JOSE DE LUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SANTIAGO G. MALIWANAG, RTC EXECUTIVE JUDGE, BRANCH 71, IBA, ZAMBALES; JUAN DIMAANO, JR. AND GERINO DOBLE, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review on certiorari by petitioner Jose de
Luna from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 12922^[1]
which affirmed the reversal made by the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
Branch LXXI, of the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Botolan,
Zambales in a forcible entry case filed by petitioner against several persons,
including private respondents Juan Dimaano, Jr. and Gerino Doble.

In his complaint filed on February 7, 1972 before the Municipal
Trial Court, petitioner alleged that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel
land with an area of 30,856 square meters, located in Babon San Juan, Botolan,
Zambales, since 1938; that on December 18 and 19, 1971, defendants Octavio
Daclison, Oscar Crispin, and private respondents Juan Dimaano, Jr. and Gerino
Doble entered the land and began plowing it; and that said defendants fenced
the land with barbed wire on January 15 and 16, 1972 and began planting sugar
cane on February 5 and 6, 1972, despite his objections. Petitioner prayed that the defendants be
ordered to vacate the land and pay him the amount of P45.00 monthly per hectare
until possession thereof would be transferred to him, with litigation expenses
and costs.

In their answer, the defendants denied the material allegations
of the complaint Daclison, Crispin and Doble alleged as a special and
affirmative defense that they have not entered nor occupied the disputed
property.

For his part, defendant Dimaano, Jr. raised as his special and
affirmative defense that petitioner was not the owner of the property, alleging
instead that the owner thereof was Agustin Dequiña, Jr., Dimaano, Jr. contended
that the property was originally owned by Agustin Dequiña, Sr., who had
declared the property in his name for taxation purposes in 1906. Upon the death of Agustin Dequiña, Sr. in
1945, he was succeeded by his son Agustin Dequiña, Jr., who possessed the
property from 1945 up to February 1972, when the same was leased to defendant
Dimaano, Jr. Agustin Dequiña, Sr. happens to be the uncle of petitioner, the
former being the elder brother of the latter’s mother, Apolonia Dequiña.

After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered in favor of
petitioner, with the trial court ordering the defendants or persons acting for
and in their behalf to restore to petitioner possession of the property. In addition, respondent Dimaano, Jr. was
ordered to pay petitioner the amounts of P12,312.00 representing actual damages
and P5,000.00 as costs of the suit.

The defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, which reversed the decision of the inferior court and dismissed the
complaint. Petitioner brought the case
on a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to Us, alleging that the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court erred in determining the
ownership of the disputed property in an action for ejectment, and in
concluding that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. is the owner of the property.

We find the petition impressed with merit.

Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only
issue to be resolved therein is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the premises, or possession de facto, independent of any
claim of ownership that either party may set forth in their pleadings.^[2]
If petitioner can prove prior possession in himself, he may recover such
possession from even the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in is
favor priority of time, he has the security that entitles him to stay on the
property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
either accion publiciana or accion reindivicatoria.^[3]

However, where the question of possession can not be resolved
without deciding the question of ownership, an inferior court has the power to
resolve the question of ownership but only insofar as to determine the issue of
possession.^[4]

In the case at bar, the inferior court acted correctly in
receiving evidence regarding the ownership of the disputed property, inasmuch
as respondent Dimaano, Jr. claimed to possess the property by virtue of a lease
agreement with the alleged owner thereof Agustin Dequiña, Jr.

Be that as it may, the respondent Court erred in upholding the
Regional Trial Court regarding the conclusion that the subject property is
owned by Agustin Dequiña, Jr. and therefore respondent Dimaano, Jr. is entitled
to possess the same.

First of all, petitioner has shown that he had prior possession of
the property. The prior possession of
petitioner was established by the testimony of his witnessess, notably that of
his tenant Epigenio Dilag and Victor dela Cruz. While petitioner admitted that he declared the property for
taxation purposes only in 1957, he had possessed the property beginning 1953 at
the very latest, when he leased the same to Epigenio Dilag, who in turn
possessed the same until respondent Dimaano, Jr. entered upon the property in
1972. The possession of the property by
Dilag since 1953 redounds to the benefit of
petitioner, since possession may be exercised in one’s own name or in
that of another.^[5]

Moreover, there is evidence to the effect that petitioner
possessed the property even earlier than 1953. Petitioner’s witness, Victor dela Cruz, who live about 400 meters from
the land in controversy, testified that he had witnessed the delivery of the
property to the petitioner and his mother Apolonia Dequiña by Agustin Dequiña,
Sr. in 1938, when they and their brothers and sisters partitioned among
themselves the properties of their deceased parents. He further testified that he saw petitioner and his mother
cultivate the land from 1938 to 1941, and that he leased the land from them
from 1944 to 1952.^[6]

On the other hand, respondent Dimaano, Jr. had failed to prove
that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. possessed the property prior to his possession, much
less the ownership of the latter
over said property. While Agustin Dequiña, Jr. testified that he is a
co-owner of the disputed property, there is nothing to support this
self-serving claim; neither does his testimony support the defense’s theory
that he had prior possession of the property. The mere fact that Agustin Dequiña, Sr. had declared the subject property
for taxation purposes from 1908 up to 1945 did not constitute possession
thereof,^[7]
nor is it proof of ownership^[8] in
the absence of Dequiña, Jr.’s actual possession of said property.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Agustin
Dequiña, Jr. was the owner of the disputed property since there is no evidence
whatsoever to support such a conclusion.

However, it goes without saying that this case does not bar
petitioner and Agustin Dequiña, Jr. from resolving the issue of ownership over
the disputed property in an appropriate proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Botolan, Zambales is hereby REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED. Costs against private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1] Ponente: Justice Jesus M
Elbinias; Justices Ricardo L. Pronove and Antonio A Martinez, concurring.

^[2]
Presco vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 82215, 192 SCRA 232
(1990).

^[3]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 315-316.

^[4]
Sec. 32. [2], B.P. Blg. 129.

^[5]
Art. 524, Civil Code.

^[6]
T.S.N., November 9, 1972, pp. 9-14.

^[7]
Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil., 114.

^[8]
Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 562; Prov. of Camarines Sur vs.
Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 600.