G.R. No. 95536. March 23, 1992
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., MARIA SALVACION SALUDO, LEOPOLDO G. SALUDO AND SATURNINO G. SALUDO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., AND PHILIPPINE AI…
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the
decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 20951 of respondent Court of Appeals[1]
which affirmed the decision of the trial court[2]
dismissing for lack of evidence herein petitioners’ complaint in Civil Case No.
R-2101 of the then Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch I.
The facts, as recounted by the court a quo and
adopted by respondent court after “considering the evidence on
record,” are as follows:
“After the death of plaintiffs’ mother, Crispina Galdo Saludo,
in Chicago, Illinois, (on) October 23, 1976 (Exh. A), Pomierski and Son Funeral
Home of Chicago, made the necessary preparations and arrangements for the
shipment of the remains from Chicago to the Philippines. The funeral home had the remains embalmed
(Exh. D) and secured a permit for the disposition of dead human body on October
25, 1976 (Exh. C). Philippine Vice
Consul in Chicago, Illinois, Bienvenido M. Llaneta, at 3:00 p.m. on October 26,
1976 at the Pomierski & Son Funeral Home, sealed the shipping case
containing a hermetically sealed casket that is airtight and waterproof wherein
was contained the remains of Crispina Saludo Galdo (sic) (Exh. B). On the same date, October 26, 1976,
Pomierski brought the remains to C.M.A.S. (Continental Mortuary Air Services)
at the airport (Chicago) which made the necessary arrangements such as flights,
transfers, etc.; C.M.A.S. is a national service used by undertakers throughout
the nation (U.S.A.), they furnish the air pouch which the casket is enclosed
in, and they see that the remains are taken to the proper air freight terminal
(Exh. 6-TWA). C.M.A.S. booked the
shipment with PAL thru the carrier’s agent Air Care International, with
Pomierski F.H. as the shipper and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the consignee. PAL, Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 Ordinary
was issued wherein the requested routing was from Chicago to San Francisco on
board TWA Flight 131 of October 27, 1976, and from San Francisco to Manila on
board PAL Flight No. 107 of the same date, and from Manila to Cebu on board PAL
Flight 149 of October 29, 1976 (See Exh. E, also Exh. 1-PAL).
“In the meantime, plaintiffs Maria Salvacion Saludo and
Saturnino Saludo, thru a travel agent, were booked with United Airlines from
Chicago to California, and with PAL from California to Manila. She then went to the funeral director of
Pomierski Funeral Home who had her mother’s remains and she told the director
that they were booked with United Airlines. But the director told her that the remains were booked with TWA flight
to California. This upset her, and she
and her brother had to change reservations from UA to the TWA flight after she
confirmed by phone that her mother’s remains would be on that TWA flight. They went to the airport and watched from
the look-out area. She saw no body
being brought. So, she went to the TWA
counter again, and she was told there was no body on that flight. Reluctantly, they took the TWA flight upon
assurance of her cousin, Ani Bantug, that he would look into the matter and
inform her about it on the plane or have it radioed to her. But no confirmation from her cousin reached
her that her mother was on the West Coast.
“Upon arrival at San Francisco at about 5:00 p.m., she went to
the TWA counter there to inquire about her mother’s remains. She was told they did not know anything
about it.
“She then called Pomierski that her mother’s remains were not
at the West Coast terminal, and Pomierski immediately called C.M.A.S., which in
a matter of 10 minutes informed him that the remains were on a plane to Mexico
City, that there were two bodies at the terminal, and somehow they were
switched; he relayed this information to Miss Saluda in California; later
C.M.A.S. called and told him they were sending the remains back to California
via Texas (see Exh. 6-TWA).
“It turned out that TWA had carried a shipment under PAL
Airway Bill No. 079-ORD-01180454 on TWA Flight 603 of October 27, 1976, a
flight earlier than TWA Flight 131 of the same date. TWA delivered or transferred the said shipment said to contain
human remains to PAL at 1400H or 2:00 p.m. of the same date, October 27, 1976
(See Exh. 1?TWA). ‘Due to a
switch(ing) in Chicago’, this shipment was withdrawn from PAL by CMAS at 1805H
(or 6:05 p.m.) of the same date, October 27 (Exh. 3-PAL, see Exh. 3-a-PAL).
“What transpired at the Chicago (A)irport is explained in a
memo or incident report by Pomierski (Exh. 6-TWA) to Pomierski’s lawyers who in
turn referred to said memo and enclosed it in their (Pomierski’s lawyers)
answer dated July 18, 1981 to herein plaintiff’s counsel (See Exh. 5-TWA). In that memo or incident report (Exh.
6-TWA), it is stated that the remains (of Crispina Saludo) were taken to CMAS
at the airport; that there were two bodies at the (Chicago Airport) terminal,
and somehow they were switched, that the remains (of Crispina Saludo) were on a
plane to Mexico City; that CMAS is a national service used by undertakers
throughout the nation (U.S.A.), makes all the necessary arrangements, such as flights,
transfers, etc., and see(s) to it that the remains are taken to the proper air
freight terminal.
“The following day October 28, 1976, the shipment or remains
of Crispina Saludo arrived (in) San Francisco from Mexico on board American
Airlines. This shipment was transferred
to or received by PAL at 1945H or 7:45 p.m. (Exh. 2-PAL, Exh. 2-a-PAL). This
casket bearing the remains of Crispina Saludo, which was mistakenly sent to
Mexico and was opened (there), was resealed by Crispin F. Padagas for shipment
to the Philippines (See Exh. B-1). The
shipment was immediately loaded on PAL flight for Manila that same evening and
arrived (in) Manila on October 30, 1976, a day after its expected arrival on
October 29, 1976.”[3]
In a letter dated December 15, 1976,[4]
petitioners’ counsel informed private respondent Trans World Airlines (TWA) of
the misshipment and eventual delay in the delivery of the cargo containing the
remains of the late Crispina Saludo, and of the discourtesy of its employees to
petitioners Maria Salvacion Saludo and Saturnino Saludo. In a separate letter on June 10, 1977
addressed to co-respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL),[5]
petitioners stated that they were holding PAL liable for said delay in delivery
and would commence judicial action should no favorable explanation be given.
Both private respondents denied liability. Thus, a damage suit[6]
was filed by petitioners before the then Court of First Instance, Branch III,
Leyte, praying for the award of actual damages of P50,000.00, moral damages of
P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
As earlier stated, the court below absolved the two respondent
airline companies of liability. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto,
and in a subsequent resolution,[7]
denied herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
In predictable disagreement and dissatisfaction with the
conclusions reached by respondent appellate court, petitioners now urge this
Court to review the appealed decision and to resolve whether or not (1) the
delay in the delivery of the casketed remains of petitioners’ mother was due to
the fault of respondent airline companies, (2) the one-day delay in the
delivery of the same constitutes contractual breach as would entitle
petitioners to damages, (3) damages are recoverable by petitioners for the
humiliating, arrogant and indifferent acts of the employees of TWA and PAL, and
(4) private respondents should be held liable for actual, moral and exemplary
damages, aside from attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.[8]
At the outset and in view of the spirited exchanges of the
parties on this aspect, it is to be stressed that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition filed in this Court to review on certiorari the decision
of the Court of Appeals.[9]
This being so, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The rule, however, admits of established
exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is
grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;[10]
(g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion;[11]
and (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by
the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.[12]
To distinguish, a question of law is one which involves a doubt
or controversy on what the law is on a certain state of facts; and, a question
of fact, contrarily, is one in which there is a doubt or difference as to the
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.[13]
One test, it has been held, is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is
a question of law, otherwise it will be a question of fact.[14]
Respondent airline companies object to the present recourse of
petitioners on the ground that this petition raises only factual questions.[15]
Petitioners maintain otherwise or, alternatively, they are of the position
that, assuming that the petition raises factual questions, the same are within
the recognized exceptions to the general rule as would render the petition
cognizable and worthy of review by the Court.[16]
Since it is precisely the soundness of the inferences or
conclusions that may be drawn from the factual issues which are here being
assayed, we find that the issues raised in the instant petition indeed warrant
a second look if this litigation is to come to a reasonable denouement. A discussion seriatim of said issues
will further reveal that the sequence of the events involved is in effect
disputed. Likewise to be settled is
whether or not the conclusions of the Court of Appeals subject of this review
indeed find evidentiary and legal support.
I. Petitioners fault
respondent court for “not finding that private respondents failed to
exercise extra?ordinary diligence required by law which resulted in the
switching and/or misdelivery of the remains of Crispina Saludo to Mexico
causing gross delay in its shipment to the Philippines, and consequently,
damages to petitioners.”[17]
Petitioners allege that private respondents received the casketed
remains of petitioners’ mother on October 26, 1976, as evidenced by the
issuance of PAL Air Waybill No. 079-01180454[18]
by Air Care International as carrier’s agent; and from said date, private
respondents were charged with the responsibility to exercise extraordinary
diligence so much so that for the alleged switching of the caskets on October
27, 1976, or one day after private respondents received the cargo, the latter
must necessarily be liable.
To support their assertion, petitioners rely on the
jurisprudential dictum, both under American and Philippine law, that
“(t)he issuance of a bill of lading carries the presumption that the goods
were delivered to the carrier issuing the bill, for immediate shipment, and it
is nowhere questioned that a bill of lading is prima facie
evidence of the receipt of the goods by the carrier. x x x In the absence of convincing testimony establishing
mistake, recitals in the bill of lading showing that the carrier received the
goods for shipment on a specified date control (13 C.J.S. 235).”[19]
A bill of lading is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of
the goods and an agreement to transport and deliver them at a specified place
to a person named or on his order. Such
instrument may be called a shipping receipt, forwarder’s receipt and receipt
for transportation.[20]
The designation, however, is immaterial. It has been held that freight tickets for bus companies as well as
receipts for cargo transported by all forms of transportation, whether by sea
or land, fall within the definition. Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a bill of lading includes airway
bills of lading.[21]
The two-fold character of a pill of lading is all too familiar: it is a receipt as to the quantity and
description of the goods shipped and a contract to transport the goods to the
consignee or other person therein designated, on the terms specified in such
instrument.[22]
Logically, since a bill of lading acknowledges receipt of goods
to be transported, delivery of the goods to the carrier normally precedes the
issuance of the bill; or, to some extent, delivery of the good sand issuance of
the bill are regarded in commercial practice as simultaneous acts.[23]
However, except as may be prohibited by law, there is nothing to prevent an
inverse order of events, that is, the execution of the bill of lading even
prior to actual possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to be
transported. There is no law which
requires that the delivery of the goods for carriage and the issuance of the
covering bill of lading must coincide in point of time or, for that matter,
that the former should precede the latter.
Ordinarily, a receipt is not essential to a complete delivery of
goods to the carrier for transportation but, when issued, is competent and prima
facie, but not conclusive, evidence of delivery to the carrier. A bill of lading, when properly executed and
delivered to a shipper, is evidence that the carrier has received the goods
described therein for shipment. Except
as modified by statute, it is a general rule as to the parties to a contract of
carriage of goods in connection with which a bill of lading is issued reciting
that goods have been received for transportation, that the recital being in
essence a receipt alone, is not conclusive, but may be explained, varied or
contradicted by parol or other evidence.[24]
While we agree with petitioners’ statement that “an airway bill
estops the carrier from denying receipt of goods of the quantity and quality
described in the bill,” a further reading and a more faithful quotation of
the authority cited would reveal that “(a) bill of lading may contain
constituent elements of estoppel and thus become something more than a contract
between the shipper and the carrier. x
x x (However), as between the shipper and the carrier, when no goods have
been delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from
showing the true facts x x x. Between
the consignor of goods and a receiving carrier, recitals in a bill of lading as
to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were
delivered for shipment. As between the
consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital.“[25]
(Emphasis supplied.)
For this reason, we must perforce allow explanation by private
respondents why, despite the issuance of the airway bill and the date thereof,
they deny having received the remains of Crispina Saludo on October 26, 1976 as
alleged by petitioners.
The findings of the trial court, as favorably adopted by the
Court of Appeals and which we have earlier quoted, provide us with the
explanation that sufficiently overcomes the presumption relied on by petitioners
in insisting that the remains of their mother were delivered to and received by
private respondents on October 26, 1976. Thus –
“x x x Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago, Illinois, Bienvenido
M. Llaneta, at 3:00 p.m. on October 26, 1976 at the Pomierski & Son Funeral
Home, sealed the shipping case containing a hermetically sealed casket that is
airtight and waterproof wherein was contained the remains of Crispina Saludo
Galdo (sic) (Exh. B). On the same
date October 26, 1976, Pomierski brought the remains to C.M.A.S. (Continental Mortuary Air Services) at the
airport (Chicago) which made the necessary arrangements such as flights,
transfers, etc; C.M.A.S. is a national service used by undertakers
throughout the nation (U.S.A.), they furnish the air pouch which the casket is
enclosed in, and they see that the remains are taken to the proper air
freight terminal (Exh. G-TWA). C.M.A.S.
booked the shipment with PAL thru the carrier’s agent Air Care International,
with Pomierski F.H. as the shipper and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the
consignee. PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454
Ordinary was issued wherein the requested routing was from Chicago to San
Francisco on board TWA Flight 131 of October 27, 1976, and from San Francisco
to Manila on board PAL Flight No. 107 of the same date, and from Manila to Cebu
on board PAL Flight 149 of October 29, 1976 (See Exh. E, also Exh.
1-PAL).”[26]
(Emphasis ours.)
Moreover, we are persuaded to
believe private respondent PAL’s account as to what transpired on October 26,
1976:
“x x x Pursuant thereto, on 26 October 1976, CMAS
acting upon the instruction of Pomierski, F.H., the shipper requested booking
of the casketed remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo on board PAL’s San Francisco-Manila
Flight No. PR 107 on October 27, 1976.
“2. To
signify acceptance and confirmation of said booking, PAL issued to said
Pomierski F.H., PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 dated October 27, 1976
(sic, ’10/26/76′). PAL confirmed the
booking and transporting of the shipment on board of its Flight PR 107 on
October 27, 1976 on the basis of the representation of the shipper and/or CMAS
that the said cargo would arrive in San Francisco from Chicago on board United
Airlines Flight US 121 on 27 October 1976.”[27]
In other words, on October 26, 1976 the cargo containing the
casketed remains of Crispina Saludo was booked for PAL Flight Number PR-107
leaving San Francisco for Manila on October 27, 1976. PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 was issued, not as evidence of
receipt of delivery of the cargo on October 26, 1976, but merely as a
confirmation of the booking thus made for the San Francisco-Manila flight
scheduled on October 27, 1976. Actually, it was not until October 28, 1976 that PAL received physical
delivery of the body at San Francisco, as duly evidenced by the Interline
Freight Transfer Manifest of the American Airline Freight System and signed for
by Virgilio Rosales at 1945H, or 7:45 P.M. on said date.[28]
Explicit is the rule under Article 1736
of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier
begins from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force
and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless
the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu,[29]
and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance of
the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled to receive them.[30]
And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have
been placed in the exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for
the purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier has accepted
them.[31]
Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier, the liability of
the common carrier commences eo instanti.[32]
Hence, while we agree with petitioners that the extraordinary
diligence statutorily required to be observed by the carrier instantaneously
commences upon delivery of the goods thereto, for such duty to commence there
must in fact have been delivery of the cargo subject of the contract of
carriage. Only when such fact of
delivery has been unequivocally established can the liability for loss, destruction
or deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier, absent the excepting
causes under Article 1734, attach and the presumption of fault of the carrier
under Article 1735 be invoked.
As already demonstrated, the facts in the case at bar belie the
averment that there was delivery of the cargo to the carrier on October 26,
1976. Rather, as earlier explained, the
body intended to be shipped as agreed upon was really placed in the possession
and control of PAL on October 28, 1976 and it was from that date that private
respondents became responsible for the agreed cargo under their undertakings in
PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454. Consequently, for the switching of caskets prior thereto which was not
caused by them, and subsequent events caused thereby, private respondents
cannot be held liable.
Petitioners, proceeding on the premise that there was delivery of
the cargo to private respondents on October 26, 1976 and that the latter’s
extraordinary responsibility had by then become operative, insist on foisting
the blame on private respondents for the switching of the two caskets which
occurred on October 27, 1976. It is
argued that since there is no clear evidence establishing the fault of
Continental Mortuary Air Services (CMAS) for the mix-up, private respondents
are presumably negligent pursuant to Article 1735 of the Civil Code and, for
failure to rebut such presumption, they must necessarily be held liable; or,
assuming that CMAS was at fault, the same does not absolve private respondents
of liability because whoever brought the cargo to the airport or loaded it on
the plane did so as agent of private respondents.
This contention is without merit. As pithily explained by the Court of Appeals:
“The airway bill expressly provides that ‘Carrier certifies
goods described below were received for carriage’, and said cargo was ‘casketed
human remains of Crispina Saludo’, with ‘Maria Saludo as Consignee; Pomierski
F.H. as Shipper; Air Care International as carrier’s agent.’ On the face of the
said airway bill, the specific flight numbers, specific routes of shipment and
dates of departure and arrival were typewritten, to wit: Chicago TWA Flight 131/27 to San Francisco
and from San Francisco by PAL 107 on October 27, 1976 to Philippines and to
Cebu via PAL Flight 149 on October 29, 1976. The airway bill also contains the following typewritten words, as
follows: all documents have been
examined (sic). Human remains of
Crispina Saludo. Please return back
(sic) first available flight to SFO.
“But, as it turned out and was discovered later the casketed
human remains which was issued PAL Airway Bill #079-1180454 was not the remains
of Crispina Saludo, the casket containing her remains having been shipped to
Mexico City.
“However, it should be noted that, Pomierski F.H., the shipper
of Mrs. Saludo’s remains, hired Continental Mortuary Services (hereafter
referred to as C.M.A.S.), which is engaged in the business of transporting and
forwarding human remains. Thus,
C.M.A.S. made all the necessary arrangements – such as flights, transfers, etc.
– for shipment of the remains of Crispina Saludo.
‘The remains were taken on October 26th, 1976, to C.M.A.S. at the
airport. These people made all the
necessary arrangements, such as flights, transfers, etc. This is a national service used by
undertakers throughout the nation. They
furnished the air pouch which the casket is enclosed in, and they see that the
remains are taken to the proper air freight terminal. I was very surprised when Miss Saludo called me to say that the
remains were not at the west coast terminal. I immediately called C.M.A.S. They called me back in a matter of ten minutes to inform me that the
remains were on a plane to Mexico City. The man said that there were two bodies at the terminal, and somehow
they were switched. x x x (Exh. 6-‘TWA’,
which is the memo or incident report enclosed in the stationery of Walter
Pomierski & Sons Ltd.)’
“Consequently, when the cargo was received from C.M.A.S. at
the Chicago airport terminal for shipment, which was supposed to contain the
remains of Crispina Saludo, Air Care International and/or TWA, had no way of
determining its actual contents, since the casket was hermetically sealed by
the Philippine Vice?Consul in Chicago and in an air pouch of C.M.A.S., to
the effect that Air Care International and/or TWA had to rely on the
information furnished by the shipper regarding the cargo’s content. Neither could Air Care International and/or
TWA open the casket for further verification, since they were not only without
authority to do so, but even prohibited.
“Thus, under said circumstances, no fault and/or negligence
can be attributed to PAL (even if Air Care International should be considered
as an agent of PAL) and/or TWA, the entire fault or negligence being
exclusively with C.M.A.S.”[33]
(Emphasis supplied.)
It can correctly and logically be concluded, therefore that the
switching occurred or, more accurately, was discovered on October 27, 1976; and
based on the above findings of the Court of Appeals, it happened while the
cargo was still with CMAS, well before the same was placed in the custody of
private respondents.
Thus, while the Air Cargo Transfer Manifest of TWA of October 27,
1976[34]
was signed by Garry Marcial of PAL at 1400H, or 2:00 P.M., on the same date,
thereby indicating acknowledgment by PAL of the transfer to them by TWA of what
was in truth the erroneous cargo, said misshipped cargo was in fact withdrawn
by CMAS from PAL as shown by the notation on another copy of said manifest[35]
stating “Received by CMAS – Due to switch in Chicago 10/27-1805H,”
the authenticity of which was never challenged. This shows that said misshipped cargo was in fact withdrawn by
CMAS from PAL and the correct shipment containing the body of Crispina Saludo
was received by PAL only on October 28, 1976, at 1945H, or 7:45 P.M., per
American Airlines Interline Freight Transfer Manifest No. AA204312.[36]
Witness the deposition of TWA’s ramp serviceman, Michael Giosso,
on this matter:
“ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
On that date, do (sic)
you have occasion to handle or deal with the transfer of cargo from TWA Flight
No. 603 to PAL San Francisco?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
Yes, I did.
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
What was your
participation with the transfer of the cargo?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
I manifested the freight
on a transfer manifest and physically moved it to PAL and concluded the
transfer by signing it off.
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
You brought it there
yourself?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
Yes sir.
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
Do you have anything to
show that PAL received the cargo from TWA on October 27, 1976?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
Yes, I do.
(Witness presenting a
document)
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
For purposes of clarity,
Exhibit I is designated as Exhibit I-TWA.
x x x
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
This Exhibit I-TWA,
could you tell what it is what it shows?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
It shows transfer of
manifest on 10-27-76 to PAL at 1400 and verified with two signatures as it
completed the transfer.
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
Very good. Who was the PAL employee who received the
cargo?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
The name is Garry
Marcial.”[37]
The deposition of Alberto A. Lim, PAL’s cargo supervisor at San
Francisco, as deponent-witness for PAL, makes this further clarification:
“ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
You mentioned Airway
Bill, Mr. Lim. I am showing to you a PAL
Airway Bill Number 01180454 which for purposes of evidence, I would like to
request that the same be marked as evidence Exhibit I for PAL.
x x x
In what circumstances
did you encounter Exhibit I-PAL?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
If I recall correctly, I
was queried by Manila, our Manila office with regard to a certain complaint
that a consignee filed that this shipment did not arrive on the day that the
consignee expects the shipment to arrive.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
Okay. Now, upon receipt of that query from your
Manila office, did you conduct any investigation to pinpoint the possible
causes of mishandling?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes.
x x x
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
What is the result of
your investigation?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
In the course of my
investigation. I found that we received
the body on October 28, 1976, from American Airlines.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
What body are you
referring to?
x x x
ALBERTO A. LIM:
The remains of Mrs.
Cristina (sic) Saludo.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
Is that the same body
mentioned in this Airway Bill?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes.
ATTY. CESAR P MANALAYSAY:
What time did you
receive said body on October 28, 1976?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
If I recall correctly,
approximately 7:45 of October 28, 1976.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
Do you have any proof with
you to back the statement?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes. We have on our records a Transfer Manifest
from American Airlines Number 204312 showing that we received a human remains
shipment belong to Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo or the human remains of Mrs.
Cristina (sic) Saludo.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
At this juncture, may I
request that the Transfer Manifest referred to by the witness be marked as an
evidence as Exhibit II-PAL.
x x x
Mr. Lim, yesterday your
co-defendant TWA presented as their Exhibit I evidence tending to show that on
October 27, 1976 at about 2:00 in the afternoon they delivered to you a cargo
bearing human remains. Could you go
over this Exhibit I and please give us your comments as to that exhibit?
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
That is a vague
question. I would rather request that
counsel propound specific questions rather than asking for comments on Exhibit
I-TWA.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
In that case, I will
reform my question. Could you tell us
whether TWA in fact delivered to you the human remains as indicated in that
Transfer Manifest?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes, they did.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
I noticed that the
Transfer Manifest of TWA Marked as Exhibit I-TWA bears the same numbers or the
same entries as the Airway Bill marked as Exhibit I-A PAL tending to show that
this is the human remains of Mrs Cristina (sic) Saludo. Could you tell us whether this is true?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
It is true that we
received human remains shipment from TWA as indicated on this Transfer
Manifest. But in the course of
investigation, it was found out that the human remains transferred to us is not
the remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo which is the reason why we did not
board it on our flight.”[38]
Petitioners consider TWA’s statement that “it had to rely on
the information furnished by the shipper” a lame excuse and that its
failure to prove that its personnel verified and identified the contents of the
casket before loading the same constituted negligence on the part of TWA.[39]
We uphold the favorable consideration by the Court of Appeals of
the following findings of the trial court:
“It was not (to) TWA, but to C.M.A.S. that the Pomierski &
Son Funeral Home delivered the casket containing the remains of Crispina
Saludo. TWA would have no knowledge
therefore that the remains of Crispina Saludo were not the ones inside the
casket that was being presented to it for shipment. TWA would have to rely on the representations of C.M.A.S. The casket was hermetically sealed and
also sealed by the Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago. TWA or any airline for that matter would not have opened such a
sealed casket just for the purpose of ascertaining whose body was inside and to
make sure that the remains inside were those of the particular person indicated
to be by C.M.A.S. TWA had to accept
whatever information was being furnished by the shipper or by the one
presenting the casket for shipment. And so as a matter of fact, TWA carried to San Francisco and transferred
to defendant PAL a shipment covered by or under PAL Airway Bill No.
079-ORD-01180454, the airway bill for the shipment of the casketed remains of
Crispina Saludo. Only, it turned out
later, while the casket was already with PAL, that what was inside the casket
was not the body of Crispina Saludo so much so that it had to be withdrawn by
C.M.A.S. from PAL. The body of Crispina
Saludo had been shipped to Mexico. The
casket containing the remains of Crispina Saludo, was transshipped from Mexico
and arrived in San Francisco the following day on board American Airlines. It was immediately loaded by PAL on its
flight for Manila.
“The foregoing points at C.M.A.S., not defendant TWA much less
defendant PAL, as the ONE responsible for the switching or mix-up of the two bodies
at the Chicago Airport terminal, and started a chain reaction of the
misshipment of the body of Crispina Saludo and a one-day delay in the delivery
thereof to its destination.[40]
Verily, no amount of inspection by respondent airline companies
could have guarded against the switching that had already taken place. Or, granting that they could have opened the
casket to inspect its contents, private respondents had no means of
ascertaining whether the body therein contained was indeed that of Crispina Saludo
except, possibly, if the body was that of a male person and such fact was
visually apparent upon opening the casket. However, to repeat, private respondents had no authority to unseal and
open the same nor did they have any reason or justification to resort thereto.
It is the right of the carrier to require good faith on the part
of those persons who deliver goods to be carried, or enter into contracts with
it, and inasmuch as the freight may depend on the value of the article to be
carried, the carrier ordinarily has the right to inquire as to its value. Ordinarily, too, it is the duty of the
carrier to make inquiry as to the general nature of the articles shipped and of
their value before it consents to carry them; and its failure to do so cannot
defeat the shipper’s right to recovery of the full value of the package if
lost, in the absence of showing of fraud or deceit on the part of the
shipper. In the absence of more
definite information, the carrier has the right to accept shipper’s marks as to
the contents of the package offered for transportation and is not bound to
inquire particularly about them in order to take advantage of a false
classification and where a shipper expressly represents the contents of a
package to be of a designated character, it is not the duty of the carrier to
ask for a repetition of the statement nor disbelieve it and open the box and
see for itself.[41]
However, where a common carrier has reasonable ground to suspect that the
offered goods are of a dangerous or illegal character, the carrier has the
right to know the character of such goods and to insist on an inspection, if
reasonable and practical under the circumstances, as a condition of receiving
and transporting such goods.[42]
It can safely be said then that a common carrier is entitled to
fair representation of the nature and value of the goods to be carried, with
the concomitant right to rely thereon, and further noting at this juncture that
a carrier has no obligation to inquire into the correctness or sufficiency of such
information.[43]
The consequent duty to conduct an inspection thereof arises in the event that
there should be reason to doubt the veracity of such representations. Therefore, to be subjected to unusual
search, other than the routinary inspection procedure customarily undertaken,
there must exist proof that would justify cause for apprehension that the
baggage is dangerous as to warrant exhaustive inspection, or even refusal to
accept carriage of the same; and it is the failure of the carrier to act accordingly
in the face of such proof that constitutes the basis of the common carrier’s
liability.[44]
In the case at bar, private respondents had no reason whatsoever
to doubt the truth of the shipper’s representations. The airway bill expressly providing that “carrier certifies
goods received below were received for carriage,” and that the cargo
contained “casketed human remains of Crispina Saludo,” was issued on
the basis of such representations. The
reliance thereon by private respondents was reasonable and, for so doing, they
cannot be said to have acted negligently. Likewise, no evidence was adduced to suggest even an iota of suspicion
that the cargo presented for transportation was anything other than what it was
declared to be, as would require more than routine inspection or call for the
carrier to insist that the same be opened for scrutiny of its contents per
declaration.
Neither can private respondents be held accountable on the basis
of petitioners’ preposterous proposition that whoever brought the cargo to the
airport or loaded it on the airplane did so as agent of private respondents, so
that even if CMAS whose services were engaged for the transit arrangements for
the remains was indeed at fault, the liability therefor would supposedly still
be attributable to private respondents.
While we agree that the actual participation of CMAS has been
sufficiently and correctly established, to hold that it acted as agent for
private respondents would be both an inaccurate appraisal and an unwarranted
categorization of the legal position it held in the entire transaction.
It bears repeating that CMAS was hired to handle all the
necessary shipping arrangements for the transportation of the human remains of
Crispina Saludo to Manila. Hence, it
was to CMAS that, the Pomierski & Son Funeral Home, as shipper, brought the
remains of petitioners’ mother for shipment, with Maria Saludo as
consignee. Thereafter, CMAS booked the
shipment with PAL through the carrier’s agent, Air Care International.[45]
With its aforestated functions, CMAS may accordingly be classified as a
forwarder which, by accepted commercial practice, is regarded as an agent of
the shipper and not of the carrier. As
such, it merely contracts for the transportation of goods by carriers, and has
no interest in the freight but receives compensation from the shipper as his
agent.[46]
At this point, it can be categorically stated that, as culled
from the findings of both the trial court and appellate courts, the entire
chain of events which culminated in the present controversy was not due to the
fault or negligence of private respondents. Rather, the facts of the case would point to CMAS as the culprit. Equally telling of the more likely
possibility of CMAS’ liability is petitioners’ letter to and demanding an
explanation from CMAS regarding the statement of private respondents laying the
blame on CMAS for the incident, portions of which, reading as follows:
“x x x we were informed that the unfortunate a mix-up occurred
due to your negligence. x x x.
“Likewise, the two airlines pinpoint the responsibility upon
your agents. Evidence were presented to
prove that allegation.
“On the face of this overwhelming evidence we could and should
have filed a case against you. x x
x.”[47]
clearly allude to CMAS as the party at
fault. This is tantamount to an
admission by petitioners that they consider private respondents without fault,
or is at the very least indicative of the fact that petitioners entertained
serious doubts as to whether herein private respondents were responsible for
the unfortunate turn of events.
Undeniably, petitioners’ grief over the death of their mother was
aggravated by the unnecessary inconvenience and anxiety that attended their
efforts to bring her body home for a decent burial. This is unfortunate and calls for sincere commiseration with
petitioners. But, much as we would like
to give them consolation for their undeserved distress, we are barred by the
inequity of allowing recovery of the damages prayed for by them at the expense
of private respondents whose fault or negligence in the very acts imputed to
them has not been convincingly and legally demonstrated.
Neither are we prepared to delve into, much less definitively
rule on, the possible liability of CMAS as the evaluation and adjudication of
the same is not what is presently at issue here and is best deferred to another
time and addressed to another forum.
II. Petitioners further fault the Court of Appeals for ruling
that there was no contractual breach on the part of private respondents as
would entitle petitioners to damages.
Petitioners hold that respondent TWA, by agreeing to transport
the remains of petitioners’ mother on its Flight 131 from Chicago to San
Francisco on October 27, 1976, made itself a party to the contract of carriage and,
therefore, was bound by the terms of the issued airway bill. When TWA undertook to ship the remains on
its Flight 603, ten hours earlier than scheduled, it supposedly violated the
express agreement embodied in the airway bill. It was allegedly this breach of obligation which compounded, if not
directly caused, the switching of the caskets.
In addition, petitioners maintain that since there is no evidence
as to who placed the body on board Flight 603, or that CMAS actually put the
cargo on that flight, or that the two caskets at the Chicago airport were to be
transported by the same airline, or that they came from the same funeral home,
or that both caskets were received by CMAS, then the employees or agents of TWA
presumably caused the mix-up by loading the wrong casket on the plane. For said error, they contend, TWA must
necessarily be presumed negligent and this presumption of negligence stands
undisturbed unless rebutting evidence is presented to show that the switching
or misdelivery was due to circumstances that would exempt the carrier from
liability.
Private respondent TWA professes otherwise. Having duly delivered or transferred the
cargo to its co-respondent PAL on October 27, 1976 at 2:00 P.M., as supported
by the TWA Transfer Manifest, TWA faithfully complied with its obligation under
the airway bill. Said faithful
compliance was not affected by the fact that the remains were shipped on an
earlier flight as there was no fixed time for completion of carriage stipulated
on. Moreover, the carrier did not
undertake to carry the cargo aboard any specified aircraft, in view of the
condition on the back of the airway bill which provides:
“CONDITIONS
OF CONTRACT
x x x
“It is agreed that no time is fixed for the completion of
carriage hereunder and that Carrier may without notice substitute alternate
carriers or aircraft. Carrier assumes
no obligation to carry the goods by any specified aircraft or over any
particular route or routes or to make connection at any point according to any
particular schedule, and Carrier is hereby authorized to select, or deviate
from the route or routes of shipment, notwithstanding that the same may be
stated on the face hereof. The shipper
guarantees payment of all charges and advances.”[48]
Hence, when respondent TWA shipped the
body on an earlier flight and on a different aircraft, it was acting well
within its rights. We find this
argument tenable.
The contention that there was contractual breach on the part of
private respondents is founded on the postulation that there was ambiguity in
the terms of the airway bill, hence petitioners’ insistence on the application
of the rules on interpretation of contracts and documents. We find no such ambiguity. The terms are clear enough as to preclude
the necessity to probe beyond the apparent intendment of the contractual
provisions.
The hornbook rule on interpretation of contracts consecrates the
primacy of the intention of the parties, the same having the force of law
between them. When the terms of the
agreement are clear and explicit, that they do not justify an attempt to read
into any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to be understood
literally just as they appear on the face of the contract.[49]
The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together[50]
and such a construction is to be adopted as will give effect to all provisions
thereof.[51]
A contract cannot be construed by parts, but its clauses should be interpreted
in relation to one another. The whole
contract must be interpreted or read together in order to arrive at its true
meaning. Certain stipulations cannot be
segregated and then made to control; neither do particular words or phrases
necessarily determine the character of a contract. The legal effect of the contract is not to be determined alone by
any particular provision disconnected from all others, but in the ruling
intention of the parties as gathered from all the language they have used and
from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[52]
Turning to the terms of
the contract at hand, as presented by PAL Air Waybill No. 079-01180454,
respondent court approvingly quoted the trial court’s disquisition on the
aforequoted condition appearing on the reverse side of the airway bill and its
disposition of this particular assigned error:
“The foregoing stipulation fully answers plaintiffs’
objections to the one-day delay and the shipping of the remains in TWA Flight
603 instead of TWA Flight 131. Under
the stipulation, parties agreed that no time was fixed to complete the contract
of carriage and that the carrier may, without notice, substitute alternate
carriers or aircraft. The carrier did
not assume the obligation to carry the shipment on any specified aircraft.
x x x
“Furthermore, contrary to the claim of plaintiffs-appellants,
the conditions of the Air Waybill are big enough, to be read and noticed. Also, the mere fact that the cargo in
question was shipped in TWA Flight 603, a flight earlier on the same day than
TWA Flight 131, did not in any way cause or add to the one-day delay complained
of and/or the switching or mix-up of the bodies.”[53]
Indubitably, that private respondent can use substitute aircraft
even without notice and without the assumption of any obligation whatsoever to
carry the goods on any specified aircraft is clearly sanctioned by the contract
of carriage as specifically provided for under the conditions thereof.
Petitioners’ invocation of the interpretative rule in the Rules
of Court that written words control printed words in documents,[54]
to bolster their assertion that the typewritten provisions regarding the
routing and flight schedule prevail over the printed conditions, is
tenuous. Said rule may be considered
only when there is inconsistency between the written and printed words of the
contract.
As previously stated, we find no ambiguity in the contract
subject of this case that would call for the application of said rule. In any event, the contract has provided for
such a situation by explicitly stating that the above condition remains
effective “notwithstanding that the same (fixed time for completion of
carriage, specified aircraft, or any particular route or schedule) may be
stated on the face hereof.” While petitioners hinge private respondents’
culpability on the fact that the carrier “certifies goods described below
were received for carriage,” they may have overlooked that the statement
on the face of the airway bill properly and completely reads –
“Carrier certifies goods described below were received for
carriage subject to the Conditions on the reverse hereof the goods then
being in apparent good order and condition except as noted hereon.”[55]
(Emphasis ours.)
Private respondents further aptly observe
that the carrier’s certification regarding receipt of the goods for carriage
“was of a smaller print than the condition of the Air Waybill, including
Condition No. 5 – and thus if plaintiffs-appellants had recognized the former,
then with more reason they were aware of the latter.”[56]
In the same vein, it would also be incorrect to accede to the
suggestion of petitioners that the typewritten specifications of the flight,
routes and dates of departures and arrivals on the face of the airway bill
constitute a special contract which modifies the printed conditions at the back
thereof. We reiterate that typewritten
provisions of the contract are to be read and understood subject to and in view
of the printed conditions, fully reconciling and giving effect to the manifest
intention of the parties to the agreement.
The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier’s liability for delay
is that in the absence of a special contract, a carrier is not an insurer
against delay in transportation of goods. When a common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a
contract that they shall be delivered at destination within a reasonable time,
in the absence of any agreement as to the time of delivery.[57]
But where a carrier has made an express contract to transport and deliver
property within a specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract and is
liable for any delay, no matter from what cause it may have arisen.[58]
This result logically follows from the well-settled rule that where the law
creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled from performing it without
any default in himself, and has no remedy over, then the law will excuse him,
but where the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself,
he is bound to make it good notwithstanding any accident or delay by inevitable
necessity because he might have provided against it by contract. Whether or not there has been such an
undertaking on the part of the carrier is to be determined from the
circumstances surrounding the case and by application of the ordinary rules for
the interpretation of contracts.[59]
Echoing the findings of the trial court, the respondent court
correctly declared that ?
“In a similar case of delayed delivery of air cargo under a
very similar stipulation contained in the airway bill which reads: ‘The carrier does not obligate itself to
carry the goods by any specified aircraft or on a specified time. Said carrier being hereby authorized to
deviate from the route of the shipment without any liability therefor’, our
Supreme Court ruled that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and
to deliver merchandise, and persons are not vested with the right to prompt
delivery, unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation. Said rights and obligations are created by a
specific contract entered into by the parties (Mendoza vs. PAL, 90 Phil.
836).
“There is no showing by plaintiffs that such a special or
specific contract had been entered into between them and the defendant airline
companies.
“And this special contract for prompt delivery should call the
attention of the carrier to the circumstances surrounding the case and the
approximate amount of damages to be suffered in case of delay (See Mendoza
vs. PAL, supra). There was
no such contract entered into in the instant case.”[60]
Also, the theory of petitioners that the specification of the
flights and dates of departures and arrivals constitute a special contract that
could prevail over the printed stipulations at the back of the airway bill is
vacuous. To countenance such a
postulate would unduly burden the common carrier for that would have the effect
of unilaterally transforming every single bill of lading or trip ticket into a
special contract by the simple expedient of filling it up with the particulars
of the flight, trip or voyage, and thereby imposing upon the carrier duties
and/or obligations which it may not have been ready or willing to assume had it
been timely advised thereof.
Neither does the fact that the challenged condition No. 5 was
printed at the back of the airway bill militate against its binding effect on
petitioners as parties to the contract, for there were sufficient indications
on the face of said bill that would alert them to the presence of such
additional condition to put them on their guard. Ordinary prudence on the part of any person entering or
contemplating to enter into a contract would prompt even a cursory examination
of any such conditions, terms and/or stipulations.
There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a
bill of lading without dissent raises a presumption that all terms therein were
brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him, and in the
absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped from thereafter denying that he
assented to such terms. This rule
applies with particular force where a shipper accepts a bill of lading with
full knowledge of its contents, and acceptance under such circumstances makes
it a binding contract. In order that
any presumption of assent to a stipulation in a bill of lading limiting the
liability of a carrier may arise, it must appear that the clause containing
this exemption from liability plainly formed a part of the contract contained
in the bill of lading. A stipulation
printed on the back of a receipt or bill of lading or on papers attached to
such receipt will be quite as effective as if printed on its face, if it is
shown that the consignor knew of its terms. Thus, where a shipper accepts a receipt which states that its conditions
are to be found on the back, such receipt comes within the general rule, and
the shipper is held to have accepted and to be bound by the conditions there to
be found.[61]
Granting arguendo that Condition No. 5 partakes of the
nature of a contract of adhesion and as such must be construed strictly against
the party who drafted the same or gave rise to any ambiguity therein, it should
be borne in mind that a contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and
unenforceable, for being subversive of public policy, only when the weaker
party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is
reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of
the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.[62]
However, Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[63]
instructs us that contracts of adhesion are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in
reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent. Accordingly, petitioners, far from being the
weaker party in this situation, duly signified their presumed assent to all
terms of the contract through their acceptance of the airway bill and are
consequently bound thereby. It cannot
be gainsaid that petitioners were not without several choices as to carriers in
Chicago with its numerous airways and airlines servicing the same.
We wish to allay
petitioners’ apprehension that Condition No. 5 of the airway bill is productive
of mischief as it would validate delay in delivery, sanction violations of
contractual obligations with impunity or put a premium on breaches of contract.
Just because we have said that Condition No. 5 of the airway bill
is binding upon the parties to and fully operative in this transaction, it does
not mean, and let this serve as fair warning to respondent carriers, that they
can at all times whimsically seek refuge from liability in the exculpatory
sanctuary of said Condition No. 5 or arbitrarily vary routes, flights and
schedules to the prejudice of their customers. This condition only serves to insulate the carrier from liability in
those instances when changes in routes, flights and schedules are clearly
justified by the peculiar circumstances of a particular case, or by general
transportation practices, customs and usages, or by contingencies or
emergencies in aviation such as weather turbulence, mechanical failure,
requirements of national security and the like. And even as it is conceded that specific routing and other
navigational arrangements for a trip, flight or voyage, or variations therein,
generally lie within the discretion of the carrier in the absence of specific
routing instructions or directions by the shipper, it is plainly incumbent upon
the carrier to exercise its rights with due deference to the rights, interests
and convenience of its customers.
A common carrier undertaking to transport property has the
implicit duty to carry and deliver it within a reasonable time, absent any
particular stipulation regarding time of delivery, and to guard against
delay. In case of any unreasonable
delay, the carrier shall be liable for damages immediately and proximately resulting
from such neglect of duty.[64]
As found by the trial court, the delay in the delivery of the remains of
Crispina Saludo, undeniable and regrettable as it was, cannot be attributed to
the fault, negligence or malice of private respondents,[65]
a conclusion concurred in by respondent court and which we are not inclined to
disturb.
We are further convinced that when TWA opted to ship the remains
of Crispina Saludo on an earlier flight, it did so in the exercise of sound
discretion and with reasonable prudence, as shown by the explanation of its counsel
in his letter of February 19, 1977 in response to petitioners’ demand letter:
“Investigation of TWA’s handling of this matter reveals that
although the shipment was scheduled on TWA Flight 131 of October 27, 1976, it
was actually boarded on TWA Flight 603 of the same day, approximately 10 hours
earlier, in order to assure that the shipment would be received in San
Francisco in sufficient time for transfer to PAL. This transfer was effected in San Francisco at 2:00 P.M. on
October 27, 1976.[66]
Precisely, private respondent TWA knew of the urgency of the
shipment by reason of this notation on the lower portion of the airway
bill: “All documents have been
certified. Human remains of Cristina
(sic) Saludo. Please return bag first
available flight to SFO.” Accordingly, TWA took it upon itself to carry
the remains of Crispina Saludo on an earlier flight, which we emphasize it
could do under the terms of the airway bill, to make sure that there would be
enough time for loading said remains on the transfer flight on board PAL.
III. Petitioners challenge the validity of respondent court’s
finding that private respondents are not liable for tort on account of the
humiliating, arrogant and indifferent acts of their officers and
personnel. They posit that since their
mother’s remains were transported ten hours earlier than originally scheduled,
there was no reason for private respondents’ personnel to disclaim knowledge of
the arrival or whereabouts of the same other than their sheer arrogance,
indifference and extreme insensitivity to the feelings of petitioners. Moreover, being passengers and not merely
consignors of goods, petitioners had the right to be treated with courtesy,
respect, kindness and due consideration.
In riposte, TWA claims that its employees have always dealt
politely with all clients, customers and the public in general. PAL, on the other hand, declares that in the
performance of its obligation to the riding public, other customers and
clients, it has always acted with justice, honesty, courtesy and good faith.
Respondent appellate court found merit in and reproduced the
trial court’s refutation of this assigned error:
“About the only evidence of plaintiffs that may have reference
to the manner with which the personnel of defendants treated the two plaintiffs
at the San Francisco Airport are the following pertinent portions of Maria
Saludo’s testimony:
‘Q – When you arrived
there, what did you do, if any?
A – I immediately went to the TWA counter and I
inquired about whether my mother was there or if they knew anything about it.
Q – What was the answer?
A – They said they do not know. So, we waited.
Q – About what time was
that when you reached San Francisco from Chicago?
A – I think 5 o’clock. Somewhere around that in the afternoon.
Q – You made inquiry it
was immediately thereafter?
A – Right after we got off the plane.
Q – Up to what time did
you stay in the airport to wait until the TWA people could tell you the
whereabouts?
A – Sorry, Sir, but the TWA did not tell us
anything We stayed there until about 9 o’clock. They have not heard anything about it. They did not say anything.
Q – Do you want to
convey to the Court that from 5 up to 9 o’clock in the evening you yourself
went back to the TWA and they could not tell you where the remains of your
mother were?
A – Yes sir.
Q – And after nine
o’clock, what did you do?
A – I told my
brother my Mom was supposed to be on the Philippine Airlines flight. ‘Why don’t we check with PAL instead to see if
she was there?’ We tried to comfort each other. I told him anyway that was a shortest flight from Chicago to
California. We will be with our mother
on this longer flight. So, we checked
with the PAL.
Q – What did you
find?
A – We learned, Yes,
my Mom would be on the flight.
Q – Who was that
brother?
A – Saturnino
Saludo.
Q – And did you find
what was your flight from San Francisco to the Philippines?
A – I do not know
the number. It was the evening flight
of the Philippine Airline(s) from San Francisco to Manila.
Q – You took that
flight with your mother?
A – We were
scheduled to, Sir.
Q – Now, you could
not locate the remains of your mother in San Francisco could you tell us what
did you feel?
A – After we were
told that my mother was not there?
Q – After you
learned that your mother could not fly with you from Chicago to California?
A – Well, I was very
upset. Of course, I wanted the
confirmation that my mother was in the West Coast. The flight was about 5 hours from Chicago to California. We waited anxiously all that time on the
plane. I wanted to be assured about my
mother’s remains. But there was nothing
and we could not get any assurance from anyone about it.
Q – Your feeling
when you reached San Francisco and you could not find out from the TWA the
whereabouts of the remains, what did you feel?
A – Something nobody
would be able to describe unless he experiences it himself. It is a kind of panic. I think it’s a
feeling you are about to go crazy. It
is something I do not want to live through again.’ (Inting, t.s.n., Aug. 9,
1983, pp. 14-18).’
“The foregoing does not show any humiliating or arrogant
manner with which the personnel of both defendants treated the two
plaintiffs. Even their alleged
indifference is not clearly established. The initial answer of the TWA personnel at the counter that they did not
know anything about the remains, and later, their answer that they have not
heard anything about the remains, and the inability of the TWA counter
personnel to inform the two plaintiffs of the whereabouts of the remains,
cannot be said to be total or complete indifference to the said
plaintiffs. At any rate, it is any rude
or discourteous conduct, malfeasance or neglect, the use of abusive or insulting
language calculated to humiliate and shame passenger or bad faith by or on the
part of the employees of the carrier that gives the passenger an action for
damages against the carrier (Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, 43
SCRA 397; Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., 18 SCRA 155; Lopez, et
al. vs. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431; Northwest Airlines,
Inc. vs. Cuenca, 14 SCRA 1063), and none of the above is obtaining in the
instant case.”[67]
We stand by respondent court’s findings on this point, but only
to the extent where it holds that the manner in which private respondent TWA’s
employees dealt with petitioners was not grossly humiliating, arrogant or
indifferent as would assume the proportions of malice or bad faith and lay the
basis for an award of the damages claimed. It must however, be pointed out that the lamentable actuations of
respondent TWA’s employees leave much to be desired, particularly so in the
face of petitioners’ grief over the death of their mother, exacerbated by the
tension and anxiety wrought by the impasse and confusion over the failure to
ascertain over an appreciable period of time what happened to her remains.
Airline companies are hereby sternly admonished that it is their
duty not only to cursorily instruct but to strictly require their personnel to
be more accommodating towards customers, passengers and the general
public. After all, common carriers such
as airline companies are in the business of rendering public service, which is
the primary reason for their enfranchisement and recognition in our law. Because the passengers in a contract of
carriage do not contract merely for transportation, they have a right to be
treated with kindness, respect, courtesy and consideration.[68]
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from
any other contractual relation, and generates a relation attended with public
duty. The operation of a common carrier
is a business affected with public interest and must be directed to serve the
comfort and convenience of passengers.[69]
Passengers are human beings with human feelings and emotions; they should not
be treated as mere numbers or statistics for revenue.
The records reveal that petitioners, particularly Maria and
Saturnino Saludo, agonized for nearly five hours, over the possibility of
losing their mother’s mortal remains, unattended to and without any assurance
from the employees of TWA that they were doing anything about the
situation. This is not to say that
petitioners were to be regaled with extra special attention. They were, however, entitled to the
understanding and humane consideration called for by and commensurate with the
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, and not the cold
insensitivity to their predicament. It
is hard to believe that the airline’s counter personnel were totally helpless
about the situation. Common sense could
and should have dictated that they exert a little extra effort in making a more
extensive inquiry, by themselves or through their superiors, rather than just
shrug off the problem with a callous and uncaring remark that they had no
knowledge about it. With all the modern
communications equipment readily available to them, which could have easily
facilitated said inquiry and which are used as a matter of course by airline
companies in their daily operations, their apathetic stance while not legally
reprehensible is morally deplorable.
Losing a loved one, especially one’s parent, is a painful
experience. Our culture accords the
tenderest human feelings toward and in reverence to the dead. That the remains of the deceased were
subsequently delivered, albeit belatedly, and eventually laid in her final
resting place is of little consolation. The imperviousness displayed by the airline’s personnel, even for just
that fraction of time, was especially condemnable particularly in the hour of
bereavement of the family of Crispina Saludo, intensified by anguish due to the
uncertainty of the whereabouts of their mother’s remains. Hence, it is quite apparent that private
respondents’ personnel were remiss in the observance of that genuine human
concern and professional attentiveness required and expected of them.
The foregoing observations, however, do not appear to be
applicable or imputable to respondent PAL or its employees. No attribution of discourtesy or
indifference has been made against PAL, by petitioners and, in fact, petitioner
Maria Saludo testified that it was to PAL, that they repaired after failing to
receive proper attention from TWA. It
was from PAL that they received confirmation that their mother’s remains would
be on the same flight to Manila with them.
We find the following substantiation on this particular episode
from the deposition of Alberto A. Lim, PAL’s cargo supervisor earlier adverted
to, regarding their investigation of and the action taken on learning of
petitioner’s problem:
“ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
Yes.
Mr. Lim, what exactly
was your procedure adopted in your so called investigation?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
I called the lead agent
on duty at that time and requested for a copy of airway bill, transfer manifest
and other documents concerning the shipment.
ATTY ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
Then, what?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
They proceeded to
analyze exactly where PAL failed, if any, in forwarding the human remains of
Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo. And I found
out that there was not (sic) delay in shipping the remains of Mrs. Saludo to
Manila. Since we received the body from
American Airlines on 28 October at 7:45 and we expedited the shipment so that
it could have been loaded on our flight leaving at 9:00 in the evening or just
barely one hour and 15 minutes prior to the departure of the aircraft. That is so (sic) being the case, I reported
to Manila these circumstances.”[70]
IV. Finally, petitioners insist, as a consequence of the delay in
the shipment of their mother’s remains allegedly caused by wilful contractual
breach, on their entitlement to actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and legal interest.
The uniform decisional tenet in our jurisdiction holds that moral
damages may be awarded for wilful or fraudulent breach of contract[71]
or when such breach is attended by malice or bad faith.[72]
However, in the absence of strong and positive evidence of fraud, malice or bad
faith, said damages cannot be awarded.[73]
Neither can there be an award of exemplary damages[74]
nor of attorney’s fees[75]
as an item of damages in the absence of proof that defendant acted with malice,
fraud or bad faith.
The censurable conduct of TWA’s employees cannot, however, be said
to have approximated the dimensions of fraud, malice or bad faith. It can be said to be more of a lethargic
reaction produced and engrained in some people by the mechanically routine
nature of their work and a racial or societal culture which stultifies what
would have been their accustomed human response to a human need under a former
and different ambience.
Nonetheless, the facts show that petitioners’ right to be treated
with due courtesy in accordance with the degree of diligence required by law to
be exercised by every common carrier was violated by TWA and this entitles
them, at least, to nominal damages from TWA alone. Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code make it clear that
nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for
the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has
been done but the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of
damages being left to the discretion of the court according to the
circumstances of the case.[76]
In the exercise of our discretion, we find an award of P40,000.00 as nominal
damages in favor of petitioners to be a reasonable amount under the
circumstances of this case.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that an award of
P40,000.00 as and by way of nominal damages is hereby granted in favor of
petitioners to be paid by respondent Trans World Airlines, the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Nocon, JJ., concur.
[1]
Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponente, with Justices Filemon D. Mendoza
and Artemon D. Luna, concurring; Petition, Annex C; Rollo, 154.
[2]
Penned by Judge Lucio F. Saavedra; Petition, Annex A; Rollo, 51.
[3]
Rollo, 159-163.
[4]
Exhibit G, Bill of Exhibits, 7.
[5]
Exhibit H, ibid., 9.
[6]
Original, Record, 1
[7]
Petition, Annex E; Rollo, 200.
[8]
Rollo, 16-17.
[9]
Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court.
[10]
Ramos, et al. vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al., 19 SCRA
289 (1967); Malaysian Airline System Bernad vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 156 SCRA 321 (1987).
[11]
Abellana, et al. vs. Dosdos, etc., et al., 13 SCRA 244 (1965); Uytiepo,
et al. vs. Aggabao, et al., 35 SCRA 186 (1970); Carolina Industries,
Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734 (1980).
[12]
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 33 SCRA 622 (1970); Sacay vs.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 (1986); Manlapaz vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 147 SCRA 236 (1987).
[13]
Pilar Development Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 146
SCRA 215 (1986).
[14]
Vda. de Arroyo vs. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, et al, 23
SCRA 525 (1968).
[15]
Comment of Respondent TWA, 5; Rollo, 206; Comment of Respondent PAL,
10-11; Rollo, 213.
[16]
Consolidated Reply, ibid., 229.
[17]
Rollo, 17-26.
[18]
Exhibit E, Bill of Exhibits, 5; Exhibit 1-PAL, Bill of Exhibits, 32.
[19]
Rollo, 20.
[20]
13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 771.
[21]
4 Alcantara, Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 118 (1987).
[22]
13 C.J.S., Carriers, 233.
[23]
13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 775.
[24]
13 C.J.S., Carriers 232.
[25]
Op. cit., 240-243.
[26]
Rollo, 160.
[27]
Memorandum for Private Respondent PAL, 1-2.
[28]
Exhibits 2 and 2-A-PAL; Bill of Exhibits, 31.
[29]
Article 1737, Civil Code.
[30]
Article 1738, id.
[31]
13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 763-764. .
[32]
Op. cit., 762-763.
[33]
Rollo, 163-165.
[34]
Exhibit 1-TWA, Bill of Exhibits, 33.
[35]
Exhibit 3-PAL, ibid., 30.
[36]
Exhibit 2-PAL, ibid., 101.
[37]
Exhibit 5-PAL, ibid., 39-41.
[38]
Exhibit 5-PAL, ibid., 58-63, 71-73.
[39]
Rollo, 229-230.
[40]
Ibid., 166-167.
[41]
13 C.J.S., Carriers 148.
[42]
13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 751.
[43]
Manuel A. Barcelona, Liabilities of Carriers: Airline Practices and Procedures, in CURRENT ISSUES AFFECTING
AIRLINES IN THE PHILIPPINES, 103 (1989).
[44]
Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., 30 SCRA 69 (1969).
[45]
Rollo, 160.
[46]
13 C.J.S., Carriers 41; 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 572.
[47]
Annex 2, Opposition to Joint Motion to Dismiss, 1-2, Original Record, 253-254;
Memorandum of Private Respondent TWA, 250.
[48]
Exhibit 2-A-TWA, Bill of Exhibits, 26.
[49]
Article 1370, Civil Code; Philippine Airlines vs. Philippine Airlines
Employees Association, 70 SCRA 180 (1976); Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 311 (1986); Honrado, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 326 (1991).
[50]
Article 1374, Civil Code.
[51]
See Section 9, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[52]
Ruiz, et al. vs. Sheriff, et al., 34 SCRA 83 (1970); National Union Fire
Insurance Company of Pittsburg, et al. vs. Stolt-Nielsen Philippines,
Inc., et al., 184 SCRA 682 (1990).
[53]
Rollo, 168-169.
[54]
Section 13, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[55]
Exhibit E, Bill of Exhibits, 5.
[56]
Comment of Private Respondent PAL, 9; Rollo, 221.
[57]
13 C.J.S., Carriers 390, 392; Mason vs. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 262 III. App 580.
[58]
13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 854; Chicago & A.R. Co. vs. Kirby, 225 US
155, 56 Led 1033, 32 Sct 648; Harmony vs. Bingham, 12 NY 99.
[59]
13 C.J.S., Carriers 395; Frey vs. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., 100
N.Y.S. 225, 114 App. Div. 747.
[60]
Rollo, 168-169.
[61]
13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 778-779; See Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 91 SCRA 223 (1979) and Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 164 SCRA 268 (1988).
[62]
Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., etc., 98 Phil.
85 (1955); Fieldman’s Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Vda. de Songco, 25 SCRA 70
(1968); Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, 83 SCRA 361 (1978).
[63]
Supra, Fn. 61.
[64]
Chicago & A.R. Co. vs. Kirby, supra; Warren vs.
Portland Terminal Co., 121 Me 157, 116 A 411, 26 ALR 304.
[65]
Petition, Annex A; Rollo, 79.
[66]
Exhibit F and Exhibit 4-TWA, Bill of Exhibits, 6.
[67]
Petition, Annex C; Rollo, 169-172.
[68]
Alitalia Airways vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 187 SCRA 763 (1990); cf.
Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., 18 SCRA 168 (1966).
[69]
See Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 188 SCRA 461
(1990).
[70]
Exhibit 5-PAL, 50-51; Bill of Exhibits, 83-84.
[71]
Article 2220, Civil Code; Tamayo vs. Aquino, et al., 105 Phil. 949
(1959); China Airlines Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 169
SCRA 226 (1989).
[72]
Perez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 13 SCRA 137 (1965); Sabena Belgian
World Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 171 SCRA 620 (1989).
[73]
Coscolluela vs. Valderrama, 2 SCRA 1095 (1961); Pan American World
Airways, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 687
(1990).
[74]
Article 2232, Civil Code; Davila, et al. vs. Philippine Airlines, 49
SCRA 497 (1973); Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
159 SCRA 433 (1988); Esguerra vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 173 SCRA 1
(1989).
[75]
Article 2208, Civil Code; Federation of United NAMARCO Distributors, Inc. et
al. vs. National Marketing Corporation, 4 SCRA 867 (1962); Songcuan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 191 SCRA 28 (1990).
[76]
See Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Cuenca, et al., 14 SCRA 1063 (1965);
Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Branch XXXIV), et al., 84 SCRA 59 (1978); Alitalia vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 192 SCRA 9 (1990).