HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA AND BASSER MUSA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, FIFTH SHARI’…

Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari’a
District Court, and of venue, in an intestate proceeding, are herein raised.

Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri
Musa, a Muslim, who passed away on 31 December 1987.  He had six (6) wives, three (3) of whom he
later divorced, and twenty three (23) children. 
He had extensive real and personal properties located in the provinces
of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental.  Petitioners, Hadji
WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA
Musa, are among those he divorced, while private
respondent Hadji Jahara
ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving widows.  RIZAL Musa and
BASSER Musa are two (2) of his sons.

On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a “Joint
Petition for the Administration and Settlement of the Intestate Estate of the
Late Jamiri Musa and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership,” before the Shari’a
District Court, Fifth Shari’a District, with station
at Cotabato City (SDC Spec. Proceedings No. 89-19)
(the Intestate Case).  That Court
embraces the province of Maguindanao within its
jurisdiction but not the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental.

The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri
Musa, a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao,
left various properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao
(184 hectares), Davao del Sur
(61 hectares), and Davao Oriental (207
hectares).  Aside from
the settlement of the vast estate, also prayed for was the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership assets of the decedent and ABDURAHIM and the segregation
and turn-over to the latter of her one-half (1/2) share.

Appearing as oppositors were:  Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the divorced
wives, who also claim to be widows of the deceased; RIZAL, Putih
Musa and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the decedent; and BASSER,
another son.  They alleged that venue was
improperly laid, and that the properties of the decedent located outside Maguindanao were beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari’a District Court, Fifth Shari’a
District.

Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in
form and substance.  Respondent
Judge issued the Order of Publication on 11 July 1989 and initially set the case for hearing on 18 September 1989.

All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing
on said date where petitioners, through counsel, manifested their desire to
have the case amicably settled. 
Respondent Judge “in the interest of peace and harmony among the
heirs of the deceased Jamiri Musa,”
appointed the following as Special Administrators:  ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL, for all properties situated in Davao Oriental; and BASSER, for all properties situated in Davao del Sur.

However, on 4 October
1989, ABDURAHIM, in her “Manifestation and Motion to Cite for
Contempt,” accused BASSER, among others, of having allegedly fired upon
the house of her son-in-law in Maguindanao on 21 September 1989.

Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an “Opposition to Petition
for Administration and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership” was filed by
Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally married to the decedent
and, as such, there was “nothing to support her claim” of having had
a conjugal partnership with the latter; and that venue was improperly
laid.  Petitioners also asked that RIZAL
be issued Letters of Administration instead.

In her Reply, filed on 25
October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her marriage to the decedent
was admitted by the latter in various Deeds of Sale he had signed, which were
presented as documentary evidence.  Since
there was no amicable settlement reached, hearings on the Joint Petition were
conducted, commencing on 27 December
1989.

On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing
ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix upon the finding
that she was legally married to the decedent. 
Petitioners moved for reconsideration.

In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June
1990, incorporating the testimonies of the two (2) other witnesses
presented by Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order, dated 16 May 1990.  Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM as
Regular Administratrix was maintained.

On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a “Motion for
Reconsideration With Motion to Dismiss,” raising once again, mainly the
questions of venue and of jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the real
properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao
del Sur and Davao Oriental.

Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court’s
jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22
August 1990.  Hence, the
elevation of the instant Petition for Prohibition before this Court seeking to
enjoin respondent Judge Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari’a
District Court, Fifth Shari’a District, from further
taking action on the “Joint Petition.”

Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have
dismissed the Intestate Case for lack of jurisdiction and for improper
venue.  Private respondent maintains the
contrary.

We rule against Petitioners.

Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines,
explicitly provides that exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of settlement
of the estate of deceased Muslims, belong to Shari’a
District Courts.  Thus:

“Art. 143.  Original
Jurisdiction.  – The Shari’a District Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:

“x x x             x x x                 x x x

“(b) All cases
involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment
of administrators or executors
regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.” (Chapter
I, Title I, Book IV, par. (b)).  (Emphasis supplied).

Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate
of a deceased Muslim is, in
fact, involved herein, the Joint Petition was correctly filed before the Shari’a District Court, Fifth Shari’a
District.

In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention
to the Rules of Court mandating
that:

Sec. 1. 
Where estate of deceased persons settled.  – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.  The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.  The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.” (Rule 73).  (Underscoring ours).

It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at
the time of his death was actually
in Davao
City, not Maguindanao, as averred by ABDURAHIM, the proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari’a
District Court, Fifth Shari‘a District, and that
venue is more properly laid in Davao City before the
Regional Trial Court since there are no Shari’a
District Courts therein.

At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the
deceased in an estate proceeding is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but merely of venue.  The
law of jurisdiction confers upon Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts) jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased (In the matter of the intestate estate of Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).

To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao, Upi,
Maguindanao, and Davao City.  In fact, in various Deeds of Sale presented
as evidence by the parties, the decedent alternately stated his place of
residence as either Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, which is the
residence of ABDURAHIM, or Davao
City, where Petitioners
reside.  As this Court held in Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954), “a man can have but one domicile
for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence.” Venue, therefore, ordinarily could be at either place of the
decedent’s residence, i.e., Maguindanao or Davao City,
but for the provisions of the Muslim Code vesting exclusive original
jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and settlement of estates of deceased
Muslims, in Shari’a District Courts (supra).

But petitioners also contend that the Shari‘a
District Court, Fifth Shari’a District, presided over
by respondent Judge, has no territorial jurisdiction over properties of the
decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental, citing as
statutory authority therefor the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, which provides:

“Art. 138.  Shari’a judicial districts.  – Five special judicial districts, each to
have one Shari’a District Court presided over by one
judge, are constituted as follows:

“x x x             x x x                x x x

“(e)
The Fifth Shari’a District, the Provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the City of Cotabato.”

Indeed, Davao del Sur
and Davao Oriental are not comprised within the Fifth Shari’a
District.  In fact, those provinces are outside the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao created by Republic Act No. 6734, its
Organic Act.  But as stated in that law, “the Shari’a District Court and the Shari‘a Circuit
Courts created under existing laws shall continue to function as provided therein.” (Art. IX, Sec. 13).

Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides:

(4)  Except in cases of successional
rights, the regular courts shall acquire jurisdiction over controversies
involving real property outside the area of autonomy.” (Art. IX, Section 17 [4]).  (Underlining ours).

Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled with the fact that the
decedent was also a resident of
Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in that
province, venue has been properly laid with the Shari’a
District Court, Fifth Shari’a District, which is vested
with territorial jurisdiction over Maguindanao,
notwithstanding the location in different provinces of the other real
properties of the decedent.

A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to
the detriment of the expeditious settlement of estate proceedings (See Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 30 June 1988, 163
SCRA 237 [1988]).  Besides,
the judgment that may be rendered by the ‘Shari’a
District Court, Fifth Shari’a District, may be
executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.

“When an action covers various parcels of land situated in
different provinces, venue may be laid in the Court of First Instance of any of
said provinces, and the judgment rendered therein may be executed in other
provinces where the rest of the
real estate is situated” (National Bank v. Barreto,
52 Phil. 818 [1929]; Monte Piedad v. Rodrigo, 56
Phil. 310 [1931]; El Hogar Filipino v. Seva, 57 Phil. 573 [1932]; Bank of P.I. v. Green, 57 Phil.
712 [1932]).

The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts (Rule 73, sec. 1).  There should be no impediment to the application
of said Rules as they apply suppletorily to the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, there being nothing inconsistent with the provisions
of the latter statute (Article 187 of said Code).

And while Rule 73 provides that “the jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record,” we have taken cognizance of this Petition
for Prohibition considering that the jurisdiction of a Shari’a
District Court, a relatively new Court in our judicial system, has been
challenged.

WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the
case hereby REMANDED to the Shari’a District Court,
Fifth Shari’a District, for continuation of the
intestate proceedings.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento,
and Regalado, JJ., concur.