving further credence to the assertion
of the defense that Richelda’s testimony was imagined;

b. The alleged makeshift
police blotter was never presented as documentary evidence for the prosecution;

c. the bolo allegedly
surrendered by accused Rañola belonging to Salvador Halayhay was never
presented in court;

d. it is also of record
that a certain Pat. Macadat who allegedly investigated the eyewitness was never
presented by the prosecution even if his testimony could have been vital to the
prosecution; and

e. the alleged barangay
councilman who immediately went to the house to look at the body of the victim
was also not presented in court. (see
Rollo, pp. 63-64)

These contentions are devoid of merit.

It is up to the parties to determine for themselves whether it is
necessary to present corroborating evidence or to rely alone on its principal
evidence if they believe this to be sufficient (People v. Sorio, ibid,
p. 556, citing People v. Octavio
Juanga, G.R. No. 83903, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 226). The number of witnesses has nothing to do with the credibility of a
witness.

The non-presentation of Salvador Halayhay and his sons, as well
as Patrolman Macadat and the members of the Barangay Council, being merely
corroborative, is therefore, not fatal to the prosecution’s case. Their testimonies could have been merely a
duplication of the other prosecution witnesses’ testimonies.

Anent the appellant’s claim that the alleged police blotter was
never presented, the same is belied by the records as the said police blotter
was presented by the prosecution and the same was identified by prosecution
witness, Sgt. Felizardo Dantes (p. 4, tsn, November 13, 1991).

In the light of the foregoing considerations, there is a clear
indication that the trial court did not commit any error in finding the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the death of Alito Sanay.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court dated June
18, 1990 is AFFIRMED except as to the amount of indemnity the appellant should
pay the heirs of the deceased which is hereby increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.