SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND MA. LUISA VEROY, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. WILLIAM L. LAYAGUE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH XIV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AT DAVAO CITY; AND BRIG. GEN. PANTALEON DUM…

This was originally a petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: certiorari, to review the Order of the respondent Judge
dated October 2, 1990 denying herein petitioner’s Motion for Hospital
Confinement; mandamus, to compel respondent Judge to resolve
petitioners’ long pending motion for bail; and prohibition, to enjoin further
proceedings on the ground that the legal basis therefore is unconstitutional
for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided
at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village, Catalunan Grande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted
to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System
sometime in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East
Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in
Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had
their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soquilon for the
salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their
house. While the Veroys had the keys to
the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit
breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her access in
case of an emergency. Hence, since
1988, the key to the master’s bedroom as well as the keys to the children’s
rooms were retained by herein petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the
caretakers could enter the house.

On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol
Station, PC/INP, acting upon a directive issued by Metrodiscom Commander Col.
Franco Calida, raided the house of herein petitioners in Davao City on
information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel
soldiers. They were able to enter the
yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the
owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by
telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask permission to
search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of
rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to
Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be
conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP,
Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. The authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was
relayed by Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice
by telephone on the matter and that the permission was given on the condition
that the search be conducted in his presence.

The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the
house of herein petitioners in Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant
to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into
the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain
entrance into the kitchen. However, a
locksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock
of the door leading to the children’s room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children’s room and
conducted the search. Capt. Obrero
recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live bullets
in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of
RAM-SFP (samples of which were attached as Annexes “H” and “H-1” of the
petition) (Rollo, pp. 49-55) were also found in the children’s room. A search of the children’s recreation and
study area revealed a big
travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men’s brief, two (2) pieces
polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo, sweat shirt, two (2) pairs
men’s socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled “Islamic Revolution
Future Path of the Nation”, a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious
pamphlets was found in the master’s bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory
and receipt of the articles seized in the house (Annex “F” of the Petition,
Rollo, p. 48). Said receipt was signed
by Eric Burgos one of the caretakers, and George Badiang, the locksmith, as
witnesses. Sgt. Justalero turned over
the articles to Sgt. Rodolfo Urbano at the police station.

The case was referred  for
preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo
Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by
the Department of Justice through Department Order No. 88 dated May 16, 1990. In a resolution dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal
Ponferrada recommended the filing of an Information against herein petitioners
for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion) (Annex “L” of the Petition, Rollo,
p. 71). Hence, on August 8, 1990 an
Information for the said offense was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Davao City before the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 20595-90 and entitled “People of the Philippines
v. Atty. Leopoldo Veroy and Mrs. Maria Luisa Veroy” (Annex “K” of the Petition,
Rollo, p. 70). No bail was recommended
by the prosecution.

The aforementioned resolution dated August 6, 1990 of Fiscal
Ponferrada was received by the petitioners on August 13, 1990. On the same day, the latter filed a Motion
for Bail before herein respondent Judge Layague which was denied on August 17,
1990 for being premature since at that time, petitioners had not yet been
arrested. Despite the fact that the
warrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them, herein petitioners
voluntarily surrendered themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS
Chief, since it was the CIS that initiated the complaint. However, the latter refused to receive them
on the ground that his office has not yet received copies of their warrants of
arrest.

In the meantime, on August 15, 1990, herein petitioners were
admitted to the St. Luke’s Hospital for various ailments brought about or
aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal
complaint. On August 17, 1990, Brig.
Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they be allowed to be confined at the
hospital and placed under guard thereat.

In an Indorsement dated August 20, 1990, the CIS through Capt.
Benjamin de los Santos, made its return to the trial court informing the latter
of the voluntary surrender of herein petitioners and the fact that they were
under hospital confinement. Herein
petitioner reiterated their Motion for Bail. In an Order dated August 24, 1990 (Annex “M” of the Petition, Rollo, p.
74), the hearing for the Motion for Bail was set for August 31, 1990 to enable
the prosecution to present evidence in opposition to said motion. The prosecution filed its written opposition
(Annex “N” of the Petition, Rollo, p. 75) on August 28, 1990, arguing that the
evidence of petitioners’ guilt was strong and thereafter presented its
evidence.

On September 21, 1990, respondent Judge required the CIS to
produce the bodies of herein petitioners on October 1, 1990 for arraignment
(Annex “O” of the Petition, Rollo, p. 76). Upon their arraignment, herein petitioners entered a plea of not guilty
and filed an “Urgent Motion for Hospital Confinement” (Annex “OO” of the Petition,
Rollo, p. 77) which was denied by the court in its Order dated October 2, 1990
(Annex “P” of the Petition, Rollo, p. 80). It likewise ordered their commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation
Center, Ma-a, Davao City pending trial on the merits. Herein petitioners argued orally a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the prosecution. At the conclusion thereof, the court a quo issued a second
order (Annex “Q” of the Petition, Rollo, p. 83) denying their motion for
reconsideration and as to the alternative prayer to reopen the motion for
hospital confinement, set the continuance thereof to October 17, 1990. It was further ordered that the petitioners
shall remain under the custody of the PC-CIS pending resolution of the case.

Meanwhile, petitioners were returned to the St. Luke’s Hospital
where their physical condition remained erratic. On or about October 18, 1990, herein petitioners were informed
that Brig. Gen. Dumlao had issued a directive for their transfer from the St.
Luke’s Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the October 2, 1990 Order (Annex
“Q” of the Petition, Rollo, p. 83). Petitioners made representations that the tenor of the court order
warranted maintenance of the status quo, i.e., they were to
continue their hospital confinement. However, Brig. Gen. Dumlao informed them that unless otherwise
restrained by the court, they would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the
order of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. On
October 25, 1990 this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering: (a) respondent Hon. William L. Layague to
refrain from further proceeding with petitioners’ “Motion for Hospital Confinement”
in Criminal Case No. 20595-90 entitled “People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo
Veroy and Ma. Luisa Veroy”; and (b) respondent Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao to
refrain from transferring petitioners from the St. Luke’s Hospital (Rollo, pp.
84-A to 84-C).

On November 2, 1990, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners’ Motion
for Bail (Annex “A” of the Second Supplemental Petition, Rollo, p. 133). Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition on
November 7, 1990 (Rollo, p. 105) and a Second Supplemental Petition on November
16, 1990 (Rollo, p. 120) which sought to review the order of the trial court
dated November 2, 1990 denying their petition for bail.

Acting on the Supplemental Petition filed by petitioners and
taking into consideration several factors such as: a) that the possibility that they will flee or evade the
processes of the court is fairly remote; b) their poor medical condition; and
c) the matters in their Second Supplemental Petition especially since the
prosecution’s evidence refers to constructive possession of the disputed
firearms in Davao City through the two (2) caretakers while petitioners lived
in Manila since 1988, this Court, on November 20, 1990, granted petitioners’
provisional liberty and set the bail bond at P20,000.00 each (Rollo, p. 141). Petitioners posted a cash bond in the said amount on November 23, 1990 (Rollo, pp.
143-145).

The petition was given due course on July 16, 1991 (Rollo, p. 211). Respondents adopted their Comment dated December 28, 1990 (Rollo,
pp. 182-191) as their Memorandum
while petitioners filed their Memorandum on September 9, 1991 (Rollo, pp.
218-269).

As submitted by the respondents, and accepted by petitioners, the
petition for mandamus to compel respondent judge to resolve petitioners’
Motion for Bail, and the petition for certiorari to review the order of
respondent judge initially denying their Motion for Hospital Confinement, were
rendered moot and academic by the resolutions of this Court dated November 20,
1990 and October 25, 1990, respectively. What remains to be resolved is the petition for prohibition where
petitioners raised the following issues:

1.     
Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph
of Section 1 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution;

2.     
Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been repealed by Republic Act
No. 6968;

3.     
Assuming the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in admitting in evidence certain
articles which were clearly inadmissible for being violative of the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866
has been laid to rest in the case of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January
30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor
does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy.

Likewise, petitioners’ contention that Republic Act 6968 has
repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the
intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and
where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction
(Provincial Board of Cebu v. Presiding Judge of Cebu, CFI, Br. IV, G.R. No.
34695, March 7, 1989 [171 SCRA 1]). A
perusal of the aforementioned laws would reveal that the legislature provided
for two (2) distinct offenses: (1)
illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866; and (2)
rebellion, coup d’ etat, sedition and disloyalty under Republic
Act 6968; evidently involving different subjects which were not clearly shown
to have eliminated the others.

But petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866 is couched in general or vague terms. The terms “deal in”, “acquire”, “dispose” or “possess” are capable of
various interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not
the definition includes “constructive possession” or how the concept of
constructive possession should be applied. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and
ammunitions. They were in Quezon City
while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being charged under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein
the items were found belongs to them (Memorandum for Petitioners, Rollo, pp.
242-244).

Otherwise stated, other than their ownership of the house in
Skyline Village, there was no other evidence whatsoever that herein petitioners
possessed or had in their control the items seized (Ibid., pp. 248-250). Neither was it shown that they had the
intention to possess the Firearms or to further rebellion (Ibid., p. 252).

In a similar case, the revolver in question was found in
appellant’s store and the question arose whether he had possession or custody
of it within the meaning of the law.

This Court held that:

“The animus possidendi must be proved in opium cases
where the prohibited drug was found on the premises of the accused and the same
rule is applicable to the possession of firearms. The appellant denied all knowledge of the existence of the
revolver, and the Government’s principal witness stated that there were a
number of employees in the store. The
only testimony which tends to show that the appellant had the possession or
custody of this revolver is the inference drawn from the fact that it was found
in his store, but we think that this inference is overcome by the positive
testimony of the appellant, when considered with the fact that there were a
number of employees in the store, who, of course, could have placed the
revolver in the secret place where it was found without the knowledge of the
appellant. At least there is a very
serious doubt whether he knew of the existence of this revolver. In such case the doubt must be resolved in
favor of the appellant.” (U.S. v. Jose and Tan Bo., 34 Phil. 724 [1916])

But more importantly, petitioners question the admissibility in
evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.

Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had
permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it
was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged
“rebel” soldiers. The permission did
not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the
house. The items taken were, therefore,
products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence
against them.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures
must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto
are: (1) a search incidental to an
arrest; (2) a search of a a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).

None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein
petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment
center for rebel soldiers. While Capt.
Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he
did not have a search warrant
and the owners were not present. This
shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did
not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek
permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but
only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers
had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.

In a number of cases decided by this Court, (Guazon v. De Villa,
supra.; People v. Aminnudin, G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988 [163 SCRA 402];
Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987 [151 SCRA 279]), warrantless
searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had
every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal searches, were
inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions subsequently instituted
against the accused-appellants (People v. Cendana, G.R. No. 84715, October 17,
1990 [190 SCRA 538]).

Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of
this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary. Hence, the rule having been
violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were
confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary
principle. They cannot be used as
evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for
illegal possession of firearms. (Roan
v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala
prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge
that the same existed. Without the
knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted and the
criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., on leave.