PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARIO BANEZ Y ARGENTE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Bañez

The Case

This is People of the Philippines versus Mario Bañez y Argente, a criminal appeal from a conviction for murder. The People prosecuted Bañez for the killing of Floro Hubilla, a neighbor, who was stabbed to death inside his own house in Quezon City. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it shows how the Supreme Court treats the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility, it illustrates why alibi and flight figure in the analysis, and it settles a fine point of criminal law — that treachery cannot be appreciated separately when it is already absorbed by abuse of superior strength, and that dwelling, though not alleged in the information, may still be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.

Procedural History

Bañez was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 103, at Quezon City. Upon arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty, and after trial on the merits the trial court, on November 28, 1989, rendered its decision convicting him as principal in the charge of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. Bañez appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning as errors the failure to observe the presumption of innocence, the conviction despite alleged doubt, and the disregard of the testimony of a defense eyewitness. The appeal was resolved by the Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction with modifications on the civil aspect.

Facts

Mario Bañez and Floro Hubilla were neighbors at Payatas, Quezon City, and had known each other personally for six years. On the evening of July 20, 1985, at around ten o'clock, Hubilla was inside his house with his wife Alfreda and their two daughters, Amalia and Leticia, then thirteen and fourteen years old. Three men — Bañez, Rudy Perez, and a certain Jun Taruk — entered the yard and invited Hubilla to a drinking session. Alfreda told them her husband was already drunk and could not join them.

The three, led by Bañez, then challenged the deceased to come out, saying, "Palabasin si Floro kung siya'y matapang." When he refused, they banged the locked front door. Bañez, already very drunk, entered through the back door followed by his companions and pushed Alfreda aside. She saw him pull out an eight-inch single-bladed knife from his waistline and walk toward her husband, who was lying on the floor. Hubilla tried to fight back, but his hands were held by Perez and Taruk. Alfreda saw Bañez stab him three times — below the armpit, at the neck, and at the cheek. The two daughters jumped out of the window and ran to the barangay hall for help. After the stabbing, the three men fled. The death certificate listed the cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage from stab wounds on the head and trunk.

Bañez was arrested only on April 4, 1987, while his two companions remained at large. His defense was denial and alibi: he claimed that while the group was passing the alley beside the victim's house to serenade a young lady, Jun Taruk slipped and bumped the wall, that Alfreda shouted at them, that the deceased dared them to come in, and that he and a companion named Berto then fled in different directions, with Bañez going home at about ten fifteen in the evening. He claimed Perez and Taruk later came looking for him and warned him to hide because Alfreda would implicate him, owing to an occasion when he had slapped her. He nonetheless stayed home until his arrest.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution evidence was sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in disregarding the testimony of the defense witness and in giving credence to the prosecution eyewitnesses.
• Whether or not the appellant's alibi can prevail over his positive identification by the eyewitnesses.
• Whether or not treachery attended the commission of the offense.
• Whether or not dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance although not alleged in the information.

Applicable Provisions

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, defining and penalizing murder, provides:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. 2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise. 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin. 4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity. 5. With evident premeditation. 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

This is the provision under which the appellant was convicted, and it fixes the penalty that the Court calibrated after finding dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.

Ruling

On the first three issues, the Court held that the appellant's contentions were devoid of merit. The trial court had relied on the testimonies of the victim's wife and daughter, who both positively identified Bañez as one of the three who assaulted and killed the deceased. The Court stressed that the function of assigning values to testimonies is best performed by the trial judge, and that testimonies given in a simple, straightforward manner, mentioning details that could not have been merely concocted, indicate sincerity and truth. The alleged motive of Alfreda — revenge for the slapping — was utterly insufficient to attribute so heinous a crime, and it is against human nature for witnesses to knowingly impute a crime to a person not responsible for it.

On the alibi, the Court held that it cannot prevail over positive identification, especially where the appellant's residence was only a short distance from the scene. The Court also noted material contradictions between the appellant and his witness, and that the witness herself admitted she had quarreled with Alfreda and wanted to get even. The trial court's finding that the appellant went into hiding after the crime was upheld, and the Court reiterated that flight is an admission of guilt.

On treachery, however, the Court ruled in favor of the appellant. Where three persons, including the appellant, assaulted the victim inside his house and the appellant stabbed him while the latter was firmly held by the two companions, treachery cannot be appreciated because it is deemed included in abuse of superiority. The Court quoted the settled rule:

In this case, where three persons including the appellant, assaulted the victim inside his house and the appellant stabbed the deceased while the latter was firmly held by the two other companions, the rule is settled that treachery cannot be appreciated because here it is deemed included in abuse of superiority.

On dwelling, the Court held that the commission of the crime in the dwelling of the offended party, when the latter has given no provocation, is aggravating, and that although not alleged in the information, dwelling being a generic aggravating circumstance may be appreciated. With dwelling aggravating the offense, the penalty should be death; but since the death penalty is no longer imposable under the 1987 Constitution, the trial court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua.

Doctrine

First, treachery is absorbed by abuse of superior strength and cannot be appreciated as a separate qualifying circumstance where the evidence shows that the assailants took advantage of their combined strength, as when two companions held the victim while the appellant stabbed him. Second, dwelling is a generic aggravating circumstance that may be appreciated even if not alleged in the information, provided the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who gave no provocation. Third, alibi cannot prevail over positive identification, particularly where the distance between the appellant's residence and the scene is short. Fourth, flight is an admission of guilt and is inconsistent with a claim of innocence. Finally, the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great weight, and straightforward testimony bearing details that could not have been concocted is indicative of truth.

Disposition

The judgment appealed from was affirmed with modification: the civil indemnity was increased to 50,000 pesos, the award of moral damages was deleted for lack of evidence, and the exemplary damages were reduced from 200,000 pesos to 20,000 pesos.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: treachery cannot be appreciated when it is deemed included in abuse of superiority, and dwelling, though not alleged in the information, may be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Examiners like to use this case to test the relationship between treachery and abuse of superior strength, and the rule that alibi and flight cannot overcome positive identification by credible eyewitnesses.