DULCE BEO AND AUGUSTO LIANKO, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF DOMINADOR ABADA, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for review on certiorari involves an action
for possession and quieting of title over a parcel of land, the identity of which is the sole issue presented
for resolution.

The facts of the case, as gleaned from the record, are as
follows:

The spouses Francisco and Felicisima Lianko owned five (5) parcels of land situated in Hecming, Virac, Catanduanes.  These
lots were designated as Lot No. 1661-A, Lot No. 1661-C, Lot No. 1661-D, Lot No.
1662, and Lot No. 1663.^[1]
The object of the instant dispute is Lot No. 1661-D, which has an area of
181,035 square meters.^[2]

The couple was childless. 
Thus, when Francisco died on February
16, 1950, his entire estate, including his share of the five
aforementioned parcels of land, was inherited by his widow, Felicisima.  The latter however, had just one surviving relative
in the person of her nephew Dominador Abada, whom she appointed as administrator of her property
in 1956.

Felicisima Lianko
also had just one household helper named Dolores Buitre,
who had served her and her husband for many years.  Dolores continued to stay with her even after her husband’s
death.  During her years of service with
the Liankos, Dolores bore two illegitimate children
by Felicisima’s nephew, Dominador
Abada.  These
two children are none other than herein
petitioners.  Dominador,
however, married Virginia B. Abada, with whom he
eventually had thirteen children.^[3]

The instant dispute took root when Felicisima
Lianko purportedly donated one of her lots, namely
Lot No. 1661-D, to Dolores Buitre and her children,
as evidenced by a deed of donation dated November 15, 1950. 
Dolores allegedly accepted the donation for herself and her
children.  At the time of the donation, the five lots of Felicisima Lianko were yet unsurveyed.  It was
only in 1959 when she caused the survey of her land, with the consent of both
Dolores Buitre and Dominador
Abada.^[4]

According to the evidence presented by private respondents before
the court a quo, the 1959 survey delineated the property in the
following manner:  Lot No. 1661-A, Lot No. 1661-C, Lot No.
1661-D and Lot No. 1662 went to Dominador Abada, and Lot No. 1663 to Dolores Buitre.^[5] Private respondents further contend that, as
a consequence of said survey, Felicisima Lianko executed an affidavit dated February
6, 1963, wherein she
defined the boundaries of the lot she donated to Dolores, which is Lot No.
1663.

Petitioners, on the other hand, have a different version.  They claim that the aforementioned affidavit
is proof of a donation separate and distinct from the 1950 donation.  Petitioners
contend that the lots donated,
as well as the donees, are different in each
case.  In the donation of 1950, Felicisima Lianko donated Lot No.
1661-D to Dolores Buitre and her children, whereas in
the donation evidenced by the 1963 affidavit, it was Lot No. 1663 which Felicisima Lianko donated, and to
Dolores Buitre alone. 
To bolster their claim, petitioners presented a certification by the
Register of Deeds of Catanduanes that OCT No. 178
Vol. III covering Lot No. 1663 was
issued to Dolores Buitre on August 16, 1963, pursuant to Free Patent No. 203497 issued by the
Bureau of Lands on June 4, 1962.^[6] In addition, petitioners presented evidence
showing that after the death of Dolores Buitre, OCT
No. 178 was cancelled by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of Lot No. 1663
in favor of the heirs of Dolores Buitre
(petitioners), under TCT No. 103 issued on December 6, 1966.

At any rate, petitioners purchased Lot No. 1661-D (the very same
piece of land covered by the deed of donation of 1950) from Felicisima
Lianko for the sum of P10,000.00.  The transaction
was evidenced by a deed of sale dated November 23, 1973.^[7] The description of Lot No. 1661-D in the
deed of sale is exactly the same description of the property covered by the
deed of donation of 1950.  Petitioners
testified before the court a quo that they purchased the lot in
question in order to “reinforce” their ownership thereof, as they
believed that the donation of said lot to them and their mother did not convey
full ownership to them.^[8] Nevertheless, it was conceded by petitioners
that Lot No. 1661-D remained titled, and declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Felicisima Lianko.^[9] But they claimed to have possession of the
land from 1950 to 1972, and that after the sale, petitioner Augusto
Lianko tried to take possession and administration of
the lot, but was prevented from doing so by Dominador
Abada, who eventually inherited the entire estate of Felicisima Lianko when she died
intestate on March 31, 1976.^[10]

Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for possession and
quieting of title over Lot No. 1661-D against their father Dominador
Abada before the then Court of First Instance of Catanduanes, Branch 1, docketed as Civil Case No. 987.^[11]
During the pendency of the case, Dominador
Abada died and was substituted as party defendant by
his wife Virginia and his thirteen legitimate children.

After due trial, the court a quo rendered a
decision in favor of petitioners, declaring them to be the lawful owners of the
lot in question, and ordered private respondents to vacate the same and surrender possession thereof to petitioners.

On appeal, respondent court reversed the decision of the court a quo.  The appellate court found that based
on the evidence presented before the lower court, the land under litigation,
Lot No. 1661-D, was not satisfactorily proven by petitioners to be the same land subject matter of the deed of donation and the deed of sale
presented by them.

Hence, the instant petition for   review,
wherein petitioners raise three assignments of error, to wit:

1. “RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT;

2. RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
DISREGARDING PETITIONERS’ ORAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES; and

3. RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE APPEALED DECISION AND DECLARING
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS THE OWNERS OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.”^[12]

All these assigned errors may be put together into a single
issue:  whether or not Lot No 1661-D was
duly proved by petitioners to be the same land subject of the deed of donation
and the deed of sale.

A careful review of the record reveals that Our answer must be in
the negative.

What is fundamental in the correct resolution of this case lies
in the interpretation of the sketch plans^[13]
depicting the property of Felicisima Lianko which were presented by the parties before the trial
court, as well as the deeds presented by petitioners.  These are the only substantial pieces of
evidence in the record which would enable the determination of the identity of
the land under litigation.

The court a quo noted that as stated in the deed of donation, the adjoining land south of the land described therein is
stated to be that of Francisco Lianko.  (The five lots were previously titled in the
name of Felicisima’s late husband.) Consequently, the
lower court postulated that this southern boundary could at present be Lot No.
1662 and Lot No. 1663 in the sketch plans, as there is no land owned by
Francisco Lianko south of Lot No. 1663.  Hence, it concluded that based on the
southern boundary, the property described in the deed of donation could only
refer to Lot No. 1661-D.

It was likewise observed by the trial court that Lot No. 1661-D
as stated in the sketch plans^[14]
contains an area of 171,051 square meters, or more than 17 hectares, which is
closer to the land area of the lot described in the deed of donation, unlike
Lot No. 1663 which has an area of only six (6) hectares.

Finally, the court a quo held that Lot No. 1663
could not possibly be the land subject of the deed of donation and the deed of sale, contrary to the contention of
private respondents, because if the original certificate of title covering Lot
No. 1663 was based on the deed of donation of 1950, then the same should have
been issued in the name not only of Dolores Buitre
but also of her children.

It is plain to the eye that the foregoing findings of the trial
court in support of its award of Lot No. 1661-D to petitioners are at best weak and based largely on conjecture.

The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, based its reversal of the
lower court decision on the evidence presented and on established
jurisprudence.  A summary of said
decision would be proper at this juncture in order to show that denial of the
instant petition is called for.

According to the appellate court, the sketch plans presented by
both parties show that Lot No. 1661-D is bounded on the north by the properties
of Leonarda Vargas, Albino Taller, Victorino Vargas and Juan Sorra; on the east by Nicomedes Zafe, Dionisia de Lumbao, Juan Papango and Basilia Taller; on the south by a road; and on the west by
Lot No. 1661-A and Lot No. 1661-B.^[15]

In contrast, the land in question is described in the deed of
donation and deed of sale as being bounded on the north by the properties of
Felix Abundo, Carlos Zafe,
and Eulogio Zafe; on the
east by Maria Arcilla and Dionisio
Posada; on the south by Francisco Lianko; and on the
west by Pedro Tablate
and Alipio Benavides.^[16]

The appellate court observed that the boundaries as set out in
the sketch plans cannot be reconciled with the land descriptions as set forth
in the deeds of donation and sale.  Such
gross inconsistency can only lead to the inescapable conclusion that the land
described in the deeds of donation and sale do not pertain to Lot No. 1661-D,
as described in the sketch plans of both parties.  And because petitioners failed to explain the
discrepancy or present other evidence to prove with certainty the location and
area of the land they seek to recover, respondent court correctly applied the
invariable rule that a person who claims ownership of real property is
duty-bound to clearly identify the land being claimed, in accordance with the
title on which he anchors his right of ownership.  When the record does not show that the land
subject matter of the action for recovery of possession has been exactly
determined, such action cannot prosper,^[17]
as in the case of petitioners.  In sum,
proof of ownership coupled with identity of the land is the basic rule.^[18]

Corollarily, the rule is likewise
well-settled that in order that an action for recovery of possession may
prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not
only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed, by describing
the location, area and boundaries thereof.^[19] As the appellate court succinctly
stated, “he who claims to have a better right to the property must clearly
show that the land possessed by the other party is the very land that belongs
to him.”^[20]

Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that the boundaries as
set out in the sketch plans cannot be reconciled with the land descriptions as
set forth in the deed of donation and
in the deed of sale.  The incompatibility
is much too glaring to be ignored, such that the property described in the
deeds of donation and sale and the land in question cannot possibly pertain to
one and the same parcel of land. 
Moreover, respondent court also found that the court a quo
erroneously identified the land in question as Lot No. 1661-D simply on the
basis of the southernmost boundary of the land, and on its land area, which, as
stated in the aforementioned deeds, is more proximate to the land area of Lot
No. 1661-D than to that of Lot No. 1663 as stated in the sketch plans.  We uphold the finding of the appellate court
that the exact location and identity of the land under litigation cannot be
determined on the mere basis of the southernmost boundary without giving the
least consideration to the other boundaries. 
In like manner, the land in question cannot be determined as Lot No.
1661-D simply because the land area of the property donated as stated in the
deeds of donation and sale is “very close” to the land area of Lot
No. 1661-D as stated in the sketch plans. 
Such a finding can never approximate the standard
set by the law that the land being claimed should be clearly
identified.

Finally, we cite with approval
several material inconsistencies
considered by the Court of Appeals to further militate against the cause of
petitioners.  First, the latter admitted
that the land descriptions set forth in the deed of donation was based on old
boundaries.  There is no dispute that the
land was later surveyed.  And yet the
deed of sale contained the very
same land description as that found in the deed of donation.  Secondly, only Lot No. 1663 was turned over to petitioners by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement,
notwithstanding that they were at the time in possession of the deed of donation, thus giving them every reason to
include the lot purportedly covered by said donation in the extrajudicial settlement.  But they did not.  Lastly, it took
petitioners four years from the execution of the deed of sale in 1973 before
taking formal and positive action to claim Lot No. 1661-D.  Petitioners would not have committed, or
omitted, to do all the foregoing if they truly and honestly believe that Lot
No. 1661-D belongs to them.

Petitioners, however, invoke the general rule that findings of
fact of the trial court which tried the case and heard the witnesses are not to
be disturbed on appeal, unless substantial
facts and circumstances have
been overlooked which, if properly considered, might affect the outcome of the case.^[21] We have no objection to the rule
itself.  However, its application to the
instant case would be improper as the rule is usually more appropriate for
criminal cases wherein testimonies of witnesses are often the key to conviction or acquittal.  This is not to say, however, that it finds no
application in civil cases. 
Nevertheless, the aforecited rule cannot be
applied to the resolution of the case at bar as the latter falls squarely
within the exception to said rule, as above-stated.  The trial court clearly misappreciated
the evidence thereby warranting a reversal
by the appellate court.  Moreover, We
have ruled time and again that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court^[22] provided they are borne out by the record or
are based on substantial evidence,^[23] the very situation obtaining in the case at
bar.

Still grasping at straws, petitioners aver in the instant
petition that the disparity in the names of the owners of the lots adjoining
the land in question as described in the deeds of donation and sale and the sketch plans is most likely due to the
probability that these names may have changed over time.  Such a claim without the benefit of any hard
evidence to support it with is nothing but mere conjecture, much like the
decision of the court a quo in the instant case.  Suffice it
to say that to the very end, petitioners have miserably failed in proving their
ownership of Lot No. 1661-D.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated May 9,
1990 is hereby AFFIRMED.  No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Page 39, rollo.

^[2]
Ibid.

^[3]
Ibid, page 41.

^[4]
Ibid, page 40,.

^[5]
Ibid, page 40.

^[6]
Ibid, page 63.

^[7]
Ibid, page 33.

^[8]
T.S.N., Feb. 12, 1980,
pages 17 to 18.

^[9]
Pages 32 to 33, rollo.

^[10]
Ibid, pages 32 and 39.

^[11]
Ibid, page 39.

^[12]
Page 13, rollo.

^[13]
Exhibit “A.”

^[14]
Exhibit “A-1.”

^[15]
Page 42, rollo.

^[16]
Ibid.

^[17]
Del Valle vs. Mercado, et al., 34 Phil. 963 (1916).

^[18]  Flores vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 178 SCRA 717 (1989).

^[19]
Galace, et al. vs. Bagtas,
et al., 11 SCRA 687 (1964).

^[20]
Page 43, rollo.

^[21]
People vs. Caoile, 61 SCRA 73 (1974).

^[22]
Amigo vs. Teves, 96 Phil. 252 (1954).

^[23]
Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 332
(1979).