EDUARDO ACOP, ROGER ALMEN­DAREZ, BIENVENIDO AMBRAY, BENITO ARELLANO, WILLIAM ARMENDARES, HERMINIO ARREZA, TEODORO ARREZA, PEREGRINO BANGUIS, MOISES BARENG, HIPOLITO BONGGOT, RAM…

In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, the petitioners (86 security guards) assail:

1.  the
order dated June 11, 1990
of the National Labor Relations Commission, 5th Division, denying their
petition for a writ of
injunction to stop the Surigao Development
Corporation (SUDECOR) from terminating their services on May 31, 1990. 
The NLRC held that the petition was moot and academic as their dismissal
from the service of SUDECOR had become a fait accompli
(Annex A, Petition); and

2.  the
order of August 24, 1990
denying their motion for reconsideration and remanding the records of the case
to the Arbitration Branch for further proceedings (Annex B).

On October
11, 1988, the
petitioners filed in the Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office XI
a letter-complaint charging SUDECOR with violations of labor standards, by not
paying them overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, night differentials,
daily camping allowance, not providing them with safety devices and housing,
and by illegally dismissing some employees (NLRC Case No. RAB-11-04-00277-89).

On April
12, 1989, the
Regional Director indorsed the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC because an issue arose as to whether the complainants (herein petitioners)
were employees of SUDECOR.

On May 23,
1990, the
petitioners, anticipating their mass dismissal at the end of that month, filed
with the NLRC a telegraphic motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to stop the same.  They
followed it up on May 28, 1990 with
a supplemental complaint and
petition for preliminary injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order which was received by the NLRC on May 30, 1990.

As previously stated,
both the telegraphic and formal petitions for injunction were not acted upon
immediately by the NLRC.  By the time it
did on June 11, 19???0, the petitioners had already been laid off from their jobs.  The NLRC’s minute
resolution dated June 11, 1990 stated that:

“After due deliberation, the Commission resolves to dismiss
the petition for injunction for being moot and academic, the action sought to
be enjoined had already transpired on May 31, 1990.

“Meanwhile, the instant petition may be treated either as a
complaint for illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practice (ULP) and the same
is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch for appropriate action.” (Annex A, p. 37, Rollo.)

The petitioners received
the resolution on June 14, 1990.  They
filed by registered mail on June 25,
1990 a motion for
reconsideration with the NLRC en banc which denied their motion
for tardiness.  The dispositive
part of the NLRC resolution dated August 24, 1990, received by the petitioners on September
14, 1990, reads as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, the challenged order is upheld and the appeal
DISMISSED for lack of merit.  The Motion
for Reconsideration is DENIED for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. 
Let the record of the instant cases be immediately remanded to the
Arbitration branch of origin for further proceedings.  The Executive Labor Arbiter is directed to
submit a report on the action taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the records of the cases.” (pp. 52-53, Rollo.)

In their petition for certiorari
in this Court, the petitioners bitterly assail
the NLRC’s delay in resolving their application for a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.  They allege that since their telegraphic
motion was sent on May 23, 1990 and the supplemental motion was filed on May 28,
1990, the NLRC had
enough time to issue a temporary restraining order to stop their wholesale
dismissal on May 31, 1990.

The petitioners allege
that the NLRC erred in holding that their motion for reconsideration was filed
late because said pleading was in fact filed on the
tenth day of the ten-day period for appeal not “three (3) days out of
time.” (p. 28, Rollo.)

The petition for certiorari
has no merit.  Even if the petitioners’
computation of the appeal period were correct, the NLRC committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying their motion for reconsideration for, as a
matter of fact, the injunctive relief prayed for could not be granted because
the mass lay-offs which were sought to be enjoined, had already occurred.  A writ of injunction cannot be issued against
consummated acts (Ramos vs. CA, G.R. No. 80908, May 24, 1989; Aragones vs. Subido, 25 SCRA 95
[1968]; Ramonte vs. Bonto, 16 SCRA 257 [1960]).

The failure of the NLRC
to act immediately on the application for injunction is not reviewable
by this Court.  In light of the
explanation given by the Commission
in its order of August
24, 1990, no grave abuse of discretion nor excess of jurisdiction is
imputable to it.

“In passing it should be stated here and now that the
regionalization of the Commission is by mandate of Republic Act 6715 which
amended the Labor Code.  Pursuant
thereto, this Division of the Commission after months of preparation opened its doors in Cagayan
de Oro City on May 17, 1990.  At
the time everything was in disarray.  The
records were not yet delivered by the shipping company at the warehouse.  The Commissioners who are not from the place
were still relocating their families.  To
top it all, the staffing pattern intended for the Division Office was not yet
realized because of the lack of funding and the dearth of trained
personnel.  Altogether, the Commission
could not be expected to perform miracles like acting on a telegraphic motion
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, which to grant the same on
this basis is a procedural
risk.  The same is true with acting on a
petition for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to prevent the doing of an
act which is threatened to be done on the day following the date of its
filing.” (p. 52,
Rollo.)

In any event, the petitioners are not bereft of adequate remedies.  In their action for illegal dismissal,
(RAB-11-04-00277-89, “Eduardo Acop, et al. vs. Surigao
Development Corporation and Ret. Gen. Reynaldo G. Dilan,
Vice-President for Field Operations and Administration”) which is still
pending in the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, they may prove the
employer-employee relationship between themselves and SUDECOR (which the latter
has denied) and ask for reinstatement with backwages.

WHEREFORE, the
petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.  Costs against the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.