THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. JUAN SALANDANAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
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United States versus Salandanan
The Case
This is a criminal case from the early years of the American regime in the Philippines: the United States, as complainant and appellee, against Juan Salandanan, the defendant and appellant. The action is one for homicide, arising from a killing committed in the course of a violent attack upon the accused and his wife. The case matters because it is a foundational statement on the complete defense of self-defense under the old Penal Code, and specifically on how the courts must judge the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel an aggression — not in the calm of hindsight, but in the heat of a hand-to-hand fight.
Procedural History
The case was tried in the court below, which found Juan Salandanan guilty of the crime of homicide. That court gave him the benefit of two mitigating circumstances — immediate provocation, and excitement sufficient to overcome reason and self-control — and sentenced him to six years and one day of prision mayor. The trial court refused to apply the complete defense of self-defense, reasoning that although the accused may have acted in self-defense and there was unlawful aggression without provocation on his part, the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression had not been proven, because once the deceased was deprived of the weapon, the accused had no necessity to employ it. The defendant appealed, and the case reached the Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment below and acquitted him.
Facts
One afternoon, while Juan Salandanan was absent from his house, Domingo Alba Clemente entered and proposed to the defendant's wife that she have illicit intercourse with him. She refused. He then endeavored to rape her: he seized her and was about to throw her to the ground when he was surprised by the defendant, who at that moment returned to the house and rushed in upon hearing his wife's screams for help.
Upon seeing the defendant, Alba turned on the woman and inflicted a serious wound on her right forearm with a bolo he was carrying. He then immediately attacked the defendant, wounding him in the breast. A hand-to-hand struggle followed between the two men.
In the course of that struggle, the defendant succeeded in snatching the bolo from Alba's hands, and with it inflicted upon him a wound from which he died shortly after. On these facts the trial court convicted him of homicide, and the case came before the Supreme Court on appeal.
Issues
- Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense, with unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased and without provocation on his own part.
- Whether or not the accused exceeded the limits of a just defense, given that he used the deceased's own bolo after wresting it from him.
- Whether or not the accused is wholly exempt from criminal liability under the self-defense provision of the Penal Code.
Applicable Provisions
Section 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, the self-defense provision, provides:
The following are exempt from criminal liability: 4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that there is unlawful aggression on the part of the person attacked, that the means employed to prevent or repel it are reasonable, and that there is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
This is the provision the trial court refused to apply and which the Supreme Court held was fully satisfied, so that the accused is wholly exempt from criminal liability.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court found unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased without provocation of any kind on the part of the accused. The deceased had attacked the defendant and his wife with a bolo, wounded both of them, attempted to rape the wife, and continued his aggression up to the point of commencing and maintaining a hand-to-hand struggle.
On the second issue, the Court disagreed with the trial court's view that the reasonable necessity of the means employed had not been proven. It held that it cannot be said the accused exceeded the limits of a just defense in wounding the aggressor with the same bolo with which he had been attacked and wounded. It does not appear that the struggle ceased after the weapon was taken from the aggressor; consequently it cannot be asserted that the danger to the defendant had ceased. If the struggle continued, the defendant might in turn have been disarmed in the changing fortunes of the fight, in which case he would have been completely at the mercy of his adversary. This was a contingency the accused might well have reasonably feared, especially since he had received a somewhat serious wound in the breast which might well have appeared to him, under those critical circumstances, to be much more serious than it really was, placing him at a disadvantage for a prolonged hand-to-hand struggle.
The Court stressed that the law cannot require a man so forcibly and persistently attacked to retain the presence of mind necessary to pick and choose, and to employ some other less violent means, especially remembering the natural rapidity with which the defense must necessarily be made if it is to produce the effect of repelling the aggressor.
On the third issue, the Court concluded that the act of the accused in defense of his person complies with all the conditions which, under section 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, wholly exempt him from criminal liability.
Doctrine
Self-defense under section 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code requires three elements: unlawful aggression on the part of the person attacked; reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. When all three concur, the accused is wholly exempt from criminal liability.
The reasonable necessity of the means employed is judged from the standpoint of the defender in the actual circumstances of the attack, not by the calm measure of hindsight. The defender is not required to retain the presence of mind to pick and choose less violent means, given the natural rapidity with which the defense must be made. The taking of the aggressor's weapon does not by itself end the aggression where the struggle continues; the danger is not deemed to have ceased, and the defender may reasonably fear being disarmed in turn and left at the mercy of his adversary.
Disposition
The Court acquitted the defendant and reversed the judgment below, with the costs of both instances de oficio.
Remember This
The single line worth memorizing: the law cannot require a man so forcibly and persistently attacked to retain the presence of mind necessary to pick and choose less violent means, for the defense must be made with the natural rapidity the situation demands. Examiners like to use this case on the element of reasonable necessity of the means employed in self-defense, and on the question whether the danger ceases once the aggressor is disarmed while the struggle continues.