ITALIAN VILLAGE RESTAURANT AND/OR MR. ANDREW NG, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND FELICISIMO D. EVANGELISTA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari
to annul and set aside the July 31, 1990 order of the public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissing petitioners’ appeal for
not filing the cash or surety bond within the reglementary period as well as
the orders dated September 10, 1990 and October 2, 1990 denying petitioners’
motions for reconsideration.

It appears on record that at around 11:00 A.M. of August 26,
1988, private respondent Felicisimo Evangelista, a waiter of petitioner Italian
Village Restaurant, had a fight with another employee, Rodolfo Regala, inside
the waiter’s quarter of said restaurant resulting in his termination as per
memorandum dated August 31, 1988^[1]
issued by the petitioner for violation of the petitioner’s House Rules and
Regulations, paragraph 6, which penalizes with dismissal “an act of
initiating an actual fight or indulging in a fight inside the company’s
premises.”^[2]

As a result of his dismissal, private respondent Felicisimo
Evangelista filed a complaint against herein petitioner on September 9, 1988
with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, NCR,
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-09-03813-88 for illegal dismissal,
underpayment, illegal deduction, payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.

After hearing on the merits, a decision was rendered by
the Arbiter on October 20, 1989, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents to reinstate complainant
to his former position with all the rights, privileges and benefits
appertaining thereto and with backwages from September 1, 1988 until his actual
reinstatement. Further, respondents are
ordered to pay complainant the sum of P14,040.00 representing the accumulated
deductions from his salary. Finally,
respondents are also ordered to pay complainant attorney’s fees equivalent to
ten (10%) percent of whatever amounts adjudicated in his favor.

“All other claims of the complainant are hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.

“SO ORDERED.”^[3]

Petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 4, 1989
and the next day, December 5, 1989, petitioner immediately filed its appeal
with the National Labor Relations Commission.

On April 26, 1990, petitioner received an Order from the NLRC
dated April 25, 1990, as follows:

“1.     To post with the
RAB of origin or direct to Commission a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the regular Courts in the amount of thirty seven thousand nine
hundred fifty nine (P37,959.00)
Pesos more or less which is equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
you are appealing from; and

‘2.      To immediately
reinstate complainant(s) under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to his dismissal, or separation or, at APPELLANT’s option to reinstate him in
the payroll, and to submit proof of compliance thereof, otherwise, a Writ of
Execution shall issue.”

Instead of complying with the Order, petitioner filed on May 4,
1990 a motion for extension of ten (10) days from May 6, 1990 to post a surety
bond. And without waiting for an action
on its motion, filed on May 15, 1990 or nine (9) days from May 6, 1990, a
supersedeas bond.

For the late filing of its bond, the NLRC issued an Order dated
July 31, 1990 dismissing petitioner’s appeal which it received on August 28,
1990. The Order reads:

“However, the records show that the aforementioned compliance
was effected only after nineteen (19) days from receipt of the aforesaid Order
which determined the amount of the bond required to be posted.

“Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended,
provides among others, as follows:

“In case of judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company x x x.”

“Since the respondents had not filed any cash or surety bond
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the Order of this Commission
dated April 25, 1990, its appeal is deemed not perfected.”

Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied in the Order of
September 6, 1990 and so with its second Motion for Reconsideration on
September 25, 1990 (Annexes E, F and H-Petition), petitioner instituted the
present Petition for Certiorari.

Petitioners’ contention that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing their appeal has no factual or legal basis.

Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 provides:

“ART. 223. Appeal. – Decisions, awards, or
orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
such decisions, awards or orders. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

‘(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion
on the part of the Labor Arbiter;

‘(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or
coercion, including graft and corruption;

‘(c) If made purely
on questions of law; and

‘(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which
would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.

‘In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.’ (underscoring
ours)”^[4]

It is clear from the aforementioned provision of the law that the
appeal of any decision, award or order of a labor arbiter should be made within
10 days from receipt of said decision, award or order and in cases where the
judgment involves a monetary award, the appeal is deemed perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond also within 10 days from receipt of the order. Such mandatory periods are imposed to
prevent needless delays and to insure the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business.

In the case at bar, petitioner received a copy of the decision of
the Labor Arbiter on December 4, 1989. Immediately thereafter, or on December 5, 1989 petitioners filed their
appeal without the necessary supersedeas bond which should have been filed
simultaneously with the notice of appeal to perfect the same.

Public respondent instead of dismissing
right away the appeal of petitioners issued an Order on April 25, 1990,
directing the petitioners to file a supersedeas bond in the amount of
P37,959.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order, and which the latter
received on April 26, 1990. Consequently, petitioners have until May 6, 1990 within which to file
the supersedeas bond. This they did not
do. What they did was to file a motion
for extension of ten (10) days from May 6, 1990 or up to May 16, 1990. No action was taken on the motion in view of
Section 6, Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC which provides:

“No extension of period. No motion for extension of the period within
which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.” (p. 5, Memo of Private
Respondent)

Petitioners filed their supersedeas bond only on May 15, 1990 or
nineteen (19) days from receipt of the Order. Aside from the more than four months that the appeal was pending without
the required supersedeas bond, petitioners were still given a ten day period by
the public respondent in its order of April 25, 1990. How then can petitioners claim abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent. On the contrary, public respondent was more than lenient
to petitioners. Besides, up to this
point in time, private respondent has not been reinstated by the petitioners to
his former position as mandated by Article 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code
as amended, which states:

“In any event the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal.”

The perfection of an
appeal within the reglementary period from the decision is
jurisdictional.^[5]
To extend the period of the appeal is to delay the case, a circumstance which
would give the employer the chance to wear out the efforts and meager resources
of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained to give up for less
than what is due him.^[6]

At any rate, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the public respondent which “implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”^[7]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Exhibit “11”.

^[2]
Exhibit “5”.

^[3]
pp. 7-8, Decision; pp. 367-368, Record.

^[4]
Art. 223, Rollo, pp. 59-60.

^[5]
Veterans Philippines Scout Security
Agency vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 78062, 174 SCRA 347 (1989).

^[6]
Arceo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 51839,
June 14, 1989, Third Division, Minute Resolution.

^[7]
Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 38 O.G. 830; Palma vs. Q.
& S., Inc., 17 SCRA 97.