PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MICHAEL ALEJANDRO Y MARIANO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Michael Alejandro was convicted
of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, and sentenced to life imprisonment
and a fine of P20,000.00 plus the costs.^[1] In this appeal, he asks for the reversal of
his conviction or at least the reduction of his penalty “in the interest
of justice and equity.”

The evidence for the
prosecution consisted mainly of the testimonies of the NARCOM operatives who
conducted the buy-bust operation that led to the appellant’s arrest and
prosecution.^[2]

That evidence showed that
at about half past five in the afternoon of June 4, 1989, a confidential informer reported to Sgt. Amos Foncardas at the NARCOM Headquarters in
Calarian, Zamboanga City, that the appellant was selling marijuana on Natividad
St., Tetuan, Zamboanga City. Acting on
this information, the Commanding
Officer, P/Major Claudio
Cabayacruz, organized a surveillance and buy-bust team with Sgt. Foncardas as
leader and C1C Bonifacio Morados and C2C Vicente Estillote as members.^[3]

Upon arrival of the team
at the target area, the informer pointed to Alejandro, who was standing near the Anaud Store at Natividad St., as the drug trafficker. Foncardas forthwith told the informer to
leave and instructed Morados to pose as buyer, furnishing him for this purpose
with a marked P5.00 bill with serial number SN-LL-742686.^[4]

Morados approached
Alejandro and asked him in chavacano: “Tiene ba quita alli?” (Do you have anything there?) The
latter answered: “Tiene aqui valor de P5.00 lang de marijuana. (I have here worth only P5.00 of
marijuana.) Morados then said:
“Saca yo se, compra yo conose.” (I will take that, I will buy it.)^[5]

Alejandro thereupon took
from the right pocket of his shirt an object wrapped in a piece of newspaper
and handed it to Morados. After opening
the parcel and finding what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves with three
rolling papers, Morados gave the marked money to Alejandro. He then gripped Alejandro’s right hand,
identified himself as a NARCOM agent, and placed his quarry under arrest.^[6]

Foncardas and Estillote,
who were about ten meters away from the two, rushed to assist Morados. Foncardas retrieved the marked money from
Alejandro and received the wrapped parcel from Morados. The team then took the accused to the NARCOM
headquarters at Calarian, Zamboanga City.^[7]

Custody of the accused,
together with the seized parcel and the marked money, was turned over to NARCOM
Investigator Norberto Francia. Francia
prepared an Investigation Report,^[8] Booking Sheet and Arrest Report,^[9] and
a written request addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory for the examination of
the contents of the seized parcel.^[10]

Athena Elisa P. Anderson,
the forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, subjected the contents of the
parcel to physical, micro-chemical and confirmatory or duoquinois tests and
found them positive for marijuana. Her
findings were embodied in her Official Dangerous Drugs Report,^[11] which
was offered as an exhibit along with the marijuana and affirmed by her at the
trial.^[12]

The accused denied the charge against him and gave a different
version of the incident. He claimed
that in the afternoon of June 4, 1989, he had gone on orders of his father to
buy fish at the public market on Falcatan St. On his way home, someone driving a motorcycle blocked his way and
immediately handcuffed him. The bicycle
he was riding fell to the ground, spilling the fish he had bought. He was then brought to the NARCOM headquarters
at Calarian by several men who said they were NARCOM agents.^[13]

Abraham Narag and Roberto Feliciano testified that they were at
the Anaud Store and witnessed Alejandro’s arrest. They also saw his parents standing on the other side of the
street across the store, only about two meters away from their son. Alejandro’s father later picked up the fish
that were scattered on the street.^[14]

Alejandro swore that at the police headquarters, the NARCOM agent
took his wallet from his pocket and laid his money on the table. They then placed a P5.00 bill on top,
telling him it was the marked money. The accused denied ownership of
the bill but the agents insisted that it was his. The policemen later returned his money but retained the marked bill.^[15]

Going over the appellant’s brief, the Court notes that it does
not point to any error committed by the trial court. It simply hints, and rather vaguely at that, that the evidence
may have been “planted” on Alejandro and points to newspaper reports
of abuses committed by the police who “blackmail and profit from their
alleged suspects.” No evidence of this charge is offered. The brief is practically an admission of
guilt. The appellant is in effect
throwing himself at the mercy of this Court and praying that the original
sentence “be reduced to make itself more palatable to reason.”

An appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case wide open for
review and empowers (indeed obligates) the appellate court to correct such
errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if they have not been
assigned.^[16]
However, a careful study of the record yields no compelling reason for a
reversal of the respondent court. The
prosecution has adequately established that the accused was caught in the act
of selling P5.00 worth of marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.

The appellant’s claim that he was a victim of a frame-up is not
convincing. It has not been shown that
the NARCOM agents planted evidence on him in order to extort money from him or
to exact personal vengeance or to harass him or to just strengthen an otherwise
weak case.^[17]
This defense, like alibi, is inherently weak, as easy to fabricate as it is
difficult to prove.

Alejandro’s denial cannot prevail against his positive
identification as the marijuana peddler. As a mere negative self-serving averment, his defense cannot have
heavier evidentiary weight than the sworn declarations of the police officers
who testified affirmatively on his sale of the prohibited drugs.

The trial court considered it significant that when the appellant
was blocked and handcuffed, he did not even make any protest or outcry. We have noted this too. No less strangely, his parents who,
according to the appellant and his witnesses, were only two meters away from
him, did not even bother to ask the policemen why their son was being arrested. There was no explanation for this odd indifference. The parents were not even presented as
witnesses to corroborate their son.

We come now to the appellant’s contention that the penalty of
life imprisonment imposed upon him for the sale of five pesos worth of
marijuana is excessive and grossly disproportionate to the offense, to the
extent of being cruel and unjust. He
asks that the penalty be reduced if he cannot be acquitted.

The law imposes the
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00
to P30,000.00 regardless of the amount involved in the sale of
prohibited drugs.^[18] This
is not cruel punishment. It is settled
that “it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion,
or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution” as it may be
that it was prescribed to prevent or discourage the proliferation of crimes
that are especially hurtful to the public interest.

As Justice Tuason said in
People v. Estoista:^[19]

xxx The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the
very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to
promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in
normal circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present
case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared
unconstitutional for this reason.

x x x

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. “The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.”
(24 C. J. S., 1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held
that to come under the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly
oppressive,” “wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community.” (Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a radical
measure and the public interest at stake, we do not believe that five years’
confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant’s and similar
cases, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the
extent of being shocking to public conscience.

A similar justification
was made in People v. De la Cruz,^[20] where the penalty of six months imprisonment and a fine of P2,000.00
was imposed for profiteering because the offense was especially inimical to the
national economy and the consuming public, and in People v. Dionisio,^[21] where a “bookie” was sentenced to
one month imprisonment and the penalty, although disproportionate to the
offense, was sustained by this Court on the ground that “the social
scourge of gambling must be stamped out.”

There is no question that
the illicit distribution of drugs is one of the most serious problems of our
society and that nothing less than the most determined efforts are needed to
combat it. The stern penalties
prescribed by the Dangerous Drugs Act are intended to deter the aggravation of
this problem, which has already prejudiced the lives and future of thousands of
our people, especially the youth. The
persons who peddle prohibited drugs are, as described in one decision,^[22] “evil merchants of misery and
death.” The penalties imposed on them are neither cruel nor inhuman but
totally condign, if not in fact even inadequate.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED and the
appeal DISMISSED, with costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decided by Judge T. Hamoy; Rollo, p. 13.

^[2]
TSN, July 24, 1989, pp. 2-24, Sgt.
Bonifacio Morados; September 20, 1989, pp. 2-9, Sgt. Amos Foncardas; September
20, 1989, pp. 25-32, Sgt. Norberto Francia.

^[3]
TSN, July 24, 1989, pp. 4-6; Sept. 20,
1989, p. 3.

^[4]
TSN, July 24, 1989, pp. 7-10; Sept. 20,
1989, p. 4; Exh. “A.”

^[5]
TSN, September 6, 1989, p. 20.

^[6]
TSN, July 24, 1989, pp. 11-15.

^[7]
TSN, July 24, 1989, pp. 18-19; September 20, 1989, pp. 5-6.

^[8]
Exhibit “I.”

^[9]
Exhibit “H.”

^[10]
Exhibit “C.”

^[11]
Exhibit “E.”

^[12]
TSN, September 6, 1989, pp. 51-53.

^[13]
TSN, November 8, 1989, pp. 4-7, 10.

^[14]
TSN, October 25, 1989, pp. 5-11, 32, 35, 38-39.

^[15]
TSN, November 8, 1989, pp. 10-11.

^[16]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1988
Ed., Vol. 2, p. 405 citing: People vs. Geredias, et al. (CA) 51 OG 4614;
People v. Borbano, 76 Phil. 702; Villareal v. People, 84 Phil.
264.

^[17]
TSN, November 8, 1989, p. 15.

^[18]
Section 4, Article II, Republic Act No.
6425 as amended; People vs. de Guzman, 188 SCRA 407; People v.
Bati, 189 SCRA 97; People v. Garcia, 198 SCRA 603; People v.
Celiz, 214 SCRA 255; People v. Labra, 215 SCRA 822.

^[19]
93 Phil. 647.

^[20]
92 Phil. 906.

^[21]
22 SCRA 1299.

^[22]
People v. de Guzman, supra.