FELIX R. GONZALES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN AND ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, RESPONDENTS.

Gonzales versus Sandiganbayan

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction brought by Felix Gonzales, the former Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, against the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, and Antonio Baltazar. Gonzales asks the Supreme Court to annul the Sandiganbayan resolution that refused to quash the amended information charging him with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The case matters because it is the Court's leading refinement of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases: it tells us that delay alone does not violate the Constitution, and it gives us the balancing test that every bar candidate must be able to recite.

Procedural History

The charge began as a complaint affidavit filed with the Tanodbayan, the precursor of the Ombudsman, and passed through several special prosecutors and several resolutions, some recommending dismissal and some recommending prosecution. After reinvestigation, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, and later an amended information excluded Roberto Palanca from the charge. Gonzales moved to dismiss or quash the information, arguing that the preliminary investigation had taken too long and that the complainant had filed more than one motion for reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan, through its First Division, denied the motion in a resolution issued in March 1990 and promulgated in April 1990. Gonzales then came to the Supreme Court by a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, asking that the Sandiganbayan resolution be annulled.

Facts

The controversy arose from an agreement between the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, represented by Director Gonzales, and Roberto Palanca for the experimental use of a fishing net known as the Otoshi-Ami Net, or Lambaklad. In November 1975, Baltazar filed an affidavit-complaint with the City Fiscal of Manila against Gonzales for malversation involving the alleged illegal use of a government vessel. The fiscal found a prima facie case, but the Ministry of Justice dismissed the complaint on review.

Baltazar then filed another complaint affidavit with the Tanodbayan, this time charging illegal use of the vessel and the loss of the fishing net. This became the case that later ripened into the criminal case before the Sandiganbayan. Over the years, special prosecutors issued a series of resolutions: one recommended dismissal of the vessel charge and a preliminary investigation of the net charge; another recommended dismissal of the whole case for insufficiency of evidence; still another ordered a fresh preliminary investigation. Baltazar repeatedly moved for reconsideration. Eventually, in March 1989, a special investigation officer recommended reversal of the dismissal and the filing of an information against Gonzales and Palanca for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the Ombudsman approved it.

The information was filed before the Sandiganbayan in May 1989, and an amended information dropping Palanca followed in September 1989. Gonzales then moved to dismiss or quash, and when the Sandiganbayan refused, he brought this petition, invoking the ruling in Tatad versus Sandiganbayan, where a delay of three years in terminating a preliminary investigation was held to violate the right to speedy disposition of cases.

Issues

• Whether or not the long delay of the Tanodbayan and the Ombudsman in terminating the preliminary investigation violated the petitioner's constitutional right to due process and to speedy disposition of cases, warranting dismissal of the case under the doctrine of Tatad versus Sandiganbayan.
• Whether or not the information was filed only after more than one motion for reconsideration had been filed by the private complainant, in violation of Rule 13(c) of Administrative Order No. 3 issued by the Tanodbayan on December 1, 1979.

Applicable Provisions

Section 16 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

This is the constitutional guarantee on which the petitioner anchors his first ground, and which the Court measures against the conduct of both the prosecution and the accused.

Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial.

The Court treats the right to speedy disposition as akin to the right to speedy trial, so the same standards govern whether either right has been violated.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. The Court emphasized that this right, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured, or when without cause a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. The Court adopted the balancing test, weighing the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant, and considering the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.

Applying that test, the Court found that the doctrine in Tatad versus Sandiganbayan did not apply, because that case rested on peculiar circumstances — political motivations, a blatant departure from established procedure, and a delay that could not be justified on the record — none of which obtained here. The Court noted that the delay could not be imputed solely to the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan had recounted that the clarificatory hearings were repeatedly reset, largely at the instance of Gonzales and his counsel, and that the case did not become ripe for resolution until the affidavit of Palanca was submitted in October 1987. After the information was filed, Gonzales himself filed several motions seeking reconsideration and suspension of the proceedings. The Court therefore concluded that the delay was equally chargeable to the petitioner, and that he could not seek the protection of the law to cover up for his own actuations.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was no violation of Rule 13(c) of Administrative Order No. 3. While two motions for reconsideration were filed, the Court explained that they were directed against two different resolutions issued after two different preliminary investigations — the first by Prosecutor Mendoza and the second by Prosecutor Templonuevo. The concept of a second motion for reconsideration is one that seeks a further reconsideration of an order or resolution that denied the first motion, and that was not the situation here.

Doctrine

The right to speedy disposition of cases is not violated by mere lapse of time. It is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured, or when without cause a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. The Court applies a balancing test, weighing the conduct of both the prosecution and the accused, and considering the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant. A delay that is substantially attributable to the accused's own motions and requests for postponement cannot be invoked by him as a violation of his constitutional guarantee. Finally, a second motion for reconsideration, within the meaning of the Tanodbayan rules, is one that seeks further reconsideration of the very resolution that denied the first motion; motions against distinct resolutions arising from distinct preliminary investigations are not counted as second motions.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, thereby sustaining the Sandiganbayan resolution that denied the motion to dismiss or quash the information.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the right to speedy disposition is violated only by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, tested by balancing the conduct of both sides. Examiners use this case to test whether you can distinguish it from Tatad versus Sandiganbayan, and to see whether you know that delay chargeable to the accused defeats his own constitutional objection.