G.R. No. 95642. May 28, 1992
AURELIO G. ICASIANO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17 February
1987 with the Supreme Court against then acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of
Naic, Cavite, herein petitioÂner Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. for grave abuse of
authority, manifest partiality and incompetence.[1]
The administrative complaint arose from two (2) orders of
detention dated 18 and 27 November 1986 issued by the said acting judge against
complainant (Magbago) for contempt of court because of her continued refusal to
comply with a fifth alias writ of execution.
After evaluating the allegations of the complaint, respondent’s
comment thereon and the Court Administrator’s recommendation, the Supreme Court
dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit in an en banc
resolution dated 2 February 1988.[2]
Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, complainant Magbago also filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman the same letter?complaint earlier filed with
the Supreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge Icasiano, Jr. of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019, sec. 3 par. [e]). The complaint with the Ombudsman was
docketed as TBP-87- 00924.
After considering respondent Judge Icasiano’s answer, in a
resolution dated 7 April 1988 Special Prosecutor Evelyn Almogela-Baliton
recommended dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. The recommendation was approved by then
Special Prosecutor/Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales. It appears from the records of the Tanodbayan, which were
forwarded to the Supreme Court, upon order of the Court in connection with this
case, that the resolution dismissing the complaint was released on 14 April
1988.
The Solicitor General’s memorandum in the present case (p. 3,
par. 2) states that the office of the Tanodbayan received another complaint
from the same Romana Magbago (complainant in TBP-87-00924) which was docketed
this time as TBP-87-01546. The exact
date of filing of the second complaint is not stated but the records of the
case were allegedly among those transmitted to the then newly created office of
the Ombudsman; unfortunately, the transmitted records did not contain the
earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP-87-00924.
Special Prosecutor Nicanor Cruz, Jr. who was assigned to
investigate the case (TBP-87-01546) appeared completely unaware of the earlier
case, TBP-87-00924, because the following transpired in TB-87-01546:
1. Preliminary
investigation.
2. Petitioner
(Icasiano, Jr.) appeared on 7 November 1989 and asked for 5 days to file
counter affidavit; however no such counter?affidavit was filed.
3. The Clerk of Court
of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite was summoned to testify on the
contempt proceedings held before said court.
4. A resolution of the investigator dated 30
January 1990 was issued recommending the filing of the information.
5. A memorandum dated
5 March 1990 of Special Prosecution Officer III Jane Aurora L. Lantion adopted
the recommendation of the investigator.
The corresponding information against
herein petitioner was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 14563.
After said information was filed on 21 March 1990, petitioner (as
accused) filed a motion for reinvestigation which resulted in the issuance of
two (2) separate resolutions from the respondent Sandiganbayan, namely,
resolution dated 9, May 1990, reading:
“Considering that the ‘MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION’ filed by
accused Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Jr., which, among other things indicates that
he has been exonerated by the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter No.
MTJ-87-81 filed by the complaining party herein against the accused, the prosecution
is given fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof to indicate if the judicial act
or acts complained of have been taken to a superior court for review (and the
resolution thereof, if any) as well as whether or not the Supreme Court
Resolution dated February 2, 1988 in the above mentioned administrative matter
had already resolved the issue at bar, considering that the question of
evidence required therein cannot be greater than in criminal cases such as that
initiated by the instant Information.”
and Order dated 21 May 1990, reading:
“It appearing that the prosecution is still to submit its
comment on this Court’s Resolution requiring a review and affirmation of the
alleged exoneration of the accused herein by the Supreme Court which
exoneration, if true, would put at very serious doubt the prosecution of this
case against him, by agreement of the parties, the arraignment of the accused
is hereby reset for July 9, 1990 at 8:00 o’clock in the morning.“
Special Prosecution Officer III Erdulfo Q. Querubin responded to
the resolution of 9 May 1990 with a Compliance/Manifestation dated 28 May 1990
stating:
“x x x x
x x x x x
1. That the records in the
hands of the prosecution do not show any indication that the judicial acts
complained of have been taken to a superior court for review;
2. That prosecution’s
records do not contain any document or paper relative to A.M. No. MTJ-87-81,
Romana Magbago vs. Judge Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr., Municipal Trial Court,
Tanza, Cavite, except a xerox copy of the Supreme Court’s Resolution, dated
February 2, 1988, which was attached to copy (sic) of the Motion For
Reinvestigation and Deferment of Arraignment, dated May 8, 1990, furnished to
the Office of the Deputy Special Prosecutor on same date, and prosecution’s information
on the matter is limited to the text of said resolution.” [3]
The petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation was denied in the 29
June 1990 resolution, of respondent court, which stated thus:
“Both the accused and Atty.
Jaime C. Baldos having received this Court’s Resolution dated May 29, 1990 before
June 7, 1990 (when the registry notices were received by this Court) or more
than twenty-one (21) days ago, despite which the accused had failed to present
relevant papers and documents to demonstrate action by the Supreme Court as
(in) Administrative Matter MTJ 87-81 which would support his claims that the
subject matter of this case has been resolved by the Supreme Court in his
favor, his motion for reinvestigation is DENIED.”
Petitioner then moved to quash the information on the following
grounds:
1. that the accused shall be
placed in double jeopardy in so far as the resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court
in Administrative Case No. RTJ-87-81;
2. that there exists no valid
cause of action as may be filed against the accused.
3. that the Hon. Sandiganbayan cannot acquire valid jurisdiction
over the person of the accused and subject matter of this instant case.[4]
Denying the motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan held:
“Judge Aurelio
Icasiano, Jr.’s Motion to Quash dated July 16, 1990 is denied.
“The Supreme Court’s
resolution in Administrative Matter No. MTJ-87-81 lodged by the same
complaining person, Romana Magbago, whether of exoneration or conviction, even
if evidence beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction in said
proceedings, cannot serve as basis for the defense of double jeopardy because
MTJ-87-81 remains an administrative case and the instant proceeding is
criminal. One is not a bar to the
other.
“In an administrative
matter against a deputy clerk of court of a Court of First Instance and a clerk
thereat for shortages in the collection of court fees, the Supreme Court said,
‘…. It is clear that both respondents
Armando Soriano and Milo Tijam are still administratively and criminally
liable (despite restitution) for which they may still be prosecuted for
malversation.’ (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Soriano, 136 SCRA 461,
465, underscoring and words in parenthesis supplied).
“Necessarily, the
Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction over the criminal action arising from the
subject matter of the administrative case against the accused since it is only
the SandiganÂbayan which may hear prosecutions for the violation of R.A. No.
3019.”
A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence the
present petition relying on the sole ground that the respondent court acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in
denying his motion to quash the information, and that there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Initially, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court
ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from further proceeding with the
criminal case.[5]
After a closer look at the records of the case, the Court is of the view that
the distinction between administrative and criminal proceedings must be upheld,
and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to the other.
It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that
double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the Supreme
Court case (against the herein petitioner) was administrative in character
while the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in
nature.
When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any
of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as personnel
administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable
controversies. Administrative procedure
need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same acts subject
of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is
fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a competent court; c) a valid arraignÂment; (d) the defendant
had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.[6]
All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the administrative case, which should
take care of petitioner’s contention that said administrative case against him
before the Supreme Court, which was, as aforestated, disÂmissed, entitles him
to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the
Sandiganbayan.[7]
The charge against petitioner Judge Icasiano before the
Sandiganbayan is for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and
incompetence in having issued two (2) orders of detention against complaining
witness Magbago. Ordinarily,
complainant’s available remedy was to appeal said orders of detention in
accordance with the Rules. It is only
when an appellate court reverses the lower court issuing the questioned orders
can abuse, partiality or incompetence be imputed to the judge[8]. Here no appeal from the questioned orders of
the issuing judge (petitioner Icasiano) was taken: instead, administrative and criminal cases were filed against the
judge for issuing the orders.
It is precisely for this reason among others, that the
administrative case against petitioner was dismissed by the Supreme Court for
lack of merit; and yet, it cannot be assumed at this point that petitioner is
not criminally liable under R.A. 3019, par. 3(e) for issuing the questioned
orders of detention. In fact, the
Ombudsman has found a prima facie case which led to the filing of
the informaÂtion.
We now recur to the fact that the Tanodbayan had earlier
dismissed the complaint against petitioner Judge Icasiano for violation of Sec.
3(e) of R.A. 3019. This was in
TBP-87-00924. The case was dismissed
for lack of merit on 14 April 1988. Because no motion to re-open or revive the case could be found in the
pleadings, a resolution of this Court dated 30 April 1991 required the Office
of the Ombudsman to submit the pertinent office memorandum justifying the
re-opening of a case which had already been dismissed and to elevate the
records to this Court.
The Ombudsman’s compliance claims that it is not true that
TBP-87-01546 was “reopened.” “TBP-87-01546 was another case
involving the same parties and the same facts docketed separately from
TBP-87-00924.”[9]
He further
explained:
“TBP-87-01546 was among the several cases transmitted to the
then newly created Office of the Ombudsman in line with the intention to
relieve the former Office of the Tanodbayan of some of its long-pending
cases. The record of TBP-87-01546 did
not contain the resolution previously issued in TBP-87-00924 which was approved
by former Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales.
Upon the record of TBP-87-01546 being received in the Office of the
Ombudsman, it was assigned to Investigator Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr. for appropriate
action. Upon his recommendation, a
preliminary investigation was conducted with the respondent therein (herein
petitioner Judge Icasiano, Jr.) having been served with subpoena for the
preliminary investigation scheduled on November 7, 1989. Judge Icasiano affixed his signature to the
said subpoena and appeared at the hearing to ask for an extension of five (5)
days within which is to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the extension granted him, Judge Icasiano failed to file
any counter-affidavit nor to call attention to the fact that a similar case had
earlier been dismissed by the former Office of the Tanodbayan.”
No memorandum justifying reopening of a case previously dismissed
by the Tanodbayan was submitted to this Court by the Office of the
Ombudsman. What was submitted is a
memorandum dated 5 March 1990 signed by Jane Aurora C. Lantion, Special
Prosecution Officer III, which justifies the filing of the information for
violation of sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019 as amended, thus:
“x x x x
x x x x x
While there is no showing that a charge in writing or Petition for
Contempt has been filed againt defendant Magbago before respondent’s sala,
records bear out that petitions to declare defendant for Contempt have been
previously filed in Civil Case No. 404 on 10 February 1984, 13 June 1984 and 12
September 1984. There is no showing
that these petitions have been acted upon by the judges before whom the same
were filed. This, plus the fact that
the writs of execution could not be enforced against defendant Magbago, could
have been the reasons for respondent’s action herein complained of. Though the ends may be justifiable, the
means employed which contravene the requirements of due process cannot put the
imprimatur of legality to respondent’s judicial actuation subject of this case.
x x x x
x x x x x”
In any case, the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint
cannot bar the present prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et al. vs.
Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines,11 a preliminary investigation (assuming one had been
conducted in TBP-87- 00924) is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches.
In Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan,10 this Court also held:
“Moreover, there is no rule or law requiring the Tanodbayan to
conduct another preliminary investigation of a case under review by it
(him). On the contrary, under
Presidential Decree No. 911, in relation to Rule 12, Administrative Order No.
VII, the Tanodbayan may, upon review, reverse the findings of the investigator,
and thereafter ‘where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an
information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn statements
or evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting another preliminary
investigation.’”
In the present controversy, it will be noted that a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman in TBP-87-01546 to
accord the herein petitioner due process even if it could be argued that in
TBP-87-01546, the Ombudsman was merely reviewing the Tanodbayan’s original
dismissal of the complaint in TBP-00924 (involving the same parties and the
same facts), and he could have filed the information even without a new
preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued
earlier is LIFTED; the SandiganÂbayan is ordered to proceed with Criminal Case
No. 14563.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., on leave.
[1]
Docketed as Adm. Matter No. MTJ-87-81
[2]
Rollo, pp. 35-36
[3]
Sandiganbayan Record
[4]
Rollo, pp. 5-6
[5]
Resolution of 8 November 1990
[6]
People vs. Bocar, G.R. No.
L-27735, 16 August 1985, 138 SCRA 166
[7]
Consider however, Alejandro Suerte v. Municipal Judge Marcial G.
Ugbinar (Adm. Matter No. 88-MJ, 25 January 1977, 75 SCRA 69), where former
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando reiterated the concept first enunciated by
Mr. Justice Malcolm in 1922 in re Horrilleno (43 Phil. 212) that an
administrative charge against a judge, being in its nature highly penal, the
charge of serious misconÂduct against a judge must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt and governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. (De Guzman
vs. De Leon, Administrative Case No. 1328-MJ, 30 July 1987, 72 SCRA
177).
[8]
Garcia v. Alconcel, Adm. Matter No. 2499-CC [OCA-101], 30 January 1982,
111 SCRA 178.
[9]
Rollo, p. 72.
10
G.R. No. 68086, 24 September 1986, 144 SCRA 415.
11 G.R.
Nos. 92362- 67, 15 October 1991