LOURDES PEÑA QUA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, JAMES QUA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION), CARMEN CARILLO, EDUARDO CARILLO, JOSEPHINE CARILLO, REBEC…

This case deals with the issue of whether or not private
respondents possess the status of agricultural tenants entitled to, among
others, the use and possession of a home lot.

Respondent Court of Appeals,^[1]
in denying due course to the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioner, stated the antecedents of this case in the lower courts as
follows:

x x x (O)n July
17, 1986, petitioner Lourdes Peña Qua filed a complaint for ejectment
with damages against private respondents claiming that she is the owner of a parcel of residential land, Lot No. 2099 of
the Malinao Cadastre,
situated at Poblacion, Tinapi,
Malinao, Albay, with an
area of 346 square meters, which is registered in her name under TCT T-70368;
that inside the land in question is an auto repair shop and three houses, all
owned by private respondents; and that said respondents’ stay in the land was
by mere tolerance and they are in fact nothing but squatters who settled on the land without any agreement between her (sic), paying no rents to her nor
realty taxes to the government.

In their answer, private respondent Carmen Carillo,
surviving spouse of the late Salvador Carillo (and
[respectively the] mother and mother-in-law of the other [private]
respondents), alleged that the lot in question is a farm lot [home lot] because
she and her late husband were tenants of the same including the two other lots
adjoining the lot in question, Lots No. 2060 and 2446, which also belong to
petitioner; that as tenants; they could not just be ejected without cause; that
it was not petitioner who instituted them as tenants in the land in question
but the former owner, Leovigildo Peña,
who permitted the construction of the auto repair shop, the house of Carmen Carillo and the other two houses.

After trial, the Municipal Court [found private respondents to be mere
squatters and] rendered judgment^[2]
ordering x x x [them] to
vacate and remove their houses and [the] auto repair shop from the lot in
question and to pay the petitioner attorney’s fees and a monthly rental of
P200.00.

On appeal to respondent [Regional Trial] Court, the judgment was
modified by ordering the case dismissed [insofar as] Carmen Carillo
[was concerned being qualified as an agricultural tenant and] declaring that
the home lot and her house standing thereon should be respected.^[3]

Believing that even private respondent Carmen Carillo
does not qualify as an agricultural tenant, petitioner pursues her cause before
this forum citing only one ground for the entertainment of her petition, to
wit:

THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT [Court of Appeals] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND ACTED CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, FOR DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITIONER’S CRY FOR JUSTICE AND FOR DISMISSING THE PETITION.^[4]

The Court agrees and finds that respondent Court of Appeals
committed a grave abuse discretion in dismissing the petition for review of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, the same being replete with
inconsistencies and unfounded conclusions. 
Because of this jurisdictional issue raised by petitioner, the Court
hereby treats this petition as a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.^[5]

The Regional Trial Court^[6]
made the following observations:

The land in question is a measly three hundred forty six (346)
square meters and adjoining another two (2) lots which are separately titled
having two thousand four hundred thirteen (2,413) square meters and eight
thousand two hundred ninety eight (8,298) square meters – the three (3) lots
having a total area of eleven thousand fifty seven (11,057) square meters, more
or less, or over a hectare of land owned by the plaintiff or by her
predecessors-­interest.

In the 346 square meters lot stand (sic) four (4)
structures, [to wit]:  an auto repair
shop, a house of [private respondent] Carmen Carillo
and two (2) other houses owned or occupied by the rest of the [private
respondents] x x x; in
other words, the [private respondents] almost converted the entire area as
their home lot for their personal aggrandizement, believing that they are all
tenants of the [petitioner].

Claimed, the defendants planted five hundred (500) coconut trees
and only fifty (50) coconut trees
survived in the land in question and/or in the entire area of the three
lots.  Such an evidence (sic) is
very untruthful, unless it is a seed bed for coconut trees as the area is so
limited.  But found standing
in the area in question or in the entire three (3) lots are only seven (7) coconut trees, the harvest of which is [allegedly] 2/3 share for the [petitioner] and the 1/3 share for the [private respondents].  The share, if ever there was/were, could not even suffice [to pay] the amount of taxes of the land (sic) paid religiously by the [petitioner] yearly.^[7] (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the source of livelihood of
private respondents is not derived from the lots they are allegedly
tenanting.  This conclusion is further
supported by private respondent Carmen Carillo’s
assertion that the auto repair shop was constructed with the consent of
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest for whom her husband served as a
driver-mechanic.^[8]

From private respondents’ manner of caring for the lots, it is
also apparent that making the same agriculturally viable was not the main
purpose of their occupancy, or else they should have immediately replanted
coconut trees in place of those that did not survive.  Indeed, the location of their auto repair
shop being near the poblacion and along the highway, private
respondents chose to neglect the cultivation and propagation of coconuts,
having earned, through the automobile repair shop, more than enough not only
for their livelihood but also for the construction of two other dwelling houses
thereon.  It is also intimated by the
Regional Trial Court that there is no direct evidence to confirm that the
parties herein observed the sharing scheme allegedly set-up between private
respondents and petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest.

Notwithstanding the foregoing indicia of a
non?agricultural tenancy relationship, however, the Regional Trial Court
decided in favor of private respondent Carmen Carillo
and ruled, thus:

In View of the Foregoing, and Premises considered, the Court
renders Judgment:

1.  Ordering defendants, namely:  Eduardo Carillo,
Josephine P. Carillo, Rebecca Carillo,
Maria Cepres, Cecilio Cepres and Salvador Carillo, Jr.,
to vacate and remove their two (2) houses and the auto repair shop from the
premises in question, and restoring the area to the lawful owner, the herein
plaintiff;

2.  Ordering said six defendants to pay the
plaintiff jointly and severally the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos
as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses;

3.  Ordering said six defendants to pay plaintiff
the sum of One hundred Seventy One Pesos and Thirty Six Centavos (P171.36)
monthly, for the use of the area in question, commencing July 17, 1986 the date
the plaintiff filed this action in Court, up to the time the defendants vacate
the area in question and restore the same to the plaintiff peacefully.

4.  And
ordering said six (6) defendants to pay the costs proportionately.

The case against defendant, Carmen Carillo, is hereby, ordered
DISMISSED.  The home lot and where her house
stands is respected. 
And without pronouncement as to
its costs (sic).

IT IS SO ORDERED.^[9]
(Emphasis supplied.)

Without explaining why, the Regional Trial Court chose not to
believe the findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and instead, adopted
the recommendation of the Regional Director for Region V, acting for the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, without making separate findings and arriving at an
independent conclusion as to the nature of
the relationship between the parties in this case.  This is evident in the following excerpt of the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court:

The dispositive part of the Resolution of
this Civil Case No. T-1317 for Ejectment with
Damages, Referral Case No. 880054 states and is quoted verbatim:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are constrained to issue
the following resolutions:

1)     
Certifying this case as NOT PROPER FOR TRIAL in
as far as the homelot and house built thereon by the
spouses Carmen Carillo (sic);

2)      Advising the plaintiff to institute proper
cause of action in as far as the auto repair shop and the two (2) houses
erected on her landholdings by the children of tenant-farmer Salvador Carillo since they appear as not the lawful tenants
thereat.

SO RESOLVED.

x x
x                 x
x x                 x x x”

From the foregoing dispositive part of
the resolution penned down by the Regional Director, it defines and explains
the status of each of the defendants.^[10]

Time and again, the Court has ruled that, as regards relations
between litigants in land cases, the findings and conclusions of the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, being preliminary in nature, are not in any way binding on
the trial courts^[11]
which must endeavor to arrive at their own independent conclusions.

Had the Regional Trial Court hearkened to this doctrine,
proceeded to so conduct its own investigation and examined the facts of this
case, a contrary conclusion would have been reached, and the findings of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, sustained, particularly when the circumstances
obtaining in this case are examined in the light of the essential requisites set by law for the existence
of a tenancy relationship, thus:  (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) the purpose is agricultural production; and (4) there is consideration.^[12]
It is also understood that (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on the
land, that (6) there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration
consists of sharing the harvest.^[13]

It is contended by petitioner that the parcel of land occupied by
private respondents, Lot No. 2099, with an area of only 346 square meters is
residential in nature, being situated near the poblacion of Malinao, Albay, and as evidenced by the tax declaration obtained by
petitioner to this effect.  Indeed, the
municipal trial court judge ordered the ejectment of
the private respondents on this basis. 
On the other hand, private respondents aver that the lot is agricultural
being bounded by two other agricultural lands planted to coconuts titled in the
name of petitioner and all three parcels being cultivated by them.

The Court is not prepared to affirm the residential status of the
land merely on the basis of the tax declaration, in the absence of further
showing that all the requirements for conversion of the use of land from
agricultural to residential prevailing at the start of the controversy in this
case have been fully satisfied.^[14]

Be that as it may and recognizing the consent to the presence of
private respondents on the property as given by petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, the situation obtaining in this case still lacks, as
discussed earlier, three of the afore-enumerated requisites, namely:  agricultural production, personal cultivation
and sharing of harvests.

The Court reiterates the ruling in Tiongson
v. Court of
Appeals,^[15]
that

All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy
relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites do (sic)
not make the alleged tenant a de facto
tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant.  This is so
because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure
nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.

Under the foregoing, private respondent Carmen Carillo is not
entitled to be considered an agricultural tenant.  Therefore, she may be not allowed the use of
a home lot, a privilege granted by Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, in relation to Section 22 (3) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,^[16] only
to persons satisfying the qualifications of agricultural tenants of
coconut lands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is issued REINSTATING the decision of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malinao-Tiwi, Albay, Fifth Judicial Region dated 19 August 1987.  No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Second Division composed of Justices Jose A. R. Melo,
Chairman, Antonio M. Martinez and Nicolas P. Lapeña,
Jr., members.  The latter was the ponente.

^[2]
See Rollo, p. 25.  The decision was penned by the Hon. Juan C.
Guillermo, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Albay.

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 45-46.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 10.

^[5]
Dentech Manufacturing Corporation v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 81477, April
19, 1989, 172 SCRA
588.

^[6]
Branch 17, Regional Trial Court,
Fifth Judicial Region, with the Hon.
Milagros J. B. Marcaida,
presiding.

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 30-31.

^[8]
Rollo, pp. 29-30.

^[9]
Rollo, p. 33

^[10]
Rollo, p. 31.

^[11]
See De la Cruz v. Bautista, G.R.
No. 39695, June 14 1990, 186 SCRA 517, and the
cases cited therein.

^[12]
Hilario v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 70736, March 16, 1987,
148 SCRA 573.

^[13]
See note 11, supra.  See
also Caballes v. Department of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 78214, December 5,
1988, 168 SCRA 247.

^[14]
See MAR Memorandum-Circular No. 11–79, Series of 1979, entitled
“Guidelines Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural lands to
Non-Agricultural Purposes or to Change/Shift to Other Agricultural Uses,”
in relation to Section 36 (1) of Republic Act 3844, as amended, which provides:

Section
36.  Possession of landholding;
exceptions.  – Notwithstanding any
agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except
when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory if after due hearing it is shown
that:

1) The landholding is declared by the
department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes:  Provided, That the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to
five times the average of the
gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar
years;

xxx                      xxx                               xxx

^[15]
No. 62626, July 18, 1984, 130 SCRA
482, reiterated in Hilario, supra and Caballes, supra.

^[16]
Section 35, R.A. No. 3844, as amended, also known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, provides:

Section
35.  Exemption from leasehold of other
kinds of lands.  – Notwithstanding
the provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case of fishponds, saltbeds, and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts,
cacao, coffee durian, and other similar permanent trees at the time of the
approval of this Code, the consideration, as well as the tenancy system
prevailing, shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred and ninety-nine, as amended. 
(Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand,
Section 22(3) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, also known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines,
provides:

Sec. 22.  Rights of the Tenant: —

x x x                       x
x x                 x x x

(3) The tenant
shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an
area of not more than 3 per cent of the area of his landholding provided that
it does not exceed one thousand square meters and that it shall be located at a
convenient and suitable place within the land of the landholder to be
designated by the latter where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may
raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and engage in minor
industries, the products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively.  The tenant’s dwelling shall not be removed
from the lot already assigned to him by the landholder, except as provided in
section twenty-six unless there is a severance of the tenancy relationship
between them as provided under section nine, or unless the tenant is ejected
for cause, and only after the expiration of forty-five days following such severance
of relationship or dismissal for cause.

x x x                 x
x x                 x x x