JOSE DE GUIA, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, RESPONDENTS.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court and Article 181 of the Labor Code (Pres. Decree No. 442, as
amended), filed by petitioner on his own behalf, challenges the Decision of the
Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the finding of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) that petitioner’s ailment
“Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy with Vitreous Hemorrhage” is not
compensable.

Petitioner was first employed as storekeeper by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue on 23 March 1956. He
later earned several promotions as Assistant Agent, Assistant Examiner, Revenue
Examiner II, and Senior Revenue Examiner on 7 December 1977, until he became,
on 1 August 1985, a Supervising Revenue Enforcement Officer, which position he
held when disability forced him to retire at age 61 on 1 January 1988.

Petitioner claims that sometime in 1982, he experienced loss of
vision for which he consulted an eye specialist who diagnosed his visual
impairment as “the result of continuous visual insult in the pursuit of
his duties, wherein cataract and vitreous hemorrhage sets in as complication of
both eyes” (Annex A, Petition). Laser photocoagulation was prescribed and rendered in 1983 by another
eye specialist of the Eye Referral Center who found petitioner to be suffering
from “Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy with Vitreous Hemorrhage”
(Petition, pp. 3-4). On 8 August 1986,
he underwent panretinal photocoagulation at the Southeastern Eye Center of
North Carolina, U.S.A. (ibid.).

On 19 June 1987, he filed a claim for compensation benefits under
Pres. Decree No. 626. On 3 July 1987,
the GSIS denied his claim on the ground that petitioner’s underlying ailment,
“diabetes mellitus,” is not listed as an occupational disease and
that it has not been shown that the nature of his work had increased the risk
of his contracting his eye ailment. This Decision was affirmed by the ECC on 17 January 1990, which ruled:

“Our medical research shows that diabetes mellitus is a
disorder of carbohydrate metabolism which may be classified into primary and
secondary metabolism which may be classified into primary and secondary
type. Genetic susceptibility plays a
role in the pathogenesis of the primary type. The secondary type may be due to pancreatic disease, hormonal
abnormalities, drugs and chemicals, insulin receptor, abnormalities, genetic
syndromes and other factors. Complications of the disease involve the eye, kidney, nerves, blood
vessels and other organs. (Harrison’s
Principles of Internal Medicine, Braunwald, et al. 11th Edition).

“We have conducted a thorough study of the facts of the case
and after a careful analysis of the evidence submitted, we believe appellant’s
claim does not fall within the purview of the Employees Compensation Law (P.D.
626, as amended).

“The records of the instant case is (sic) bereft of evidence
which would show a causal relation between the ailment (diabetes mellitus) and
appellant’s former employment and working conditions. The case cannot, therefore; be considered as compensable.”
(Rollo, pp. 18-19)

Unsuccessful below, petitioner is now before us.

Petitioner alleges that, as Revenue Examiner, he spent endless
hours in examining voluminous income tax returns which subjected him to
constant physical and mental stress (Petition, p. 7). Citing the case of Millora v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, et al. (G.R. No. 69572, 28 July 1986, 143 SCRA 151), he claims
that these stresses in employment are medically recognized as predisposing
factors in the development of diabetes (Rollo, pp. 11-12).

We are constrained to reject petitioner’s submissions.

Under the Labor Code, in order that an employee may be entitled
to sickness benefits, they must have resulted from any illness (a) definitely
accepted as an occupational disease, or (b) caused by employment, subject to
proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.

Inasmuch as petitioner’s “diabetic retinopathy” and its
underlying ailment, “diabetes mellitus,” are not listed in the Table
of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex “A” of the Rules on
Employees’ Compensation, petitioner is required to prove a positive
proposition, which is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by
working conditions (Rodriguez v. ECC, G.R. No. 46454, 28 September 1989, 178
SCRA 30). That burden of proof,
petitioner has failed to discharge.

Petitioner’s “diabetic retinopathy” is a complication
linked with his diabetic condition, from which he was suffering for twenty-five
(25) years. The very medical
terminology emphasizes that complication. In other words, petitioner’s eye condition was not contracted by reason
of his employment but came about as a complication of an underlying
disease. Neither can it be said
therefore, that the risk of contracting the eye ailment was increased by his
working conditions for irrespective of those conditions, the complication could
have set in.

The underlying ailment, “diabetes mellitus” is neither
work-connected. It is a metabolic and a
familial disease to which, one is pre-disposed by reason of heredity, obesity
or old age. While petitioner states
that no one in his family is suffering from the illness, genetic susceptibility
is a factor that stretches from generation to generation. And even assuming that petitioner has
satisfactorily proven that he is not predisposed to the disease due to
heredity, he has not shown that he is not predisposed thereto due to old age or
obesity. Stated otherwise, irrespective
of the type of work that petitioner had been engaged in, he could have
contracted diabetes.

We thus find no causal relation between petitioner’s basic
illness, “diabetes mellitus” and its complication “diabetic
retinopathy” with his employment and working conditions nor can we say
that the nature of his work had increased the risk of his contracting either
ailment.

The medical certificate (Annex A, Petition), issued in 1982,
which certified that “visual impairment was the result of continuous
visual insult in the pursuit of his duties,” and that “cataract and
vitreous hemorrhage sets in as complications of both eyes,”
carefully avoided any mention of the cause of the complications, i.e., the
patient’s diabetic condition. It was
the diagnosis of “diabetic retinopathy” made by the Eye Referral
Center that pinpointed the exact ailment.

While, indeed, in the case of Millora (supra), it
was recognized that physical and emotional stresses could be predisposing factors
to the development of diabetes, that was because it was shown therein that the
claimant was not predisposed to “diabetes mellitus” by reason of old
age, obesity or heredity. Similar proof
is wanting herein. What has been
established is that petitioner had been suffering from diabetes for no less
than twenty-five (25) years, which means even before he became a Revenue
Examiner, when he alleges that he was subjected to physical and emotional
stresses.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the judgment under
review is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.