MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER, MERLIN ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG AND OTHER TEACHER-MEMBERS SO NUMEROUS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. TH…

The series of events that touched off these cases started with
the so-called “mass action” undertaken by some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17, 1990
to “dramatize and highlight”^[1]
the teachers’ plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.

The petition in G.R. No.
95590 alleges in great detail the character and origins of those grievances as
perceived by the petitioners, and the attempts to negotiate their correction;^[2]
these are more briefly, but quite adequately and with no sacrifice of relevant content, set forth in the petition in G.R. No. 95445, portions of which are
quoted hereunder without necessarily affirming their objective truth or
correctness:

“3. Together
with other teachers embracing the Teachers and Employees Consultative Council
(TECC) and the Alliance of Concerned Teachers, the petitioners, in accordance
with their Constitution and By-Laws, resolved to engage in mass concerted actions, after
peaceful dialogues with the heads of the Department of the Budget and
Management, Senate and House of Representatives in public hearings as well as
after exhausting all administrative remedies, to press for, among other things,
the immediate payment of due chalk, clothing allowances, 13th month pay for
1989 arising from the implementation of
the Salary of Standardization Law, the recall of DECS Order 39 s. 1990
directing the oversizing of classes and overloading
of teachers pursuant to the cost-cutting measures of the government, the hiring of 47,000 new teachers
to ease the overload of existing teachers, the return of the additional 1% real
property taxes collected by local government units to education purposes to be administered by the Local School Boards, and
consequent recall of DBM Circulars Nos. 90-4 and 9011 and local budget circular
No. 47 consistent with RA 5447 and the new Constitution mandating that
education shall enjoy the highest budgetary priority in the national budget,
and other equally important demands; The dialogues and conferences initiated
by the petitioners and other teacher organizations were as early as March 14,
1989, March 14, 1990, April 23, 1990, May 28, 1990, June 5, 1990, September 3,
1990 and September 14, 1990 with the Civil Service Commission, the Senate and
House of Representatives, Department of Budget and Management and the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, but all these did not result in
the granting of the demands of the petitioners,
leaving them with no other recourse but to take direct mass action such as the
one they engage in three weeks ago.

4.  On September
14, 1990, the petitioners and other teachers in other cities and
municipalities in Metro Manila, staged a protest rally at the DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last
call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands.  No response was made by the respondent
Secretary of Education, despite the demonstration so the petitioners began the
ongoing protest mass actions on September 17, 1990. 
***”^[3]

September 17, 1990
fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day.  There is no question that the some 800
teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their classes on that day;
instead, as alleged in the petition in G.R.
No. 95590,^[4]
they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio
in the morning whence they proceeded to the National Office of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) for a whole-day assembly.  At about 1:00
o’clock p.m., three representatives of the group were allowed to
see the respondent Secretary of Education who “*** brushed aside their
grievances,” warned them that they would lose their jobs for going on
illegal and unauthorized mass leave. 
Upon leaving said respondent’s presence, they were handed an order
directing all participants in the mass action to return to work in 24 hours or
face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.^[5]
Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week,
with more teachers joining in the days that followed.  In its issue of September 19, 1990, the newspaper Manila Standard reported
that the day previous, the respondent Secretary of Education had relieved 292
teachers who did not return to their classes. 
The next day, however, another daily, Newsday, reported that the
Secretary had revoked his dismissal order and instead placed 56 of the 292
teachers under preventive suspension, despite which the protesters’ numbers had
swelled to 4,000.^[6]

On the record, what did happen was that, based on reports submitted
by the principals of the various public schools in Metro-Manila, the respondent
Secretary of Education had filed motu proprio administrative complaints against the
teachers who had taken part in the mass actions and defied the return-to-work order
on assorted charges like grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross
violation of the Civil Service Law, absence without official leave, etc., and
placed them under 90-day preventive suspension. 
The respondents were served copies of the charge sheets and given five
(5) days to submit answer or explanation.  Later, on October 8, 1990, the
respondent Secretary constituted an investigating committee of four (4) to determine and take the
appropriate course of action on the formal charges and designated the special
prosecutors on detail with the DECS to handle their prosecution during the
formal hearings.^[7]

On October 11, 1990,
the respondent Secretary of Education rendered the first of his now-questioned
decisions on the administrative complaints. 
In Case No. DECS 90-002, he found
twenty (20) respondent teachers guilty of the charges preferred against them
and dismissed them from office, effective immediately.^[8]
In the other investigations that followed and as of December 3, 1990, 658
teachers were dismissed, 40 were suspended for one (1) year, 33 for nine (9)
months, and 122 for six (6) months; 398 were exonerated.^[9]

Earlier, on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 95445
had filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, a petition^[10]
for prohibition, declaratory relief and preliminary mandatory injunction to
restrain the implementation of the return-to-work order of September 17, 1990
and the suspension or dismissal of
any teacher pursuant thereto and to declare said order null and void.  Issuance ex parte of
a temporary restraining order was sought, but seeing no compelling reason therefor, the Regional Trial Court instead set the
application for preliminary injunction for hearing, and heard the same, on September 24, 1990.  Thereafter and following the submission of
memorandums by the parties, said Court rendered judgment declaring the assailed
return-to-work order valid and binding, and dismissing the petition for lack of
merit.^[11]

Review of said judgment is sought in G.R. No. 95445.

G.R. No. 95590 is a parallel original proceeding for prohibition,
mandamus and certiorari
grounded on the same state of facts and instituted for substantially the
same purpose, i.e., the invalidation of the return-to-work order of the respondent
Secretary of Education and all orders of suspension and/or dismissal thereafter
issued by said respondent against the teachers who had taken part in the mass
actions of September 17, 1990 and the days that followed.

Both cases were ordered consolidated by Resolution issued on October 25, 1990,^[12]
and separate comments were filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the
public respondents, in G.R. No.
95445 on October 31, 1990,
and in G.R. No. 95590 on December 5,
1990.^[13]
On November 20, 1990 the
parties were heard in oral argument on the petitioners’ united pleas for a
temporary restraining order/mandatory injunction to restore the status quo ante and enjoin the public respondents
from continuing with the issuance of suspension orders and proceeding with the
administrative cases against the teachers involved in the mass actions.

Said pleas were denied by the Court in its Resolution of December 18, 1990,^[14]
and a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 was
likewise denied.

In two separate but identically-worded motions filed on their
behalf by Atty. Froilan M. Bacungan,^[15]
the following persons, to wit:  Florita D. Guazon, Elisea G. Lazo, Gonzala G. Sioson, Esperanza
Valero, Nenita Pangilinan,
Ramon David, Aurora Bosi, Encarnita
David, Socorro Sentin, Crispulo
Santos, Rodriguez Bagana, Rodolfo D. Bacsal, Ruben Bersamina, Rodolfo
Arroyo, Irene Gadil, Rebecca Roldan,
Rosita Samson, Priscilla Avendia, Arturo Cabuhat, Rosalinda Caoili,
Angelina Corpuz, Purisima Leria, Elsie Somera, Dedaica
Jusay, Teresita partoza, Gloria Salvador, Catherine
San Agustin, Nestor Aguirre, Lorenza Real, Celia Ronquillo, Vicente Carranza,
Jessie Villanueva, Yolanda Alura, Clara Alvarez, Danilo Llamas, Ladera Panita, Myrna Sena, Zenaida Ligon, Daisy S. Conti, Danilo Caballes, Susan Maragat, Roberto Manlangit and
Elizabeth T. Aguirre, seek leave to withdraw as parties in G.R. No. 95590.  These movants claim
that they are such parties although not individually so named in the petition in said
case, being among those referred to in its
title as “other similarly
situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded,”
who had been administratively charged, then preventively suspended and/or
dismissed in the wake of the mass actions of September 1990.  They assert that since this Court is
not trier of facts,
they have opted to appeal the questioned decisions or actuations of the
respondent Secretary of Education to the Civil Service Commission where they
believe they will have “* * all the opportunity to introduce evidence on how (Secretary) Carino
violated their constitutional rights to due
process of law * * security of tenure and * * peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances * *.”

An opposition to the first motion was filed^[16]
which, briefly, contended that, as this Court had already found that the
petitioners had gone on an unlawful strike and that public respondent Carino’s acts were prima facie lawful, the motion was either an attempt at forum–shopping or meant to avoid the “inevitable
outcome” of issues already
pending final determination by the Court.

The Court’s Resolution of December 18, 1990, supra, denying the petitioners’ plea for
restoration of the status quo
ante and to restrain/enjoin further suspensions of, and the initiation or
continuation of, administrative proceedings against the teachers involved, is
based on the following postulates:

(1)  the undenied —
indeed, the pleaded and admitted — fact that about 800 teachers, among them
the individual petitioners and other unnamed but “similarly situated”
members of the petitioning associations in both cases, unauthorizedly absented
themselves from their classes on a regular schoolday,
September 17, 1990, in order to participate in a “mass action”
to dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of
the public authorities, either to implement at all or to implement in a just and correct manner, certain laws and
measures intended to benefit them materially;

(2)   the fact, too, that in the days that followed,
more mass actions for the same purpose were undertaken, notwithstanding a return-to-work order
issued by the respondent Secretary of Education; more teachers joined the
so-called “peaceful assemblies” on September 18, 1990 and the number
rising to 4,000 on September 19, 1990;^[17]

(3)   that from the pleaded and admitted facts,
these “mass actions” were to all intents and purposes a strike; they
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work
which it was the teachers’ duty
to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons;

(4)   that this Court had already definitively
ruled that employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private
sector, do not have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to
self-organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of employment terms
and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of such working conditions
as are not fixed by law;^[18]

(5)   that upon the foregoing premises, it was prima
facie lawful and within his statutory authority for the respondent
Secretary of Education to take the actions complained of, to wit:  issue a return-to-work order, prefer
administrative charges against, and place under preventive suspension, those
who failed to comply with said order, and dismiss from the service those who
failed to answer or controvert the charges;^[19]

The Court has not since been presented with any consideration of
law or established fact that would impair the validity of these postulates or
preclude continued reliance thereon for the purpose of resolving the present
petitions on their merits.

The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioners
have a right to strike, which it is clear they do not, however justifiable
their reasons, nor whether or not there
was in fact such a strike, it being
equally evident from the pleadings that there was, and there being no dispute
about this.  What, therefore, is brought
before the Court is the question of whether or not any rights of the
petitioners under the due process clause of the Constitution as it applies to
administrative proceedings were violated in the initiation, conduct, or
disposition of the investigations complained of.

Indeed, what the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 proclaim about
denial of due process being their “paramount complaint” * * *
“central to their prayer for interlocutory relief”^[20]
could as well be said of the merits of their main cause as of their plea for a
restraining order pendente lite or a preliminary injunction.

There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court’s taking
up that issue and resolving it in these cases. 
Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by this Court in the exercise of
its review jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious reason that it is one of
fact.  The petitions and subsequent pleadings of the petitioners allege facts and circumstances which, it is claimed, show denial of due
process, citing as supposedly “representative samples”^[21] among others:  (a) that teachers were dismissed on the sole
basis of unsworn reports of their principals and
without evidence of their alleged failure to obey the return-to-work
order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to specify the particular charges or
offenses allegedly committed; (c) that some teachers were not furnished sworn complaints, and others were
suspended without any formal charges; (d) that teachers who attempted to return
within a reasonable time after notice of the
return-to-work order were not accepted back; and similar allegations.

These are however denied and disputed by the public respondents,
who set forth their own version, initially in their separate Comments in both
cases and, later and in greater
detail, in their Consolidated Memorandum of December 3, 1990, supra, from which the following passages are quoted:

“Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and G.R. No. 95590 admit engaging in strike (referred
by semantic interplay as “concerted activity” or “mass action“)
directed against public respondent Carino beginning September 17, 1990 (MPSTA Petition, pp. 3, 9; ACT Petition, pp.
15-16).

To avoid the disruption of classes, public respondent Carino, also on September 17, 1990, issued a ‘return to
work order’ reminding striking workers that in law, they cannot engage
in strike and warning them that dismissal proceedings will be instituted
against them if they do not return to work within 24 hours from their walkout (MPSTA Petition, p. 4; ACT Petition, p. 15) and a memorandum to DECS officials instructing
them to notify the striking
teachers to return to work within 24 hours from their walkout and to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who defy the return to work order as well
as to hire temporary replacements (MPSTA Petition, p. 4; ACT Petition,
pp. 15-16).

The striking teachers who did not heed the return-to-work order
were administratively charged and preventively suspended for ninety days for grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, insubordination,
refusal to perform official duty, absence without leave beginning September 17,
1990 and other violations of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.  All the striking teachers were served with the suspension orders and the charge sheets notifying
them of the charges and giving them
five (5) days from receipt of the
charge sheets within which to
file their respective answers.

With  the filing of the
administrative complaints and the receipt of the answers of some of the
teachers involved, public respondent Carino on
October 8, 1990 issued a Memorandum
forming an Investigation
Committee composed of Atty. Reno Capinpin of DECS
Administrative Services as Chairman; Dr. Alberto Mendoza, representing the
Division Supervisors, Atty. Evangeline de Castro, representing the City Superintendent of Schools of Manila,
and Atty. Isaias Melegrito,
representing the National PPSTA Organization, as members.  Copy of the aforesaid Memorandum is hereto
attached as
Annex “1”.

The committee was
authorized to meet everyday, even as Special Prosecutors from the Department of
Justice on detail with the DECS were designated to handle the prosecution
during the formal hearings (Ibid.).

Petitioners in ‘G.R. No. 95545’ and ‘G.R. No. 95590’ admit
having received the charge
sheets and notices of
preventive suspension wherein they were given five days from
receipt of the charges within which to file their answers (MPSTA Petition, p.
4; ACT Petition, p. 16, Annexes ‘X’ to ‘AA’).

* * *.

* * * Many striking
teachers received their preventive suspension orders and the charge
sheets from their respective
principals when they visited their schools. 
Many refused to receive and sign receipt
therefore; others tore up the preventive suspension orders and charge
sheets in front of their principals.  Instead, they took the
occasion to belittle and insult the substitute teachers who took over their
classrooms temporarily.

The striking teachers were given a period of five days to file
their Answers in line with Sec. 8,
Rule III of Rules on Administrative
Disciplinary Cases in CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 46, S.
1989.  The motion for extension of time
to file Answer was denied by DECS Task Force because it was
dilatory — the alleged reason being that Atty. Fabros is handling 2,000 cases of teachers.  The DECS was constrained by Sec. 38(d) of
P.D. 807 and Sec. 8 of the Memorandum Circular mentioned which mandate that
administrative cases must be the decided within 30 days from the filing of the
charges. 
Another reason was that many refused to receive the
notice of charges.  Also, to delay the resolution of the cases was to their disadvantage.

Moreover, another reason proferred was
that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila still had to act on the petition before it.  However, the Motion was filed AFTER the RTC
Manila had already dismissed the Petition.

Nevertheless, answers to the administrative complaints started
pouring in at the DECS, as prepared personally by the striking teachers or by their lawyers.

After initial assessments of the reports coming in from the
principals of the schools concerned and the answers of the striking teachers,
the DECS Special Task Force prepared on October 9, 1990 and submitted to
respondent Secretary Carino the Guidelines and
Criteria as to the nature of the evidence to be assessed and the corresponding penalty to be imposed against the striking
teachers, which was approved by respondent Secretary Carino
on the same day.  A copy of the aforesaid
Guidelines and Criteria is hereto attached as Annex ‘2’.  Thereafter, the DECS Special Task Force
proceeded with its task of investigating the cases against the striking
teachers.

Those who refused to sign the DECS return-to-work order, the
preventive suspension orders and the charge sheets, some even tearing up the
documents presented to them by their principals
were considered by the DECS Special Task Force as having waived their right to
be heard; their cases had to be resolved on the basis of the records.  Nevertheless, the DECS Special Task Force
summoned the principals concerned, who then testified under oath confirming
their reports on the absences of the striking teachers.  Some clarificatory
questions were asked of them on the manner of the service of the DECS orders
and the situation obtaining in their schools.

For those who answered the charge sheets, the DECS Special Task
Force set the administrative cases for hearing. 
Many of the striking
teachers refused to appear at the hearings but preferred to submit their case on the basis of their answers.

With regard to those
who attended the hearings, each of the absent or striking teachers was
investigated and asked questions under oath on their answers and the reasons
for their absences and/or joining the teachers’ strike.  Some teachers reiterated their answers to the
charge sheets, either giving justifiable reasons for their absences on the days mentioned or maintaining their stubborn
stand that they have all the right to absent themselves from classes in the exercise of their constitutional right
to join mass action to demand from the government what are supposedly due
them.  Still the DECS Special Task Force
was not satisfied with their written answers and explanation during the hearings. 
The principals of the striking teachers were summoned and they confirmed
under oath their reports of absences and/or on teachers joining the strike.

After having conducted fully their investigations, the DECS Special Task Force submitted in series their
investigation reports and
recommendation for each category of striking teachers to respondent Secretary Carino.  The
investigation reports, together with their supporting documents, submitted by
the DECS Special Task Force indicated clearly the manner and conduct of the
administrative hearings, the nature and weight of the evidence adduced,
and the corresponding penalty or exoneration recommended.

On the bases of the investigation reports and recommendations of
the DECS Special Task Force, and after evaluating the reports and its documents
attached, respondent Secretary Carino promulgated the decisions either for exoneration,
suspension or dismissal.  Copies of the
DECS decisions of exoneration, suspension or dismissal were forwarded to the
principals of the striking teachers concerned. 
Those exonerated were allowed
to resume their duties and received their back salaries.  Some of the teachers either suspended or
dismissed have already received the copies of the decisions, either personally
or through mail.

* * *”^[22]

This copious citation is made,
not to suggest that the Court finds what is stated therein to be true and the
contrary averments of the petitions to be false, but precisely to stress that
the facts upon which the question of alleged denial of due process would turn
are still in issue, actively controverted, hence not
yet established.

It is not for the Court, which is not a trier of facts, as the
petitioners who would now withdraw correctly put it, to make the crucial
determination of what in truth transpired concerning the disputed
incidents.  Even if that were within its
competence, it would be at best a monumental task.  At any rate, the petitioners cannot — as it
seems they have done — lump together into what amounts to a class action
hundreds of individual cases, each with its own peculiar set of facts, and
expect a ruling that would justly and correctly resolve each and everyone of
those cases upon little more than general allegations, frontally disputed as
already pointed out, of incidents supposedly “representative” of each
case or group of cases.

This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the
Supreme Court, especially when numerous parties disparately situated as far as
the facts are concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and
generalization of what should be alleged with particularity becomes
unavoidable.  The petitioners’ obvious
remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to
take part, assert and vindicate
their rights therein, see those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged
guilty, appeal to the Civil Service Commission; or if, pending said
proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary
because the respondent Secretary or those
acting under him or on his instructions were acting without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, to apply, not directly to
the Supreme Court, but to the Regional Trial Court, where there would be an
opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting corrective relief.

Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order of
recourse through the judicial hierarchy; they by-pass the rungs of the judicial
ladder at the peril of their own
causes.^[23]
This Court is a court of last resort.  Its
review jurisdiction is limited to resolving
questions of law where there is
no dispute of the facts or the facts have already been determined by lower
tribunals, except only in criminal actions where capital penalties have been
imposed.

WHEREFORE, both petitions are DISMISSED, without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely,
that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the
matters complained of.  The motions to
withdraw, supra, are merely NOTED, this disposition rendering any
express ruling thereon unnecessary.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., see dissenting opinion.

^[1]
as the petition in G.R. No. 95590 puts it

^[2]
Rollo, G.R. No. 95590, pp. 9-19

^[3]
Rollo, G.R. No. 95445, pp. 3-4

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 16-17

^[5]
Annexes L and L-1, petition, G.R. No. 95590; Rollo,
p. 53

^[6]
Annexes M and N, petition, G.R. No. 95590; Rollo,
pp. 54-55

^[7]
Annexes X, Y, Z and AA, Petition; respondents’ Consolidated Memorandum of
December 3, 1990, pp. 3-4, and Annex 1 thereof; both in G.R. No. 95590; Rollo,
pp. 71-81, 326-327, 358; see also respondents’ Comment dated November 27, 1990,
Rollo, pp. 104, 106-107)

^[8]
Annex U, Petition, G.R. No. 95590; Rollo, pp.
67-68

^[9]
Public respondents’ Consolidated Memorandum; Rollo,
G.R. No. 95590, pp. 324, 350

^[10]
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54468

^[11]
Annex A, Petition, G.R. No. 95445; Rollo, pp.
15-18

^[12]
Rollo, G.R. No. 95590, pp. 55-56

^[13]
Rollo, G.R. No. 95445, pp. 73-103; Rollo, G.R. No. 95590, pp. 104-135

^[14]
Rollo, G.R. No. 95590, pp. 466-482

^[15]
on February 22, 1991 and April 4, 1991; Rollo,
G.R. No. 95590, pp. 526-528; 534-537

^[16]
on April 4, 1991, for the
public respondents by the Solicitor General; no opposition was filed to the subsequent motion;
it would, at any rate, have been
merely redundant, both motions being identical in terms, as already stated.

^[17]
pars. 3.20 and 3.21, Petition in
G.R. No. 95590; Rollo, p. 17

^[18]
Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) vs. Court of
Appeals, 175 SCRA 686, citing Alliance of Government Workers vs.
Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1

^[19]
Chapters 2, 7 and 8 of Book IV, Administrative Code [E.O. 292, as amended by RA
6733; sec. 37[b], P.D. 807; sec. 28[c], RA 2260, the Civil Service Act of 1959
in relation to sec. 36 of P.D. 807; Memorandum Circular No. 30, s. 1989, of the
Civil Service Commission

^[20]
Motion for Reconsideration of January
4, 1991; Rollo, pp. 485,486

^[21]
Motion for Reconsideration, supra;
Rollo, G.R. No. 95590, pp. 491 et seq.

^[22]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 95590, pp. 325-327,
331-335

^[23]
Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217, 231-232

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