PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DOMICIANO PERALTA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The lifeless body of Rosita Peralta was found in her house in the
early morning of March 2, 1982. Blood
trickled from her nostrils and mouth and there were nail marks and bruises on
her chin and neck. She had been
strangled.

After investigation, particularly of the victim’s daughter Siony,
an information for parricide was filed against Rosita’s husband, Domiciano
Peralta. He pleaded not guilty upon his
arraignment before the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur. The trial that followed was presided by four
judges in succession.^[1] Judge
Benjamin V. Panga rendered the decision convicting the accused and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties. It also made him liable to the victim’s
heirs in the amount of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P5,000.00 in moral
damages, and for the costs.^[2]

The prosecution witnesses were Dr. Wilfredo Galan, the medical
officer who performed the autopsy on Rosita Peralta;^[3]
Atanacia Ramos, her mother;^[4] and
Judge Juan B. Paaño, Jr., who took Rosita’s sworn statement.^[5]
The defense presented the accused himself^[6] and
his daughter Siony.^[7]

Dr. Galan established the cause of death and declared that it
occurred at about half past four in the morning of March 2, 1982.^[8]

Atanacia testified that at about 4:30 that morning, her
granddaughter Siony came to her house and frantically told her that the accused
was strangling his wife, Rosita. The
two rushed to the couple’s house and, after unlocking the door, found Rosita
already dead. Domiciano was nowhere in
sight. They immediately reported the
matter to the police, who eventually arrested the appellant as the suspected
killer.^[9]

For his part, Domiciano claimed that at the supposed time of his
wife’s strangulation, he was at his place of work in Maybayawas, Catagbacan,
Goa, Camarines Sur. He learned of her death at 3:00 o’clock that afternoon
and, later, that he was suspected of
her killing. That same day, he
proceeded to the Goa Police Station where he was made to sign a document, which
turned out to be a confession. Disclaiming it at the trial, he said that he signed it without the
assistance of counsel or full awareness of its contents.^[10]

Siony, the daughter, had earlier implicated her father in the
sworn statement she made at the preliminary investigation of the case.^[11]
She now appeared to testify on his behalf. She swore on the stand that she did see someone strangling her mother in
the morning in question but insisted that she could not identify that person.^[12]
In effect, she said that the culprit was not her father, thus contradicting her
earlier assertion that she saw him strangling her mother.

After the defense had rested, the prosecution presented Judge
Paaño as rebuttal witness. He affirmed
the regularity of the preliminary investigation he conducted and declared that
Siony’s narration of the strangulation of her mother by the accused was
completely voluntary.^[13]

After assessing the evidence (mostly the testimonies of the
witnesses as recorded), Judge Panga opted in favor of the prosecution and
rejected both the appellant’s alibi and his daughter’s change of stand. The decision held that Siony’s statement at
the preliminary investigation was more credible because it was made shortly
after the occurrence of the killing. Moreover, her narration of the incident jibed with the detailed medical
findings of the injuries sustained by the victim as indicated in the autopsy
report.^[14]

We agree with the conclusion of the trial court. There were, in our view, certain
circumstances that may have persuaded the daughter to change her former
declaration and testify in favor of her father.

First, the appellant was her father after all, and she probably
felt that she should not be responsible for his incarceration for the rest of
his life. Second, her testimony was
given seven years after the incident and therefore could not be expected to be
as accurate as the statement she made in the preliminary investigation only
hours after the killing. Third, during
all this time, her father had been under detention and she must have believed
that this was punishment enough for him. Lastly, she was, at the time she testified in court, living with her
father’s sister,^[15]
who may have greatly influenced her testimony and caused her to recant her
earlier statement.

There is another important point. The statement she made to her grandmother when she rushed to inform
her of her father’s attack on her mother was part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This section provides:

Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

Res gestae means the “thing done.” As
held in People v. Sanchez,^[16] it
refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately
after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.

There are three requisites for the admission of evidence as
constituting part of the res gestae, to wit: 1) that the principal act, the res gestae, is
a startling occurrence; 2) that the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and 3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.^[17]

Siony rushed to Atanacia immediately upon seeing her father
strangling her mother to death. Her
spontaneous declaration to Atanacia was part of the res gestae and
is assumed to preclude the probability of premeditation or fabrication.^[18]
Since the utterance was made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of
the senses rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when
consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear, the
utterance may be taken as expressing Siony’s real belief as to the facts just
observed by her.^[19]

Besides, it is settled that where a witness testified for the
prosecution and retracts his testimony and subsequently testified for the
defense, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison
coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence.^[20]
The well-known rule is that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked
upon with considerable disfavor by the courts.^[21] In
the case before us, Siony testified during the preliminary examination
conducted by Judge Paaño that the appellant choked her mother to death. Her subsequent retraction was an
afterthought and has no probative value at all.

The appellant’s alibi is flawed, not only by its inherent
weakness but also by its implausibility. There is only a five-minute walking distance between his place of work
and his house, where the killing occurred. It was not impossible or even difficult for him to commit the crime and
return or go to Maybayawas, assuming he was really there. Significantly, no one has corroborated his
alibi, which is all the weaker for this deficiency.

There is no reason to impute improper motives, or even
inaccuracy, to Judge Paaño, who testified to facts relating to the discharge of
his official duties. Credence is
generally accorded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are enforcers
of the law and are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.^[22]

We also reject the defense theory that Judge Panga could not have
correctly evaluated the testimony of the witnesses because he had not presided
at the trial of the case. While it is
true that the trial judge who did so would be in a better position to ascertain
the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not
necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot
render a valid and just decision. He can
also rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the
basis for his decision, which is what Judge Panga did. As we observed in People v. Abaya:^[23]

x x x And the mere fact that Judge Alfredo C. Flores did not
preside at the trial of this case in its entirety, having taken over only when
the last defense witness was to be presented, did not detract from the
validity, much less the correctness, of his decision. The full record was available to him. It is evident from the knowledgeable and analytical decision he
has written that he thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary
evidence before him and carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses
with the seasoned perceptiveness he has developed as a trial judge.

There is no need to rule on the appellant’s extrajudicial confession as it was not
submitted in evidence by the prosecution. Evidence not formally offered or whose purpose has not been specified is
not supposed to be considered by the court.^[24] In
any event, the confession was not necessary to prove the appellant’s guilt
beyond the shadow of a doubt as this has been established by the evidence of
the prosecution.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated in this case because the appellant went to the police station not
to give himself up but to verify the charge filed against him. Neither can the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength be considered because only of the fact that the
husband was stronger than the wife, which is usually the situation between a
man and a woman. There is no evidence
of the gross physical disparity between the appellant and his victim. Moreover, the appellant was unarmed and it
has not been shown that he sought the aid of other persons or employed any
other physical advantage to enable him to kill his wife.

Domiciano Peralta admitted at the trial that Rosita was his
lawful wife.^[25]
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person who shall kill
his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate or any of his
ascendants or descendants or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall
be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to
death. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances in this case, the lesser penalty shall be imposed,
conformably to Article 63 of the said Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial
court is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the civil indemnity is hereby
increased to P50,000.00, in accordance with present policy. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason, and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Judges Rebecca Salvador, Eleuterio T. Decena, Bonifacio C. Intia and Augusto O.
Cledera

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 16-22.

^[3]
TSN, June 21, 1983.

^[4]
Ibid., August 17, 1983.

^[5]
Id., April 7, 1987.

^[6]
id., February 27, 1985.

^[7]
id., January 6, 1987.

^[8]
id., June 21, 1983, p. 8; Exh. “A.”

^[9]
id., August 17, 1983, pp. 7-13.

^[10]
id., February 27, 1985, pp. 2 -8.

^[11]
Exh. “B.”

^[12]
TSN, January 6, 1987, pp. 5-7.

^[13]
Ibid., April 7, 1987, pp. 3-10.

^[14]
Exh. “A.”

^[15]
TSN, January 6, 1987, p. 20.

^[16]
213 SCRA 70.

^[17]
People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70.

^[18]
Ibid.

^[19]
Id.

^[20]
People vs. Mindae, 216 SCRA 572.

^[21]
People vs. Logronio, 214 SCRA 519; People vs. del Pilar, 188 SCRA
37; People vs. Domenden, 6 SCRA 343.

^[22]
People vs. Pacleb, 217 SCRA 92.

^[23]
185 SCRA 424.

^[24]
Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court.

^[25]
TSN, July 1, 1986, p. 3.