ATTY. RAMON J. VELORIA, ENGR. RENATO J. ESPEJO, JESUS O. BANDOLIN, SEGUNDO D. BILLOTE, GERONIMO B. ENRIQUEZ, RODOLFO C. MADRIAGA, AND SOFRONIO L. MANGONON, AND HON. ROMULO E. AB…

This petition for  certiorari
seeks the nullification
of the (1) resolution^[1]
of the Commission on Elections dated August 2, 1990, and (2) resolution^[2]
dated March 7, 1990 issued by Judge Santiago Estrella dismissing the election
protest filed by the petitioners against the private respondents, Atty. Pedro
N. Sales. Engr. Wilfredo E. Soriano, Erlinda C. Tambaoan, Engr. Emilio M.
Angeles, Jr., Eleuterio C. Sison, Manuel Ferrer and Santos Sibayan.

The seven (7) petitioners, Ramon Veloria, Renato Espejo, Jesus
Bandolin, Segundo Billote, Geronimo Enriquez, Rodolfo Madriaga, and Sofronio
Mangonon, as well as the seven (7) private respondents. Pedro Sales, Wilfredo Soriano, Erlinda
Tambaoan, Emilio Angeles, Jr., Eleuterio
Sison, Manuel Ferrer and Santos Sibayan were candidates for municipal mayor
(Veloria and Sales), vice-mayor (Espejo and Soriano) and members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Manaoag, Pangasinan, in the local elections of January 18,
1988.

After the canvass of the election returns on January 31, 1988, the private respondents were proclaimed
duly elected to the positions they ran for.

Dissatisfied, the petitioners filed Election Protest No. U-4659
which was raffled to Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, then presided over by the late Hon. Alfredo de Vera.

Several proceedings were had, and some issues were brought up to
the Court of Appeals and this Court for determination.

Finally, the revision of ballots was set on February 26, 1990 by
Judge Santiago Estrella, Presiding Judge of Branch 49, Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, where the Election Protest No. U-4659 was re-assigned by
raffle after Judge Vera’s untimely death.

On February 26, 1990, during the scheduled initial revision of
the ballots in Precinct No. 22, Barangay Licsi, the private respondents, as
protestees, filed a “Motion to Dismiss” on the ground that the RTC
had not acquired jurisdiction over the election protest on account of the
following:

(1) that the
election protest involves the contests over three (3) different Municipal
Offices joined together in one (1) single petition namely: the Office of Municipal Mayor, the Office of
Vice Mayor, and the Offices of the Sangguniang Bayan, in wanton violation and
clear disregard of the specific and mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 35,
Part VI of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, and/or Section 2, Rule II of Comelec
Resolution No. 1451 (Procedural Rules for Election Contests):

(2) that the
Election Protest was verified by only four (4) of the seven (7) protestants in
violation of Section 6, Rule 35, Part VI of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE,
and/or Section 3, Rule II of Comelec Resolution No. 1451; and

(3) that there is no
showing that the protestants paid the requisite filing fees and legal research
fees for each interest, also in violation of Section 9, Rule 35, Part VI of the
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, and/or Section 6, Rule IV of the Procedural Rules
for Election Contests.

On March 5, 1990, the private respondents filed a Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss, alleging as additional ground for the dismissal of the
protest that:

(4) the seven (7)
protestants representing seven (7) interests or seven (7) election contests or
protests failed to make the necessary cash deposit within the period required
by this Honorable Court in clear violation of Section 10, subparagraph (b) of
Rule 35, Part VI of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.

The petitioners-protestants opposed the Motion to Dismiss. On March 7, 1990, Judge
Santiago Estrella dismissed the election protest (p. 27, Rollo).

The petitioners received a copy of the court’s Resolution on
March 15, 1990. However, instead of
perfecting an appeal within five (5) days as provided by law, the petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 20, 1990.

The protestees opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, and the
petitioners filed a Rejoinder.

In the meantime, Judge Romulo E. Abasolo, presiding judge of
Branch 47, RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, was assigned to take charge of the
cases in Branch 49 in view of
Judge Santiago Estrella’s detail in Branch 69, Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila, by order of this Court.

On March 29, 1990, Judge Abasolo denied petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration. On April 3, 1990, the petitioners (as protestants) filed a
Notice of Appeal.

On April 10, 1990, the private respondents filed a “Motion
to Dismiss Notice of Appeal” on the grounds, that:

1. the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time
in violation of Section 256, Art. XXI of the Omnibus Election code of the
Philippines (BP Blg. 881) and/or Section 22, Rule 35, Part VI of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.

2. the Resolution of the
trial court dated March 7, 1990 dismissing the election protest had already
become final and executory.

On May 10, 1990, Judge Abasolo gave due course to petitioners’
Notice of Appeal.

The private respondents (as protestees) sought recourse in the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) by a petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Restraining
Order (SPR No. 8-90) to annul Judge Abasolo’s order giving due course to the
appeal.

On May 30, 1990, the Commission en banc issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Judge Abasolo from implementing his Order
of May 10, 1990.

On June 14, 1990, the Commission en banc issued the
following Order defining the issues:

“After a thorough discussion of the issues, the following
crystallized as the only issues to be presented for resolution by the
Commission, namely: (1) the issue of
whether or not a Motion for Reconsideration in electoral cases is a prohibited
pleading; and (2) the parties agreed that in case the answer to the first issue
is ‘yes,’ the notice of appeal was filed out of time and in case the answer is
‘no,’ the notice of appeal was filed on time.

“Having agreed on these issues, the parties also agreed to
submit the same for resolution on the basis thereof.” (p. 20, Rollo.)

On August 2, 1990, the COMELEC granted the
petition for certiorari. The
dispositive portion of its resolution reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc
RESOLVES, as it hereby RESOLVES, to:

“1. GRANT the petition for Certiorari;

“2. Permanently ENJOIN Public Respondent from
implementing the order of May 10, 1990; and

“3. ORDER the Court
a quo to proceed with the disposition of Election Protest Case No. U-4659 in
accordance with the Resolution of March 7, 1990 dismissing the election protest
against herein Petitioners.” (pp.
22-23, Rollo.)

Hence, this special civil action of Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, filed on August 31, 1990 by the petitioners (protestants
below), pursuant to Rule 39, Section 1, COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE (on Review
of decisions of the COMELEC) attacking:

1. the Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc dated August 2, 1990; and

2. the Resolution of Judge
Santiago Estrella dated March 7, 1990 dismissing the election protest of the
petitioners.

Without giving due course to the petition, we required the
respondents to comment.

After the latter had filed their Comments (pp. 37-63, 110-124,
Rollo), the petitioners asked for extensions of time to reply (which the Court
granted but they did not file the promised pleading).

As grounds of this petition, the petitioners allege that the
questioned resolutions are not only erroneous but were issued by the COMELEC
“with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.”

There is no merit in this petition for review for the COMELEC
correctly found that the petitioners’ appeal from the court’s order dismissing
their election protest was indeed tardy. It was tardy because their motion for reconsideration did not suspend
their period to appeal. The
petitioners’ reliance on Section 4, Rule 19 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE
which provides:

“Sec. 4. Effect of
motion for reconsideration on period to appeal. – A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling
when not pro-forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to
the Supreme Court.”

is misplaced. The “motion for reconsideration” referred to above is a
motion for reconsideration filed in the COMELEC, not in
the trial court where a motion for reconsideration is not entertained.

The rule applicable to decisions or orders of the court in
election protests is Section 20, Rule 35 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE
which provides:

“Sec. 20. Promulgation
and Finality of Decision. – The
decision of the court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due
notice must be given the parties. It
shall become final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for reconsideration
shall be entertained.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The above COMELEC rule implements Section 256 of the Omnibus
Election Code quoted below:

“Sec. 256. Appeals. –
Appeals from any decision rendered by the regional trial court under Section
251 and paragraph two, Section 253 hereof with respect to quo-warranto petitions
filed in election contests affecting municipal officers, the aggrieved party
may appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court [now Commission on Elections]
within five days after receipt of a copy of the decision. No motion for reconsideration
shall be entertained by the Court. The appeal shall be decided within sixty days after the case has been
submitted for decision.” (Underlining ours.)

Petitioners admitted receipt of the resolution of the trial court
dated March 7, 1990 on March 15, 1990 but they filed a notice of appeal on
April 3, 1990 only, instead of on or before March 20, 1990 (five days from
receipt of the trial court’s decision), because they filed a motion for
reconsideration which, as previously stated, is prohibited by Section 256 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Section 20, Rule 35 of the COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE.

The COMELEC, therefore, correctly ruled that the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners in the trial court on March 20, 1990
did not suspend the period to appeal since a “motion for
reconsideration” is prohibited under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

Since the right to appeal is
not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a
statutory privilege that must be exercised in the manner and according to
procedures laid down by law (Borre vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 560), and its
timely perfection within the statutory period is mandatory and jurisdictional
(Delgado vs. Republic, 164 SCRA 347; Sembrano vs. Ramirez, 166 SCRA 30; PCI
Bank vs. Ortiz, 150 SCRA 380; Quiqui vs. Boncaros, 151 SCRA 416), Judge Abasolo
gravely abused his discretion when he gave due course to the petitioners’ tardy
appeal from his predecessor’s (Judge Santiago Estrella’s) resolution of March
7, 1990 dismissing the petitioners’ election protest. Said resolution had become final and unappealable.

Nevertheless, we must grant this petition for certiorari
for the COMELEC does not possess
jurisdiction to grant the private respondents’ petition for certiorari. This Court, through Mme. Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, in the
consolidated cases of “Garcia, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al.” (G.R. No. 88158) and “Tobon Uy vs. COMELEC and Neyra (G.R. Nos.
97108-09) promulgated on March 4, 1992, ruled that the COMELEC has not been given, by the Constitution nor by law,
jurisdiction to issued writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus:

“In
the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs
of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority has
always been expressly conferred, either by
the Constitution or by law. As a matter of fact, the well-settled rule
is that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. (Orosa, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October
1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is
never derived by implication. Indeed, ‘w]hile the power
to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all
courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular
courts which have such power are expressly designated’ (J.
Aquino’s Concurring Opinion in Pimentel, supra, citing 14 C.J.S. 202;
Underscoring ours).

“Thus,
our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative
enactments. To enumerate:

“(1) Section 5[1], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred
upon this Court such jurisdiction;

“(2) Section 9[1] of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to the
Court of Appeals (then Intermediate Appellate Court);

“(3) Section 21[1] of the said Act, to Regional Trial Courts;

“(4) Section 5[1] of
Republic Act No. 6734, or the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, to the newly created Shari’ ah Appellate Court; and

“(5) Article
143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book IV of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or the
Code of Muslim Personal Law, to Shari’ a District Courts.

“Significantly, what the Constitution granted
the COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction. The Constitution makes no
mention of any power given the COMELEC
to exercise original jurisdiction over Petitions
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
unlike in the case of the Supreme Court which was specifically conferred such
authority (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[1]. The
immutable doctrine being that jurisdiction is
fixed by law, the power to issue
such Writs can not
be implied from the mere existence of
appellate jurisdiction. Just as implied repeal of statutes are frowned upon, so also should the
grant of original jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial body be
tabooed. If appellate jurisdiction has
to be statutorily granted, how much more the original jurisdiction to issue the
prerogative Writs?”

In view of this pronouncement, an original special civil action
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against a regional trial
court in an election contest may be filed only in the Court of Appeals or in
this Court, being the only courts given such original jurisdiction under the
Constitution and the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 2,
1990, of the COMELEC en banc is annulled for lack of
jurisdiction. The Resolution dated
March 7, 1990 of RTC Judge Santiago Estrella, dismissing the election protest
of the petitioners is AFFIRMED and declared final and executory. Costs against the petitioners.